[dodis.ch/52932](https://dodis.ch/52932)MemoMemo (translated from German):Austrian State Archive ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1990, GZ.22.17.01/176-II.3/90. Written and signed by Ernst Sucharipa, [dodis.ch/P57511](https://dodis.ch/P57511); also published inWilson Center, doc. 165726. Distributed to the Federal Minister, the GeneralSecretary, the section heads, all departments of the Political Section, and theAustrian diplomatic representations in member states of the CSCE. Theinformation was also part of the preparatory file for Franz Vranitzky on theoccasion of the visit by Lothar de Maizière to Austria scheduled for 25 and 26July 1990. See ÖStA Arbeitsbesuch von MP Lothar de Maizière 25./26. Juli1990, Kreisky Archives, Depositum Franz Vranitzky, AP, box BM ChoonhavanChatichai (Thailand), MP Calfa CSFR 1990 PM Silva (Portugal), MP Singh(Indien), Pres. Dubcek (CSFR), PM Kang Young-Hoon (Korea), PM Bhutto(Pakistan), Pres. George Vassiliou (Zypern), MP Maiziere Lothar (DDR)25.7.90). by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign AffairsGerman Unity, Soviet PositionVienna, 19 July 1990In addition to the information of Dep[artment] II.1.(GZ. 22.17.01/173)Document 56, [dodis.ch/52930](https://dodis.ch/52930). the followingshould be noted regarding the current Soviet position on the German question:
1) The concessions made by President GorbachevMikhailGorbachev (*1931), [dodis.ch/P31707](https://dodis.ch/P31707),General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 11.3.1985–24.8.1991,Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union 25.5.1989–15.3.1990 andPresident of the Soviet Union 15.3.1990–25.12.1991. to Chancellor KohlHelmut Kohl (1930–2017), [dodis.ch/P31852](https://dodis.ch/P31852), Chancellor of the FRG 1.10.1982–27.10.1998. on16 July go far beyond the expectations of those who ultimately considered Sovietconsent to the NATO solution for a unified Germany under the prerequisite of aspecial solution for “East Elbia”A term subsuming all formerPrussian territories East of the Elbe. possible. The solution agreed to byKohl and Gorbachev in the Caucasus provides for the future, that is the period afterthe withdrawal of Soviet troops, to a limited extent only, a special military statusfor the territory of the present GDR, cf. the not entirely clear commitment of Kohlthat no foreign troops will be stationed in this area. In contrast, all other areasof Germany as a whole will engage in a complete security policy integration. (Thelast three issues of the prestigious American magazine “Foreign Affairs” include aseries of articles from known American specialist authors – KirkpatrickJeane Kirkpatrick (1926–2006), [dodis.ch/P47062](https://dodis.ch/P47062), PoliticalScientist., Mc BundyMcGeorge Bundy (1919–1996), [dodis.ch/P37402](https://dodis.ch/P37402), Political Scientist atthe Carnegie Corporation 1990–1996., etc. – who all indicated that they didnot expect a consensual NATO solution.) It therefore seems legitimate to question thereasons why the attitude of the Soviet Union, or – more accurately – Gorbachev, wentbeyond all positive expectations:
2) The position taken by Gorbachev can on the one hand be explained as the result ofa combination of newly confirmed domestic policy strengths of the Soviet Presidenthaving “won” his party congress, and on the other hand the recognition of foreignpolicy weaknesses in his country: Fully aware that the confirmation of his(currently) unchallengeable role had increased his foreign policy scope, Gorbachev –apparently without further coordination with other still relevant forces (military,etc.) – and perhaps at the last possible moment successfully attempted to gain asmuch capital (figuratively as well as in the true sense of the word) as possible outof the Soviet withdrawal from East Germany and the renunciation of older positions ofthe Soviet Union’s policy on Germany (insisting on the neutrality of a unifiedGermany).
3) Gorbachev secured at least the following advantages for his country:
– The reduction of the total German force level to 370,000 men and thus (includingthe manning level of the NVA) an overall drop of 45%;
– The obvious assumption by unified Germany of the – substantial – costs of Soviettroop withdrawal (see letter of intent concerning agreement on effects ofDM-conversion);
– Further active efforts by the FRG to gain Western aid for the Soviet Union;
– Commitment to complete a bilateral comprehensive treaty (probably politicalconsultations and economic assistance);
4) The agreement between Kohl-Gorbachev has been completed without informing theWestern partners in advance, thus also signaling a future autonomy of German foreignpolicy.
5) President Gorbachev could speculate with the idea that after a Soviet troopwithdrawal the negative sentiment towards foreign military presence could generallygrow further in the FRG and thus perhaps a traditional goal of Soviet policy couldstill be achieved in the longer term.
6) In total, the agreements of 16 July are – as Gorbachev himself says – a matter ofsuccessful “Realpolitik.” Whether the Soviet President will succeed to domesticallysecure this result, will also depend on the further reaction in the West: too loud atriumph may be harmful, but on the other hand, in light of the Germans “going italone” (see above) it is not to be expected.