[dodis.ch/52919](https://dodis.ch/52919)LetterLetter: Foreign and CommonwealthOffice RS 021/1/90. Copied to HM Representatives at Moscow, Paris andUK Delegation to NATO and to Andrew Wood, British Minister inWashington. from the Deputy Undersecretary of State (Defense) of theBritish Foreign and Commonwealth Office, John WestonJohnWeston (*1938), [dodis.ch/P57460](https://dodis.ch/P57460),Deputy Under-Secretary of State (Defence) in the British Foreign andCommonwealth Office 1989–1990., to the British Ambassador in Bonn, SirChristopher MallabySir Christopher Mallaby (*1936), [dodis.ch/P57461](https://dodis.ch/P57461), British Ambassadorin Bonn, 1988–1993.Two plus Four: The End GamePersonal and ConfidentialLondon, 17 September 1990Dear Christopher,
1. The minor squall that blew up following David Gow’s Guardian articleof 7 SeptemberDavid Gow (*1945), [dodis.ch/P57471](https://dodis.ch/P57471), Correspondent of TheGuardian in Bonn 1989–1995. The headline read: Bonn getting too close toMoscow. and German press comment after the treaty signing on 12September prompts me to put on record a few impressions of the last forty-eight hoursbefore signature of this historic treaty.
2. After four consecutive days work in East Berlin from 4 to 7 September thePolitical Directors parted late on the Friday with an agreement on an enumerated tenarticle draft treaty subject to a couple of square bracketed passages and accompaniedby a Soviet proposal, which had no status, for a further draft article on “crossingthe line”. We had agreed to foregather in Moscow in the early evening of 11 Septemberto vet the final technical cosmetics by legal advisers and treaty experts, leaving itto Ministers to resolve on the morning of 12 September the three main outstandingissues (dual capable systems, crossing the line, suspension of QRRsQuadripartite Rights and Responsibilities.). Signature wasthen scheduled to take place at 4 pm the same day. This put the Russians under apleasing time bind.
3. Less than twenty-four hours after we left Berlin, when BondarenkoAleksander Bondarenko (1922–2010), [dodis.ch/P57463](https://dodis.ch/P57463), Head of the ThirdEuropean Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1971–1991 and aSoviet representative in the Two plus Four negotiations. had reported toKvitsinskyYuli Kvitsinsky (1936–2010), [dodis.ch/P57466](https://dodis.ch/P57466), Soviet Ambassador inBonn, 1986–1990. and ShevardnadzeEduard Shevardnadze(1928–2014), [dodis.ch/P54603](https://dodis.ch/P54603), Ministerof Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union 2.7.1985–26.12.1990. had returnedfrom the Far East, we heard in our respective capitals that the Russians wereproposing instead a further full day of Political Director work in Moscow on 11September (requiring us to travel to Moscow on 10 September). This transparentattempt to give themselves more room for manoeuvre should in my view have beenresisted. But by the time I got KastrupDieter Kastrup (*1937),[dodis.ch/P57383](https://dodis.ch/P57383), Political Directorin the FRG Foreign Ministry, 1988–1991. on the telephone on Sunday 9September, he had already conceded the point. The Americans being already in Moscowafter the Helsinki Summit, we and the French were clearly not in a position to holdout.The Helsinki Summit, to discuss the Iraq-Kuwait war, washeld between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on 5 September 1990.
4. We duly met in the whited sepulchre of the Octyabrskaya Hotel on the morning of 11September. A hastily arranged One plus Three for a few minutes beforehandrevealed:
a) intense German annoyance about David Gow in the Guardian of 7 September, overwhich they suspected the UK; and,
b) that the FRG delegation had already been holding bilaterals with the Russians inan attempt to sew up a deal on the final points, misrepresenting US views (at leastto us) into the bargain.
The Russians for their part had advanced the signature ceremony from 4 p.m. to 12.30p.m. the next day and confirmed that GorbachevMikhail Gorbachev(*1931), [dodis.ch/P31707](https://dodis.ch/P31707), GeneralSecretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 11.3.1985–24.8.1991, Chairmanof the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union 25.5.1989–15.3.1990 and President of theSoviet Union 15.3.1990–25.12.1991. would attend personally. [Kastrup thenalso told me that he thought the Russians would return to their earlier attempt toget us to drop the words “upon German request” from the provision in Article 5covering the continued troop presence of the three Allies in Berlin, in an attemptfurther to blur the distinction between the Allied presence and the residual Sovietforces presence. I told Kastrup, having taken the precaution of speaking to CharlesPowellCharles Powell (*1941), [dodis.ch/P57468](https://dodis.ch/P57468), Private Secretary tothe British Prime Minister, 1983–1991. over the weekend before leavingLondon (the Secretary of StateDouglas Hurd (*1930), [dodis.ch/P57401](https://dodis.ch/P57401), British Secretary ofState for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 26.10.1989–5.7.1995. being inJapan), that I knew the Prime Minister’s Office attached importance to retainingthose words. This may be partly the origin of the later German press canard thatBritish firmness stemmed from the views of the Prime Minister. I had not howeverdiscussed “crossing the line” with Charles Powell, because I did not want to riskplacing myself under unrealistic restrictions on that issue. In the event theRussians did not return to the charge on the words “upon German request”.]Square brackets in original.
5. When we broke at 4 pm on 11 September the position was as described in Moscow TelNo. 1694This telegram reported that all remaining issues hadbeen settled except crossing the line, which looked precariousbecause of German weakness and apparent Americanacquiescence.. Dual capable systems were already safely in the bag.Suspension of QRR did not look a stopper. The real crux was on “crossing the line”.The pass had already been virtually sold for the transitional period covering Soviettroop withdrawal, on the basis that paragraph 1 of Article 5 would preclude anymilitary activity there by armed forces of states other than the Soviet Union andGermany. It also looked uncertain whether for the period thereafter we could hold theposition with a provision excluding merely large-scale military manoeuvres (asdefined by the 1986 Stockholm CSBMs Agreement), which up to then had beenKvitsinsky’s professed major preoccupation. Kastrup was arguing for a simpleprovision against all deployment, coupled with some kind of oral statement; on thegrounds that such was the sense of Stavropol: the reference (ill-defined) tomanoeuvres appeared to be intended as a compromise. DufourcqBertrand Dufourcq (*1933), [dodis.ch/P57455](https://dodis.ch/P57455), Political Director, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs,1988–1991. was personally unhappy about this but inhibited by the fact thathis Minister was not due to arrive in Moscow until 3.30 a.m. on 12 September.Zoellick’sRobert Zoellick (*1953), [dodis.ch/P57469](https://dodis.ch/P57469), Counsellor, USDepartment of State, 1989–1992. compass was beginning to veeruncertainly.
6. With the Secretary of State’s arrival around 5.30 p.m., bilateral Ministerials gotunder way—BakerJames Baker (*1930), [dodis.ch/P56605](https://dodis.ch/P56605), United States Secretaryof State 25.1.1989–23.8.1992./Genscher,Hans-DietrichGenscher (1927–2016), [dodis.ch/P15414](https://dodis.ch/P15414),Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the FRG1.10.1982–17.5.1992. Secretary of State/Baker and later Secretary ofState/Genscher. The upshot was that we and the Americans (joined by the French)agreed to camp for the rest of the evening on Ministerial instructions to the effectthat, if paragraph 1 of Article 5 precluded all military activity [during thetransitional period, paragraph 3 of Article 5 should go no further than precludingdeployment “with the aim of holding large scale military manoeuvres”. But ourscheduled resumption at 8 pm that evening was delayed for a further hour by privateGerman/Russian bilateral activity elsewhere – a performance described as “tacky” byZoellick, who was greatly irritated by it.
7. When Kastrup and Kvitsinsky eventually returned after 9 p.m., the former put to usin the margin before resumption his provisional agreement with the Russians on asimple “no deployment” formula coupled with a four point oral statement by Genscherat the Plenary negotiating session, which the Russians would undertake to listen toin silence. [The Genscher four points were: no large scale military manoeuvres;military activities below that threshold were not specifically excluded but would notnecessarily take place, the application of the word “deployment” would be forsovereign Germany to decide; in doing so, she would exercise reason andresponsibility and bear in mind the security interests of all.]Square brackets in original.
8. This triggered sharp open disagreement among the One plus Three on the sidelinesof the meeting. The thrust of UK/US/French objections was that the Alliance shouldnot bind itself by treaty with the Soviet Union in a way which would indefinitelyforeclose options extending far beyond the foreseeable circumstances and wouldfurther limit German sovereignty beyond Stavropol. With 12 billion DM in their kittyand the world expecting signature in little more than twelve hours, we did not needto offer the Russians any more concessions. The German response was that this was alltotally unrealistic since peace had broken out in Europe. (“Oh come on! You can’t beserious.” was the stock rejoinder.) They also argued that the German word “verlegt”describing the deal at Stavropol went a good way beyond a mere no stationingagreement. When the formal session resumed I asked Kvitsinsky whether he wouldconfirm that silence by Shevardnadze in the face of an oral statement by Genschercould be interpreted at the very least as the Soviet Union not disagreeing with thisstatement. Kvitsinsky declined to provide any such assurance.
9. After further skirmishing we broke inconclusively around 10.30 pm. At that pointthere were at least five alternatives in the air.
i) Soviet position: no military activity in transitional period, simple “nodeployment” formula thereafter;
ii) US/UK/French proposal: no military activity for transitional period and “nodeployment with the aim of holding large-scale military manoeuvres” thereafter;
iii) FRG position: as for the Russians, but with oral statement by Genscher atplenary session on 12 September to which Shevardnadze would make no reply.
iv) Zoellick fallback mark I: instead of formulation at (ii) above, after “nodeployment” add new sentence in treaty (crafted with the UK) as follows: “Decisionson whether, and if so what kind of, military activities take place in that part ofGermany would be for the sovereign united Germany to make in accordance withprovisions of this treaty, the principles reflected in the Preamble and takingaccount of the security interests of the states party.”
v) Zoellick fallback mark II: simple “no deployment” formula in the Treaty plus aletter from Genscher either to the Three Allied Foreign Ministers or to the NATOSecretary-General setting out the Genscher Four Points.
10. At this juncture the Russians decided to put the frighteners on a bit. They sentsenior MFAMinistry of Foreign Affairs. officials round toeach delegation (in my case catching me in my bedroom just short of midnight) tostate formally on instructions that because of the failure to agree at officiallevel, the plenary session at 10 am the next day at the Octyabrskaya had beenpostponed, the timing of signature was in question and the press would have to beinformed. Instead Mr Shevardnadze wished to see his Ministerial colleagues alone at aworking session in the MFA Mansion at Alexander Tolstoy Street next morning at thesame hour. This tactic, which in my view was never convincing since the Russians wereunder the greatest time pressure of all, got Genscher in enough of a lather for himto go off to see Baker at 1.15 in the morning, when the latter had already taken hissleeping pill and final bedtime drink. [With hindsight this gives a subtle extraflavour to the reference in Baker’s speeches at the plenary session and the pressconference on 12 September about free citizens no longer being threatened by a knockon the door at dead of night!]Square brackets inoriginal.
11. By the following morning, when One plus Three Ministers met at the French Embassyunder Dumas’sRoland Dumas (*1922), [dodis.ch/P15651](https://dodis.ch/P15651), French ForeignMinister, 10.5.1988–28.3.1993. slightly dishevelled chairmanship, furtherUS/FRG work had produced the form of words which was eventually to become the text ofthe agreed minute annexed to the Treaty. One plus Three Ministers quickly agreed thatthey did not wish to hold out for the formulation at paragraph 9 (ii) above at theexpense of delaying signature in Moscow. But Baker in particular was clear that ifthe Administration were to carry the treaty successfully on the Hill, something inwriting would be necessary about the provisions on military activity in the formerGDR after Soviet troop departure; oral assurances would not do. When we broke fromthe breakfast the preferred solution was an inspired question and answer at the pressconference which Shevardnadze would pass to Genscher who would answer in terms of thelatest agreed text; this would then be confirmed as a record of the exchange in thepress conference by letter from Genscher to his five Two plus Four colleagues or,failing that, to the Three.
12. Genscher and Baker went off to see Shevardnadze. The Russians then let it beknown that the timetable for the morning’s meetings had reverted to the originalplan. Two plus Four Ministers had a private session at the Octyabrskaya Hotel priorto the Plenary session there. It was then that Baker stumbled on the notion of anagreed minute, to be annexed to the treaty and signed in addition to it by all sixMinisters. Slightly to everyone’s surprise this won Shevardnadze’s assent. By thistime the German delegation were once more in a highly excitable state, Genscher’sPrivate Secretary, Frank ElbeFrank Elbe (*1941), [dodis.ch/P57472](https://dodis.ch/P57472), Private Secretary ofHans-Dietrich Genscher 1987–1992., being particularly disagreeable, andventing all kinds of nonsense about how close “some people” had come “to screwing itup”. The formal plenary session and the predictable speeches for the occasionfollowed without controversy. We broke to allow final preparations of the text forsignature. At this point we moved from the sublime to the ridiculous. The Germanword-processor back-up went on the blink, thus delaying both German and French textsof the agreed minute. The American delegation, despite being 180 strong in Moscow,were apparently unable to produce a typewriter in the hotel that morning. I began towonder about the wisdom of having conceded to the Americans the final textual work,the UK team having earned much credit throughout the session in Berlin and the earlystages in Moscow with our Toshiba lap-top producing running updates of the texts innear real time around the table.
13. Signature duly followed under Gorbachev’s benevolent eye. Bondarenko looked tenyears younger on the instant. Champagne and congratulations were lavish. The finalforty-eight hours were nevertheless instructive. They brought home for me that, withthe arrival of German unity, Germany will not be simply the Federal Republic plus,but a different entity. Looking back on the whole process I see something of a threadrunning through: the early reluctance of the Germans to discuss politico-militaryissues at One plus Three, the bilateral concessions made at Stavropol(pace Bob Blackwill’s valedictory at Carnegie, Zoellick sees that asessentially bilateral) the subsequent systematic ambiguity about what had been agreedthere on the troop movement question (“verlegt” in German serving variously as“stationing”, “deployed” and “moved” depending on the day and the argument), thefait accompli over the exclusion of SOFA/SAStatus of Forces Agreement/Supplementary Agreement (to the SOFA). fromapplication in the former GDR, the acrimony over the crossing the line issue at thelast, Genscher’s unforthcoming answer at the press conference to the question aboutAllied forces in Berlin, and the general obtuseness and emotion on the German sidefaced with the assertion that an important Alliance interest might be at stake.
14. I do not wish to exaggerate all this or to diminish the achievement, for theGermans and indeed for us all, that German unification represents. We have everyreason to work within the Alliance as within the Community to maintain and ifpossible strengthen the underlying strategic Western solidarity. But as we embark onthis renewed challenge from 3 October I already begin to feel as I look at our Germanpartners that:
‘You are not the same people who left that station
Or who will arrive at any terminus …’T. S. Eliot, The DrySalvages, Four Quartets, Canto III, London, 1944.
I would be interested in your diagnosis.
Yours ever John