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TO FIXOTT (RWR)

INFO MOSCO WSHDC LDN PARIS POECD COPEN STKHM ROME HAGUE OSLO

PFEER BRU BNATO CANDILREPNAKO VIENN VNA A WSAW BGRAD BUCST BPEST

PMRMT GENEV PRGUE PCOOTT/DOYLE/IA/AC PMOOTT/HEINE BECKER FINOTT/1F/IER

TT NDQOTT/DM/CDS/ADMPOL/DGPOLPLANS/DNATOPOL/DIPOL/DESTRATA/ DE CAF

PAG ATHNS ANKRA HSKI BERN DUBLN LISBON MDRID DE OTT

DISTR CPD CPE IFB USS RGB IDC RGZ RED REM RWD RWR IDD IDR IDA IDX

URD EED EER IFES IND INF EE ESE EFB

PFF Z0G1224 16JUL

---GERMANY: THE SUMMER OF 1990

SUMMARY: AN UNBELIEVABLE SUMMER CONTINUES TO CONTRIBUTE TO AN
IMPROBABLE YEAR. LAST WEEKS SOVIET CONCESSION THAT UNITED GERMAN
MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS NOW ACCEPTABLE, AND THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR
AGREEMENT IN PARIS ON POLISH WESTERN BORDERS HAVE EFFECTIVELY
REMOVED THE FINAL INTERNATIONAL BARRIERS TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION.

THF DEVIL, TO ADAPT THE OLD GERMAN ADAGEMAY RESIDE IN THE REMAINING
DETAILS, BUT AT THE MOMENT AT LEAST THERE IS CONFIDENCE ON ALL
SIDES THAT THEY WILL BE OVERCOME, AND ON SCHEDULE. IT IS HOWEVER
ALREADY CLEAR THAT THE IMPACT ON EUROPE OF ITS REUNITED CENTRE
WILL BE PROFOUND. STILL TO BE GAUGED IS THE PRECISE NATURE OF
THIS IMPACT. THE PRESENCE OF A UNITED GERMANY—AND THE MOMENTOUS
...?
Changes that gave rise to it—will affect virtually all aspects of the way in which CDA and CDMS have thought not/not only about Europe but also about the transatlantic relationship. A reunited Germany could well necessitate the readjustment of some of the fundamental assumptions in CDN foreign policy, including our views of the role of the alliance, and our place in East-West relations.

In retrospect it is clear that Soviet intentions behind the chain of events that led to the breach of the Wall on 09Nov89 were foreshadowed in the Joint Soviet/FRG Declaration of 13Jun of that year. In it, Gorbachev endorsed the principle of national self-determination, thus effectively burying the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty and of the irreversibility of communism. At the time, German officials who had worked on the declaration were jubilant, but few others took its implications to heart.

By November, the SED ideologist, Otto Reinhold, was saying on West German television that a GDR without socialism would lose its legitimacy. The end of Honecker by the turn of the year, and the reduction of the SED in the spring elections to a splinter party proved his point: the GDR had voted to abolish itself. What happened between then and now looks like the working out of some sort of inexorable logic of history, but there was also virtually unbelievable German good luck, combined with political...
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COURAGE AND DETERMINATION NOT/NOT ONLY ON GORBACHEVS PARTY BUT
ALSO BY EAST EUROPEANS. AMONG THE LATTER WERE MEMBERS OF THE
THEN HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT WHO IN THE AUTUMN OF 1989 TOOK THE
PREFACE DECISION TO BREAK THEIR TREATY COMMITMENTS WITH THEIR
EAST GERMAN PARTNERS BY PERMITTING GDR REFUGEES IN HUNGARY TO
FLOW WEST, KNOWING FULL WELL THAT SUCH A DECISION WAS CROSSING A
COMMUNIST RUBICON, AND WOULD CREATE A CRISIS WITHIN THE EASTERN
PLOB FROM WHICH RECOVERY WAS UNLIKELY.

SO GREATLY HAVE TIMES CHANGED AT THIS POINT THAT CHANCELLOR
WOHL WENT TO MOSCOW LAST WEEK, RETURNING WITH SOVIET AGREEMENT ON A
UNITED GERMANY IN NATO. THIS AGREEMENT IS THE MORE STRIKING BECAUSE
IT WAS REACHED INDEPENDENT OF ANY VISIBLE, DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO
THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR PROCESS, AND REMOVED IN DETAIL FROM ANYTHING
PUT THE PROADEST NATO IMPRIMATUR (SO FAR AS WE KNOW THERE WAS
NO/NO PRIOR NATO CONSULTATION ON THE REDUCTION OF GERMAN TROOP
LEVELS OFFERED BY KOHL, OR ON THE AGREEMENT THAT THE 330,000
SOVIET TROOPS LEAVE GERMANY NO/NO LATER THAN 1994). A STRONG
USA PROFILE IN THIS DEAL WAS MOREOVER NOTICEABLE BY ITS ABSENCE:
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED THAT GERMANY WOULD
GO ITS OWN WAY ON ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE EAST, WHATEVER DECISIONS
WERE OR WERE NOT/NOT TAKEN AT THE HOUSTON SUMMIT. THIS LAISSEZ
FAIRE APPROACH ON THE MECHANICS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION SEEMS
...
Generally shared by other allies, the Ridley affair notwithstanding.

4. This is a great Western victory: removing the Iron Curtain from central Europe and opening the way to the final achievement of the goals we set for ourselves at the beginning of the CSCE process in the 1970s, this is the much-to-be-welcomed culmination of a remarkable team effort, despite occasional doubts, hiccups and false starts. According to FM Shevardnadze, the LDN NATO summit, in transforming the purpose of the Alliance, prepared the way for Soviet agreement on a United Germany in NATO. On 1 Nov, everything will culminate at the Paris CSCE meeting when German Union will be recognized (presumably in a declaration) by all participating states and where new security structures under CSCE auspices will be established at the same time as OEF I concludes and the final agreement on the elimination of four power rights in Germany is reached. A breathtaking agenda for a single relatively brief meeting.

5. The original deal at Potsdam looking to a democratic Europe is thus being implemented after a delay of some 40 years. German reunification and its concomitant twin, the revolutions in Eastern Europe, have drastically changed what the Russians used to call the correlation of forces in Central Europe. With German Union, the Western European political and economic equilibrium at least
Symbolically shifts its center of gravity away from the Rhein toward the Elbe. Despite various studies that we and our allies have undertaken, the shape of such a transformed Europe is barely visible; many studies have focussed on the processes/processes of German union, implications for NATO etc., but few on the facts, as rearranged, following union. These latter are virtually upon us. First among them is that the West German identity assumed by the FRG which virtually everyone has taken as a given, will perforce begin its disappearance the day a united Germany is proclaimed. A reunited Germany will be much greater than the sum of its parts, the FRG plus the GDR plus Berlin. But what in fact will it be?

6. The Federal German Republic had already emerged as the Western European primus inter pares, and with de facto Soviet withdrawal in the East, a united Germany will become the predominant power in an area which Germans (and their Austrian cousins) have historically contested with the Russians. Here, the paradox is that as the FRG emerged as the dominant economic power in Europe it remained only a quasi-sovereign country, militarily limited in many respects by the terms of various NATO agreements, and by a kind of political self-censorship in its dealings with both East and West, particularly on security issues. With the imminent emergence of a fully sovereign,
UNITED GERMANY (WITH OF COURSE, ONE OR TWO TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS) THIS ERA IS VIRTUALLY AT AN END.


CHANCELLOR KOHL HAS SOUGHT TO PLAY DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
The profound changes now underway, speaking of a united Germany as the quote rational center of Europe unquote and of the German ability to act as a clearing house of ideas between Western and Eastern Europe. For some time yet, a united Germany will indeed be preoccupied with internal matters. There are dislocations in the GDR created by the onset of capitalism—its aggressive West German variety has so far been underplayed by the FRG coalition, but already the effects on GDR agriculture and industry have been profound. The complexity of the issues involved in the new Germany's European vocation are miniaturized in the debate over whether the capital of a united Germany should be Berlin. Dr. Maiziere has unwisely made this a pre-condition for union, and President von Weizsäcker (for unknown reasons) has also entered an intensely political debate on the side of Berlin. There is thus revealed a second debate about whether Germany should now turn to the East as much as it had turned to the West. With big metropolitan Berlin—a major European city by any standards—the vision of an Eastern empire comes virtually automatically to mind. For many Germans, to opt for Berlin is to opt for an Eastern quote empire unquote, an Eastern economic hinterland. This is feared as much by many Germans as it is by others.
In the rush of events over German unification and the transformation of Eastern Europe, one overarching fact is occasionally missed. The strongest military power in Europe remains the Soviet Union, and in many respects, and in ways still difficult to measure, the Soviet Union retains its full potential as arbiter of events in Central Europe, perhaps now less in conjunction with its transatlantic superpower partner and more with the new Germany: the determination of events in Europe is now more firmly in the hands of Europeans in ways not thought possible only a few months ago.

10. Even as German preoccupations over completing the integration of its eastern with its western parts will continue, post unification, it is certain that German reticence internationally will disappear. Of necessity and inevitably, there will be pressures for the building of a truly global German foreign policy beyond the range of relatively narrowly-focused matters as now practised by the FRG. The effects of the emergence of this central European superpower on our present transatlantic relationship with the FRG is as yet discernable in only the vaguest outline. As Germany unites, grows together and begins to flex its new muscles many of the assumptions CDA has so long held vis-à-vis the FRG will need the closest reexamination if we are to maximize the strengths we can draw from relationships with a transformed Europe.