MESSAGE

SECRET

FM/DE
FM EXTOTT/ 15FEB90

TO/À
TO BRU COPEN PARIS BONN ATHNS ROME LUXEMBOURG HAGUE ANKRA OSLO

INFO
LSBON MDRID LDN WSH DS MOSCO WSNEW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD GENEV

DISTR
BREIC BNATO VNACE DBLN VIENNA HLSKI STKHLM BERN TOKYO CNBRA PRMNY

REF
OECD PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/TELLIER/DOYLE/ELCOCK

SUBJ/SUJ
DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS DMT IDX BCB PGB EFB URB RGB CPD CPP

BMA BFD EED EER RGX RED RGZ RWD RWR RDD RBR RBT IND INE INP IMD

IMM IMH IDD IDA IDR ICX ISD URR IFB

OTTAWA CONFERENCE: EAST-WEST RELATIONS

WE HAD ALL PREDICTED THAT MINISTERIAL PORTION OF OPEN SKIES CONF

WLD BECOME SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE OF ITS UNIQUE POSITIONING OF KEY

PLAYERS AT A KEY TIME IN HISTORY. IS THREE-LINE FULL PAGE HEADLINE

MORE THAN VINDICTIVE PREDICTION:

OF NY TIMES 14FEB INDICATES QUOTE ACCORD IN OTTAWA: WEST AND

SOVIETS AGREE WITH TWO GERMANY'S ON RAPID SCHEDULE FOR UNIFICATION

TALKS; GORBACHEV ACCEPTS BUSH'S TROOP CEILING UNQUOTE. PREDICTION

WAS MORE THAN BORNE OUT.

2. OTTAWA MTG HAS OBVIOUSLY BEEN UNIQUE VENUE FOR COUNCILL TIONAL

LEVEL BEHIND-THE-SCENES NEGOTIATIONS AND CONVERSATIONS, MANY

INVOLVING SSEA, AND PM. BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD

FIVE SEPARATE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS ON TUESDAY. SSEA AND SHEVARDNADZE

HAD SIX HRS OF DISCUSSION DURING BILATERALS ON WED ALONE. THIS TEL

ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE SOME OF THE MORE CENTRAL ASSESSMENTS THAT WERE

MADE PRIVATELY TO CDNS IN LAST SEVERAL DAYS, OR TO OTHERS AS

REPORTED TO US, TO INFORM YOUR OWN DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF EVENTS.
BEARING IN MIND THAT CDA IS NOT/NOT TO BE A MERE OBSERVER
OF WHAT IS TAKING PLACE BUT A PARTICIPANT IN THE PROCESS,
WITH VIEWS TO OFFER, AND INTERESTS TO ADVANCE.

3. THIS TEL WILL NOT/NOT BE ABOUT OPEN SKIES. THAT PART OF
CONF IS PROCEEDING VERY WELL. IDEA WAS APPLAUSED BY MINS AS
MOST IMPORTANT CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE YET AND THOUGH
DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH REMAIN, THERE IS EVERY LIKELIHOOD
THEM WILL BE SETTLED IN TIME FOR A TREATY TO BE PRESENTED TO
MINS IN BUDAPEST IN MAY. THIS WILL BE A VERY CONSIDERABLE
ACCOMPLISHMENT. AS PM PUT IT PRIVATELY, A TREATY IS A TANGIBLE
PROOF OF ACHIEVEMENT AND PROGRESS, AND WE CDNS SHLD PRESS AND
PRESS TO ENSURE ITS IMPORTANCE IS APPRECIATED SO THAT THIS
ACHIEVEMENT IS REALIZED.

4. IT WLD BE OBVIOUS TO SAY THAT IT WAS ISSUE OF GERMAN
UNIFICATION WHICH DOMINATED OTT MTG. CERTAINLY THIS WAS ALL
THAT GENSCHER HAD ON HIS MIND AND THE DRIVING HOME IN CORRIDOR
NEGOTIATIONS OF THE QUOTE 2 PLUS 4 UNQUOTE FORMULA FOR ITS
DISCUSSION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WAS VERY MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT
(THOUGH TARNISHED BY VIVID AND BITTER CONTESTATION IN NATO
CAUCUS OF THE UNFORTUNATE WORDING OF ITS MANDATE).

5. BUT TO USA AND USSR, THE HURTLING OF EVENTS IN GERMANY TOWARD
DE FACTO UNIFICATION IN ONLY SEVERAL WEEKS TIME WAS PART,
ALBEIT MAJOR PART, OF BIGGER TABLEAU OF UNPREDICTABILITY

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AND INSTABILITY WHICH IS EVEN MORE MAJOR PREOCCUPATION. AS SHEVARDNADZE PUT IT TO SSEA, QUOTE SITUATION IS SO COMPLEX, SO URGENT, AND SO DANGEROUS UNQUOTE. IT IS SEARCH FOR PREDICTABILITY AND STABILITY WHILE ACCOMMODATING FORCES OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND REFORM WHICH CHARACTERIZES THE TWO GREAT POWERS POLICY OBJECTIVES. IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY WILL WORK TOGETHER IN THIS SEARCH. OUR TALKS WITH SOVIETS AND AMERICANS ALIKE REVEAL UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL OF COOPERATION, AND FROM USA SIDE STRENUOUS EFFORT TO SUPPORT GORBACHEV (AND SHEVARDNADZE) POLITICALLY.

6. BAKER AND HIS COLLEAGUES STRESSED IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION THAT WHILE GORBACHEV IS SECURE IN HIS CONTROL, THE USSR IS IMPLODING. GOVT CAN PROBABLYCOPE, BUT NOT/NOT IF IT IS SUBJECT AS WELL TO EXTERNAL PRESSURES. SHEVARDNADZE HAD STRESSED TO BOTH BAKER AND GENSCHER THE SHOCK OF HAVING BEEN CRITICIZED BY THE CENTRAL CTTEE FOR RECENT USSR QUOTE LOSSES UNQUOTE. QUOTE WHAT ARE YOU DOING WITH OUR SECURITY UNQUOTE CONSERVATIVES ARE SAYING. UNIFICATION OF GERMANY IS BY FAR THE MOST EXPLOSIVE DEVELOPMENT IN VIEW OF THESE CRITICS.

7. USA IS THEREFORE DETERMINED TO WATCH ITS LANGUAGE IN DESCRIBING USA-USSR RELATIONS. SOVIETS MADE A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN OTTAWA BILATERAL TALKS IN ACCEPTING BUSH FORCE REDUCTION FORMULA IN THAT IT IS ASYMMETRIC BOTH IN CUTS AND
IN END RESULTS, BUT THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT A CONCESSION. WHAT USA SIDE UNDERSTOOD FROM THAT IS THAT IT WLD PROVIDE UNACCEPTABLY VOLATILE FUEL TO MOSCOW CONSERVATIVE CRITICS IF IT WERE. USA PURPOSE IS TO ESTABLISH QUOTE DIGNITY UNQUOTE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS FOR THAT REASON, AS TWO SIDES BUILD TOWARD JUNE BILATERAL SUMMIT WITH AN INTENSITY IN POLITICAL LEVEL DISCUSSION THAT IS WITHOUT PRECEDENT (2 MORE MAJOR BAKER-SHEVARDNADZE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NOW AND JUNE).

8. IN MANY RESPECTS, SENSITIVITY TO USSR INTERESTS IS THE DRIVING REASON BEHIND 2 PLUS 4 FORMULA FOR HANDLING THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY. EVERYONE ACCEPTS THAT UNIFICATION IS UP TO THE GERMANS; IT WILL TAKE PLACE AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE 18MAR GDR ELECTIONS. THE QUESTION IS ITS POLITICAL PACKAGING AS WELL AS THE NEED TO FIND A FORMULA FOR THE CONTROVERSIAL EXTERNAL ASPECTS.

9. AS GENSCHER PUT IT TO NATO CAUCUS, SHEVARDNADZE WAS QUOTE CERTAINLY NOT SHY UNQUOTE IN DESCRIBING SOVIET PUBLIC SENTIMENT ON THE ISSUE. TO SSEA, SOVIET FM SAID QUOTE LEADERS OF FRG SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THEY HAVE GONE TOO FAR UNQUOTE, SHEVARDNADZE HAD IMPRESSION THAT FRG PARTISAN POLITICAL PROCESS WAS IN SOME RESPECTS FORCING EVENTS AS THREE FRG PARTIES VIED TO OUTDO EACH OTHER WITH ESCALATION OF PROMISES. GENSCHER IN HIS PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS PLACED STRESS ON HAEMORRAGING CONDITIONS...5
IN GDR. EXODUS IS NOW AT 3200 A DAY; MOST BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES ARE JAMMED. GENSCHER WAS MAN DRIVEN AT OTT CONF BY HISTORIC FEAT OF ACHIEVING UNIFICATION. HIS EXPLANATION FOR URGENCY RANG TRUE, AS DID HIS SATISFACTION AS A GERMAN STATESMAN, BUT HIS INSTINCTS AS PARTY POLITICIAN WERE NOT/NOT WHOLLY OBSCURED, AND AS WOERNER CANDIDLY ACKNOWLEDGED IN PRIVATE DINNER HOSTED BY ASSOC DEF MINISTER COLLINS, BOTH CDU AND FDP HAVE TO WORK HARD TO COMPENSATE FOR OBVIOUS ADVANTAGE HELD AMONG GDR VOTERS BY SDP.

10. POINT OF THESE INTERNAL FRG POLITICAL POINTS IS THAT WE ARE TOLD GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE ARE THEMSELVES GOING OUT OF THEIR WAY TO UNDERSTAND THEM. THEY ARE REASONING LIKE POLITICIANS NOW BECAUSE LIKE ALL THE OTHERS AT OTT CONF FROM EASTERN EUROPE (EXCEPT FISCHER) THEY NOW HAVE TO. BUT THEY EXPECT THEIR OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL INTERESTS TO BE RESPECTED BY POLITICAL PROCESS. SHEVARDNADZE PUT IT TO BAKER ON ISSUE OF UNIFICATION QUOTE WE HAVE TO BE PARTICIPANTS, NOT/VICTIMS UNQUOTE.

11. THIS WAS CENTRAL IMPULSE FOR CREATING 2 PLUS 4 AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR USSR EXPLAINS WHY NATO ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO TOLERATE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF CONSULTATIONS. BOTH HURD AND BAKER SEEMED PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE THAT A GAFFE HAD BEEN
COMMITTED OVER MANDATE FOR THE FOREIGN MINS OF FIVE
(GDR BECOMES ACADEMIC) TO DISCUSS QUOTE THE ISSUES OF
SECURITY OF THE RPT THE NEIGHBOURING STATES UNQUOTE.
THEY OFFERED IN NATO CAUCUS AT SSEA URGING TO ENSURE CLOSE
ONGOING CONSULTATION IN NATO BUT GENSCHER WAS INDIGNANT AND
UPTIGHT ABOUT THE ISSUE. THIS MAY ONLY MEAN THAT 2 PLUS 4
SOLUTION WAS STILL VERY FRAGILE. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT
USA-USSR FORMULA THAT QUOTE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION
ARE ENTIRELY UP TO GERMANS WHILE EXTERNAL ASPECTS NEED TO
BE DISCUSSED WITH OTHERS UNQUOTE IS GOING TO BE HARDER TO
AGREE UPON WITH BOTH USSR AND GERMAN PARTNERS IN PRACTICE
THAN IN THEORY. DUTCH FM (SUPPORTED MOST STRENuously BY
ITALIAN, BELGIAN, NORWEGIAN) ASKED, QUOTE IF IT IS A QUESTION
OF POLISH BORDERS ONLY WHY NOT/NOT SAY SO UNQUOTE. THERE WAS
NO/NO SATISFACTORY ANSWER, AND SINCE GENSCHER HAS MADE IT
VERY CLEAR FRG WILL CONFIRM CURRENT EASTWARD BORDERS
EXPEDITIOUSLY, THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR 2 PLUS 4 TO BE USED
FOR MUCH MORE. GENSCHER NEEDS IT TO FINALIZE UNIFICATION
ITSELF IN RAPIDLY CHANGING LANDSCAPE.
12. QUESTION IS WHETHER IT WILL ALSO BE USED TO PRE-Negotiate
RELATIONSHIP OF UNIFIED GERMANY TO NATO AS THIS RELATES TO
ALL OF THE OTHER CENTRAL SECURITY QUESTIONS. THIS UNANSWERED

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PRINCIPALLY UNANSWERABLE) QUESTION HAD NON-PARTICIPATING NATO FOREIGN MINS WORRIED BUT FACT REMAINS THAT TACIT PURPOSE OF 2 PLUS 4 IS TO GIVE USSR ENTRÉE TO PROCESS WITH ALL OF THE PREOCCUPATIONS THEY BRING TO BEAR AND WAY THIS PLAYS OUT IS HARD TO PREDICT. FRENCH WOULD ARGUE (POINT MADE TO US BY POL DIRECTOR DUFOURQ) THAT THERE WAS NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE WITH USSR ON ISSUE, SINCE THEY HAD NO/NO LEVERAGE. HOWEVER, USA PREOCCUPATIONS WITH USSR LEADERSHIP COMFORT LEVELS WOULD SUGGEST USING 2 PLUS 4 AS FORUM FOR ARGUING OUT AT LEAST RESPECTIVE POINTS OF VIEW ON STATIONED FOREIGN FORCES AND POSSIBLY MORE.

13. PRES BUSH SAID IN HIS PRESS CONF 11FEB QUOTE I SUSPECT THOUGH I CANNOT/NOT PROVE IT THAT SOME OF THE WTO COUNTRIES WANT US IN EUROPE: NOT/NOT AS A THREAT, BUT AS A STABILIZING FACTOR UNQUOTE. FROM WHAT WAS SAID PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY HERE IN LAST FEW DAYS PRES BUSH'S SUSPICION IS PROBABLY RIGHT. SHEVARDNADZE SAID TO SSEA HE WOULD SEE USA AND CDN AND USSR TROOPS ALL OUT OF QUOTE EUROPE UNQUOTE BY 1995 AND BY YEAR 2000 ALL FORCES IN EUROPE ON A NATIONALLY STATIONED BASIS AND WITH A DEFENSIVE POSTURE. BUT HE ALSO SAID TO SSEA QUOTE WE ARE NOT/NOT AFRAID OF CDA BUT OF BUNDESWEHR UNQUOTE. HE MADE IT CLEAR IT WAS NOT/NOT WITH HIS FRIENDS GENSCHER
AND KOHL AT HELM THAT RUSSIANS HAD THIS FEAR BUT WITH VIEW TO DECADE OR SO HENCE. ALL OF THIS TO SUGGEST THAT PROCESS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION HAS DEEPEST POLITICAL AND SECURITY PRE-EMOTIONAL MEMORIES OF WWII ARE POLITICAL REALITY. OCCUPATIONS FOR USSR, AND THEY WILL SEEK SATISFACTION ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, PROBABLY IN TWO PLUS FOUR GROUPING.

14. THIS MAY WELL HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO IN TERMS OF ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES AND PROCESS AND IT WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT AS A NATO MATTER. SHEVARNDZIE COULD BE EXCUSED IF HE CONSIDERED THERE WERE LARGER ISSUES AT STAKE.

15. NATO FRETTING ON THIS POINT IS IRONIC COUNTERPOINT TO MOST FREQUENTLY MADE OTT CONF JOKE. AS WTO DELS INADVERTENTLY AND REPEATEDLY WANDERED INTO NATO CAUCUS MTGS TO RETRIEVE BRIEFCASES, OR SHOPPERS DRUG MART PURCHASES, LEFT A PREVIOUS SESSION, THEY RITUALISTICALLY INTONED WHEN THEY REALIZED WHERE THEY WERE, QUOTE WE ARE JOINING, BUT NOT/NOT QUITE YET UNQUOTE.

16. IN PUBLIC DEBATE, WTO MEMBERS AT CONF WERE RELATIVELY RESTRAINED. PLENARY DEBATE WAS REMARKABLE IN THAT ALMOST ALL OF THE SPEECHES FROM WTO AND NATO USED SAME WRITERS LEXICON OF POLITICAL PHRASES ABOUT RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, OPENNESS, STABILITY, SECURITY, ETC AND FOR ONCE WORDS USED MEANT THE SAME TO ALL THE USERS. PRIVATELY, WTO DELS (EXCEPT FOR HAPLESS EAST GERMANS) ACKNOWLEDGED WTO WAS FINISHED. PUBLICLY THEY CONTINUED

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518-2
TO REFER TO VALUE OF ALLIANCES FOR ACCELERATING FORCE
REDUCTIONS AND ARMS CONTROL. TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY CAN
INDULGE IN LONG-TERM THINKING, THEY SEE ACTIVITY SHIFTING
TOWARD AN ALLIANCE-FREE FORUM, A NEW CSCE, BUT AS DIENSTBIER
PUT IT PRIVATELY, HE AND OTHERS CAN HARDLY STRATEGIZE PAST
THE END OF EACH WEEK. SHEVARDNADZE SPOKE ELOQUENTLY TO SSEA
ABOUT THE SERIOUS DISCONNECT IN TIMING IN EE AND THE USSR
BETWEEN POLITICAL REFORM AND ECONOMIC REFORM. THE ECONOMIC
REFORM TASK IS MUCH MORE ENORMOUS AND DIFFICULT THAN WESTERNERS
THINK, HE SAID. LAWS HAVE TO BE RE-WRITTEN, DEBATED, APPROVED
ON SUCH FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES AS THE NATURE OF PROPERTY. EVEN
MORE SIGNIFICANT IS THE ESTABLISHED COMMAND ECONOMY NETWORK
BOTH BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE COMECOM COUNTRIES AND WITHIN THE
USSR ITSELF, WHICH IS A LOT EASIER TO WISH AWAY THAN TO ACTUALLY
REPLACE. THE REAL PROBLEM HERE IS FRUSTRATED EXPECTATIONS,
A BASIC INGREDIENT OF THE DANGEROUS INSTABILITY WHICH SO
TROUBLED THE USSR INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY. THESE REALIZATIONS
NO DOUBT TEMPERED THE BEHAVIOR OF THE OTHER FOREIGN MINS FROM
EXCEPT FOR POLES AND CZECH UNDERCUTTING OF KARPOV DURING NEGOS ON OPEN
EASTERN EUROPE WHO DID NOT TAKE ISSUE WITH THE USSR (EXCEPT
PERHAPS FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA), BEARING IN MIND PERHAPS THAT IT
WAS GORBACHEV AND PERESTROIKA WHICH HAD HELPED PUT THEM HERE.
17. HOWEVER, ALL ACCEPTED THAT OTT CONF REPRESENTED A NEW
DEPARTURE IN ATTITUDE AND DIRECTION. THE QUESTION IS WHERE IT WILL LEAD.

18. GIVEN THAT STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY ARE THE GOALS, AND THAT EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES ARE IN FLUX OR IN CASE OF WTO VIRTUALLY DEFUNCT, TENDENCY IS TO THINK AHEAD TO AN ENGLOBING SECURITY FRAMEWORK WHICH SEEMS TO BE A MORE MUSCULAR AND MORE EFFECTIVE CSCE.

19. ALL DELS HERE WERE IN FAVOUR OF A CSCE SUMMIT BEFORE END OF 1990 - VIRTUALLY ALL ANTICIPATED SIGNATURE OF CFE AGREEMENT TO BE A PROMINENT ACHIEVEMENT OF SUMMIT. BUT THERE WAS A RANGE OF VIEWS AS TO SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATION OF SUMMIT, SUBSTANCE TO BE EXPECTED FROM SUMMIT, AND THUS FROM RENEWED CSCE ITSELF.

20. AS YOU KNOW, USSR POSITION HAS BEEN IN FAVOUR OF QUOTE INSTITUTIONALIZING UNQUOTE THE CSCE PROCESS, WHICH SEEMS TO MEAN GIVING IT ONGOING SECRETARIAT AND MEMBER STATE PRESENCE AND FUNCTIONS TO PROPEL NEGOTIATION, CONSULTATION, AND PROGRAMS IN POLITICAL SECURITY, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL AREAS. SHEVARDNADZE TOLD SSEA THEY SAW THE SUMMIT IDENTIFYING THE CSCE AS THE SUCCESSOR AGENCY FOR THE CFE I PROCESS AND AS THE LOCALE AS WELL FOR CONSOLIDATING THE FINAL POST WW II SETTLEMENT PROCESS. THE SUMMIT SHERD SET A MANDATE TO ENABLE THE CSCE TO ENCOURAGE AND EVENTUALLY TO CODIFY THE CONVERSION OF STATES TO DEFENSIVE MILITARY POSTURES, AS WELL AS TO ENGAGE...
IN THE OTHER CRITICAL ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIROMENTAL
ADJUSTMENT ACTIVITIES.

21. DEEPER SOVIET INTERESTS WERE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED.
SHEVARDNADZE SPOKE WITH REFERENCE TO GERMAN UNIFICATION OF
THE IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY OF USA AND CDN PRESENCE IN THE
CSCE. HE WISHES TO QUOTE ACCELERATE THE PROCESS OF ENGLOBING
STRUCTURES IN THE CSCE UNQUOTE. USA OFFICIALS TOLD US THAT IN
THEIR VIEW USSR IS LOOKING TO STABLE PLURALISTIC FRAMEWORK OF
CSCE AS SORT OF COUNTER TO FEDERAL INSTABILITY WITHIN USSR
ITSELF. USA CONSIDERS THIS A SERIOUS CONCERN AND WILL PROBABLY
UPGRADE THEIR OWN CREATIVE ATTENTION TO CSCE POTENTIAL IN
CONSEQUENCE.

22. FRG VIEWS SEEM SIMILAR TO THOSE OF USSR. GENSCHER SPOKE OF
CSCE AS Locale FOR NEXT PHASE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
NEGOTIATIONS AND AS QUOTE PERMANENT STAGE UNQUOTE FOR
DISARMAMENT PROCESS. ON UNIFICATION, FRG IS GOING TO REPORT
TO CSCE SUMMIT ON DETAILS, BUT DOES NOT/NOT INTEND ANY DISCUSSION
OR NEGOTIATION THERE, WHICH, OF COURSE, REMAINS TO BE SEEN RE
EXTERNAL ASPECTS.

23. FRENCH TOO SEE CSCE AS USEFUL TO ENGLOBE CHANGING SECURITY
SITUATION BUT OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH DUFOURQ DO NOT/NOT REVEAL
MUCH IN WAY OF FRENCH THINKING REGARDING ANY SUBSTANTIVE
...7.13

2 Plus 4, and EC-12, and only then in NATO, though Summit to
proceed on all these issues in various official discussions to
positions we know existed.
13 Feb was not/not able to draw out a very open discussion of
Chair at both IMPROPTU NATO CAUCUS and CLOSE Session of 25
Chair of Budapest Open Skies FINALE, or Copenhagen Human Dimension
or a Special Prep Com at separate Ministerial MG. SSEA in

12. The divergent views on CSCE need urgent reconciliation.

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SEVEN SHERPA MTGS MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY.

26. FOR THESE REASONS, STEPS BY POSTS TO DIALOGUE AT MOST SENIOR LEVELS OF HOST GOVTS WILL BE IMPORTANT. THERE IS SOME CREDIT AVAILABLE FROM OPEN SKIES CONF HOST FUNCTIONS AND SSEA LEADERSHIP TO DRAW UPON. YOU WILL HAVE READ PM AND SSEA STATEMENTS TO OPEN SKIES PLENARY. AS GENERAL SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE, WE WOULD ADD THAT A REINFORCED AND MORE EFFECTIVE CSCE PROCESS IS VERY MUCH A CDN OBJECTIVE. SSEA FOUND IN DISCUSSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE THERE IS MUCH CDA AND USSR SHARED ON THIS ISSUE AND ON PROPOSALS FOR AN ACTIVE PREPARATORY PROCESS. WE SHALL PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON CSCE AND ON OTHER ISSUES SHORTLY.

27. THIS TEL IS TO TRY IN HASTE TO RETURN SOME VERY TENTATIVE ANALYSIS TO THOSE OF YOU WHO HAVE SO THOUGHTFULLY CONTRIBUTED IN RECENT MONTHS TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THESE TRULY MOMENTOUS ISSUES, AND SPECIFICALLY TO PREPARATION OF THIS VERY IMPORTANT MTG OF 23 MINS WHICH HAS, WE THINK IT FAIR TO SAY, WORKED OUT VERY WELL. ACCURATE AND SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE VARIOUS NEEDS AND POSITIONS AT PLAY IN THE UNFOLDING OF THESE EVENTS WILL NOW BE NEEDED MORE THAN EVER IF CDN OPPORTUNITIES AND INTERESTS ARE TO BE APTLY ASSESSED AND ADVANCED. WE COUNT ON YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS AND WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO ENSURE YOU ARE WELL POSITIONED IN REGARD TO THINKING HERE. MORE DETAILED ...
AND FACTUAL REPORTS OF SPECIFIC MTGS AND SESSIONS ARE,
OF COURSE, GOING OUT TO THOSE CONCERNED IN USUAL WAY.

MARCHAND