



Sacha Zala and Thomas Bürgisser (eds.)

# Geneva, Helsinki, and the Making of the CSCE

International Diplomatic Documents on the Conference  
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1969–1975



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Thomas Bürgisser and Sacha Zala (eds.)

with the collaboration of Christian Bracher

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
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Cover: The Opening Ceremony of the Helsinki Summit of the CSCE in Finlandia Hall on 30 July 1975. Source: National Archives and Records Administration (Wikimedia Commons).



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This volume brings together contributions from fifteen countries and two international organisations. It is the largest multinational edition of diplomatic documents ever published and showcases the potential of the international network of Editors of Diplomatic Documents. Established in 1988, the network was institutionalised in Geneva in 2013 as the International Committee of Editors of Diplomatic Documents (ICEDD). Delegations from different parts of the world met for the first time in London in 1989. Since then, conferences have been held biennially in The Hague (1992), Ottawa (1994), Rome (1996), Bonn (1998), Washington (2001), Canberra (2003), Paris (2005), Dublin (2007), The Hague (2009), Jerusalem (2011), Geneva (2013), Washington (2015), London (2017), Berlin (2019), Warsaw (postponed until 2022), Rome (2024), and Bern (2026).

At the Geneva Conference, held at the Palais des Nations on 3 October 2013, the participants adopted the Charter of the International Committee of Editors of Diplomatic Documents. Article 2 defines the Committee's purpose:

"The International Committee shall bring together scholars with a common interest in the editing of contemporary diplomatic documents, enabling them to engage in a wider discussion and investigate common concerns, concepts, problems and methodologies over a diverse range of historical and historiographical areas."

To strengthen scholarly cooperation and foster exchanges within the international historical community, ICEDD was admitted in 2017 as an Affiliated International Organisation of the International Committee of Historical Sciences (CISH).

In 2019, the thirtieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall offered ICEDD members the first opportunity to transform their international network into a genuinely collaborative documentary editing project. The outcome of this initiative was *When the Wall Came Down. The Perception of German Reunification in International Diplomatic Documents 1989–1990*, edited by Marc Dierikx and Sacha Zala and published by the *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland* (Dodis). This pioneering Dodis volume established a new model of collaborative documentary editing in which participating documentary editing projects jointly present documents from their respective national editions on a common historical theme. The initiative has since been continued by Piotr Długolecki's *The Polish Crisis 1980–1982 from the Western Perspective* (2022), published by the Polish Institute of International Affairs, and Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio's *The Dissolution of the USSR as Seen from World Capitals* (2024), published by the *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*.

The 18<sup>th</sup> International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents takes place in Bern from 2 to 5 September 2026. While continuing its traditional exchange on questions of documentary editing, the conference is dedicated to the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

between 1969 and 1975. Organised by Dodis, the conference forms part of the official programme of Switzerland's 2026 Chairpersonship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The CSCE process contributed significantly to the peaceful end of the Cold War, led to the establishment of the OSCE in 1994, and helped prevent or contain major military conflicts on the European continent until 2022. At a time when European security faces its greatest challenges since the end of the Second World War, it is particularly timely to revisit this remarkable multilateral achievement. The making of the CSCE stood in stark contrast to a vision of international politics in which self-proclaimed great powers divide the world among themselves through hasty and often violent bargains. Instead, it represented an attempt to establish a durable and comprehensive European security framework through painstaking negotiations based on the principle of consensus among all participating states. The objective was to develop a code of conduct capable of accommodating not only the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, but equally those of states such as Belgium, Bulgaria and Switzerland, as well as Malta and the Holy See.

To produce this unprecedented edition, documentary editing projects from around the world joined forces to produce a documentary edition devoted to a major theme in contemporary history. The participating editions represent all the principal groups involved in the CSCE process: founding members of the European Community (France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy); states that joined the Community in 1973 (Ireland and the United Kingdom); NATO members from the European periphery (Portugal and Türkiye) and North America (Canada and the United States); European neutral states (Austria, Finland, and Switzerland); a former member of the Warsaw Pact (Poland); a Mediterranean state not participating in the CSCE (Israel); an observer from East Asia (Japan); and two international organisations, the European Union and NATO. The result of this unprecedented collaboration is the volume before you.

As with all Dodis editions, this publication is conceived from the outset as a hybrid print and digital edition. The printed volume is complemented by an open-access digital edition available through the Dodis database, where readers can consult the original documents as facsimiles in their original languages, together with complete archival references, metadata, supplementary material and the English translations published in this volume. Dodis serves as the coordinating editorial centre, providing the digital infrastructure and editorial coordination. The volume was edited by Thomas Bürgisser and Sacha Zala, with the assistance of Christian Bracher. Our sincere gratitude goes to the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for its generous support, and to all participating documentary editing projects, whose contributions made this publication possible.

May this truly multinational collaboration continue to strengthen the International Committee of Editors of Diplomatic Documents and inspire future international documentary editing initiatives.

Bern, July 2026

Sacha Zala



The *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland* (Dodis) Research Centre, based in Bern, is an institute of the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences (SAGW) and thus part of the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences (a+). It operates under the patronage of the Swiss Society for History (SGG) and receives additional support from the Swiss Federal Archives (SFA) and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA).

As an independent research institution funded under the Federal Decree on Education, Research and Innovation, Dodis serves as a centre of excellence for the history of Switzerland's international relations and foreign policy. The chronological documentary edition *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland* (DDS) is complemented by the thematic source editions published in the *Quaderni di Dodis – fonti* series. These volumes enable specific topics to be explored in greater depth, make previously inaccessible source material available to scholars and the wider public through open-access publication, and enrich the Dodis online database by expanding its corpus of data and metadata.

This volume of the *Quaderni di Dodis* is the product of an international collaborative project carried out under the auspices of the International Committee of Editors of Diplomatic Documents (ICEDD). Editors and archivists from fifteen countries – Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States – and two international organisations (the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) participated in this project, contributing a total of 104 documents illustrating their respective perspectives on the making of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). For this publication, documents originally written in languages other than English have been translated by the respective national editors. Through the implementation of state-of-the-art editorial workflows, the transcriptions comply with the standards of the Text Encoding Initiative (TEI) and are available in the freely accessible Dodis database both in HTML format and as machine-readable XML files for download and reuse. The original documents are likewise available in the Dodis database as facsimiles in their original languages. The printed edition is complemented by a fully open digital edition, providing access to the original-language facsimiles, TEI-encoded transcriptions, and downloadable XML files through the Dodis database.

In this volume, the documents dating from March 1969 to August 1975 are numbered and presented in strict chronological order. A table at the beginning of the volume provides a brief summary of each document to facilitate consultation. The heading of each document contains an editorial title, the original classification (e.g. Secret, Confidential), any priority marking, the date and place of

origin, and a permanent link (e.g. [dodis.ch/76946](http://dodis.ch/76946)) providing access to the document's digital transcription, facsimile, metadata and related digital resources. Document titles appear in CAPITAL LETTERS and are based on the original titles; titles enclosed in square brackets have been supplied by the editors. As a general rule, documents are published in full. Where passages unrelated to the subject of this volume have been omitted, the document heading is marked *Extract*, and the omissions are indicated by [...] together with a footnote containing the permalink to the complete facsimile. Forms of address and complimentary closes are silently omitted unless considered of particular significance.

The editorial section also includes the references provided in the footnotes. These are clearly distinguished from the document text by the use of *italics*, whereas the document text is set in Roman type. Within the documents, *italics* reproduce emphasis in the original (e.g. underlining, capital letters, etc.). Editorial interventions appear in square brackets and in *italics*. Obvious spelling and punctuation mistakes in the documents have been corrected without indication; other errors are discussed in the footnotes. In addition, the formatting of telegrams and telexes (e.g. capitalisation and abbreviations) has been standardised to improve readability. The first footnote of each document contains the archival reference, the type of source, and additional relevant information, thereby enabling readers to locate the original documents. It may also include information on authorship, addressees, the context in which the document was created, and other source-critical details. Subsequent footnotes provide further information on documents and persons referred to in the text. Wherever possible, links to the Dodis database (e.g. [dodis.ch/P15249](http://dodis.ch/P15249)) are provided, giving readers access to additional information on individuals, organisations, and geographical entities. Notes addressing specific issues or related topics refer readers to further documents and thematic compilations in the Dodis database. The documents published in this volume thus serve as a guide to the extensive resources available in the Dodis database. Together, the printed edition and the Dodis database form an integrated scholarly edition.

The *appendix* provides links to dynamic online directories and indexes that integrate the documents published in this volume with the Dodis database. The dossier directory offers a convenient starting point for further research, including guidance on locating the original documents in the archives.

The online *list of abbreviations*, together with the *indexes of individuals, organisations, and geographical entities*, enable readers to navigate seamlessly between the printed edition and the ever-expanding digital resources of the Dodis database.

## Multi-Perspective Views on the Making of the Helsinki Final Act: An Introduction

In the heat of the Geneva summer of 1975, at the Centre William Rappard, the final touches were being put to the drafting of what would come to be known as the Helsinki Final Act. Yet another “final act” was nearing completion in the same building. Hidden among the records of the Swiss Federal Archives is the final draft, dated 11 July, of a satirical text entitled “Ultimate Act” – a document no scholar of the history of the Helsinki Final Act would expect to find. Its mock-solenn overtone leaves little doubt that this was no ordinary diplomatic text: “With much mutual self-congratulation the individual participating delegations who have laboured long, mightily and with complete disregard for all instructions, often long into the day, have with this document finally given birth”, the preamble declares. “Insofar as any significance is attached to this document/documents, the participating States hereby wish it to be generally understood that they are not committed to anything.” Full stop. The participating States, it says, laid down ten “some sort of” declarations which, “given the current state of international affairs, in particular the irresponsibility of détente, will act as bases (not military, the other sort) for their future misconduct with their mutual correspondents” ([do-dis.ch/76303](https://dis.ch/76303)). A fitting epitaph for six years of painstaking negotiations?

It was the young diplomat Roy Reeve, a member of the British delegation in Geneva, who wrote this satire on the final drafting of the concluding document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Spanning several pages, laced with bitter humour and dripping with sarcasm, it captures the half-resigned realisation that the years of hard graft devoted to this convoluted text during gruelling negotiations in Helsinki and Geneva had ultimately produced a document that seemed hardly worth the paper it was written on. Was it merely a diplomatic exercise that had dragged on for years, the brainchild of overambitious negotiators, an ambassador’s pipe dream with no basis in reality, a paper tiger? It certainly seemed so. In the summer of 1975, there was no real enthusiasm for the results of the CSCE, neither among diplomats nor among politicians, let alone among the general public. And yet history would prove otherwise.

When the 35 participating states signed the Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, they concluded a diplomatic process that had begun more than six years earlier with a very different ambition. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies had long promoted the idea of a European security conference as a means of confirming the post-war territorial and political order. By the time the heads of state and government assembled in the Finlandia Hall, a masterpiece of organic modernism by the Finnish architect Alvar Aalto, however, that original concept had been transformed. One could say, metaphorically speaking, that the Final Act now resembled the interior of the building, in which it was signed: it

remained strictly functional, but had become something broader, more complex, dynamic, human-centred, and less predictable than anticipated.

The history of the CSCE from 1969 to 1975 is the story of its transformation. In the end, the Final Act was not a European peace treaty, not a legally binding security pact, and not the permanent pan-European organisation that Moscow had once envisaged. Instead, it became a political framework linking borders, sovereignty, military confidence-building, economic cooperation, information, and human rights as parts of a continuing review process. The 104 diplomatic documents assembled in this volume show how a proposal originally designed to stabilise the status quo was gradually reshaped by neutral initiatives to establish and develop a procedural framework for consensus and the firm Western insistence on including “human contacts” in the Final Act. In the course of this transformation, the conference ceased to be a single event and became a negotiating forum. Its procedures became part of its substance; its three “baskets” turned apparently separate issues into elements of a single diplomatic package; and its follow-up provisions ensured that Helsinki would be less an end point than the beginning of a process. A process that, in the eyes of some, contributed to the eventual collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and to the upheaval of the continent’s political landscape.

### **From the Budapest Appeal of 17 March 1969 to the Beginning of the Preliminary Talks**

The declaration called on all European countries to improve East–West relations and to organise a Pan-European Conference on Security Issues in Europe and European Cooperation, emphasising peaceful coexistence, respect for existing borders, non-interference in internal affairs, and greater political, economic, and cultural cooperation among European states. The Soviet initiative to convene a European security conference was met with astonishment and scepticism in the West. Coming only months after the Warsaw Pact suppression of the “Prague Spring” by military invasion, the so-called Budapest Appeal of 17 March 1969 “with its unusual moderate and conciliatory tone” was interpreted by French diplomats as Moscow’s attempt to demonstrate initiative in Europe at a moment of tension with China, to make Westerners “turn the page with respect to the events that occurred in Czechoslovakia”, and reopen dialogue with Washington (doc. 1, [dodis.ch/76960](https://dodis.ch/76960)). The Italian Ambassador in Moscow reached a similar conclusion. Given the revolutionary undertones within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he doubted Moscow’s sincerity regarding its policy of coexistence. At the same time, he saw the possibility that the idea of a conference might somewhat loosen the Soviet grip on the satellite states in Eastern Europe. “A preconceived negative assessment of this new Soviet initiative seems to me to be just as risky and unrealistic as accepting it without the necessary critical analysis of its motives, characteristics and aims”, the Ambassador advised his ministry in Rome’s Palazzo della Farnesina (doc. 2, [dodis.ch/75738](https://dodis.ch/75738)).

The Eastern European perspective confirms that the Budapest Appeal was not merely a Soviet gesture. Poland saw in the conference “a convenient tool

for achieving the fundamental objectives of our policy”, which were the recognition of the territorial and political realities that mattered most to Warsaw: the Oder-Neisse Line, the existence of the German Democratic Republic and the post-war borders of Europe, as well as disarmament and the development of economic relations. It therefore resisted any agenda that would dissolve these questions into non-controversial topics of marginal importance like cooperation in tourism, culture or technical exchange (doc. 3, [dodis.ch/76893](https://dodis.ch/76893)). Meanwhile in Washington, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger did not believe “that in and of itself this ‘appeal’ does anything to advance the prospects of a European settlement”. Nevertheless, he advised US President Richard Nixon not to give a negative response to the proposal. “Rather, we might use it in our effort to impress on the Soviets the need to talk concretely about the issues that exist between us”, such as non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries and non-discrimination of the Federal Republic of Germany (doc. 4, [dodis.ch/76941](https://dodis.ch/76941)).

Finland soon gave the Soviet initiative a procedural form. As early as 1966, Helsinki had declared that a carefully prepared conference on European security might be useful, provided that all interested states participated. After the Budapest Appeal both the Hungarian and Soviet Ambassadors suggested Helsinki as a possible venue for the conference to the Finnish government. At the end of April 1969, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs therefore instructed its diplomatic representations in capitals of neutral and NATO member states “to canvass the attitudes of various countries towards the Conference on Security in Europe in general and on a meeting to prepare it, and to report continually on developments (this also applies to member states of the Warsaw Pact)” (doc. 5, [dodis.ch/76725](https://dodis.ch/76725)). The Finnish memorandum of 5 May 1969 formalised this line, offering Helsinki as a potential place for multilateral contacts while keeping participation free of any implication of recognition (doc. 6, [dodis.ch/76726](https://dodis.ch/76726)).

The initial reactions already revealed a number of key factors of the future debate: all those consulted expressed a generally positive view and emphasised the importance of careful preparation. Unsurprisingly, Moscow, Budapest, Warsaw and East Berlin were strongly supportive of the Finnish initiative. Brussels, Oslo and The Hague held out the prospect of coordination in the course of NATO consultations. The participation of the United States was named as condition sine qua non in most Western and neutral capitals, and many considered the unresolved German question an obstacle (doc. 7, [dodis.ch/76727](https://dodis.ch/76727)). Discussions had already taken place within the Western alliance by the summer. The Turkish government also insisted in their reply that discussion of such a broad and vague concept as European security required serious attention and an agenda set in advance, since a conference “where anyone can bring up any topic they wish, will do more harm than good” (doc. 8, [dodis.ch/77136](https://dodis.ch/77136)). Ottawa’s official response to the Finnish offer made the transatlantic argument even more explicit. European security had repeatedly drawn the country into European wars; the Department of Foreign Affairs could therefore not accept a conference in which North America appeared only as an optional accessory (doc. 9, [dodis.ch/77044](https://dodis.ch/77044)). In order to avoid “second class status for Canada”, Ottawa intended “linking our participation firmly with that of USA” (doc. 12, [dodis.ch/77045](https://dodis.ch/77045)). Polish Foreign Minister Stefan

Jędrychowski on the other hand feared that Moscow, eager for quick convening, might reduce the conference to a modest agenda of non-use of force and economic cooperation, thereby losing the central aim of border recognition (doc. 10, [dodis.ch/76894](https://dodis.ch/76894)). Even Switzerland, the most sceptical among the neutrals, had to admit, that it could not simply stand aside from a process that might reshape European security sustainably (doc. 13, [dodis.ch/32405](https://dodis.ch/32405)).

The early exploratory talks on a European Security Conference showed that the interests of the participating states were very diverse and that there were differing views even within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO). In the autumn of 1969, the election of Willy Brandt and the prospect of German Ostpolitik encouraged Soviet hopes that the Federal Republic might become more flexible. Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgorny presented the changing atmosphere in Bonn as a favourable sign (doc. 11, [dodis.ch/75699](https://dodis.ch/75699)). Meanwhile, Polish consultations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary and Romania showed how terms such as sovereignty, non-intervention, territorial integrity and equality could be used as aims not only to confirm Europe's post-war borders, but also for promoting the reduction of American forces in Europe and protecting socialist regimes from Western interference, as well as to shield, as implicitly expressed by Romania, Eastern state's independence from Moscow (doc. 14, [dodis.ch/76895](https://dodis.ch/76895)). By signing the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties on 12 August and 7 December 1970, the FRG acceded to Poland's key priority for recognition of the Oder–Neisse Line as its official western border.

Finland's proposal of 24 November 1970 for discussions on the arrangements for the security conference between the heads of missions in Helsinki, moved the process a step further. Again, the Finns were stressing "that the participation of Governments in various stages of the present process of consultation and negotiation does not imply recognition under international law, of existing political circumstances in Europe" (doc. 15, [dodis.ch/76729](https://dodis.ch/76729)). After the Four Power Agreement on Berlin of 3 September 1971, the Soviet Union pressed to accelerate preparations for the conference in Helsinki and at the same time separate the issue of arms reduction in Europe from the conference agenda (doc. 16, [dodis.ch/76896](https://dodis.ch/76896)). In spring 1972, the United States accepted that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions would proceed in parallel. They insisted, however, that "the relationship between MBFR and CSCE should be minimal" (doc. 17, [dodis.ch/76942](https://dodis.ch/76942)). At the same time, Bonn demanded that preparatory talks could only start after the success of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was ensured, which would be the case after the signing of the Final Protocol on 3 June 1972. The Foreign Office formulated a comprehensive strategy on the topics to be covered in the future. Above all the implementation of improved "people-to-people contacts and exchange of information" between Eastern and Western Europe would be "the most important, clearly visible benchmark of détente and cooperation" that could possibly be achieved. "We must therefore strive to win as much acceptance as possible for this idea at a CSCE – including with regard to the same question in the relationship between the two states in Germany" (doc. 18, [dodis.ch/77012](https://dodis.ch/77012)). Now that the main obstacles had been overcome, Poland, by contrast, regarded the "struggle" as having moved "from the stage of convening the



conference to the stage of its course and results". Warsaw feared Western attempts to introduce freer circulation of ideas and human contacts as instruments of "ideological infiltration, undermining the foundations of the socialist system and loosening the cohesion of the socialist community". On the other hand, it continued to push for the establishment of a permanent pan-European organ that could consolidate a new security order (doc. 21, [dodis.ch/76897](https://dodis.ch/76897)).

Obviously, specific national interests played a central role in the preparations. Canadian diplomats developed in the summer of 1972 one of the broadest Western agendas, combining security and economic questions with family reunification, mixed marriages, freer publications, broadcasting and cultural exchange, also "for the purpose of diversifying Canada's external relations, reducing our vulnerability to and dependence on the USA". When it came to liberalisation tactics, Ottawa relied on "low-key persuasion" rather than "a frontal attack against the repressive practices of the Communist regimes" (doc. 26, [dodis.ch/77046](https://dodis.ch/77046)). The Portuguese regime, which continued to seek to prevent the independence of its colonies in Africa by force and was facing growing criticism as a result, adopted a tougher stance on this issue. In Lisbon, Foreign Minister Rui Patrício complained to NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns that the same communist powers, which were calling for dialogue and cooperation in Europe, were engaging in "incitements to violence and confrontation and aid to subversion and aggression" against Portuguese interests on "other continents" (doc. 27, [dodis.ch/76736](https://dodis.ch/76736)). As a European nation "with its main problem centred on Africa" and "located at one end of the continent", questions of European Security did not assume the same degree of importance for Portugal as it did for others. The CSCE, on the other hand, was likely to be more damaging to Lisbon because of "principles and declarations approved by the Conference which, although referring to Europe, could serve as a pretext for demands on Portugal that affect its African interests" (doc. 36, [dodis.ch/76737](https://dodis.ch/76737)). Turkey, as another peripheral country, considered it as being in its national interest to use the CSCE to reinforce ties with Western Europe. Ankara saw the strengthening of the position of the FRG, as well as that of the Eastern European satellite states, in relation to Moscow as a possible means of alleviating the Soviet pressure on Turkey (doc. 29, [dodis.ch/77134](https://dodis.ch/77134)). Switzerland, as a state that did not belong to any military alliances, sought to use the framework of the CSCE to secure recognition of its status as a neutral country from the European powers. It also launched an initiative to develop a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes, taking "into account the interests of small states vis-à-vis large ones" and emphasising "the rule of law in international relations" (doc. 22, [dodis.ch/34499](https://dodis.ch/34499)). The Swiss put forward their proposal by stepping up their previously low-key diplomatic visits, travelling to numerous foreign capitals and hosting receptions in Bern at various levels, in order to keep abreast of other initiatives and avoid becoming isolated. They held close consultations with neutral countries, but "had to accept the obvious fact that the real laboratory of the CSCE lies elsewhere", namely within the appropriate bodies and NATO and the European Community (doc. 31, [dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487)).

The European Commission also sought to shape the agenda. The CSCE should not weaken the European Economic Community or allow economic questions

within EEC competence to be handled by NATO or by individual states alone, Commission President Sicco Mansholt stated at the ministerial conference in Luxembourg on 27 May 1972. The existence and future development of the Community had to be recognised “an essential element of cooperation, peace, and security in Europe” (doc. 19, [dodis.ch/77038](https://dodis.ch/77038)). The European Parliament was meanwhile working on a resolution aimed at pushing Community Member States to adopt common positions particularly in the commercial, scientific, and technical fields, to be presented in Helsinki, as well as to promote “genuine free movement of persons and ideas throughout the European continent” (doc. 24, [dodis.ch/77039](https://dodis.ch/77039)). By autumn, the European Commission had finally issued guidelines intended to steer the Member States’ attitude in response to the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies were still ignoring the Community. It demanded that they demonstrate with “utmost clarity” the upholding of “the political and legal commitments they have undertaken in favour of European integration”. The normalisation of relations between the Community and the countries of Eastern Europe was one of the goals of the CSCE, but without the Member States having to pay any political or economic price for it (doc. 30, [dodis.ch/77040](https://dodis.ch/77040)). Shortly before the start of the preliminary negotiations, NATO also issued a steering brief to its members, urging them to adopt common positions. The West wanted freer movement of persons, information and ideas, cooperation, confidence-building measures and a limitation of the Brezhnev doctrine’s practical reach; it did not want a “political court of appeal, which might give the Russians scope to interfere in our affairs”. Being in a stronger bargaining position than the East, “Allied Governments should adopt a hard-headed business-like attitude”, the steering brief stated. “As a general rule, all concessions should be justified in terms of the real advantage to be expected in equivalent counter-concessions” (doc. 32, [dodis.ch/76974](https://dodis.ch/76974)).

Non-European states observed the preparations for the CSCE with interest, particularly with regard to the possible inclusion on the conference agenda of a special item on the situations in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. Israel was less than enthusiastic about such ideas and sought to prevent any Arab countries from being invited to the conference. The official line for Jerusalem’s diplomats was that bringing up a discussion on the Middle East would “turn the conference into an arena for unpleasant and fruitless discussions, in the style of UNCTAD, the UN, etc. ...which will disrupt the work of the Conference, detract from its seriousness, and reduce its chances of success” (doc. 20, [dodis.ch/75731](https://dodis.ch/75731)). Accordingly, during talks in Vienna in July 1972, Prime Minister Golda Meir rebuffed Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky when he was promoting European “good offices” that would be beneficial to the negotiating atmosphere between Israel and Egypt (doc. 25, [dodis.ch/76979](https://dodis.ch/76979)). As another non-European player, the Japanese diplomatic service also monitored the preparations for the conference project with great interest. The Permanent Representative to the international organisations in Geneva was sceptical about the Westerners’ mindset, “that alongside armaments, political discussions and cultural exchanges should be used to change the nature of the Soviet Union”. It seemed doubtful that the Western “counteroffensive through cooperation in economic and cultural exchanges” against the Eastern objective of consolidating the status quo would succeed and



“how far the iron wall can be broken in terms of human traffic and exchange of ideas” (doc. 28, [dodis.ch/76947](https://dodis.ch/76947)). It was probably the Japanese Ambassador in London who described the differing expectations among the various participants in the most colourful terms: “Even if this conference is held, concrete results cannot be expected”, he wrote to Tokyo in June, “and any conclusions reached will likely be a product of parties sleeping in the same bed but dreaming different dreams” (doc. 23, [dodis.ch/76946](https://dodis.ch/76946)).

### **The Multilateral Preparatory Talks from 22 November 1972 to 8 June 1973 in Dipoli**

Finland’s invitation of 9 November 1972 to the Heads of mission accredited in Helsinki brought the multilateral consultations into existence: representatives of the interested states were asked to begin the preparatory negotiations at Dipoli Conference Building on the campus of the Helsinki University of Technology in Otaniemi on 22 November 1972 (doc. 33, [dodis.ch/76730](https://dodis.ch/76730)).

As of 1 January 1973, the European Community grew from six to nine members following the accession of Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland. They harmonised their position on the organisation of the CSCE in three stages, on the timetable, on procedural questions such as the choice of consensus for decision-making rather than a voting system, as well as draft mandates to the various committees and sub-committees. “In reality, however, they are for the most part based on French reference documents and it would be more accurate to say that they illustrate the alignment of our eight partners with our own views in this area” surmised a French memorandum (doc. 34, [dodis.ch/76975](https://dodis.ch/76975)). An even more detailed plan covering all sorts of procedural questions was presented by the NATO Political Committee. The outline scenario’s basic aim was to ensure that at the coming CSCE enough common ground existed among the preparatory meeting’s participants “to warrant expectations that a Conference would produce satisfactory results”. Therefore, the talks at Dipoli should be kept “as informal and flexible as possible” (doc. 35, [dodis.ch/76986](https://dodis.ch/76986)). Although consensus within the NATO Member States was achieved on a wide range of issues, there still remained numerous unresolved questions of procedural and substantive nature which the Allies had not yet agreed upon, even after the start of the preparatory talks (doc. 37, [dodis.ch/76987](https://dodis.ch/76987)). One of these questions concerned the exact wording of the agenda item “freer movement” Canada defended the NATO formula against the softer language (“human contacts”) preferred by the EEC countries. “Anyone with experience of negotiating with USSR is aware that concessions are not extracted by unilateral softening of positions”, Ottawa insisted on not narrowing the mandate before entering in proper negotiations (doc. 38, [dodis.ch/77047](https://dodis.ch/77047)).

From its very beginning, the Dipoli consultations obviously became much more than a technical prelude. The different agenda items were grouped into four main “chapters” which were to be known as “baskets”, divided into subcommittees and working groups: I) “political and security matters”; II) “economic and related issues; III) “human contacts, culture, and information”; and IV) “follow-up of the conference”. In March 1973, the Turkish Ambassador in Helsinki captured the

dynamics of the preliminary negotiations in a report to Ankara. He observed the active role taken by the EEC countries and especially by France, which allowed the United States to keep a low profile, while letting the remaining Westerners and neutrals suspect the tendency of the Nine to form a bloc. He addressed German sensitivity, the Neutral's pressing for the Mediterranean and the arbitration institution, Yugoslavia's drive for economic cooperation and Romania's focus on security issues, as well as the shifting of the consultations "towards private contacts and backroom activities" (doc. 41, [dodis.ch/77131](https://dodis.ch/77131)). The venue for the conference also became a hotly debated topic. Whilst there was agreement that Helsinki should host the first phase, Vienna, Geneva and Lausanne were under consideration as venues for the actual negotiations and the final round (doc. 42, [dodis.ch/76988](https://dodis.ch/76988)). In the end, an agreement was reached on the Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki formula. From a distance, Israel followed the discussions on the inclusion of the Mediterranean issue with growing concern and continued to reject any attempt to turn the CSCE into yet another arena for the Arab-Israeli conflict; at the same time, however, it recognised that Europe's security could not be hermetically separated from the Mediterranean region (doc. 39, [dodis.ch/77194](https://dodis.ch/77194)). After the January 1973 ceasefire agreement for Vietnam, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs examined the ongoing CSCE talks with a view to identifying differences and parallels in relation to a possible model for collective security in Asia, which had already been proposed by the Soviet Union in June 1969. Tokyo feared that Moscow would now also press ahead with these plans in order to extend its influence in Asia (doc. 40, [dodis.ch/76948](https://dodis.ch/76948)).

The questions on non-use or threat of force and the inviolability of borders became a central battle in Helsinki. The West, overruling the French, fiercely opposed the Soviet demand to keep the two issues strictly separate, which would block self-determination and any peaceful change of frontiers. Moscow's unexpected insistence not only on setting up a permanent pan-European body as an outcome of the CSCE, but also on the absolute autonomy of the inviolability of the current European borders, "has unexpectedly given the West a significant negotiating advantage", an Italian memorandum stated in April 1973 (doc. 43, [dodis.ch/75743](https://dodis.ch/75743)). French diplomacy considered its "extensive consultations with the Soviet Union" to have played a major role in the progress made in Helsinki. Paris and Moscow saw themselves aligned in excluding any negotiations of military nature except confidence-building measures from the talks. The Soviet proposal to create a permanent advisory body to the CSCE was at least not openly opposed by France (doc. 46, [dodis.ch/76976](https://dodis.ch/76976)). In Washington, Helmut Sonnenfeldt wrapped up for Henry Kissinger how "the Soviets are becoming disquieted by the drift of CSCE, and will toughen up in the next round". According to him, the US delegation managed "to steer carefully between the Soviets and the Allies", supporting their NATO partner's positions whilst trying to move the process towards a conclusion eagerly awaited by the East by June. The United States also supported Moscow "on excluding military security and on some form of permanent machinery" (doc. 44, [dodis.ch/76943](https://dodis.ch/76943)). The fears of Western Europe that the United States government would be prepared to make all manner of concessions in Helsinki in order to break the deadlock in the disarmament talks with Moscow

did not seem unfounded. Distrust of Washington's intentions could only encourage the Nine to strengthen their solidarity, a report from the Western European Union's General Affairs Committee stated, "failing which they may one day find themselves faced with an American-Soviet agreement about which they have no say". It argued that détente could not be effective unless it helped "to free mankind". The Nine, NATO, the Council of Europe and the WEU each had a role to play (doc. 45, [dodis.ch/77041](https://dodis.ch/77041)).

Within the resonant concrete halls of the Finnish Students' Union at Dipoli the Multilateral Preparatory Talks for the CSCE began on 22 November 1972. The Ambassadors accredited to Helsinki, who varied considerably in their experience in multilateral diplomacy, had very little idea of what awaited them. According to the British representative, the informal talks had soon become a "Conference in their own right", which concluded after 199 days with the adoption of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations on 8 June 1973, known as the "Blue Book". The primary reason for the "relative success of the West so far", according to Ambassador Thomas Elliott, was the "careful advance preparation carried out in NATO and in the Political Consultations of the Nine". On the other hand, "the Russians" had entered the negotiations with misconceptions and "found themselves in a forum where they could expect the regular support of only six out of thirty-four delegations, and where the neutral countries, because of the consensus rule, had much more incentive to express, and persist in expressing". Moscow had to learn, that the conference could not be reduced to a mere confirmation of the status quo it had sought, for the West "stuck together well" and refused to accept an opening date for the CSCE until it was clear that the talks had "produced satisfactory results". "It was a stimulating experience", the British diplomat reported, "to find the Russians, in the hearing of representatives of all their satellites, obliged to give a detailed defence of their domestic policies on, for example, the increase of human and cultural contacts, in order to answer criticism by Liechtenstein". As a newcomer in the ECC, the United Kingdom started playing a cautious role within the Nine, but "the detached position of the French, the special preoccupations of the Germans, the eccentricity of the Italians and the public silences of Benelux increasingly made it necessary for us to give a lead" (doc. 49, [dodis.ch/76770](https://dodis.ch/76770)). The Canadians also considered that the West had gained more than had seemed possible when the talks opened. Terms like the facilitation of freer movement, family reunification, mixed marriages, or freer dissemination of information, all entered in the mandates, and the draft outline of principles for relations between European states included language that would "deny the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty" (doc. 47, [dodis.ch/77048](https://dodis.ch/77048)). Just as agreement had been reached on all major points, the Maltese delegation, much to the dismay of the Israeli observers, raised the Mediterranean issue once again and unexpectedly called for the Arab states to be included in the CSCE. The incident vividly demonstrated how the veto of a tiny nation (bribed, it was surmised, by either Libya or China) could threaten the entire outcome of the consensus negotiations (doc. 48, [dodis.ch/76980](https://dodis.ch/76980)).

### **The Opening stage of the CSCE from 3 to 7 July 1973 in Helsinki**

Finally, Stage I of the CSCE took the form of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of all Participating States, who gathered in Helsinki from 3 to 7 July 1973 to adopt the agreed mandates. Even though the stage was likely to be largely a formality, British Ambassador Elliott considered the proceedings being somewhat of a disappointment: "A number of Western Ministers said little that was new, while the Ministers from the Warsaw Pact countries said far too much that was old." Despite the rigid attitudes the Soviets publicly adopted, he remained optimistic about the negotiations in Geneva, which were due to begin in September. Just as the West could use Moscow's desire for a conference to ensure that the mandates basically reflected its plans, "we should be able to exploit the Soviet wish for a summit at the third stage to ensure that Stage II concludes in a form that is favourable to us" (doc. 53, [dodis.ch/76775](https://dodis.ch/76775)). The united front of the Allies would put the Soviets "under considerable pressure to modify their present restrictive practices in the areas of human contact and the flow of information and ideas", US Secretary of State William Rogers noted in his report to President Richard Nixon (doc. 51, [dodis.ch/76944](https://dodis.ch/76944)). This prospect did not prevent Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko from adopting a tough stance in his bilateral conversation with Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp. Preventing war and tension was the paramount issue of the CSCE, but "wars were not caused by problems of marriages, visas, travel or tourism", Gromyko declared. Europe was living on a "powder keg, which certain groups did not want to see removed", while talking "about visits to grandparents" instead. Sharp countered that for durable peace it was essential to break down mutual mistrust through human contact (doc. 50, [dodis.ch/77050](https://dodis.ch/77050)). The Federal Foreign Office also expressed cautious optimism about Stage II: "The concepts differ, but all participating States approved the mandates without reservation", Bonn stated. "We can expect the negotiations to be difficult and lengthy" as well as unity being "a major pre-requisite for the success of the CSCE" (doc. 52, [dodis.ch/77018](https://dodis.ch/77018)). The Israeli Ambassador in Helsinki also predicted that the "Third Basket" on "human contacts", which because of its significance for the plight of the Jews in Eastern Europe was of vital interest, will be "the subject of the most heated controversy at the CSCE" (doc. 54, [dodis.ch/76981](https://dodis.ch/76981)).

### **The Negotiation stage of the CSCE from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975 in Geneva**

Geneva became the workshop of the Final Act. What had been framed in Dipoli now had to be written, bracketed, compromised and packaged. As Stage II was due to take place in Geneva, Switzerland found itself in the role of host of the CSCE's main negotiating phase. The Swiss delegation had played an active role in Dipoli by establishing the procedural and organisational matters in the first weeks as well as in facilitating the start of detailed discussion by compiling and classifying all the proposals in question into a single document in January 1973. Then, Switzerland was tasked, along with Austria and Sweden, to coordinate the works

on the “security” chapter of the agenda. The choice of Geneva as the location for the second phase confirmed to Bern that Switzerland, as a neutral state, was able to provide “good offices” to the conference. The specifically Swiss proposal to develop a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes was incorporated into the Draft Recommendations and was subsequently given priority. Swiss diplomacy’s secondary objective in Geneva was to very closely monitor the further development of the agenda items human contacts and flow of information (doc. 55, [dodis.ch/38816](https://dodis.ch/38816)). The “human side of politics” also played a key role for neighbouring Austria, likewise neutral, as was evident from the opening statement made by the head of Vienna’s delegation to the Sub-Committee on “human contacts”. Due to their geography and history, Austrians “maintain many family and other personal relationships beyond our borders and therefore have a very concrete interest in creating better conditions for contacts between people in all their forms”, Ambassador Helmut Liedermann declared. His country was not pursuing missionary aims, “but purely practical goals that are in line with our own interests and at the same time serve to ease tensions” (doc. 57, [dodis.ch/75712](https://dodis.ch/75712)). In early October, French diplomacy approached its intervention on the flow of information in a similar spirit of principled realism, admitting that within the according Sub-Committee, “two fundamentally different conceptions of information” were clashing. The task, the French delegate claimed, was not to reconcile political philosophies, but to negotiate practical improvements in access, dissemination and journalistic work: “Our effort to boost and to enrich the flow of mutual information between our countries can only succeed if, on both sides, we accept the rules of the game and stick to them” (doc. 58, [dodis.ch/76977](https://dodis.ch/76977)).

Separate from the CSCE, negotiations on MBFR between member states of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, being prepared since January, officially started in Vienna on 30 October 1973, excluding neutral and non-aligned countries. In a lecture at the NATO Defence College in Rome, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jörg Kastl pointed out that the Alliance’s desired to reach with the MBFR “a more stable military balance in Central Europe at a lower level where hitherto the level of armed confrontation had been the highest”. As for the Geneva negotiations on CSCE, Kastl cherished that the Allies around the big table, may “not sing ‘con una voce’, but rather sing, each one harmoniously a polyphonically orchestrated theme”, to bring the Conference, with much patience and tenacity, to a good end (doc. 56, [dodis.ch/76989](https://dodis.ch/76989)). To take the musical metaphor to its logical conclusion: there have also been repeated attempts to disrupt the complex harmony of the Western concerto. Poland was, admittedly, well aware of the linkage sought by the Federal Republic – combining Warsaw’s core demand the principle of the inviolability of frontiers with the principles of the self-determination of nations and the peaceful change of borders – related to the inner-German relationship rather than threatening the Oder-Neisse Line. Because all of the Nine feared that a strict interpretation of the principle of territorial integrity might pose an obstacle to European integration, the East found itself “opposed by the entire united bloc of the EEC”. Warsaw therefore sought to find a formula that would reject the FRG’s interpretation without interfering with the integration doctrine, in order to break up the Western front (doc. 59, [dodis.ch/76990](https://dodis.ch/76990)).



[dis.ch/76898](https://dis.ch/76898)). The Soviet Ambassador in Bonn also criticised the West German wording regarding the inviolability of frontiers in a conversation with Chancellor Willy Brandt. The FRG continued to strengthen its position on the issue of German Unity amongst its allies, without provoking a bilateral dispute with the Soviet Union (doc. 61, [dodis.ch/77019](https://dodis.ch/77019)). In a letter to General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev from February 1974, Brandt reiterated that the agreement reached in the 1970 Moscow Treaty, namely “that the principle of the inviolability of frontiers does not affect states’ sovereign right to change frontiers through peaceful means”, could certainly be incorporated into the CSCE as well without controversy. Neither did the Chancellor wish for co-operation in the humanitarian sphere to be seen as interference in the internal structures of other states (doc. 65, [dodis.ch/76991](https://dodis.ch/76991)).

Whereas on 5 April 1974, all CSCE participating States approved the inclusion of a statement on the continued admissibility of peaceful and consensual frontier changes in the Declaration on Principles, the positions in Basket III, indeed, remained far apart. “Essentially WPO have shown no sign of accepting anything more than statement of good intent in human contacts area, well hedged by respect for restrictive principles”, the Canadian delegation summarised. It considered that during the drafting phase ahead “every inch of real progress beyond minimal level will be hard-fought and will require stubborn and united efforts of allies combined with as much influential neutral support as can be rallied” (doc. 63, [dodis.ch/77052](https://dodis.ch/77052)). An assessment by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states just how far apart the positions were. The USSR and its allies’ fundamental pursuit – besides the quickest possible conclusion and institutionalisation of the CSCE, thereby ensuring an appropriate formulation of the inviolability of borders – was to effectively guarantee that the “maximalist demands” of the capitalist countries regarding human rights “will not serve the interests of anti-communist forces and that they will be implemented with full respect for the sovereignty of states, non-interference in their internal affairs as well as their laws and customs” (doc. 64, [dodis.ch/76899](https://dodis.ch/76899)). As the Turkish delegation rightly observed, two entirely distinct approaches to the Conference’s concept clashed here: that of the West, which was based on human relations, and that of the Soviet Union, which put forward the supremacy of the State and wanted to avoid any initiative “that would undermine the Eastern system even in the long term and open up a breach”. Ankara’s self-interest came up insofar as the delegation sought to ensure that no wording in Basket I “undermines any ‘option’ necessary for us to pursue the Cyprus issue” (doc. 62, [dodis.ch/77137](https://dodis.ch/77137)).

Whilst the situation in Cyprus was not due to fully escalate until the summer of 1974, the Middle East once again captured the attention of the international community as early as October 1973 with the Yom Kippur War. As a “non-participating Mediterranean State”, Israel – alongside the Arab states – was able to set out its position at the opening sessions, a topic which, as was strongly emphasised by the Israeli Ambassador to Bern, had ultimately not been included as an official conference agenda item in Helsinki (doc. 60, [dodis.ch/76982](https://dodis.ch/76982)). The fact that Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Syria had all raised the Middle East conflict in their statements “in an explicit and controversial manner and in extreme lan-

guage that is offensive to Israel” fuelled Jerusalem’s concerns that the issue might nevertheless be discussed before the CSCE (doc. 68, [dodis.ch/76983](https://dodis.ch/76983)).

The drafting work on the principle of the inviolability of borders began in March 1974. A Turkish report takes us deep into the intricacies of the editorial process. It traces how various proposals were put forward seeking to reconcile the opposing positions on the contentious issues of linking the principle with the non-use of force, the special status of certain borders and their changing through peaceful means (doc. 66, [dodis.ch/77129](https://dodis.ch/77129)). In April, the French Ambassador in Bonn, Jean Sauvagnargues, introduced further complicating aspects regarding the German question within the context of the negotiations. He feared that the specific situation of the two Germanies and the prerogatives of the Four Powers, as set out in the Berlin Agreement, might become diluted within a pan-European framework of rules (doc. 67, [dodis.ch/76978](https://dodis.ch/76978)). Italian diplomats, on the other hand, levelled harsh criticism at a French draft which sought to safeguard quadripartite responsibilities by means of a general reaffirmation of all existing treaties. This move, they feared, could also be interpreted as an indirect legitimisation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. They also accused the Bonn Group – that is, the Four Powers and the FRG – of having accepted a solution favourable to the Soviet Union without sufficient consultation with the European Community and NATO regarding the clause on the peaceful change of frontiers (doc. 71, [dodis.ch/75748](https://dodis.ch/75748)).

“The negotiations are undoubtedly in crisis”, was the conclusion at a meeting of the Swiss Federal Council with its diplomats to the CSCE in June. Their own proposal on the peaceful settlement of disputes was in danger of failing. Discussions about military measures – where the Swiss, together with the other neutrals (Sweden, Austria, Finland) and the non-aligned (Yugoslavia, Malta and Cyprus), had been drafting their first common proposal as the “N+N Group” – still remained “so benign as to seem laughable”. In Basket III “things are at a standstill” too, but there was still “a glimmer of hope”. Bern believed that the CSCE was an opportunity for the N+N “to demonstrate their political existence and make their voices heard”, although it remained unsure if they “could really offer anything concrete to break the deadlock at the Conference” (doc. 69, [dodis.ch/38858](https://dodis.ch/38858)). A Finnish initiative proposing a compromise formula on which the USA and the USSR had agreed upon behind the scenes, did not, for the time being, satisfy the demands of the Nine (doc. 70, [dodis.ch/77133](https://dodis.ch/77133)). The “package deal” eventually presented by the N+N states at the end of July as a compromise acceptable to all sides meant that, on the one hand, the provisions in Basket III were implemented in accordance with Soviet wishes, subject only to the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, but on the other hand, as demanded by the West, they were also in line with human rights, fundamental freedoms, as well as the fulfilment of international obligations.

The agreement on the “package deal” fuelled Soviet hopes that the conference would terminate soon. In the Austro-Soviet talks held in Vienna in August 1974, Moscow was urging a swift conclusion “within a few months”, arguing that most of the points of contention had been resolved. Furthermore, the USSR complained about Austrian pressure regarding confidence-building measures. There was “a minimum and a maximum of what is possible” in the negotiations. “Let us strive



to turn the minimum of what is possible into the maximum of what is possible", was Austria's answer (doc. 72, [dodis.ch/75715](https://dodis.ch/75715)). It would take almost a year before a compromise could be reached. Meanwhile, Washington remained utterly uninterested in the European wrangling over the negotiations. When Secretary of State Kissinger took "five minutes" to brief newly elected US President Gerald Ford on the CSCE, he stressed that the United States "never wanted" this Conference. With unvarnished candour, he stated that the document, with its "big issues", which was currently being negotiated in Geneva, was, in his view, "meaningless" (doc. 73, [dodis.ch/76949](https://dodis.ch/76949)). Well into the autumn of 1974, there had been little progress to report on the shores of Lake Geneva.

The Italian delegation claimed to have been the first to perceive "signs of some thaw in the Soviet positions during an informal working meeting we had in early October with leading members of the USSR delegation" in Geneva. From then on, the negotiations proceeded at a much faster pace. The "results achieved, though not sensational, have been encouraging". Still the West would not yield the idea, that all the decisions of the CSCE had equal value: both "Basket I" with its demands upheld by Moscow, as well as its Western counterpart "Basket III". What lay ahead was the challenging task of putting all the documents in order, so that the texts still reflected, through the device of square brackets, the contrasting positions for which new compromises would have to be sought through a complex process of "give and take". Interestingly, the Italian delegation also sought to revive the discussion of a "follow-up" to the CSCE, which had originally been a priority for the Eastern bloc, but, as negotiations progressed successfully in the final phase, had become of greater interest to the West (doc. 76, [dodis.ch/75750](https://dodis.ch/75750)). Shortly before the Christmas break, the head of the Canadian delegation in Geneva, Thomas Delworth, took stock of the situation. The "greatest single achievement to date" was the elaboration of the family reunification text, made possible by Western persistence over many months and a series of recent Soviet concessions in connection with Brezhnev's summits with Ford in Vladivostok in November and with the French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing at Rambouillet in December 1974 (doc. 75, [dodis.ch/77054](https://dodis.ch/77054)). Delworth expressed his satisfaction that in the public assessment of the conference's meaning for Canada, the "heavy emphasis on human contacts issues" appeared to have been well received. He now recommended bringing a number of other aspects of the conference "into sharper Canadian focus" (doc. 74, [dodis.ch/77053](https://dodis.ch/77053)).

In January 1975, the Quai d'Orsay drew up an overview of the points of contact with the Federal Republic of Germany on various CSCE issues. Among other things, the French were happy having obtained a guarantee for quadripartite rights over Berlin and Germany as a whole, and emphasised that both Paris and Bonn regarded the same principles as being "of paramount importance" to them (doc. 77, [dodis.ch/76984](https://dodis.ch/76984)). Bonn, in turn, revisited the issue of "peaceful change", which had already been generally agreed upon, being included in the CSCE Declaration on Principles in April 1974. However, the exact positioning of the reference remained unresolved. Furthermore, since October 1974, the Soviet side had been unjustifiably complaining that the West Germans had changed the wording (doc. 78, [dodis.ch/77013](https://dodis.ch/77013)). When it was finally announced in early March 1975

that the USA and the USSR had agreed, without prior consultation, on the clause concerning the peaceful change of frontiers, Italian frustrations sharpened. Washington had mistakenly treated the question as one of exclusive German interest and ignored the Italian insistence that the issue was also fundamental to the interests of European political unification, now once again “sacrificed on the altar of the Soviet-American understanding”, the diplomats in Palazzo della Farnesina lamented bitterly. Furthermore, the new formula “coincides fully with the Soviet approach”, leaving the West without any bargaining chips, prompting the Italians to go so far as to declare the CSCE a political failure (doc. 79, [dodis.ch/75752](https://dodis.ch/75752)). Despite these disagreements amongst the Nine, the Heads of Government of the EC, at the inaugural meeting of the European Council in Dublin Castle on 10 and 11 March 1975, adopted a declaration in which they noted that, thanks to their concerted diplomacy, substantial progress had been achieved and undertook to seek positive solutions to the outstanding issues “to envisage concluding the Conference in the near future and at the highest level” (doc. 80, [dodis.ch/77042](https://dodis.ch/77042)).

The exact date of the closing conference had yet to be confirmed. At the meeting of Ministers of the EC on European Political Cooperation, held under the Irish Presidency on 26 May in Dublin, the Soviet request for a summit date in July was put forward as a bargaining chip by the West. The United Kingdom proposed using the prospect of a summer summit “as a form of pressure to obtain concessions from the East” on the remaining points that had not yet been settled. This position was shared by France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (doc. 85, [dodis.ch/76938](https://dodis.ch/76938)). In a further lecture delivered at the Defence College, Assistant Secretary-General Kastl provided an overview, from NATO’s perspective, of the state of the disarmament talks with the Warsaw Pact in Vienna, stressing the parallelism between MBFR and the CSCE. He emphasised that the West had managed to put its stamp on the CSCE – at first a “Soviet baby” – particularly in Basket III, for which “the Russians” had originally envisaged nothing more than an “increased number of exchanges between La Scala and the Bolshoi”. However, even after many years, the work was still not complete. Kastl expressed his regret for his colleagues in Geneva, who were still “looking for fine printed texts with commas and iotas in the right place” (doc. 81, [dodis.ch/76990](https://dodis.ch/76990)). However, the final phase of the CSCE did not take place in a political vacuum. One year after the fall of the authoritarian dictatorship in Portugal and shortly before the first free elections, NATO member states put pressure on the Soviet government to cease support for the Portuguese Communist Party, threatening that they would not sign the Final Act otherwise (doc. 82, [dodis.ch/76738](https://dodis.ch/76738)). In the midst of revolutionary upheaval, the transitional government saw its participation in the CSCE as an opportunity for Portugal “having an active voice in continental affairs, not distancing itself from Europe and keeping all doors open”. It generally aligned itself with the Allied positions, but adopted a discreet attitude and sought to establish good ties with the socialist countries as well (doc. 83, [dodis.ch/76761](https://dodis.ch/76761)).

It was clear to Western observers that the forthcoming conclusion of the conference would substantially enhance the prestige of the USSR, strengthen Brezhnev’s position, further consolidate the status quo, and consequently free

Moscow for some time from concerns about defending its interests in Europe (doc. 87, [dodis.ch/77059](https://dodis.ch/77059)). According to the head of the Canadian delegation Delworth, the aim of the West was therefore to seize the authority to interpret the Final Act. Contrary to the view widely held in the press and diplomatic circles, he believed “that the totality of CSCE text – even if sometimes lumpy and elephantine in expression – is encouragingly positive and tilted in our direction”. Precisely because the Soviets had invested so much in painful negotiations, they could not afford, with regard to the result, “to pretend that it never happened even though they do not much like it”. Canadian diplomacy should now widely publicise “the scope of Soviet failure at CSCE” in order to ensure that Moscow harbours no illusions during the pre- and post-Helsinki summit period “as to problems they are going to face in trying to sell West a European security pig-in-a-poke based on a propagandistic presentation of CSCE text rather than a careful reading of it” (doc. 84, [dodis.ch/77057](https://dodis.ch/77057)). West-German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, too, regretted the media’s tendency to attach less importance to the conference’s results than they deserved. At the cabinet meeting of 9 July 1975, he stressed that the coherence of NATO and EEC proved to be reliable during the whole process and interpreted that “the necessity to cooperate as closely as possible within the framework of this Conference and to shoulder the main burden of the West there” even constituted “a particularly effective integrating factor in the political cooperation of the Nine”. In addition, the Federal Republic’s diplomacy had been “able to eliminate or at least minimise the threats to our Germany policy that individual provisions in the set of principles could have harboured”. As for Basket III, Bonn’s ideas regarding cooperation and contacts, information and culture had not been realised to the desired extent, but “nonetheless, these obligations set a standard against which states will have to allow themselves to be measured” and therefore had the potential to change Europe’s reality for the better (doc. 86, [dodis.ch/77015](https://dodis.ch/77015)).

Another contribution to public framing is the assessment carried out by Ireland, which during its Presidency in the first half of 1975 had the tough task of speaking on behalf of the Community and coordinating their positions. The Department of Foreign Affairs rated the outcome as “moderately satisfactory” and considered the unity in outlook and the Nine’s acting together to be the most important feature of the Conference (doc. 88, [dodis.ch/76939](https://dodis.ch/76939)). “Everyone came away more or less satisfied”, the French Foreign Ministry echoed in its summary. The primary focus now was also on the interpretation of the texts and their presentation to the public. The members of the Community should shield themselves against the dangers posed by the traps of language, the French warned. Eastern propaganda would try to reintroduce notions like “irreversible détente” (as means of enshrining the status quo and move towards “the dissolution of military alliances and the establishment of a collective security system in Europe”), as well as “peaceful coexistence” – which for the communists meant “exploiting the weaknesses and divisions of the adversaries by all means short of war, with the final goal of overturning Western democracy” (doc. 89, [dodis.ch/76985](https://dodis.ch/76985)).

### The Third Stage: the CSCE Summit from 30 July to 1 August 1975 in Helsinki

“The Conference could only be a stage in the process of détente, and a great deal will depend on the way in which the implementation of its results can be assessed and reviewed”, British diplomats summarised the results of the Geneva negotiations for the Foreign Office in Whitehall. By far the most important factors for their “relatively satisfactory results”, they considered “the unity and determination of the Nine and the Fifteen”, assisted, especially in Basket III, by the neutrals and non-aligned. The Soviet leadership “will try to extract every possible propaganda advantage” from the Helsinki summit, but “they have paid quite a high price” for it (doc. 95, [dodis.ch/76776](https://dodis.ch/76776)). Canadian diplomacy recommended the Cabinet to sign the Final Act, because the Soviet “desire to render the European situation immutable has not been fulfilled, and instead the idea of change, of dynamic and evolving relationships rather than fixed and static ones, runs through the CSCE text as a whole like a continuing theme”. For the first time, the Eastern European governments had given a clear moral and political commitment that human contacts and the freer flow of information were legitimate subjects for multilateral negotiation. “[A] chart for future action has been laid out, in terms not just of general principles but also of specific measures” (doc. 91, [dodis.ch/77060](https://dodis.ch/77060)). Canada contrasted its active participation in the CSCE with the United States’ passive posture, arguing that this would lessen any tendency to regard it “simply as a North American adjunct to NATO” and would instead place the country “firmly into European camp” (doc. 94, [dodis.ch/77061](https://dodis.ch/77061)). Indeed, a sceptical Secretary of State Henry Kissinger briefed President Ford for his Helsinki speech that Washington had “participated in the CSCE with restraint, wishing neither to block the efforts of its Allies nor to have the CSCE seen as a source of contention between the US and the Soviet Union.” The story Ford should tell the world was one of the CSCE’s modest achievements and of the fact that the proof of its success lay in the future, while “a strong Allied defence posture” remained “a precondition for security and future détente” (doc. 92, [dodis.ch/76956](https://dodis.ch/76956)). Irish diplomacy also recommended approval of the Final Act by the Taoiseach, stressing that its principles with constitutional implications on territorial integrity and non-intervention in internal affairs were “to be seen only as a statement of political intent and that they do not have any legal force”. Due to its importance for the German question and European integration, the agreed upon formula “peaceful change of frontiers” was also acceptable for Dublin (doc. 93, [dodis.ch/76940](https://dodis.ch/76940)).

The Eastern side also expressed their satisfaction. The Politburo of the United Workers’ Party confirmed “the compliance of the CSCE Final Act with the vital interests Poland”. The socialist countries had succeeded in ensuring that the summit was dominated by the priority issue of security, “rather than the issues of the ‘third basket’”. As for the speeches delivered by the 35 heads of state and government of the participating countries in Helsinki, those of the socialist countries were “united in character”, with the exception of that given by President Nicolae Ceaușescu presenting his “well-known programme of Romanian foreign policy with some demagogic accents” (doc. 99, [dodis.ch/76900](https://dodis.ch/76900)). Diplomatic cir-

cles in both Bonn and London also drew detailed analyses of the speeches. The Federal Foreign Office recorded a generally sober assessment by the East. By contrast, NATO members as well as neutral Western leaders emphasised the need for peaceful change in Europe. A sceptical President Ford passionately defended the ideals of the Western democracies as well and reaffirmed US support for the CSCE and Europe. The only sour note was the openly played-out war of words between Cyprus and Turkey (doc. 101, [dodis.ch/77014](https://dodis.ch/77014)). British Ambassador Elliott saw this unique summit as a sensational success for his host country, whose inhabitants “have long felt themselves to be an almost forgotten nation in an isolated corner of Europe”. Now, for a short while, they found themselves at the “centre of the world”. He surmised that the speeches by the heads of delegation would “provide those who are thoroughly familiar with the intricacies of Phase II – as well as future historians – with a great quarry of material for study and analysis”. He highlighted in particular the words of his prime minister, who emphasised that “the Conference would be judged by the effect it had on the lives of ordinary people in Europe; ‘there is no reason why in 1975 Europeans should not be allowed to marry whom they want, travel abroad where and when they want, and meet whom they want’” (doc. 103, [dodis.ch/76777](https://dodis.ch/76777)).

Two of the summit speeches are fully reproduced in this volume. The President of the Swiss Confederation Pierre Graber stressed that his country’s neutrality never was an excuse for indifference or isolationism, but dictated the ambition to serve the international community. He was delighted to see not only neutrality, but also human rights included in the chapter on the principles, which had now the same importance in the European consciousness as respect for the inviolability of borders. The discussions in Geneva had revealed that the Swiss project for the peaceful settlement of disputes was not yet acceptable to everyone and its development was to be resumed in the follow-up of the Conference. The CSCE’s results were “both little and much”, Graber concluded: “Little, if we consider them in isolation and as the end point of a long and difficult exercise. Much, if they could be the sign and promise of a truly new era in international relations” (doc. 96, [dodis.ch/38867](https://dodis.ch/38867)). Austrian Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky saw the “code of conduct between states” elaborated at the CSCE only “as the conclusion of a first, but very decisive phase” within the process of détente – the start of which he traced back to the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 – and which “must now show visible and substantial results”. Kreisky particularly emphasised two elements. First, he again brought in interdependence of Europe with the Middle East, which was not only the “cradle of our culture” but on whose oil reserves the western part of the continent was heavily dependent. Kreisky therefore appealed once again to the Arab states and Israel to find a peaceful solution to their conflict. His second point was to make it clear that, in his view, there was no reason “to downplay or even ignore the fundamental differences” between the “various political systems and social orders” in Europe. According to Kreisky, “coexistence” could not be valid “in the ideological sphere”. Austria was “prepared for this controversy” and ready for a “global debate to take place in a peaceful manner” (doc. 97, [dodis.ch/75720](https://dodis.ch/75720)). With regard to the first point, the conflict in the Middle East was not mentioned at all in the Mediterranean chapter of the Final Act, which Israel



noted with satisfaction as a success. A final clause Malta managed to insert into the document, however, ensured that the Arab-Israeli issue might not disappear entirely from future discussions, which had now been confirmed by Kreisky's intervention (doc. 90, [dodis.ch/77196](https://dodis.ch/77196)). The second point had further repercussions in that the Soviet authorities, albeit jokingly, accused Kreisky of having "declared war on communism" in his speech. The Austrian Ambassador in Moscow countered the provocation by accusing the Soviets of exerting influence in favour of the communists in Portugal, thereby alienating the social democratic parties of Western Europe (doc. 102, [dodis.ch/75726](https://dodis.ch/75726)).

In fact, the Helsinki Summit was also heavily influenced by the dramatic events surrounding the change of government in Portugal. As the Portuguese Ambassador in Washington reported, Soviet interference in the elections contributed to the US's perceived overly conciliatory stance towards the USSR regarding the CSCE coming under fire in the press (doc. 98, [dodis.ch/76762](https://dodis.ch/76762)). Francisco da Costa Gomes, Portugal's interim president, who had been appointed from the ranks of the military junta that overthrew the dictatorship, encountered growing concern among his Western counterparts during the bilateral talks which, like many other heads of state, he held during the Helsinki Summit. For example, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, pointed to a deterioration in the situation, which led him to believe that a dictatorial solution was inevitable in Portugal – a view that Costa Gomes vehemently rejected, arguing instead for a pursuit of a "socialist solution based on a multi-party system" (doc. 100, [dodis.ch/76763](https://dodis.ch/76763)). The most recent assessment came from a circular issued by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 22 August 1975, which provides an overview of the results, organised according to the Declaration of Principles and the Confidence-Building Measures, the texts of Baskets II and III, the Declaration on the Mediterranean, and the Follow-up of the Conference. For Rome, the result was clear: "Thanks to their cohesion, particularly among the Nine, the Western countries were able to achieve results that we have no hesitation in describing as consistent with our ideas and requirements" (doc. 104, [dodis.ch/75753](https://dodis.ch/75753)).

As the 104 documents in this volume show, the Helsinki Final Act was deliberately ambiguous, but not empty. It confirmed the inviolability of frontiers, yet did not make them immutable. It affirmed sovereignty and non-intervention, yet placed self-determination, human rights, and fundamental freedoms beside them. It recognised the political realities of post-war Europe, yet refused to transform them into a legally binding settlement. It gave the Soviet Union the summit it had sought, but denied it the short declaratory conference it had originally imagined. It avoided a permanent European security organisation, but created a follow-up process to ensure that the implementation of its results could be monitored and reviewed. Therein lay the significance of Helsinki. The CSCE did not overcome the division of Europe in 1975. It created a language, a forum, and a set of political expectations through which that division could be addressed, contested, and gradually transcended. The participating states had not agreed on what *détente* meant, but they had agreed on texts to which each of them could later be held. The CSCE paved the way for a long and often arduous process of dialogue, which may



30 well have contributed to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and, in any case, demonstrated the possibility of shaping a peaceful Europe and putting it into practice.

Thomas Bürgisser and Sacha Zala, July 2026

- 1  
22.3.1969  
[dodis.ch/76960](https://dodis.ch/76960)  
France

*Eastern Europe Department memorandum on the Declaration on European Security*

The Warsaw Pact summit exposed internal divisions. Moscow failed to tighten military control. The moderate Budapest declaration offered little new, mainly aiming to revive détente with the West.
- 2  
27.3.1969  
[dodis.ch/75738](https://dodis.ch/75738)  
Italy

*The Italian Ambassador in Moscow to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Nenni on the Budapest Appeal*

The Soviet initiative seeks to strengthen the Warsaw Pact and reopen dialogue with Western Europe, combining détente with strategic pressure. Driven by internal issues, China conflict, and control over allies, it aims to divide the West. The response should be cautious, firm, and realistic.
- 3  
4.4.1969  
[dodis.ch/76893](https://dodis.ch/76893)  
Poland

*Memorandum by Foreign Minister Jędrzychowski regarding further Action and Consultation with the USSR on CSCE*

Positive reactions from Western countries to the Budapest Appeal are noted, with emphasis on the need for consultations with the USSR and other signatories. Poland should undertake active preparatory measures for the CSCE and support Finland's candidacy to host the conference.
- 4  
4.4.1969  
[dodis.ch/76941](https://dodis.ch/76941)  
United States

*National Security Advisor Kissinger to President Nixon*

A briefing on the Soviet initiative proposing a European security conference, analysing Moscow's motives and outlining the US response to the Warsaw Pact "appeal". At this stage, holding grandiose conferences seems futile and dangerous.
- 5  
25.4.1969  
[dodis.ch/76725](https://dodis.ch/76725)  
Finland

*The Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the idea of convening a preparatory meeting for a Conference on Security in Europe*

In response to the Warsaw Pact proposal, Finland favours a European security conference, supports a preparatory meeting with broad representation, will survey countries' positions, and will monitor and assess prospects for preparatory measures.

- 32      **6**      *Instructions to all Finnish missions in Europe, the United States and Canada concerning the Conference on European Security*  
 2.5.1969  
[dodis.ch/76726](https://dodis.ch/76726)  
 Finland  
 In a memorandum dated 5 May 1969, Finland takes the initiative for a European Security Conference, advocating a broadly inclusive, well-prepared meeting without preconditions, offering to host it, and emphasizing neutrality and cooperation.
- 7**      *Initial reactions of foreign powers to the Finnish Government memorandum on the European Security Conference*  
 7.5.1969  
[dodis.ch/76727](https://dodis.ch/76727)  
 Finland  
 Most states respond cautiously but positively to Finland's proposal. The preparation should be careful, and the resolving of German participation, as well as superpower agreement, is seen as the main obstacle.
- 8**      *Analysis of the reactions to the Finnish memorandum by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*  
 25.7.1969  
[dodis.ch/77136](https://dodis.ch/77136)  
 Türkiye  
 Ankara reviews Finland's initiative. It supports the idea in principle but stresses careful preparation, agreed agenda, broad participation, and gradual bilateral consultations.
- 9**      *The Canadian Department of External Affairs to the Finnish Ambassador in Ottawa*  
 4.9.1969  
[dodis.ch/77044](https://dodis.ch/77044)  
 Canada  
 Canada supports Finland's proposal to host a European security conference, welcoming efforts to improve East–West relations, promote stability, and prepare carefully for a successful and inclusive dialogue on European security.
- 10**      *Memorandum by Foreign Minister Jędrychowski on the Soviet position concerning CSCE*  
 [8.10.1969]  
[dodis.ch/76894](https://dodis.ch/76894)  
 Poland  
 USSR's push to rapidly convene the European Conference on Security and Cooperation while excluding border recognition is unfavourable to Polish interests. Intensive action, including a memorandum and counter-draft agenda, is needed to shift Moscow's stance.
- 11**      *The Austrian Ambassador in Helsinki on a Conversation with Soviet President Podgorny*  
 14.10.1969  
[dodis.ch/75699](https://dodis.ch/75699)  
 Austria  
 The USSR was pleased that Austria was the first country to respond positively to the Finnish initiative for a Security Conference. Based on the election results in the Federal Republic of Germany, Podgorny was confident that it would yield positive results.

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|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 33 | <b>12</b><br>1.11.1969<br><a href="https://dodis.ch/77045">dodis.ch/77045</a><br>Canada       | <i>The Department of External Affairs to the Canadian Embassy in Moscow on Canadian Participation</i><br>Determined to participate in a European Security Conference, Canada opts not to lobby for support, but to assert its right to be involved in the proceedings based on its role over the past century in European affairs and on its direct stake in European security.                               |
|    | <b>13</b><br>29.12.1969<br><a href="https://dodis.ch/32405">dodis.ch/32405</a><br>Switzerland | <i>Meeting of the Federal Political Department's Working Group on the European Security Conference</i><br>Diplomats are sceptical about the project. What remains are empty words and dangerous illusions reminiscent of the period before the Second World War. Swiss participation could depend on the recognition of neutrality; further commitments must be clarified.                                    |
|    | <b>14</b><br>3.7.1970<br><a href="https://dodis.ch/76895">dodis.ch/76895</a><br>Poland        | <i>Memorandum from the Department of Studies and Programming of the MFA to the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs</i><br>Reactions among Warsaw Pact countries to Poland's security project are mixed. The GDR and Hungary have expressed support, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have not yet responded, and Romania has offered comments. For now, the idea should be promoted without a formal presentation. |
|    | <b>15</b><br>24.11.1970<br><a href="https://dodis.ch/76729">dodis.ch/76729</a><br>Finland     | <i>Memorandum by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on multilateral gatherings on the arrangement of the Security conference</i><br>The Finnish government has been exploring ways and means to develop bilateral contacts in order to proceed towards a common understanding. It proposes discussing arrangements for a European security conference in multilateral gatherings in Helsinki.                   |
|    | <b>16</b><br>11.10.1971<br><a href="https://dodis.ch/76896">dodis.ch/76896</a><br>Poland      | <i>Memorandum by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs</i><br>The issue of convening a European conference on security and cooperation was discussed between Polish and Soviet representatives. The four-party agreement on West Berlin is assessed as a factor facilitating the conference. Further action and consultations are necessary.                                                                 |
|    | <b>17</b><br>5.4.1972<br><a href="https://dodis.ch/76942">dodis.ch/76942</a><br>United States | <i>National Security Advisor Kissinger to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird on Presidential Guidance on MBFR and CSCE</i><br>President Nixon's guidance is transmitted to members of his cabinet, outlining US policy decisions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a European Security and Cooperation Conference.                                                            |

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|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 34 | <p>18<br/>18.5.1972<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/77012">dodis.ch/77012</a><br/>Federal Republic of Germany</p> | <p><i>Guidelines of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</i></p> <p>The efforts to build understanding in Europe have reached a degree that evinces the possibility of a successful Conference on Security and Co-operation as a further contribution to détente. The Foreign Office will coordinate the preparatory work.</p>         |
|    | <p>19<br/>27.5.1972<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/77038">dodis.ch/77038</a><br/>European Community</p>          | <p><i>Speech by the President of the European Commission Mansholt at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of EC Member and Acceding Countries</i></p> <p>The President supports the political guidelines, stresses the Community's role in East–West cooperation, and calls for coordinated positions, especially on economic issues that are also discussed within NATO.</p>                                  |
|    | <p>20<br/>28.5.1972<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/75731">dodis.ch/75731</a><br/>Israel</p>                      | <p><i>The Director of the North American Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Israeli Ambassador in Ottawa</i></p> <p>The foreign ministry reports preliminary discussions on a security conference. It seeks to avoid discussion of the Middle East dispute and to prevent invitations to Arab state representatives, but would demand participation if they are included.</p>               |
|    | <p>21<br/>20.6.1972<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/76897">dodis.ch/76897</a><br/>Poland</p>                      | <p><i>Memorandum by the Deputy Foreign Minister on Polish activities regarding CSCE</i></p> <p>The state of preparations for the CSCE is assessed, along with the difficulties arising from Western policies. Resolving issues concerning the participation of the GDR and the FRG is considered an important condition for the success of the conference.</p>                                                |
|    | <p>22<br/>20.6.1972<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/34499">dodis.ch/34499</a><br/>Switzerland</p>                 | <p><i>Summary of Switzerland's position on the various issues raised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</i></p> <p>A Swiss initiative on peaceful dispute settlement appears useful and legitimate. The recognition of neutrality should be explored. Free movement of people and information is welcome, but transforming it into arrangements acceptable to all will be difficult.</p> |
|    | <p>23<br/>24.6.1972<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/76946">dodis.ch/76946</a><br/>Japan</p>                       | <p><i>The Japanese Ambassador in London to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Fukuda</i></p> <p>The Japanese ambassadors stationed in Eastern European countries met in London. While considering the response to the Soviet Union's proposed Asian Collective Security Plan, they also discussed Japan's participation as an observer in the CSCE.</p>                                                         |

- 35      24      *Motion for a resolution presented to the European Parliament on the preparation of the CSCE*  
 6.7.1972      The European Parliament welcomes recent East–West détente and calls for multilateral talks to prepare the CSCE. It urges a common Community position on easing economic and cultural barriers, free movement and promoting the Moscow missile-limitation agreement as a first step towards arms reduction.  
[dodis.ch/77039](https://dodis.ch/77039)  
 European Community
- 25      *The Israeli Ambassador in Vienna, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Meir–Kreisky Meeting*  
 19.7.1972      A summary of Prime Minister Meir’s conversation with Austrian Chancellor Kreisky, during their meeting at the congress of the Socialist International. Meir opposed Kreisky’s proposal to raise the issue of the Middle East at the CSCE.  
[dodis.ch/76979](https://dodis.ch/76979)  
 Israel
- 26      *The Assistant Under-Secretary to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs on the CSCE*  
 3.8.1972      Canada aims to use the CSCE to boost trade, cooperation, and security with Europe, reduce reliance on the US, and promote stability. It supports gradual East–West dialogue, focusing on security, economic ties, and freer movement of people, ideas, and information.  
[dodis.ch/77046](https://dodis.ch/77046)  
 Canada
- 27      *Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Patrício at the Dinner in Honour of NATO Secretary-General Luns in Lisbon*  
 [19.9.1972]      Increasingly challenged in international fora for its refusal to decolonize its overseas territories, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs reaffirms that Portugal is aligned with the path NATO is taking towards détente with Eastern Europe.  
[dodis.ch/76736](https://dodis.ch/76736)  
 Portugal
- 28      *The Japanese Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Geneva Kitahara to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira*  
 30.9.1972      This document provides a comprehensive discussion on the historical background of the CSCE and the intentions of the relevant countries, from a Japanese perspective.  
[dodis.ch/76947](https://dodis.ch/76947)  
 Japan
- 29      *The Turkish Ambassador in Helsinki, Batu, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*  
 4.10.1972      This report analyzes the CSCE amid shifting power balances and bloc rivalries, highlighting Turkish security concerns over Soviet pressure, support for a stronger Germany in Europe, cautious openness, and the long-term impacts on stability and regional security.  
[dodis.ch/77134](https://dodis.ch/77134)  
 Türkiye



- 36      30      *The European Commission's proposal to the Council on the European Communities' position*  
 9.10.1972      [dodis.ch/77040](https://dodis.ch/77040)      The Commission sets out EC principles for the CSCE: a unified stance, active participation, normalized ties with Eastern states, mutual benefits, and a strong defence of Community powers against Soviet efforts to sideline it.  
 European Community
- 31      *Proposal by the Federal Political Department to the Federal Council on the CSCE*  
 1.11.1972      [dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487)      Bilateral exchanges at all levels have been indispensable in preparing for the preliminary talks. A draft system for peaceful settlement of disputes has been developed. Regarding free movement, Switzerland could put forward proposals on family reunification.  
 Switzerland
- 32      *Report by the Chairman of the Political Committee at Senior Level*  
 7.11.1972      [dodis.ch/76974](https://dodis.ch/76974)      The Steering Brief outlines Allied strategy for CSCE talks, emphasizing Western unity, security, freer movement, and balanced negotiations with the USSR. It warns against Soviet attempts to legitimize postwar divisions, weaken NATO, and gain political leverage through détente.  
 NATO
- 33      *Memorandum by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the commencing of multilateral consultations in Helsinki*  
 9.11.1972      [dodis.ch/76730](https://dodis.ch/76730)      Multilateral consultations on European security are scheduled for 22 November 1972, bringing together 34 countries to discuss arrangements, with interpretation in six languages, reflecting broad support for preparatory talks and coordinated participation.  
 Finland
- 34      *Memorandum from the Political Affairs Directorate on the Preparation of the CSCE*  
 9.11.1972      [dodis.ch/76975](https://dodis.ch/76975)      The Nine aligned their positions on the CSCE: rejecting a US-Soviet timetable, supporting flexible consensus-based negotiations, and reaching compromises on security, cultural exchanges, and the flow of information.  
 France
- 35      *Note by the Chairman of the Political Committee at Senior Level*  
 14.11.1972      [dodis.ch/76986](https://dodis.ch/76986)      The document outlines NATO strategy for the Helsinki preparatory talks on a possible CSCE, stressing flexible, informal negotiations, Allied coordination, controlled procedures, cautious timing, and balanced agendas on security, cooperation, freer movement, and East-West relations.  
 NATO

- 37      36      *Reflection upon the dangers and opportunities represented by the CSCE to Portugal and its African policy*  
 [22.11.]1972  
[dodis.ch/76737](https://dodis.ch/76737)  
 Portugal  
 Portugal views European security talks as secondary, prioritizing African policy and regime stability; wary of Soviet influence and internal unrest, it sees risks to sovereignty but also limited economic openings with Eastern Europe.
- 37      *The NATO Secretary General Luns to the North Atlantic Council*  
 30.11.1972  
[dodis.ch/76987](https://dodis.ch/76987)  
 NATO  
 NATO allies agreed on many CSCE issues in 1972, but disputes remained over procedures, military security measures, declarations of principles, and Soviet proposals for permanent CSCE institutions.
- 38      *The Department of External Affairs to the Canadian Delegation to NATO*  
 5.1.1973  
[dodis.ch/77047](https://dodis.ch/77047)  
 Canada  
 Canada strongly opposes weakening NATO's stance on "freer movement" in CSCE talks, rejecting softer wording proposed by EEC states. It insists on firm negotiation tactics, full agenda scope, and maintaining leverage with the USSR to secure meaningful concessions.
- 39      *The Director of Europe I Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Assistant-Director General on CSCE and Middle East*  
 19.2.1973  
[dodis.ch/77194](https://dodis.ch/77194)  
 Israel  
 This report outlines opposition to adding the Middle East to the CSCE agenda, while noting that discussions on Mediterranean security are harder to reject, as separating interests across the region is seen as unrealistic.
- 40      *Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*  
 5.3.1973  
[dodis.ch/76948](https://dodis.ch/76948)  
 Japan  
 This report prepares the examination of Japan's policy response to the "Asian Collective Security Plan" proposed by the Soviet Union in 1969. It discusses the differences and similarities between it and the CSCE preparatory conference.
- 41      *The Turkish Ambassador in Helsinki Batu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*  
 7.3.1973  
[dodis.ch/77131](https://dodis.ch/77131)  
 Türkiye  
 This report on the CSCE details negotiations among Western, Eastern, and neutral states, highlighting Turkish positions on key principles, alliance coordination, conference procedures, and the growing reliance on informal diplomacy shaping outcomes and strategic balance.

- 38      42      *Report by the Chairman of the Political Committee at Senior level*  
 29.3.1973      NATO members agreed that Helsinki could host the first  
[dodis.ch/76988](https://dodis.ch/76988)      CSCE stage, but differed on later venues. Most considered  
 NATO      any decision on the third stage as premature and preferred  
                  all second-stage committees in one location.
- 43      *The Director-General for Political Affairs to the Minister*  
 2.4.1973      *of Foreign Affairs Medici on the Border Issue*  
[dodis.ch/75743](https://dodis.ch/75743)      CSCE talks show East–West rifts over the link between force  
 Italy      renunciation and inviolability of borders, plus Western strat-  
                  egy splits. The Soviet push for a fixed status quo raises stakes,  
                  and the West may seek leverage to secure human rights and  
                  self-determination.
- 44      *The member of the National Security Council Sonnenfeldt*  
 10.4.1973      *to National Security Advisor Kissinger*  
[dodis.ch/76943](https://dodis.ch/76943)      April 1973 CSCE talks show limited progress, but key dis-  
 United States      putes remain over borders, military security, human con-  
                  tacts and economic principles. Compromises are emerging,  
                  though Soviet positions are hardening ahead of the next ne-  
                  gotiation round.
- 45      *Report of the General Affairs Committee on harmonization*  
 3.5.1973      *of Western European countries policies*  
[dodis.ch/77041](https://dodis.ch/77041)      Preparation for the Helsinki talks: West European security  
 European Com-      through balanced force reductions, stability in Europe, full  
 munity      adherence to the modified Brussels Treaty, ensuring free  
                  movement of people and ideas across Europe, and continued  
                  dialogue with the Assembly on CSCE negotiations.
- 46      *Memorandum of the Political Affairs Directorate of the Ministry*  
 24.5.1973      *of Foreign Affairs on the French-Soviet Talks*  
[dodis.ch/76976](https://dodis.ch/76976)      France and the USSR reviewed progress on the CSCE, prais-  
 France      ing constructive Helsinki talks while debating military secu-  
                  rity issues. France supported confidence-building measures  
                  but rejected linking the CSCE to broader force-reduction ne-  
                  gotiations.
- 47      *The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Secretary*  
 6.6.1973      *of State for External Affairs on the Conclusion of Preparatory*  
[dodis.ch/77048](https://dodis.ch/77048)      *Talks*  
 Canada      The CSCE preparatory talks are judged a success, having  
                  achieved key Western objectives such as freer movement.  
                  Approval of the final agenda is recommended, along with  
                  continuing negotiations from a position of strength without  
                  conceding advantages to the Eastern bloc.

- 39      48  
12.6.1973  
[dodis.ch/76980](https://dodis.ch/76980)  
Israel  
*The Israeli Ambassador in Helsinki to the Director of the Europe I Department on Mintoff's position*  
This document presents speculation about the motivation of the Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff in taking up a pro-Arab position at the preliminary meetings of the CSCE in Geneva. Some believe that the Libyans or the Chinese are behind him.
- 49  
13.6.1973  
[dodis.ch/76770](https://dodis.ch/76770)  
United Kingdom  
*The British Ambassador in Helsinki on the first 200 days of the CSCE*  
The West emerged from the preparatory talks with its objectives met due to careful preparation, cohesion, and support from the neutrals. The Russians are on the defensive and this can be exploited if the Nine work together.
- 50  
5.7.1973  
[dodis.ch/77050](https://dodis.ch/77050)  
Canada  
*Conversation between Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Helsinki*  
Discussing the CSCE together, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs prioritizes security and disarmament, dismissing human contacts as secondary, while the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs argues that freer movement and personal exchanges help reduce mistrust and tensions, contributing to long-term peace.
- 51  
7.7.1973  
[dodis.ch/76944](https://dodis.ch/76944)  
United States  
*Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon on the CSCE Ministerial Meeting in Helsinki*  
All sides agree to continue work on principles, security, economic cooperation, and freer movement. Western allies stress human rights and peaceful border change, while the Eastern bloc insists on existing frontiers.
- 52  
10.7.1973  
[dodis.ch/77018](https://dodis.ch/77018)  
Federal Republic of Germany  
*Circular from the Federal Foreign Office concerning Stage I of the CSCE in Helsinki*  
Warsaw Pact countries focused on security and inviolable frontiers, while the West stressed its own vision clearly. Stage II is expected to be difficult, making Western unity essential. There are grounds for hope that it will lead to concrete results.
- 53  
16.7.1973  
[dodis.ch/76775](https://dodis.ch/76775)  
United Kingdom  
*The British Ambassador in Helsinki on Stage I of the CSCE*  
Too much time was spent on the Maltese proposal to include the Mediterranean region. There were difficulties for the Soviets in opposing more European contacts. The West can exploit their desire for a summit if the Nine maintain unity.

40

54

20.8.1973

[dodis.ch/76981](https://dodis.ch/76981)

Israel

*The Israeli Ambassador in Helsinki, to the Assistant Director-General of the Foreign Ministry on the Third Basket of CSCE*

This report discusses efforts to raise the rights of Soviet Jews within the CSCE's Third Basket, noting their importance but arguing that Israel should avoid direct involvement, as broader human rights principles are more likely to gain consensus and have an indirect impact.

55

[27.8.1973]

[dodis.ch/38816](https://dodis.ch/38816)

Switzerland

*Report of the Swiss Delegation on the state of play on the eve of the second phase of the CSCE*

The Swiss delegation played an active role and provided services to facilitate the smooth running of the consultations. The upcoming Geneva negotiations should now deepen and make more concrete the possibilities offered by the agenda approved in Helsinki.

56

19.9.1973

[dodis.ch/76989](https://dodis.ch/76989)

NATO

*Lecture given by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy at the NATO Defense College*

NATO viewed the CSCE and MBFR as tools to manage détente while resisting Soviet aims to legitimize the status quo and weaken the Alliance. Allies stressed balanced security, freer movement, cautious negotiations, and sustained Western cohesion.

57

27.9.1973

[dodis.ch/75712](https://dodis.ch/75712)

Austria

*Opening statement by the Head of the Austrian Delegation to the CSCE in Sub-Commission 8 on human contacts*

Austria wants, given its history and location, to improve conditions for human contacts and address humanitarian issues, not pursuing missionary aims but practical goals aligned with its interests and aimed at easing tensions across borders.

58

5.10.1973

[dodis.ch/76977](https://dodis.ch/76977)

France

*Intervention by the French Delegation to Sub-committee IX regarding the flow of information between European States*

The speaker highlights opposing views on information: state control versus freedom across borders. He urges practical cooperation, better mutual understanding, and gradual progress on access, distribution, and confidence-building in CSCE talks.

59

[19.10.1973...]

[dodis.ch/76898](https://dodis.ch/76898)

Poland

*Memorandum from the Department of Studies and Programming of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the principles of the inviolability of borders at the CSCE*

Poland stresses the key importance of the inviolability of borders for European peace. It rejects proposals that weaken agreed territorial settlements or reopen border issues. CSCE wording must not undermine the final status of European borders.

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|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 41 | <p><b>60</b><br/>                 23.10.1973<br/> <a href="https://dodis.ch/76982">dodis.ch/76982</a><br/>                 Israel</p>                      | <p><i>Speech by the Israeli Ambassador in Bern to the First Committee of the CSCE</i></p> <p>The day after a UNSC resolution was passed calling for a ceasefire to end the Yom Kippur war and negotiations on a peace settlement, the Israeli representative made the case for extending the Helsinki principles to the countries bordering the Mediterranean.</p>                                                                         |
|    | <p><b>61</b><br/>                 13.11.1973<br/> <a href="https://dodis.ch/77019">dodis.ch/77019</a><br/>                 Federal Republic of Germany</p> | <p><i>The Political Director of the Federal Foreign Office to State Secretary Frank on Soviet criticism of the FRG wording regarding the "inviolability of frontiers"</i></p> <p>To protect its Germany policy, Bonn seeks to link the principles of the inviolability of frontiers with the prohibition of the use of force, while ensuring that peaceful, consensual border changes remain possible for future European integration.</p> |
|    | <p><b>62</b><br/>                 29.11.1973<br/> <a href="https://dodis.ch/77137">dodis.ch/77137</a><br/>                 Türkiye</p>                     | <p><i>The Head of the Turkish Delegation to the CSCE Benler to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Second Term</i></p> <p>The second phase focuses on defining the agenda and preparing drafting. East stresses state sovereignty and stability; West emphasises human relations. Despite tensions, moderation prevails. Ankara seeks security, balanced trade gains, and safeguards on key issues.</p>                                 |
|    | <p><b>63</b><br/>                 5.12.1973<br/> <a href="https://dodis.ch/77052">dodis.ch/77052</a><br/>                 Canada</p>                       | <p><i>The Canadian Embassy in Helsinki to the Department of External Affairs on Discussions with USSR</i></p> <p>CSCE talks show little concrete progress, as major East–West disagreements on such topics as human contacts and information persist. Difficult negotiations lie ahead, likely producing only modest results, the achievement of which will require a united effort by Western allies and support from neutrals.</p>       |
|    | <p><b>64</b><br/>                 23.1.1974<br/> <a href="https://dodis.ch/76899">dodis.ch/76899</a><br/>                 Poland</p>                       | <p><i>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Assessment of the CSCE in Geneva and the Disarmament Negotiations in Vienna</i></p> <p>The second phase of the CSCE in Geneva requires accelerating work and strengthening the principle of the inviolability of borders. Preparations should also be made for the third phase of the conference and for post-conference activities following the signing of the Final Act.</p>               |



- 42      65      *The Chancellor of the Federal Republic Brandt to General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Brezhnev*  
 7.2.1974      [dodis.ch/76991](https://dodis.ch/76991)      The principle of inviolability of frontiers does not limit states' sovereign right to alter borders peacefully. Cooperation in the humanitarian sphere and cultural exchange are not intended to interfere with the internal structures of participating states.  
 Federal Republic of Germany
- 66      *The Turkish Permanent Mission to the International Organisations in Geneva to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*  
 29.03.1974      [dodis.ch/77129](https://dodis.ch/77129)      This report outlines Geneva talks on border inviolability. Key disputes persist over peaceful border changes, with a deferral proposal seen as a way to prevent deadlock.  
 Türkiye
- 67      *The French Ambassador in Bonn to Minister of Foreign Affairs Jobert on CSCE and German Affairs*  
 28.4.1974      [dodis.ch/76978](https://dodis.ch/76978)      The CSCE may dilute Four Power rights over Germany during Ostpolitik and détente, and therefore strong legal reservations are needed to preserve quadripartite authority and prevent European agreements from weakening control over German affairs.  
 France
- 68      *The Director of the Europe I Department to the Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on an Italian proposal for a declaration on the Mediterranean*  
 9.5.1974      [dodis.ch/76983](https://dodis.ch/76983)      Inquiries in the State Department indicate that the Americans are opposed to the Italian proposal. Israel will not object to all reference to the Mediterranean, but will warn the Italians about the risks involved.  
 Israel
- 69      *Meeting of the Federal Council Delegation for Foreign Affairs on the CSCE*  
 5.6.1974      [dodis.ch/38858](https://dodis.ch/38858)      Negotiations in Geneva are in crisis but perhaps the N+N could break the deadlock. The possible failure of the Swiss dispute resolution project must be acknowledged and the Turkish proposal on migrant labour may conflict with Swiss domestic policy.  
 Switzerland
- 70      *The Turkish Permanent Representative to the UN Office in Geneva to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*  
 28.6.1974      [dodis.ch/77133](https://dodis.ch/77133)      Progress continues on principles and economic issues, but the Third Basket stalls over family reunions and media openness. Limited Soviet concessions failed to unlock talks, and compromise proposals are seen as premature.  
 Türkiye

- 43
- 71  
20.7.1974  
[dodis.ch/75748](https://dodis.ch/75748)  
Italy
- The Head of Office III of the Directorate-General for Political Affairs to the Deputy Director-General*
- The memorandum stresses unresolved CSCE First Commission issues: inviolability of frontiers, peaceful change of borders, and risks associated with Soviet interpretations.
- 72  
22.8.1974  
[dodis.ch/75715](https://dodis.ch/75715)  
Austria
- Exchange of views on the CSCE between the Secretary General of the Austrian Foreign Ministry and Soviet Ambassador-at-large*
- Moscow focused on confidence-building measures, in particular the announcement of military manoeuvres, whilst Vienna outlined its position regarding Basket III, which aimed to intensify contacts between people from different countries and promote cooperation in Europe.
- 73  
28.8.1974  
[dodis.ch/76949](https://dodis.ch/76949)  
United States
- Conversation of newly sworn-in President Ford with Secretary of State Kissinger*
- CSCE strategy discussion highlights tensions over borders, peaceful change, and human contacts. It stresses balancing Soviet and European pressures and managing summit timing and implications, with limited progress and mostly tactical negotiations.
- 74  
20.12.1974  
[dodis.ch/77053](https://dodis.ch/77053)  
Canada
- The Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE to the Department of External Affairs*
- In presenting the results of the CSCE, it is recommended that Canada broaden its focus beyond human contacts to include overall achievements, such as security principles, economic cooperation, and political engagement, highlighting wider interests and reinforcing its commitment to comprehensive, ongoing East–West cooperation.
- 75  
21.12.1974  
[dodis.ch/77054](https://dodis.ch/77054)  
Canada
- The Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE to the Department of External Affairs*
- Negotiations have produced meaningful Western gains, especially on human contacts and cooperation, though progress remains uneven, with outstanding difficulties in military measures and follow-up. Overall, results are seen as an important achievement for the West.
- 76  
7.1.1975  
[dodis.ch/75750](https://dodis.ch/75750)  
Italy
- The Head of the Italian Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Geneva to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Rumor*
- This document reviews the current state of CSCE negotiations, assesses their likely evolution, identifies ongoing challenges, and outlines the concrete diplomatic opportunities available to the Italian delegation.

- 44      77      *Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on FRG and CSCE*  
 21.1.1975  
[dodis.ch/76984](https://dodis.ch/76984)  
 France  
 The Federal Republic of Germany plays a key role in the CSCE, closely following talks on borders, human contacts, quadripartite rights, and the Conference's outcome, while moving towards Western views on a flexible post-CSCE process and a possible summit.
- 78      *The Political Director of the Federal Foreign Office to the FRG Embassy in Moscow*  
 28.1.1975  
[dodis.ch/77013](https://dodis.ch/77013)  
 Federal Republic of Germany  
 Against Soviet pronouncements that there was already a consensus about the wording and placement of "Peaceful change" in the Final Document since April 1974, West Germany is still struggling for a better solution.
- 79      *The Deputy Director-General for Cultural, Scientific and Technical Cooperation to the Director-General for Political Affairs*  
 6.3.1975  
[dodis.ch/75752](https://dodis.ch/75752)  
 Italy  
 The memorandum reports that the U.S. and USSR reached a deal on peaceful border change without consulting allies, marginalizing Europe. It argues this favours Soviet aims, weakens Western leverage, and reflects wider U.S.–Soviet convergence limiting CSCE potential.
- 80      *Declaration of Heads of Government during Dublin Council on CSCE*  
 [11.3.1975...]  
[dodis.ch/77042](https://dodis.ch/77042)  
 European Community  
 Leaders reaffirm their commitment to détente and European cooperation, welcome CSCE progress, and call for the swift completion of negotiations through balanced, constructive solutions and a prompt high-level conclusion.
- 81      *Lecture by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy at the NATO Defense College*  
 13.3.1975  
[dodis.ch/76990](https://dodis.ch/76990)  
 NATO  
 NATO saw the CSCE and MBFR as ways to manage détente without weakening Western security. Allies resisted Soviet efforts to legitimize the status quo, while promoting freer movement, balanced force reductions, and Alliance cohesion.
- 82      *The Portuguese Ambassador in Helsinki to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Melo Antunes*  
 09.4.1975  
[dodis.ch/76738](https://dodis.ch/76738)  
 Portugal  
 A diplomat reports rumours that some NATO states urged the USSR to halt communist activity in Portugal, tying it to the signing of the CSCE Final Act. Eastern European officials criticise this pressure.

- |    |                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 45 | <p>83<br/>19.4.1975<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/76761">dodis.ch/76761</a><br/>Portugal</p>                        | <p><i>Notes by the Portuguese Deputy Director-General of Political Affairs and the Head of the Atlantic Pact Section on Soviet and Western objectives and the Portuguese perspective</i></p> <p>These notes highlight the Soviet and Western objectives as well as the Portuguese positions in the ongoing negotiations after the change of political regime in Portugal.</p>                                                                                                            |
|    | <p>84<br/>14.5.1975<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/77057">dodis.ch/77057</a><br/>Canada</p>                          | <p><i>The Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE to the Department of External Affairs on the NATO Summit</i></p> <p>Despite perceptions to the contrary, the result of the CSCE is largely a Western success, the Soviet Union having been forced to moderate its original aims. While Moscow may claim victory for strengthening the status quo in Europe, the agreements in fact favour gradual change and should be viewed in the West with confidence rather than concern.</p> |
|    | <p>85<br/>26.5.1975<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/76938">dodis.ch/76938</a><br/>Ireland</p>                         | <p><i>19th European Communities Ministerial Meeting on European Political Cooperation</i></p> <p>The ministers identify confidence-building measures, humanitarian provisions, and follow-up arrangements as key unresolved CSCE issues. They agree to pressure the USSR for concessions, avoiding firm deadlines while tying progress to Soviet cooperation.</p>                                                                                                                        |
|    | <p>86<br/>[...9.7.1975]<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/77015">dodis.ch/77015</a><br/>Federal Republic of Germany</p> | <p><i>Speaking Notes of Foreign Minister Genscher for the cabinet meeting on 9 July 1975 on the conclusion of the negotiating phase of the CSCE</i></p> <p>All threats to the German policy that the CSCE principles could have harboured have been minimised. If Basket III on human contacts, information, culture and education is only partly realised, then Europe's reality will have changed for the better.</p>                                                                  |
|    | <p>87<br/>9.7.1975<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/77059">dodis.ch/77059</a><br/>Canada</p>                           | <p><i>The Canadian Ambassador in Moscow to the Department of External Affairs</i></p> <p>From the vantage point of Moscow, the CSCE has enhanced both Soviet prestige and the European status quo, but it has also given the West potential longer-term advantages through agreed principles and human contacts, with key outcomes depending on their future implementation.</p>                                                                                                         |

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|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>46</p> | <p>88<br/>[...16.7.1975]<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/76939">dodis.ch/76939</a><br/>Ireland</p>          | <p><i>Meeting of Heads of government of the members of the European Communities for Political Cooperation issues</i></p> <p>The preparatory document outlines the EC leaders' views on the CSCE. Ireland sees the Conference as being a modest success, stressing realistic expectations, Soviet propaganda concerns, and the need for a joint statement and continued unity among the Nine.</p>                                                    |
|           | <p>89<br/>18.7.1975<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/76985">dodis.ch/76985</a><br/>France</p>                | <p><i>Political Affairs Directorate Memorandum on Prospects for the Détente Policy after the Final Phase of the CSCE</i></p> <p>The CSCE emerged from détente as a major step in East–West cooperation, but its Final Act remains non-binding and open to conflicting interpretations, especially regarding borders, human rights, and “irreversible détente,” requiring Western vigilance against Soviet political and ideological objectives.</p> |
|           | <p>90<br/>18.7.1975<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/77196">dodis.ch/77196</a><br/>Israel</p>                | <p><i>The Director of the Europe I Department to the Israeli ambassadors in Washington, Helsinki, etc.</i></p> <p>This report notes Israel's success in keeping the Middle East conflict and Arab positions out of the CSCE Final Act. It does include limited Mediterranean cooperation language which may lead to future efforts to expand regional involvement.</p>                                                                              |
|           | <p>91<br/>21.7.1975<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/77060">dodis.ch/77060</a><br/>Canada</p>                | <p><i>The Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Cabinet</i></p> <p>The Canadian Cabinet is informed that the CSCE has largely met Canadian objectives, with Western negotiators achieving balanced results and limiting Soviet goals. Key gains include human contacts, freer movement of people and ideas, economic cooperation, and agreed principles of peaceful change.</p>                                                            |
|           | <p>92<br/>[...22.7.1975...]<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/76956">dodis.ch/76956</a><br/>United States</p> | <p><i>National Security Advisor Kissinger to President Ford</i></p> <p>The CSCE summit preparations outline a Final Act to be signed by all participating States, confirming commitments on security, cooperation and human rights. It stresses the agreement is not legally binding but politically significant.</p>                                                                                                                               |
|           | <p>93<br/>24.7.1975<br/><a href="https://dodis.ch/76940">dodis.ch/76940</a><br/>Ireland</p>               | <p><i>Approval of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Its Signature by the Taoiseach</i></p> <p>The results achieved, while less far-reaching in the humanitarian field than desired, are on balance acceptable. The Conference has contributed to détente and has provided a valuable opportunity for smaller States to engage in multilateral dialogue.</p>                                                 |

- 47      **94**  
24.7.1975  
[dodis.ch/77061](https://dodis.ch/77061)  
Canada
- The Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE to the Department of External Affairs on Stage III in Helsinki*
- Canada was broadly engaged in the CSCE across all conference areas, reinforcing its role as an active, outward-looking partner in European affairs beyond NATO, contributing to human contacts, principles, economic cooperation, and strengthening ties with both Western and Eastern Europe.
- 95**  
25.7.1975  
[dodis.ch/76776](https://dodis.ch/76776)  
United Kingdom
- The British Permanent Representative to the International Organisations in Geneva on the Conclusion of Stage II of the CSCE*
- The British strategy in Basket III was to exploit Soviet time pressure: they either made swift and substantial concessions, or faced indefinite delay with no promise of better terms. It proved highly effective and influenced negotiations across all sectors.
- 96**  
30.7.1975  
[dodis.ch/38867](https://dodis.ch/38867)  
Switzerland
- Speech by the President of the Confederation Graber at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki*
- Switzerland's position within the CSCE was based on a commitment to a lasting peace beneficial to all of Europe, with particular emphasis on the independence and equality of states, human rights, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
- 97**  
[31.7.1975]  
[dodis.ch/75720](https://dodis.ch/75720)  
Austria
- Speech by Federal Chancellor Kreisky at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki*
- As magnificent as the Final Act might be, it will depend on how much reality the signatory states are able to give to it. Austria welcomes a peaceful global controversy between various political systems and social orders according to the principles of the CSCE.
- 98**  
4.8.1975  
[dodis.ch/76762](https://dodis.ch/76762)  
Portugal
- The Portuguese Ambassador in Washington to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Melo Antunes*
- Lisbon is informed about the central role the Portuguese case seems to play in the American press's scepticism regarding the success of East–West détente. The alleged Soviet interference in Portuguese affairs in the summer of 1975 constitutes a crucial test of the spirit of Helsinki.
- 99**  
5.8.1975  
[dodis.ch/76900](https://dodis.ch/76900)  
Poland
- Circular from the Deputy Foreign Minister on the CSCE Final Act*
- The positive assessment of the CSCE Final Act is aligned with Poland's vital interests, especially the principles of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. It is necessary to monitor foreign reactions and gradually prepare action plans based on the CSCE principles.



- 48**
- 100**  
6.8.1975  
[dodis.ch/76763](https://dodis.ch/76763)  
Portugal
- Conversations of President Costa Gomes at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki*
- The present and the future of the ongoing revolutionary process following the 25 April 1974 captains' coup in Portugal were the central topic of the conversations and were considered by many a key test to the détente.
- 101**  
6.8.1975  
[dodis.ch/77014](https://dodis.ch/77014)  
Federal Republic of Germany
- Circular from the Federal Foreign Office on the conclusion of the CSCE*
- The emphasis on the fact that the CSCE results have been achieved through compromise defines the sober assessment to be used by Eastern Europe. The Western leaders stressed the need for peaceful change in Europe, freedom of movement, the exchange of ideas and human rights.
- 102**  
7.8.1975  
[dodis.ch/75726](https://dodis.ch/75726)  
Austria
- Soviet reaction to Chancellor Kreisky's speech at the Helsinki Summit*
- A Soviet official claims jokingly, that Kreisky had "declared war on communism" in his speech. The Austrian Ambassador replies that his government had uncompromisingly distanced itself from communism before and refers to the power struggle in Portugal.
- 103**  
12.8.1975  
[dodis.ch/76777](https://dodis.ch/76777)  
United Kingdom
- The British Ambassador in Helsinki on the CSCE Summit: Finland's Place in the Sun*
- Stage III of the CSCE was largely ceremonial but symbolically powerful, showcasing heads of government. The conference was a success for Finland as the host, and it was hoped that the CSCE would boost the self-respect and security of other small nations.
- 104**  
22.8.1975  
[dodis.ch/75753](https://dodis.ch/75753)  
Italy
- Circular from the Directorate-General for Political Affairs on the CSCE Final Act*
- Western unity secured balanced principles, human rights gains, and limited Soviet aims. Military confidence-building measures (CBMs) remain weak; the economic and cooperation texts are positive. Outcomes depend on effective implementation of Conference decisions, with cautious follow-up and no new permanent bodies.

## Documents



[dodis.ch/76960](https://dodis.ch/76960)

France

*Memorandum from the Eastern Europe Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

MEETING ON THE WARSAW PACT AND DECLARATION  
ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Paris, 22 March 1969

1. The meeting at the Warsaw Pact Summit,<sup>2</sup> on which the Soviets seemed to count so much to enhance the integration of armed forces and policies of their European allies, lasted two hours and only produced a very brief communiqué,<sup>3</sup> in addition to a declaration on European security.<sup>4</sup> These texts do not include a direct or indirect condemnation of China or even an expression of solidarity that signals support to the USSR regarding the difficulties it is experiencing in the East. The Romanians have not hidden the fact that on the Soviet side, they would have wished to examine the question of relations with Peking at the meeting, and that Mr Ceaușescu<sup>5</sup> and Mr Maurer<sup>6</sup> were opposed to doing so. It could be understood that the Czechoslovakians and the Hungarians were in agreement with the Romanians regarding this point.

2. The communiqué stated that the participants established a Committee of Defence Ministers and approved new regulations for Allied forces. It is now important to determine in which direction these new measures are going. Are they contributing to a strengthening of powers of the Unified Command as the Soviets wish? According to information we have received, the new rules would establish more clearly that the national forces are at the disposal of the Unified Command, while reaffirming, as the Romanians wished, the principle of jurisdiction of national authorities over the armed forces of each country. The development of the

1 Diplomatic Archives of the French Foreign Ministry (FR-AMAE), 208QO [Europe, URSS], 524. Translated from French. This memorandum was created by the Head of the Eastern Europe Department and "conseiller des Affaires étrangères" Jacques Andréani, [dodis.ch/P51175](https://dodis.ch/P51175). For the annotated version published by the Diplomatic Archives in French, cf. [dodis.ch/76960](https://dodis.ch/76960).

2 The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states was held in Budapest on 17 March 1969. It was the first meeting since the events of August 1968.

3 The text of the communiqué is reproduced in the note from the Eastern Europe Sub-Directorate dated 28 May 1969 and entitled: Military Organisation of the Warsaw Pact. Decisions adopted at the Budapest meeting (17 March 1969), cf. FR-AMAE, 208QO [Europe, URSS], 524.

4 In a message addressed to all European countries, the member states of the Warsaw Pact declare their commitment to establishing good-neighbourly relations with other European peoples, express their firm determination to help create a climate of security and cooperation on the continent, invite all European states to redouble their efforts to consolidate peace and security in Europe, and call for the convening of a pan-European conference on security in Europe, cf. FR-AMAE, 208QO [Europe, URSS], 524.

5 Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu, [dodis.ch/P15499](https://dodis.ch/P15499).

6 Romanian Prime Minister Ion Maurer, [dodis.ch/P15323](https://dodis.ch/P15323).

multinational character of the military staff of the Pact would make it possible to involve Member States in decision-making to a greater extent. Similarly, the creation of a Committee of Defence Ministers could enable the USSR's allies to better monitor the Soviet chief commander's activities.

However, the rotation of command, requested by Romania, was not accepted. Finally, a project to create an international secretariat similar to that of NATO, proposed by the Russians, was reportedly put off until a later date.

It therefore seems that, regarding the political and military organisation of the Pact, the Soviets for the most part failed in their endeavours.

3. The declaration on Europe adopted by the communist leaders in Budapest does not contain any proposals. It calls on European countries to agree to hold a conference on European security and indicates that in such a meeting, means that could facilitate the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be discussed. In comparison with the declaration of July 1966, to which it refers, the Budapest resolution does not contain any new elements. All we can note is that it is less specific, both regarding the accusations against forces that are hostile to European security and regarding eventual possibilities for cooperation between European countries. Regarding this last point, the Budapest declaration does not go beyond the disbanding of alliances, whereas the text of 1966 cautiously envisaged progress towards the reunification of Germany.<sup>7</sup>

Also, communist countries no longer mention as they did before the disbanding of military organisations of the alliances as the first measure to take with a view to the full termination of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Conversely, it can be noted that the Budapest text excludes nearly all controversial issues regarding the West, which is unusual. The war in Viet Nam is not mentioned. Neither Germany nor the United States are attacked at all, whereas the previous declaration was full of criticism against revanchism and of calls for Europeans to rid themselves of the US presence in Europe.

The wording of the terms set down by the East for the resolution of European problems does not include any new elements with regard to previous texts of the Soviets and their allies. All that can be noted is that it only indicates the "recognition of the existence of the GDR" and not the recognition of the GDR itself. The other points – frontiers, including the one separating the two Germanies, renunciation of the right to exclusive representation, renunciation of atomic weapons, abandonment of claims regarding West Berlin – reiterated the already well-known list.

The meaning of the declaration may be evaluated according to three factors: at a time when Moscow is underlining the gravity of its dispute with Peking, the USSR intends, by taking a seemingly positive initiative on the European stage, to confirm to Westerners the idea that the break with Peking is the reason behind

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<sup>7</sup> On 5 July 1966, in its declaration on strengthening peace and security in Europe, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, meeting in Bucharest, proposed the simultaneous abolition of the two military blocs, the recognition of the existence of the two German states, the development of agreements on disarmament in Germany and Europe, and the convening of a general European conference to examine issues relating to the guarantee of security in Europe and the establishment of general European cooperation.

their wish for a rapprochement with the West. Secondly, the Soviets, by developing the idea of pan-European cooperation, hope to see Westerners finally turn the page with respect to the events that occurred in Czechoslovakia. Lastly, the almost total absence of attacks against the United States is significant at a time when Moscow is keen to resume dialogue with Washington.

4. In response to the Budapest declaration, we could:

a) Take note with satisfaction of its moderate tone and the wish that it expresses on behalf of Eastern countries to improve their relationships with the West.

b) Note that overall the document of the East does not contain new ideas and recall, with regard to the Conference on European security, the position that we have had for many years: although the idea appears good in itself, we think that it should come to fruition at a later stage of the détente process. Yet, this process was slowed by the events that occurred in Czechoslovakia. Also, the Conference meeting requires progress towards resolving the main root causes to be made. Finally, the project will immediately face the problem of the representation of the two parts of Germany.

c) Recall our conception of détente as well, which is not only the development of relations between the two blocs, but an profound change in the climate within both of them. From this point of view, the disruption brought about by the summer's events persists.<sup>8</sup>

We could point this out, while taking note of the positive signs we are currently observing in the USSR's behaviour (one of which is the Budapest text itself, with its moderate and conciliatory tone) and while expressing our wish that things move forward in the right direction, including with regard to mutual relations between socialist countries.

If we omit this aspect of things, we will risk disappointing all those – numbering many in the East, including in leaders' circles of certain countries – who ultimately share our conceptions of a genuine détente.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> A reference to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of five member states of the Warsaw Pact during the night of 20–21 August 1968.

<sup>9</sup> For all French documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2906](http://dodis.ch/C2906).



[dodis.ch/75738](https://dodis.ch/75738)

Italy

*The Italian Ambassador in Moscow Sensi to Minister of Foreign Affairs Nenni*<sup>1</sup>

## THE BUDAPEST APPEAL

Confidential

Moscow, 27 March 1969

In view of the upcoming session of the Atlantic Council, I believe it is not superfluous to add some considerations to the preliminary analysis I submitted to you on the 18<sup>th</sup> of this month regarding the recent session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact and the elements concerning European security illustrated separately in today's telexpresso.

A preconceived negative assessment of this new Soviet initiative seems to me to be just as risky and unrealistic as accepting it without the necessary critical analysis of its motives, characteristics and aims.

Without going into detail about its background (which I have explained numerous times in my reports over the past few years, particularly during high-level Italian-Soviet meetings), the conclusions of the last session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact are divided into two different components which, however, have a clear common goal: the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact and the reopening of dialogue with Western Europe.

First of all, it should be noted that, according to a basic principle of the USSR's political strategy, it is always advantageous to "take the initiative". Furthermore, attempts are made to frame the debate with the adversary on the most favourable ground. In the case of the Budapest Conference, this meant: 1) being the first to raise the issue of détente and cooperation in Europe, taking advantage of the inertia that had set in in the West after the strong reaction caused by the aggression against Czechoslovakia; 2) to reabsorb the negative effects produced by the events of last August within the communist camp itself, "normalizing" the situation and distracting attention from the resulting political and psychological problems; 3) move from what was necessarily a defensive position to one that offers new prospects for communist countries and forces Western countries to re-examine their policies and make a decision, one way or another, not on their own initiative but under external pressure.

<sup>1</sup> Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Historical Diplomatic Archives (IT-ASDMAE), DGAP, Uff. XIII (ex III), CSCE, b. 6, fasc. Sicurezza europea, 1969. *Translated from Italian. This Report N. 01066 was signed by the Italian Ambassador in Moscow, Federico Sensi, [dodis.ch/P42765](https://dodis.ch/P42765), and addressed to Minister of Foreign Affairs Pietro Nenni, [dodis.ch/P1941](https://dodis.ch/P1941). Seen by Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry Casto Caruso, [dodis.ch/P81260](https://dodis.ch/P81260).*

Apart from these methodological considerations, which are important in their own right, the factors that determined the Soviet move can, in my opinion, be summarised as follows:

1) The conflict with China certainly exerted a major influence. However, it would be wrong to attribute the USSR's hypothetical conciliatory political stance solely to this factor. First and foremost, the USSR wanted to nip any further Chinese ambitions in the bud with its decisive reaction and probably hopes to have succeeded, at least for now. According to Asian diplomatic sources, the Soviet reaction caused China to "lose face", which is particularly serious in Asia, and it is therefore possible that China, in order to regain prestige, will return to the fray with other pinpricks, perhaps in other geographical areas. However, based on the analyses made here by military experts, it is believed, as a preliminary assessment, that the Chinese are acting for political and psychological purposes and that as long as the conflict retains this character, the USSR's offensive capability in Europe will not be diminished at all.

It would therefore be an oversimplification to believe that the USSR, under pressure from the Chinese threat in the East, feels the need to rectify its essentially expansionist policy in Europe. The opposite may in fact be true, namely that the USSR wants to increase its security in Europe by exercising even greater control over the communist countries and seeking to intensify its efforts to break up the opposing front, both by attempting to exacerbate the "internal contradictions" of the capitalist camp and by sowing seeds of discord within the individual countries that belong to it. From this point of view, the Soviet initiative would therefore not be determined by considerations relating to the balance of power, but by political and psychological opportunities.

2) The situation within the European communist camp remains unsatisfactory for the USSR which, despite having apparently overcome the existing centrifugal forces, feels the deep unease and latent hostility created by the doctrine of limited sovereignty. Evidence of this situation is provided both by the difficulty the USSR is experiencing in obtaining open and decisive solidarity from its allies with regard to the Sino-Soviet conflict and by the obstacles standing in the way of the implementation of economic integration plans.

The Budapest Appeal should make it possible to overcome these difficulties by pointing to a goal in which the smaller communist countries are keenly interested, namely the resumption of economic, technical and cultural cooperation with the West (this time under the aegis of the USSR). The representatives of these countries in Moscow, and especially the Ambassadors of Romania<sup>2</sup> and Czechoslovakia,<sup>3</sup> have repeatedly explained to me the positive aspects of the Warsaw Pact initiative, suggesting that a negative response from the West could cause the more aggressive tendencies in the Soviet political leadership to prevail and lead to a tightening of the Soviet grip on their respective countries. These concerns are understandable in countries faced with the tragic alternative of submitting uncon-

<sup>2</sup> Teodor Marinescu, [dodis.ch/P45242](http://dodis.ch/P45242).

<sup>3</sup> Vladimír Koucký, [dodis.ch/P55846](http://dodis.ch/P55846).

ditionally to Soviet power or running very serious risks. It is right and politically wise to take them into account, but I believe that it is not advisable to allow oneself to be carried away by these considerations beyond the insurmountable limits of one's own security and vital interests.

It seems to me that the Budapest Appeal has also aroused some interest in Yugoslavia for reasons partly similar to those expressed in Romania and Czechoslovakia. But for the rest, Belgrade, as far as we can tell, remains firm in its belief that the USSR must demonstrate through its actions that it has renounced its aggressive policy.

On the other hand, by reiterating the preconditions for the definitive recognition of existing "realities", especially with regard to Germany, the Appeal also satisfies those Communist leaders, such as Ulbricht<sup>4</sup> and Gomulka,<sup>5</sup> who are particularly sensitive to the German question. A further clarification on this point was provided by Shelepin<sup>6</sup> in his speech yesterday in Poland, in which he stated, among other things, that the USSR would give a "resounding response to the gentlemen in Bonn who suffer from insomnia because of the maintenance of the status quo".

3) As far as the West is concerned, apart from what I have pointed out above, the offer to create a more relaxed and cooperative atmosphere seems to want to channel East-West relations into a rigidly defined path that is firmly framed within the usual Soviet patterns. Significant in this regard is the editorial published yesterday by *Izvestia*, which contrasted "little Europe" with the "great Europe" championed by the Soviets and even criticised France for its attitude during the recent Berlin crisis, while praising Paris's general policy against America and against the "hysterical protests of the Atlanticists". It is interesting to note that, in recent days, there has been a resurgence of strongly negative views regarding what has been termed here "the policy of bridges" and economic, ideological and political infiltration in communist countries with the aim of "eroding socialism" in those countries and thus weakening the USSR and the communist bloc. This "aggressive" policy is attributed not only to America and West Germany, but also to Great Britain. This view was expressed once again in the latest issue of the authoritative journal "World Economy and International Affairs" in a lengthy scientific article.

4) As usual, little is known about the internal reasons that may have prompted the new Soviet gesture of détente, but these reasons certainly exist. Even abstracting from undocumented hypotheses about the certain differences that exist within the Politburo, one can nevertheless see in the objective conditions that characterise the internal situation of the USSR (and I refer in this regard to my report No. 550 of 14 February) a real Soviet interest in developing its cooperation with

4 *First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic Walter Ulbricht*, [dodis.ch/P2597](https://dodis.ch/P2597).

5 *First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Władysław Gomułka*, [dodis.ch/P18141](https://dodis.ch/P18141).

6 *Member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Aleksander Shelepin* [dodis.ch/P40945](https://dodis.ch/P40945).

Western Europe, in the hope, perhaps, to be able to initiate a more complex and certainly less immediate collaboration with America, as the contacts established between Gvishiani<sup>7</sup> and McGeorge Bundy,<sup>8</sup> which I have already reported, would suggest.

The collective leadership, which is currently drawing up the new five-year plan, is faced with some fundamental choices: in terms of technology, the gap with America is widening rather than narrowing, while heavy military budgets and massive investments in heavy industry are required, and aid to so-called national liberation movements and developing countries demands considerable effort.

What priorities should be set? Would it not be better for the USSR to focus primarily on its own economic and technical-scientific development at this stage and to extend to the multilateral level the cooperation that is being actively sought at the bilateral level? This is just a hypothesis, but it is worth bearing in mind. It is supported by the interest that top Soviet leaders sometimes reveal (as can be seen, for example, in my telegram of 24 February about my last conversation with Kossighin<sup>9</sup>) and which has also been theorised, albeit within the usual Leninist and anti-imperialist principles, in some scientific publications, including the aforementioned journal "World Economy and International Affairs". This journal has noted, among other things, that the "revolution in the art of warfare", the "development of international relations" and economic and technological progress influence each other to a decisive extent, and went so far as to say that "this circumstance casts doubt on the possibility that military strategy issues can be dealt with exclusively by military experts".

The instability and unpredictability of internal Soviet trends make it difficult to assess the fundamental Soviet approach, but precisely for this reason, I believe that we should not neglect any opportunity to probe that approach and test its consistency and character.

5) During this period, the contradiction between the realistic and cautious policy of the Soviet state and the ideological and revolutionary direction of the Party is more striking than ever. While on the one hand there is talk of peaceful coexistence, cooperation and security, on the other hand the concepts of the struggle against imperialism and capitalism are reiterated, with the hope and prediction of their imminent and definitive defeat. After the conclusion of the Preparatory Meeting of the Conference of Communist Parties, in which the Soviets, despite all possible tactical enticements, maintained their uncompromising line, the commemoration of the Comintern was used as an opportunity to reaffirm the principle of revolutionary ideological struggle based on proletarian internationalism. Suslov<sup>10</sup> condemned any attempt at "social-democratic conciliation with the bourgeoisie and any attempt by right-wing opportunists to bring the 'spirit of reformism' into revolutionary theory". Suslov concluded by reaffirming that

<sup>7</sup> Deputy Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology Dzhermen Gvishiani, [dodis.ch/P46735](https://dodis.ch/P46735).

<sup>8</sup> President of the Ford Foundation McGeorge Bundy, [dodis.ch/P37402](https://dodis.ch/P37402).

<sup>9</sup> Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, [dodis.ch/P15549](https://dodis.ch/P15549).

<sup>10</sup> Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Mikhail Suslov, [dodis.ch/P23606](https://dodis.ch/P23606).

today more than ever, the unity of the communist movement is necessary, under the leadership of the CPSU, which “will spare no effort to consolidate unity for the triumph of communism”. Ponomarev<sup>11</sup> expressed similar ideas in his report.

The contradiction between state policy and ideological struggle is, however, only apparent since, as has also been stated here in official Party documents, the former is only an instrument of the latter and peaceful coexistence is, in reality, from a doctrinal point of view, a simple tactical expedient.

The fact that the analysis outlined in the five points above cannot be far from reality is confirmed by the timing chosen to launch the new diplomatic offensive. This is in fact part of various circumstances and contingencies, which the Soviets have most likely taken into account: the opportunity to initiate an autonomous “dialogue” with European countries, to be included in the complex situation existing in Europe and in relations between Europe and America; the prospect of a broader Soviet-American dialogue (or confrontation) on major world issues, a prospect on which the collegial leadership is focusing its attention; the 20-year expiry of the Atlantic Pact, which could provide an opportunity, according to Moscow’s wishes, for some revisionist proposals on the part of certain member countries, and in particular the next session of the Atlantic Council; the conflicts of interest and policy within some European countries; the widespread feeling in the West that the current impasse between East and West must be overcome and the genuine aspiration of peoples to seek a stable order that allows for harmonious and peaceful political and social development throughout Europe, even at the cost of certain sacrifices; the prospect of the forthcoming World Conference of Communist Parties, on which progress in the principles of the 1966 Bucharest Declaration and the 1967 Karlovy Vary Declaration would certainly exert a salutary influence to the advantage of Soviet theses.

The democratic countries of Europe and also the United States thus find themselves in need of giving an adequate response to the Budapest Appeal and of taking back the political initiative into their own hands. Careful consultation and close cooperation between the countries of Western Europe and America are of decisive importance in this regard.

The problems raised by the Budapest Appeal are essentially twofold.

The Soviet offer to address issues relating to European security and to promote a General European Conference contains nothing new: there is already a virtually uniform Western position on this matter, which does not allow for any significant variations. The lengthy correspondence between Bonn and Moscow on German issues has yielded very few results. The rejection of the use of force and the threat of force contained in the Budapest Appeal merely repeats what was already stated in the Bucharest Declaration and has no specific significance as it remains subordinate to the recognition of East Germany. The frequent references here to the possibility that Bonn’s renunciation of its national aspirations would open the way to a “normalisation” of relations between the two Germanys are clearly aimed at distancing the Federal Republic from its alliances and steering it towards

<sup>11</sup> Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of CPSU Boris Ponomarev, [dodis.ch/P55926](https://dodis.ch/P55926).

neutralist adventures with no serious prospects. Finally, the recent crisis in Berlin has shown once again that attempts at accommodation can complicate rather than alleviate the situation. In any case, when it comes to German problems, the USSR always adheres to the agreements between the four victorious powers, so it is difficult to see what progress could be achieved through a conference of all European countries (the possibility of American participation in such a conference remaining vague). Finally, it should be noted that the Budapest Appeal expressly mentions the special status of Berlin, which was not mentioned in the Bucharest Declaration.

On the other hand, it is doubtful, for obvious reasons, that the Soviets really want to go ahead with the upcoming conference and, even on this occasion, after insisting on its indispensability, they have left it to the other countries to put forward proposals for the concrete implementation of the initiative.

The issue of the Western response to the offer of various forms of cooperation aimed essentially at creating the conditions for a relaxed and constructive atmosphere is more complex. First of all, I think it is worth pointing out that it is not advisable to allow ourselves to be drawn onto the terrain chosen by our adversary. Before talking about cooperation, détente and other vague and ambiguous formulas, which are likely to create misunderstandings and complications in the future, it would be better to return to the themes that inspired the policies of various European countries in the past, even before the Czechoslovak crisis: application of the principles of the United Nations Charter, respect for the sovereignty of individual states, non-interference in their internal affairs, and a code of good international conduct. Democracy cannot renounce its essential moral values, first and foremost the defence of fundamental freedoms in relations between peoples and individuals, the non-instrumental but substantive nature of peace based on real security, and the right of all peoples to harmonious political, economic and social progress free from demagogic interference.

Once these guarantees are in place, dialogue with the USSR can become more concrete and effective, free from the neo-colonialist infringements that Soviet agents in certain Western countries are adopting with increasing ease in economic relations and political propaganda.

In conclusion, it seems to me that, at least as far as we are concerned, it would be advisable to adopt a two-pronged approach:

on the one hand, we should not miss an opportunity for realistic and constructive action, especially since the unpredictability of Soviet moves in recent times always implies the risk of sudden reversals of direction and consequent new causes of tension and risk;

on the other hand, maintaining a firm position in the face of unclear and indeed questionable requests and, before taking any initiative, assessing the actual substance, nature and aims of Soviet proposals in a tangible and realistic manner.<sup>12</sup>

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12 For all Italian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2915](http://dodis.ch/C2915).



[dodis.ch/76893](https://dodis.ch/76893)

Poland

*Memorandum by Foreign Minister Jędrychowski<sup>1</sup>*FURTHER ACTION AND CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION  
ON THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION

Secret

Warsaw, 4 April 1969

*I*

The reactions of Western countries to the Budapest Appeal<sup>2</sup> that we are so far aware of are generally positive. However, they have not taken an official position. NATO countries have announced that they will respond to the appeal at the NATO Council ministerial conference, which will begin in Washington on 10 April this year.<sup>3</sup>

In discussions with our representatives to date, representatives of Western NATO member states and neutral countries have raised questions and concerns that need to be addressed as soon as possible. The questions mainly concern:

- the subject matter of the conference,
- the procedure for preparing and convening the conference,
- participation in the conference.

In addition, some Western countries have raised the issue of the so-called preconditions for holding the conference. Some treat the premises for ensuring European security contained in the Appeal as preconditions for the conference. Some countries are exploring whether such a condition on our part also includes the prior entry into force of a non-proliferation treaty.<sup>4</sup>

*II*

The Budapest Appeal creates favourable conditions for intensifying our diplomatic efforts to promote European security. We regard the European conference as one element of these efforts.

<sup>1</sup> Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (PL-AMSZ), DSiP 60/77, w. 1. This document has been translated from Polish by Anna Sadowska. This urgent memorandum was signed by the Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Jędrychowski, [dodis.ch/P573](https://dodis.ch/P573), and addressed, amongst others, to the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Władysław Gomułka, [dodis.ch/P18141](https://dodis.ch/P18141), and to Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz, [dodis.ch/P11764](https://dodis.ch/P11764). For the full distribution list, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76893](https://dodis.ch/76893).

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the message sent on 17 March 1969 to all European countries, in which the member states of the Warsaw Pact declared their intention to establish friendly relations with the West and called for a conference on security in Europe to be convened.

<sup>3</sup> The NATO Council session took place on 10–11 April 1969 in Washington.

<sup>4</sup> This refers to the multilateral treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, submitted for signature on 1 July 1968 in London, Moscow and Washington, which entered into force on 5 March 1970 (after ratification by three depositaries and a further 40 states). Poland joined the treaty on 3 May 1969.



For the USSR, European issues are one of many problems of global politics. Other socialist countries, as demonstrated, among others, by the PCC meeting in Budapest, are less committed to the issues that are fundamental to us, namely the recognition of the territorial and political status quo in Europe.<sup>5</sup> Poland can and should play a particularly active role in the campaign to implement the Budapest Appeal, not least because of our previous initiatives.

France's position will be of great importance. Therefore, in addition to continuing talks with our existing partners, such as the Scandinavian countries, efforts should be stepped up to involve France more closely in our dialogue on the European conference.

The realisation of internal tasks related to the proposal put forward in the Appeal for a European conference on security and cooperation would require better coordination between socialist countries. To this end, it seems necessary to:

- hold bilateral consultations with the USSR as soon as possible. (We propose the level of deputy foreign ministers);<sup>6</sup>
- organising multilateral consultations between the signatories of the Budapest Appeal (not excluding Warsaw as a venue for consultations).

The purpose of both consultations would be to exchange information and agree on a common position on the main issues related to the conference (themes, mode of preparation, participation in the conference, including the issue of US participation).

### III

We believe that we should take the following position in these consultations:

Both the preparation and the possible holding of the conference should be a convenient tool for achieving the fundamental objectives of our policy. The result of the preparations for the conference and, possibly, the conference itself should be to achieve fundamental progress in the recognition of the territorial and political status quo in Europe.

The conference should focus on significant issues of European security and cooperation, on solving essential European problems in the fields of politics, disarmament and economy, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. This is important in view of the tendency of some Western and some socialist countries, which, for various reasons, show particular interest in non-controversial topics that are of only marginal importance for the resolution of key European problems. An example of this is the activity of the so-called group of ten countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Romania, Sweden, Hungary).

In accordance with the resolution of the 20th session of the UN General Assembly, it focuses on improving neighbourly relations between European countries,

<sup>5</sup> The session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states took place on 17 March 1969 in Budapest.

<sup>6</sup> Polish-Soviet consultations on the CSCE took place on 26–27 September 1969 (visit to Poland by the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Semyonov, [dodis.ch/P13452](https://dodis.ch/P13452)).

primarily on tourism, cultural and other exchanges.<sup>7</sup> This trend was also reflected in the theoretical discussion between the CSSR and Great Britain on the principles of peaceful coexistence between European countries belonging to different socio-economic systems.

The main issues of the conference should be:

*Legal and political measures:* a pan-European agreement or declaration on the non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, with equal participation of the GDR and the GFR,<sup>8</sup> which could be a significant element in recognising the existing territorial and political status quo in Europe. The adoption of a separate declaration on the recognition and respect of existing borders in Europe could also be considered. Non-European states could also accede to such a declaration.

*The subject of disarmament.* The subject of partial disarmament measures in Europe is still relevant. The main effort should be devoted to the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This would create a situation conducive to dialogue on issues of disarmament, including regional disarmament in Europe. As further steps after the entry into force of the treaty, the following could be considered in Europe:

- freezing the nuclear states' stocks of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear states;
- eliminating all nuclear weapons from a specific area in a further process, not excluding the extension of this area to the territory of all European non-nuclear states.

*Issues related to the development of economic relations:*

In addition to the issue of contacts and relations between the three existing economic groupings in Europe (COMECON, EEC, EFTA) and the issue raised in the Budapest Appeal of joint implementation of major European projects in the fields of energy, transport, and the use of water and airspace, the European conference could address matters such as:

- removing obstacles to the development of trade between European countries,
- expanding industrial, scientific, technical and technological cooperation,
- issues of pan-European infrastructure (energy, water and land transport systems, etc.),
- financial and monetary cooperation between countries across Europe,
- stimulation of the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

All these issues obviously require detailed specification, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will undertake in consultation with the relevant ministries.

<sup>7</sup> This refers to the resolution adopted on 21 December 1965 by the UN General Assembly on regional measures to improve good neighbourly relations between European countries with different social and political systems.

<sup>8</sup> In Poland, until 1970 (the signing of the normalisation agreement with West Germany), the official name used was the German Federal Republic, which was then replaced by the Federal Republic of Germany.

It can be expected that the Western side will put forward proposals for the conference agenda such as:

- the development of principles for relations between European countries in connection with the events of 21 August 1968.<sup>9</sup> This issue is also being pushed by Romania and Yugoslavia;
- the problem of selective normalisation of diplomatic relations with socialist countries, with the exception of the GDR (the position of the GFR);
- the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

During the talks, efforts should continue to be made to counteract the West's pushing of these matters.

*The mode of preparation of the conference.*

The conference should be well prepared so that it offers hope for progress in resolving fundamental European security issues.

Effective steps should be taken to convene, in the near future, in accordance with the Budapest Appeal, "a meeting of representatives of all interested European countries to determine, by mutual agreement, both the procedure for convening the conference and its agenda".<sup>10</sup> Such a meeting should take place at the level of ministers or deputy ministers of foreign affairs.

The meeting should be agreed upon through prior exchanges of views through diplomatic channels.

It seems appropriate to support Finland's initiative to hold the conference in Helsinki.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, it could be proposed that Finland, after conducting a diplomatic survey, take on the role of host for the preparatory meeting in Helsinki and act as the "secretariat" for the conference preparations (receiving positions and proposals concerning the conference, informing governments about the state of preparations, sending out invitations).

The assignment of such a role to Finland in the preparations for the conference is justified by:

- Finland's consistently neutral policy on key issues in East–West relations;
- recognition of Finland's constructive international role by countries belonging to both blocs, including the great powers;
- Finland's equal treatment of both German states in diplomatic terms;
- Finland's good relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, which we can use to influence the right direction of the conference preparations.

The purpose of the preparatory meeting would be to determine the date, venue, procedure for convening the conference and its agenda.

Given the acceptance of the concept of a preparatory meeting, it is no longer necessary to consider the establishment of an initiative group as a body to prepare for the conference. However, the possibility that the preparatory meeting might establish a supporting body to carry out specific tasks related to the convening of the European conference should not be ruled out.

<sup>9</sup> A reference to the Warsaw Pact military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

<sup>10</sup> Multilateral preparatory talks preceding the convocation of the conference began on 22 November 1972 in Helsinki.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 5, [dodis.ch/76725](https://dodis.ch/76725).

*Conference participants*

Participation in the conference by “all European states” should be adopted as a principle. This principle ensures the full and equal participation of both German states, although this does not necessarily mean that formal diplomatic relations must be established. The idea of establishing a special status for the GDR and the GFR at the conference should be rejected.

There is the question of the Vatican’s participation. We believe that the Vatican should not be excluded from participating, possibly as an observer.

An important issue is the participation of the USA in the conference. Taking into account the reactions of Western countries to the Budapest Appeal and their previous position on the proposal to convene a European conference, it is to be expected that they will raise the issue of the participation of the USA and possibly Canada as early as the preliminary talks on the preparatory meeting.

In our opinion, possible political benefits resulting from treating the US participation in the conference as a bargaining chip (e.g. in exchange for supporting our concept of equal participation of both German states in the conference) should not be ruled out in advance.

It should be born in mind that the issue of US participation in the conference is primarily a bargaining chip in the hands of the Soviet Union. This function is fulfilled by the formula presented by the USSR: “since this concerns European security issues, it is up to the European countries themselves to consider and discuss in which areas and to what extent a non-European country – the United States – can participate in the discussion of these issues”.

Poland’s position on this matter should boil down to:

- not giving the impression that we reject any US participation outright,
- emphasising the need to leave the decision on US participation to the European countries participating in the preparatory meeting.

I request your approval.<sup>12</sup>

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**12** For all Polish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2901](http://dodis.ch/C2901).

[dodis.ch/76941](https://dodis.ch/76941)

United States

*National Security Advisor Kissinger to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>*

## SOVIET INITIATIVE FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

Secret

Washington, 4 April 1969

The Soviets and East Europeans are currently pushing, diplomatically and through propaganda, an “appeal” adopted by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest on March 17 which proposes an early conference on European security. Ambassador Dobrynin<sup>2</sup> today delivered a copy to Elliot Richardson.<sup>3</sup> (You will recall that Prime Minister Rumor<sup>4</sup> raised the subject with you on April 1.)

The appeal has aroused interest in the West because it almost completely is devoid of the polemical attacks on the US and the Federal Republic which normally appear in Communist declarations of this sort. There are no really significant new substantive proposals on how to go about getting a European settlement in this document – its main concrete proposition is that officials from interested European states should meet to arrange a conference and its agenda. Its main theme is that if the present status quo is recognized in Europe, especially by the Federal Republic, there could then be extensive east–west cooperation on economic and technical matters and military alliances could be abolished.

On the face of it, the appeal excludes the United States from participation in the proposed conference. But in the past when this criticism was levelled against their European security proposals, the Soviets have indicated that they are prepared to see a US role. They have maintained this line privately in the present instance, too.

*Soviet Objectives*

There has been speculation about the reasons why this appeal should have been issued at this time. The timing may be connected with the impending NATO meeting: the Soviets may hope that the trend toward better cohesion in NATO after Czechoslovakia and as a result of your European visit can be halted or reversed by a conciliatory proposition from them. Beyond this tactical motivation, the Soviets may in fact be interested in restoring some of the east–west

1 Nixon Library (US-RMNPL), National Security Council Files, Box 392, Subject Files, Soviet Affairs. This memorandum from US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846), was sent for information to United States President Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](https://dodis.ch/P13584). It is also published in: *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, *European Security*, [doc. 2](#).

2 Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin, [dodis.ch/P42138](https://dodis.ch/P42138).

3 US Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, [dodis.ch/P46676](https://dodis.ch/P46676). For the memorandum of conversation of Dobrynin’s meeting with Richardson, 4 April 1969, cf. *FRUS*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, *European Security*, [doc. 1](#).

4 Italian Prime Minister Mariano Rumor, [dodis.ch/P15297](https://dodis.ch/P15297).

contacts, including economic ones, that were disrupted by their invasion of Czechoslovakia. Since the document makes a number of demands on the FRG – including recognition of East Germany, the Oder-Neisse Line and the “special status” of West Berlin, as well as renunciation of nuclear weapons – the Soviets may have wanted to lay the groundwork for renewed political contacts with Bonn. The obverse side of that coin is, as it always has been, an effort to isolate the Federal Republic by picturing it as the main obstacle to a European settlement if it fails to meet Communist demands.

Another motivation that may have played a role relates to Soviet efforts to consolidate the Warsaw Pact: this is the first major document in some time that all the East Europeans, including Romania, have been willing to sign.

#### *Our Attitude*

Although I do not believe that in and of itself this “appeal” does anything to advance the prospects of a European settlement, I believe we should not give it a negative response. Rather, we might use it in our effort to impress on the Soviets the need to talk concretely about the issues that exist between us.

What we have said about the inutility and, indeed, dangers of holding grandiose conferences at this stage should hold true in this case also; but we need not rule out eventual meetings, after the necessary spadework has been done to ensure that they get somewhere.

I do not believe that we should make an issue of our attendance at such meetings. Anyone who is serious about making progress on European problems knows that we must be a party; we should not make the Soviets think that they are doing us a favor if they agree to such an obvious fact of life.

I do believe that in the context of a constructive response we should make clear that

(1) in our view a real settlement in Europe is incompatible with gross intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and

(2) cannot be based on discrimination against Germany, since this would undermine any settlement from the beginning. All of this, of course, looks very far into the future. But I think it would be desirable for us to be in a positive if cautious posture on this range of issues. This, judging from discussions at NATO, is also the position of our allies in Europe.<sup>5</sup>

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5 For all documents of the United States in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2904](https://dodis.ch/C2904).

[dodis.ch/76725](https://dodis.ch/76725)

Finland

*Memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*CONFERENCE ON SECURITY IN EUROPE; IDEA OF CONVENING  
A PREPARATORY MEETING

Secret

[Helsinki,] 25 April 1969

Back in the 1950s, the Soviet Union sought to convene a German peace conference that would have confirmed the post-World War II status quo. As these efforts proved fruitless and when, on the other hand, the Soviet Union considered it most appropriate to abandon the plan of concluding a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic that it had put forward at the end of the 1950s, the Soviet Union began promoting the idea of a Conference on Security in Europe that would help to achieve recognition of the status quo and realisation of Soviet policy objectives regarding Germany.

The idea of a Conference on Security in Europe featured in the Warsaw Pact declaration of January 1965, and its importance has been continually stressed in various contexts by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in subsequent years. Since the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 subsided, the Soviet Union has once again begun promoting the idea of a Conference on Security in Europe. Meeting in Budapest on 17 March 1969, the member states of the Warsaw Pact adopted an Appeal to all European countries reaffirming their proposals on Europe from 1966 in Bucharest, finding that the time is right for a “pan-European” negotiating conference, and stating the following with respect to a preparatory conference:

“A practical step towards reinforcing European security would be an upcoming meeting of representatives of all concerned European states at which the order for convening the negotiating conference and the issues to be included in its agenda would be established by common agreement. We are prepared to consider any other proposal regarding the manner of preparing and convening this negotiating conference.”

Finland has specified its position on the Conference on Security in Europe proper in such contexts as a communiqué published in June 1966 following the visit

<sup>1</sup> Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (FI-UMA), F 7B, ETYK. Translated from Finnish. This memorandum was signed by the Deputy Director-General of Political Department, Yrjö Väinänen, [dodis.ch/P55216](https://dodis.ch/P55216).



of Prime Minister Kosygin,<sup>2</sup> when it was noted that the parties had exchanged opinions

“also with respect to a conference on European security issues, considering the arrangement of such a carefully prepared conference to be useful under the present circumstances; all concerned States would participate in such a conference.”

This position was also subsequently reiterated by Finland, for example in the March 1969 response of Foreign Minister Karjalainen<sup>3</sup> to an oral question on the matter posed by Member of Parliament Melin.<sup>4</sup>

The Hungarian Embassy received instructions from its government to submit the “Appeal” adopted in Budapest to the Finnish Government on behalf of the countries that took part in the Budapest meeting. Submitting the Appeal on 29 March 1969, Ambassador Ronai<sup>5</sup> advised Director-General Hyvärinen<sup>6</sup> that Helsinki might also be considered as a conference venue. Hyvärinen stressed that to hold the conference, it would be better to reach a political consensus between the major powers first, and only thereafter begin discussing details of the arrangements.

Soviet Ambassador Kovalev<sup>7</sup> visited the President of the Republic<sup>8</sup> on 8 April, reporting that he had been tasked with briefing the President on the proposal for a Conference on Security in Europe, and announcing that

“the Soviet Government considers it essential to immediately commence practical measures to bring about the conference. The success of the conference will require thorough advance preparation. It would be appropriate to convene a preparatory meeting at the earliest opportunity in order to prepare the conference programme and plan the work.”

The Ambassador’s announcement further notes that the Warsaw Pact countries are not ruling out US participation, continuing:

“Moscow hopes that the Finnish Government will be favourably disposed to arranging the Conference on Security in Europe and will decide to participate in the preparatory measures for the conference. I have been tasked by the Soviet Government to maintain contact with the Finnish Government on this matter.”

Ambassador Kovalev announced that a similar proposal on arranging a preparatory meeting had been submitted to all European States. With the possibility that full consensus on convening the Conference on Security in Europe had yet to

2 Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, [dodis.ch/P15549](https://dodis.ch/P15549).

3 Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ahti Karjalainen, [dodis.ch/P15255](https://dodis.ch/P15255).

4 Finnish Member of the Parliament Ingvar S. Melin, [dodis.ch/P81175](https://dodis.ch/P81175).

5 Hungarian Ambassador in Helsinki Rudolf Rónai, [dodis.ch/P53614](https://dodis.ch/P53614).

6 Finnish Director-General of the Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Risto Hyvärinen, [dodis.ch/P46543](https://dodis.ch/P46543).

7 Soviet Ambassador in Helsinki Andrei Kovalev, [dodis.ch/P81176](https://dodis.ch/P81176).

8 Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, [dodis.ch/P15249](https://dodis.ch/P15249).

be achieved between the great powers, the Soviet Union had considered it appropriate from its perspective to turn directly to the various European States.

The point of initiating discussions on a preparatory meeting is probably that it is more difficult to present arguments against such a meeting than against the conference proper, which could justifiably be considered to require a fairly far-reaching consensus on political issues. On the other hand, discussing a preparatory meeting brings the Soviet Union back into a full role in European politics following the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Nor could any discussion of a preparatory meeting sideline the German Democratic Republic, which would accordingly make its voice heard in European affairs – at least unilaterally. As the West has also shown obvious interest in a Conference on Security in Europe – albeit to varying degrees – for example in the context of celebrating the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of NATO, the Soviet Union has evidently also taken note of these new trends and decided to turn to European States, primarily raising the issue of a preparatory meeting.

Finland's position on the European Security Conference is clear. As far as a preparatory meeting is concerned, it is evident that attitudes towards it cannot conflict with attitudes towards the conference proper, nor be such as to undermine the position of Finland on the security conference itself.

It is accordingly *proposed* that a memorandum be submitted to the Soviet Union Ambassador to Helsinki and to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs at deputy ministerial level, stating:

1. the previously announced position of Finland on the security conference proper,
2. that Finland supports the arrangement of a preparatory meeting on condition of participation by a sufficient and representative number of States representing various security policy views: neutral, Warsaw Pact member states and NATO member states,
3. that the Finnish Government will instruct its diplomatic representatives in various capitals (in neutral countries, in NATO member states, and at the UN in New York and Geneva) to canvass the attitudes of various countries towards the Conference on Security in Europe in general and on a meeting to prepare it, and to report continually on developments (this also applies to member states of the Warsaw Pact),
4. the Finnish Government is monitoring the situation and will consider its realistic prospects for taking preparatory measures in the matter.

A draft memorandum is attached.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> For the first annex in Finnish, which consists of a draft memorandum to be submitted to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77520](http://dodis.ch/77520). The second annex mentioned on the facsimile could not be located.

*It is submitted for consideration* that the matter be discussed by the Government Committee on Foreign Affairs and notified to the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament. This notification could occur, for example, in the context of the next committee meeting.<sup>10</sup>

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**10** For all Finnish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2902](https://dodis.ch/C2902).

[dodis.ch/76726](https://dodis.ch/76726)

Finland

*Circular from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

Confidential

Helsinki, 2 May 1969

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs dispatches to the Mission a memorandum with translations concerning the Conference on European Security and instructs the Head of Mission to submit it in accordance with instructions issued by telegram. Some background material is also provided for discussions on the matter.

The Ministry requests the Mission to notify submission of the memorandum immediately by telegram, and to report on the associated discussion. The Ministry further instructs the Mission to investigate the attitude of countries receiving the memorandum towards the Conference on Security in Europe, to monitor the matter continuously, and to report to the Ministry thereupon.<sup>2</sup>

The Moscow Embassy has received corresponding instructions by telegram.

*European Security Conference: aspects for discussion<sup>3</sup>*

In addition to the aspects contained in the memorandum, the following instructions will be issued when submitting the memorandum on the matter and/or in other contexts for discussion thereupon, or on the European Security Conference in general:

1. This is a position statement issued on Finland's own initiative. Its presentation at this stage has been considered necessary as the issue of arranging a European Security Conference has come to the fore among Warsaw Pact, NATO,

<sup>1</sup> Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (FI-UMA), F 7B, ETYK. Translated from Finnish. This Circular letter No. 9 by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is signed by the Director-General of Political Department Risto Hyvärinen, [dodis.ch/P46543](https://dodis.ch/P46543), as well as by the Permanent State Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Jorma Vanamo, [dodis.ch/P44016](https://dodis.ch/P44016). It was sent to the Finnish Embassies in Ankara, Belgrade, Berlin, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Hague, Copenhagen, London, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Prag, Rome, Sofia, Stockholm, Warsaw, Washington and Vienna. A copy for information was also sent to the directors-general of the departments, ministerial advisors, deputy directors-general of the departments of the Finnish missions in Addis Abeba, Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Cairo, Geneva, Leningrad, Lima, Mexico, New Delhi, Beijing, Pretoria, Rio de Janeiro, Tel Aviv, Tokyo and the UN mission in New York.

<sup>2</sup> For the initial reactions of foreign powers to the Finnish Government memorandum cf. QdD 30, doc. 7, [dodis.ch/76727](https://dodis.ch/76727).

<sup>3</sup> FI-UMA, F 7B, ETYK. Translated from Finnish. This Annex to the circular, dated 5 May 1969, contains instructions and aspects to Finnish embassies when submitting the memorandum on the Finnish initiative on the European Security Conference. It is signed by Director-General Hyvärinen.

Nordic and other countries. The position statement of Finland seeks to influence resolution of the issue in a manner that is consistent with the Government's understanding, and to justify the cautious attitude of Finland towards proposals on the subject that may become contentious issues between the great powers.

2. It is the view of Finland that achieving consensus on the question of participants is an important prerequisite for arranging the conference. There is no cause for Finland to specify any detailed position at this time. The starting point nevertheless remains that all concerned governments should participate in the meeting. In the view of the Finnish Government, the countries to which the memorandum is submitted will be those with a primary interest in European security.

3. The idea of Finland serving as a possible host country for the conference derives from the details set out in the memorandum. It is precisely our even-handed approach to the German question that confers a special status on Finland. When discussing the technical arrangements for the conference, it must be stated that we anticipate no major difficulties if a broad consensus can be reached on holding the conference in Finland.

4. A meeting to discuss issues related to arranging the conference will be in order when sufficient conditions for such a meeting have emerged. A broad agreement in principle on arranging the actual conference should already have been reached by that time. It is the impression of the Finnish Government that any preparatory meeting will be chiefly technical in nature. Regarding participants, reference is made to the considerations set out at point 2 above.

*P[ro] M[emoria]*<sup>4</sup>

The Government of the Soviet Union approached recently the Governments of European countries in the matter of the arrangement of a European Security conference and of its preparations. This proposal concerning a Special preparatory meeting was extended to the Government of Finland on April 8, 1969.

The Government of Finland has on several occasions stated that Finland considers a well prepared conference on European Security problems useful. The Government of Finland considers well-founded the view of the Soviet Union that such a conference should be convened without any preliminary conditions. The participants should have the right to present their views and to make their proposals on European questions.

Furthermore, the Government of Finland is of the opinion that all Governments concerned should participate in such a conference. This opinion was expressed, e.g., in the Finnish-Soviet Communique in June 1966 on the occasion of the visit to Finland of the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A.N. Kosygin.<sup>5</sup> At the Foreign Ministers' meeting of Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, held in Copenhagen on April 23 and 24, 1969, a joint position was defined according to which "preconditions for conferences on Security problems are that

<sup>4</sup> FI-UMA, F 7B, ETYK. *This memorandum, annex to the circular and dated 5 May 1969, was distributed via Finnish embassies to European countries, the United States, and Canada concerning the organising and hosting of the preparatory meeting on European Security Conference. This annex is originally in English, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76726](http://dodis.ch/76726).*

<sup>5</sup> Alexei Kosygin, [dodis.ch/P15549](http://dodis.ch/P15549).

they should be well prepared, that they should be timed so as to offer prospects of positive results, and that all states, whose participation is necessary for achieving a solution to European Security problems, should be given opportunities to take part in the discussions.”

The Government of Finland is, consequently, favourably disposed to the convening of a conference on European Security problems. The success of such a conference requires careful preparations in advance. This is necessary to assure both a sufficiently representative participation and the technical arrangement of the conference. Considering the great importance of European Security problems the prerequisites for success of the conference should be guaranteed as well as possible. The Government of Finland considers that the preparations for the conference should begin through consultations between the Governments concerned and, after the necessary conditions exist, a preparatory meeting for consideration of the questions connected with the arrangement of the conference could be convened.

Finland has good relations with all the countries which are concerned with European Security and her impartial attitude towards the most vital problem of European Security, the German question, has been appreciated by different interested parties. This is why the Government of Finland is willing to act as the host for the Security conference as well as for the preparatory meeting provided that the Governments concerned consider this as appropriate.

The Government of Finland will send this memorandum to the Governments of all European states, to those of East and West Germany and to the Governments of the United States of America and Canada and will instruct her representatives to sound the position of these countries on the European Security conference and to Consult them on questions connected with the preparations of such a conference.

In view of this, the Government of Finland will closely follow this matter and consider what real possibilities it may have in order to take new measures on its part.<sup>6</sup>

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6 For all Finnish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2902](https://dodis.ch/C2902).

[dodis.ch/76727](https://dodis.ch/76727)

Finland

*Memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

INITIAL REACTIONS OF FOREIGN POWERS TO THE FINNISH  
GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY  
CONFERENCE

Confidential

Helsinki, 7 May 1969

The Government Committee on Foreign Affairs approved a Finnish Government memorandum on the European Security Conference on 2 May 1969.<sup>2</sup> The memorandum was dispatched to the foreign powers referred to therein at the earliest technical opportunity. The following may be noted with respect to the initial reactions of foreign powers:

I *European countries*

When Ambassador Hallama<sup>3</sup> submitted the memorandum to USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Smirnov<sup>4</sup> on 5 May, the latter commented that "Finland's position statement must be considered a step that is favourable and taken in the right direction on the issue of European security. Finland has taken an important initiative, and its position is clearly expressed in this memorandum. The Soviet Union also believes that special attention must be paid to careful preparation of the security conference, as only in this way can positive results be expected from the conference."

State Secretary Vanamo<sup>5</sup> submitted a copy of the memorandum to Ambassador Kovalev<sup>6</sup> on the same day in Helsinki. Receiving the memorandum, Ambassador Kovalev thanked the Finnish Government for its reasonable attitude to the Appeal of the Budapest meeting. He inquired on such questions as what the next step would be in the matter. The State Secretary commented that this depends on the outcome of soundings made with various governments.

Undersecretary Jödahl<sup>7</sup> of the Swedish MFA stated that *Sweden* had always stressed the importance of consultation as the first stage, and asked whether Finland was also prepared to arrange a meeting for a limited number of participants

1 Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (FI-UMA), F 7B, ETYK. Translated from Finnish. This memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, was signed on 7 May 1969 by the Deputy Director-General of Political Department, Yrjö Väinänen, [dodis.ch/P55216](https://dodis.ch/P55216).

2 Cf. QdD 30, doc. 6, [dodis.ch/76726](https://dodis.ch/76726).

3 Finnish Ambassador in Moscow Jaakko Hallama, [dodis.ch/P15435](https://dodis.ch/P15435).

4 Andrei Smirnov, [dodis.ch/P5923](https://dodis.ch/P5923).

5 Jorma Vanamo, [dodis.ch/P44016](https://dodis.ch/P44016).

6 Soviet Ambassador in Helsinki Andrei Kovalev, [dodis.ch/P81176](https://dodis.ch/P81176).

7 Ole Jödahl, [dodis.ch/P16030](https://dodis.ch/P16030).



and whether, according to the Finnish Government, the preparations also included an agenda. Ambassador Enckell<sup>8</sup> dismissed the idea of a scaled-down meeting, referring to the terms of the memorandum, which require sufficiently diverse participation. Ambassador Enckell also found that the consultations only indicate what could be discussed at the conference. Visiting Foreign Minister Karjalainen<sup>9</sup> on 6 May, Ambassador Hägglöf<sup>10</sup> of Sweden reported that he had already been tasked with informing the Government of Finland about certain viewpoints of the Swedish Government. According to Ambassador Hägglöf, bilateral discussions should already clarify the precise agenda of the meeting and which countries would participate. The Swedish Government clearly assumes that the United States must be involved from the beginning. Otherwise the discussions may prove fruitless.

State Secretary Jacobsen<sup>11</sup> of the *Norwegian* Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered it natural that, as a neutral country and a member of the Security Council, Finland had begun to explore the prospects for convening a security conference and had offered to attend to the practical arrangements for this conference. When Ambassador Suomela<sup>12</sup> submitted the memorandum on 5 May State Secretary Jacobsen commented to Suomela that Finland should be very well placed to succeed in this endeavour. The State Secretary noted that Norway had actively advocated for convening the conference. He further indicated that inviting East Germany to a security conference would cause obvious difficulties for Norway, because Norway had no relations with the East German Government. Any participation of East Germany would also have to be discussed at NATO.

The *French* Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>13</sup> commented to Ambassador Seppälä<sup>14</sup> that developing the conference issue would be time consuming, as the German issue in particular was not yet ripe for this. France viewed German representation as an obstacle, because "West Germany would hardly come to the same table with East Germany." The French source stressed that the conference issue was not urgent, as the issues of Vietnam and the Middle East were uppermost. It was likewise conjectured that this would also be the opinion of the Soviet Union, as only Romania had been active on this point in Paris.

Sir Denis Greenhill,<sup>15</sup> Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, observed that the *United Kingdom* would take the initiative seriously, and would revisit the Finnish memorandum at a later date.<sup>16</sup> The Permanent Under-Secretary of State nevertheless stressed the importance of preparing the conference well. He surmised that the USSR would agree to US participation, even though the USSR had not yet expressed this directly.

8 Finnish Ambassador in Stockholm Ralph Enckell, [dodis.ch/P46566](https://dodis.ch/P46566).

9 Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ahti Karjalainen, [dodis.ch/P15255](https://dodis.ch/P15255).

10 Swedish Ambassador in Helsinki Ingemar Hägglöf, [dodis.ch/P47664](https://dodis.ch/P47664).

11 Norwegian Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Frithjof Jacobsen, [dodis.ch/P81227](https://dodis.ch/P81227).

12 Finnish Ambassador in Oslo Pentti Suomela, [dodis.ch/P81228](https://dodis.ch/P81228).

13 Represented by French Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hervé Alphand, [dodis.ch/P200](https://dodis.ch/P200), and French Director of Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jacques de Beaumarchais, [dodis.ch/P45304](https://dodis.ch/P45304).

14 Finnish Ambassador in Paris Richard Seppälä, [dodis.ch/P58990](https://dodis.ch/P58990).

15 Denis Greenhill, [dodis.ch/P43469](https://dodis.ch/P43469).

16 Cf. QdD 30, doc. 6, [dodis.ch/76726](https://dodis.ch/76726).

When Ambassador Alholm<sup>17</sup> submitted the Finnish Government memorandum, a spokesman for *Switzerland* commented that this country was favourably disposed in principle to arranging a security conference. Secretary-General Micheli<sup>18</sup> nevertheless stressed that attitudes towards the issue of European security vary; for example the USSR considered it important above all to maintain the *status quo* in Europe. Results could only be achieved if the superpowers were prepared to agree among themselves on issues related to Europe. The reaction from the Swiss was quite sceptical. Ambassador Alholm describes this conversation saying that even though the Swiss Government has yet to decide on the participation of East Germany, it nevertheless considers an East German presence essential when discussing European security.

When Ambassador Mäkinen<sup>19</sup> submitted the memorandum in Vienna on 5 May, the Head of the Policy Department<sup>20</sup> of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that *Austria* regarded a common understanding between the USSR and the USA to be a condition for convening even a preparatory conference. The Head of the Policy Department said that Finland's even-handed approach to the German question had given it a special status for submitting an initiative in this matter. He nevertheless did not believe that the issue of East Germany would lead to a solution in the near future that would enable the conference to take place.

Great interest in the Finnish memorandum has been shown from the Government of *Hungary*, with Ambassador Ronai<sup>21</sup> expressing particular satisfaction with the position of the Finnish Government on receiving the memorandum in Helsinki. Ambassador Raustila<sup>22</sup> was asked to provide information continually on progress of the matter when submitting the memorandum.

After Ambassador Orkomies<sup>23</sup> submitted the memorandum to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs<sup>24</sup> on 5 May, the latter said that the Polish Government held the position adopted by Finland on the conference issue in high esteem. The Minister considered Finland a suitable host country for the reasons set out in the memorandum, particularly because Finland was neutral and had equitable relations with both German republics. The final position of *Poland* would nevertheless be determined after consultations with the Warsaw Pact. The Minister stressed that the participation of the United States was also suggested when a security conference proposal first emerged from Poland about five years ago. However, the proposed US involvement was sidelined due to the Vietnam War. According to the Minister, it now appears that the US is interested in discussing security issues, but perhaps less so in potentially emerging questions of cooperation between European countries. It is the impression of Poland that the participating countries should be finally agreed at a preparatory meeting.

17 Finnish Ambassador in Bern Björn Alholm, [dodis.ch/P41822](https://dodis.ch/P41822).

18 Secretary-General of the Swiss Federal Political Department Pierre Micheli, [dodis.ch/P86](https://dodis.ch/P86).

19 Finnish Ambassador in Vienna Jussi Mäkinen, [dodis.ch/P41820](https://dodis.ch/P41820).

20 Arno Halusa, [dodis.ch/P45252](https://dodis.ch/P45252).

21 Hungarian Ambassador in Helsinki Rudolf Rónai, [dodis.ch/P53614](https://dodis.ch/P53614).

22 Finnish Ambassador in Budapest Erdem Raustila, [dodis.ch/P13380](https://dodis.ch/P13380).

23 Finnish Ambassador in Warsaw Osmo Orkomies, [dodis.ch/P14060](https://dodis.ch/P14060).

24 Stefan Jędrychowski, [dodis.ch/P573](https://dodis.ch/P573).

On receiving the memorandum, the Deputy Chief of Staff<sup>25</sup> of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented to Ambassador Tuominen<sup>26</sup> that, in the impression of *Italy*, the attitude of all concerned parties on the desirability of a conference in the current circumstances should first be clarified bilaterally, as opposed to calling a preliminary meeting for the purpose of presenting ideas and proposals. The Italian view would accordingly interpret the Finnish memorandum as the first bilateral contact with Italy.

The Head of the Policy Department<sup>27</sup> of the *Belgian* Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented to Ambassador Honkaranta<sup>28</sup> that resolving the issue of European security is everyone's primary objective. He noted that there would be no realistic prospects for the conference if the USSR sought to use it to legalise the partition of Germany and that of Europe, and to disunite NATO. The Head of Department said that the Finnish memorandum would be carefully examined together with other NATO countries.

Ambassador von Numers<sup>29</sup> was advised in *The Hague* that the NATO countries would probably consult among themselves before responding to the matter.

Ambassador Mäkinen submitted the memorandum on 6 May to the Papal Nuncio in Vienna, who promised to forward it to the *Vatican*. The Nuncio commented that the USSR would probably only approve US participation on the condition that the US accepted the participation of East Germany.

Conversing with Ambassador Pakaslahti,<sup>30</sup> the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs<sup>31</sup> at the *Spanish* Foreign Service said that he particularly appreciated the even-handedness of Finland on the issue of both German republics. He was cautiously in favour of holding the conference, which should not be subject to any preconditions.

## II *The East and West German Governments*

As Head of the Commercial Mission, Vaartela<sup>32</sup> submitted the memorandum on 6 May to *East German* Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Scholz,<sup>33</sup> who viewed the measure by Finland as highly constructive. Referring to the fact that Finland had already been advised of the favourable attitude of East Germany, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs considered careful preparations for the conference necessary, and imposed the status quo in Europe as the starting point for the entire conference idea.

After Commercial Representative Salomies<sup>34</sup> submitted the memorandum on 5 May to Department Head Ruete<sup>35</sup> at the West German Foreign Office, the latter observed that the participation of *West Germany* in the matter would be quite

25 Fausto Marinucci de Reguardati, [dodis.ch/P81229](https://dodis.ch/P81229).

26 Finnish Ambassador in Rome Leo Tuominen, [dodis.ch/P81230](https://dodis.ch/P81230).

27 François-Xavier van der Straten-Waillet, [dodis.ch/P14532](https://dodis.ch/P14532).

28 Finnish Ambassador in Brussels Reino Honkaranta, [dodis.ch/P81231](https://dodis.ch/P81231).

29 Finnish Ambassador in the Hague Sigurd von Numers, [dodis.ch/P81232](https://dodis.ch/P81232).

30 Finnish Ambassador in Madrid Aaro Pakaslahti, [dodis.ch/P81233](https://dodis.ch/P81233).

31 Ramón Sedó Gómez, [dodis.ch/P81234](https://dodis.ch/P81234).

32 Finnish Consul General at the Commercial Mission in East Berlin Esko Vaartela, [dodis.ch/P81235](https://dodis.ch/P81235).

33 Ernst Scholz, [dodis.ch/P46519](https://dodis.ch/P46519).

34 Finnish Consul General at the mission in Cologne Martti Salomies, [dodis.ch/P45934](https://dodis.ch/P45934).

35 Hans Hellmuth Ruete, [dodis.ch/P81236](https://dodis.ch/P81236).

similar to that of Finland. He referred to statements by Foreign Minister Brandt welcoming the Budapest Declaration in principle, although some care would be required in preparing the security conference. According to Consul General Salomies, the West Germans “have gained the impression from the Russians that they will no longer impose recognition of East Germany and other demands as a precondition for the conference. [He] stated that Bonn would accept GDR participation.” The Department Head surmised that the preparations, including bilateral contacts, would be so time consuming that holding even a preparatory meeting this year would be unlikely.

### III *The US and Canadian Governments*

After Ambassador Munkki<sup>36</sup> submitted the memorandum on 6 May to Under Secretary of State Johnson<sup>37</sup> of the US Department of State, the latter observed with satisfaction that Finland considers careful preparation to be a prerequisite for the conference. He referred to the recently expressed position of NATO countries that European security issues involve many special problems. These should already be carefully studied and resolved before the conference, as this might even be possible before the conference. On receiving a copy of the memorandum in Helsinki on 6 May, a US Embassy representative commented that the memorandum confirmed such aspects as the established and neutral policy-based attitude of Finland towards the German question.

Receiving the conference memorandum from Ambassador Sumelius<sup>38</sup> on 6 May, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>39</sup> stated that *Canada* is positively interested in discussions on European security.<sup>40</sup> The Secretary of State stressed that the conference, whose success depends on the participation of the USA, would have to discuss security issues in a substantive manner, necessitating an exchange of views even before the preparatory meeting. The Secretary of State said “that the Canadian Government had considered the clause of the Budapest Declaration concerning Germany to impose preconditions, and would accordingly like to know whether the USSR had dropped them.”<sup>41</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Finnish Ambassador in Washington Olavi Munkki, [dodis.ch/P41305](https://dodis.ch/P41305).

<sup>37</sup> Ural Alexis Johnson, [dodis.ch/P18944](https://dodis.ch/P18944).

<sup>38</sup> Finnish Ambassador in Ottawa Holger Sumelius, [dodis.ch/P81219](https://dodis.ch/P81219).

<sup>39</sup> Mitchell Sharp, [dodis.ch/P46270](https://dodis.ch/P46270).

<sup>40</sup> For the Canadian reaction towards the Finnish memorandum and its offer to act as a host to a possible Conference on European security problems, cf. QdD 30, doc. 9, [dodis.ch/77044](https://dodis.ch/77044).

<sup>41</sup> For all Finnish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2902](https://dodis.ch/C2902).

[dodis.ch/77136](https://dodis.ch/77136)

Türkiye

*Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

FINNISH MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE CONFERENCE OF SECURITY  
IN EUROPE AND TÜRKIYE

[Ankara,] 25 July 1969

1. Consultations were held, within the framework of NATO, on the memorandum submitted by the Finnish Government regarding European security. There was a general consensus that no negative position should be taken against Finland in the reaction or response to Finnish Government's initiative.

Only Scandinavian countries stated that they found the Finnish initiative serious and constructive, and argued that the response of NATO member countries should be of the same nature. The Danish Government's decision to make a public statement on this matter without waiting for consultations within the Council was not well received by other allied countries.

Member countries other than the Scandinavian countries emphasised that it was unreasonable for Finland to undertake this task alone and that Russia was likely involved in the initiative in one way or another.

The US and Canada stated that their verbal response at the time the memorandum was submitted to them would suffice and that they would not provide any further response. Subsequently, on the occasion of his visit to Helsinki, the Canadian Foreign Minister<sup>2</sup> discussed the matter with the Finnish authorities, and remained faithful to the principles of the NATO Washington communiqué in his discussions with them.

England, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands stated that they will respond verbally. British Ambassador in Helsinki told our Ambassador that their reply was cordial but that it contained some reservations.

France also agreed that it will respond verbally and stated that the response would be consistent with the Washington communiqué and Debré's<sup>3</sup> statement at the Washington meeting.

Norway has stated that it will provide a written response.

The Eastern Bloc countries have responded positively to the Finnish memorandum since mid-June.

<sup>1</sup> Turkish Diplomatic Archives (TDA), K0001575-G0011767-234813. *Translated from Turkish. The author of the document could not be identified as the cover of the document is missing. It can be surmised that this document was drafted to analyze the reactions of the parties to the Finnish memorandum. For the Finnish memorandum, cf. QdD 30, doc. 6, [dodis.ch/76726](https://dodis.ch/76726). For the initial reactions to the Finnish memorandum, cf. QdD 30, doc. 7, [dodis.ch/76727](https://dodis.ch/76727).*

<sup>2</sup> Canadian Secretary of state for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, [dodis.ch/P46270](https://dodis.ch/P46270).

<sup>3</sup> French Minister of Defense Michel Debré, [dodis.ch/P2309](https://dodis.ch/P2309).

2. Under these circumstances, it would be consistent with the general approach for Türkiye to provide its response verbally. It might be appropriate for this response to include the following, bearing in mind the remarks made by our Minister<sup>4</sup> during his meeting with Vanamo,<sup>5</sup> the Secretary-General of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on May 21, 1969:

a) Türkiye is not opposed to the idea of convening a Conference on matters concerning European security in principle.

b) Turkish Government welcomes Finnish Government's initiative in this regard. Given Finland's position and reputation, we are confident that it can play a useful role in such an important matter.

c) The Finnish memorandum generally proposes the convening of the Conference and rightly points out the need for preparatory work to this end. We do not anticipate anyone objecting to the idea of holding a conference. However, we believe that preparation requires serious attention. European security is a broad and vague concept. It is much more likely that a Conference, where the agenda is not set in advance and anyone can bring up any topic they wish, will do more harm than good. Therefore, prior consensus must be reached among all relevant parties regarding the Conference agenda. In this way, the goal of the Conference will also be clear in advance. Since Finland has undertaken the first initiative, it can also make useful preparations and inquiries to determine the agenda. For this purpose, it is considered appropriate to begin with the issues that are most suitable for discussion and most likely to lead to a result.

d) Once the agenda is set, sufficient agreement should be reached on these issues before the Conference takes place. In this respect, it is considered that the preparation phase may take a considerable amount of time. In any case, it is practical and useful for the preparation to be matured initially through bilateral consultations.

e) It appears that opinions were expressed regarding the idea of a Conference and which states would participate in this Conference. Finnish memorandum offers more flexibility in this regard than the Pest Appeal.<sup>6</sup> Our view is that all relevant countries should participate, from the beginning, in any activities on this matter. It is an indisputable fact that the US and Canada are among them. It is unreasonable to make a distinction between some relevant countries being treated as fully relevant countries and others being involved in the matter because they were invited as a courtesy.

f) Turkish Government is ready to closely examine any subsequent attempts and suggestions made by Finnish Government in this regard.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs İhsan Çağlayangil, [dodis.ch/P44319](https://dodis.ch/P44319).

<sup>5</sup> Jorma Vanamo, [dodis.ch/P44016](https://dodis.ch/P44016).

<sup>6</sup> Budapest Appeal of March 1969.

<sup>7</sup> For all Turkish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2919](https://dodis.ch/C2919).



[dodis.ch/77044](https://dodis.ch/77044)

Canada

*The Canadian Department of External Affairs to the Finnish Ambassador in Ottawa,  
Sumelius<sup>1</sup>*

[RESPONSE TO FINLAND'S OFFER TO ACT AS HOST TO A POSSIBLE  
CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEMS]

Ottawa, 4 September 1969

Canada, which has been involved twice in this century in world wars originating in Europe, is vitally concerned with the peace and security of Europe. The prospect for improving relations between East and West and the eventual solution of the outstanding problems which still divide Europe are of continuing interest to Canada.

It is against this background that the Canadian Government has examined the Finnish memorandum of May 5, 1969 in which the Government of Finland offers to act as host to a possible conference on European security problems as well as to a preparatory meeting for consideration of the arrangements for such a conference.<sup>2</sup>

The Government of Canada believes that the positive and realistic approach reflected in the Finnish memorandum should be well received by all Governments interested in constructive steps towards a just and lasting peace in Europe, based on stability, security and mutual confidence. The Canadian Government particularly welcomes the Finnish view that any conference on European security problems should be convened without any preliminary conditions, should be well prepared, should provide for the participation of all Governments concerned and, above all, should be assured of reasonable prospects for success. The Canadian Government also agrees that a decision to hold such a conference or a preparatory meeting can be reached only after the essential groundwork has been laid as a result of consultations among all Governments concerned. With a view to playing a full part in this process, Canada is maintaining close contact with its allies and with other Governments.

The Canadian Government will continue to follow closely developments affecting the possible holding of an European security conference and related meetings and will welcome further exchanges with the Finnish Government on this matter.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9054, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 3. *This aide-mémoire of the Canadian Department of External Affairs was addressed to the Finnish Ambassador in Ottawa, Holger Lennart Sumelius*, [dodis.ch/P81219](https://dodis.ch/P81219).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 6, [dodis.ch/76726](https://dodis.ch/76726).

<sup>3</sup> For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](https://dodis.ch/C2913).



[dodis.ch/76894](https://dodis.ch/76894)

Poland

*Memorandum from Foreign Minister Jędrychowski<sup>1</sup>*[POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN  
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION]

[Warsaw, 8 October 1969]

I. On 26 September this year, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.S. Semyonov,<sup>2</sup> in a conversation with Comrade Z. Wolniak<sup>3</sup> (P.N. No. 428/ZW/69 of 28 September this year),<sup>4</sup> presented the position of the Soviet Union concerning the European Conference on Security and Cooperation.

From the information provided by Comrade Siemionow, it appears that:

1. The USSR proposes to hold a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries in the near future<sup>5</sup> to specify the political demands of the European Security Conference and agree on further steps to be taken by the socialist countries in this matter;

2. The USSR would consider the very fact of bringing about the rapid convening of a European conference to be a major success for the socialist countries. In this regard, it suggests:

- the socialist countries proposing to the West that the conference be convened in Helsinki as early as mid-1970,
- abandoning the preparatory meeting for the conference,
- agreeing to the participation of the USA and Canada in the conference, provided that the West does not question the equal participation of the GDR in the conference.

3. Seeking to convene the conference quickly, the Soviet side proposes to limit the agenda to issues which, in its opinion, currently offer hope for a solution. According to the USSR, given the position of the West, these cannot include the recognition of post-war borders in Europe and the international legal recognition

<sup>1</sup> Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (PL-AMSZ), z. 26, w. 33, t. 321. This document has been translated from Polish by Anna Sadowska. This memorandum from the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Jędrychowski, [dodis.ch/P573](https://dodis.ch/P573), was sent on 8 October 1969 to the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) Władysław Gomułka, [dodis.ch/P18141](https://dodis.ch/P18141). In his cover letter, Minister Jędrychowski wrote: "I am enclosing a memo concerning our position on the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, which we intend to forward in the form of a memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and to present in bilateral consultations with the ministries of foreign affairs of the other Warsaw Pact countries. I request your consideration and approval."; cf. PL-AMSZ, z. 26, w. 33, t. 321.

<sup>2</sup> Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Semyonov, [dodis.ch/P13452](https://dodis.ch/P13452).

<sup>3</sup> Polish Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs Zygfryd Wolniak, [dodis.ch/P44012](https://dodis.ch/P44012).

<sup>4</sup> For the urgent memorandum of 28 September 1969, cf. PL-AMSZ, DSiP 60/77, w. 1.

<sup>5</sup> A meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries, devoted to convening a European conference on security and cooperation, took place on 30 and 31 October 1969 in Czechoslovakia.

of the GDR. In view of the above, the USSR suggests that the socialist countries propose to the West that the following be agreed upon as items on the conference agenda:

- an accord on the mutual renunciation of the use or threat of force;
- an accord on the development of economic and scientific-technical cooperation.

The draft agreement on the renunciation of the use of force presented by the USSR does not contain a requirement to recognise the existing borders in Europe or to respect the territorial integrity of states.

The essence of the Soviet proposal would therefore be achieving a general improvement in the political climate in Europe. This means accepting a minimum programme in advance without attempting to achieve the fundamental premises of European security, both through bilateral talks with Western countries, including the GFR, and through multilateral talks. This puts us in an incontinent position due to our fundamental interest in the recognition of the border on the Oder and Neisse rivers and our commitment to promoting the idea of a security and cooperation agreement in Europe.

Should the issue of recognition and respect for borders in Europe be dropped from the conference agenda – even if it is intended as a first step towards further meetings – it would adversely affect the prospects of achieving progress on the recognition of our border, both at the pan-European level and in bilateral talks with the GFR.

In view of the above, in response to the position presented to us by the USSR, we propose to send a memorandum to the Soviet side in which:

- we express our support for the proposal to hold a meeting of foreign ministers of socialist countries in order to agree on a common position on the main issues related to the European conference, as well as for the suggestions regarding the date of the conference and its makeup;
- we express once again the view that the conference should focus on key issues of European security and cooperation, and that its outcome should be progress based on recognition of the existing territorial and political status quo; to this end, we propose that the basic principles of a security and cooperation agreement be considered and agreed upon at the meeting of foreign ministers in preparation. Dialogue on the draft of such an agreement – even if not all of the objectives outlined in it could be achieved immediately – would play a major role in moving forward the realization of European security premises;
- we declare that the issue of recognising the territorial status quo has not been addressed in the Soviet draft of the accord on the renunciation of the use of force or the threat of force which has been submitted to us; we therefore present a counter-draft of the “Basic Principles of an Accord on the Renunciation of the Use of Force or Threat of Force in Mutual Relations between European States”, which provides for the explicit recognition of “existing state borders in Europe and respecting them”;
- we emphasise the need to clarify the principles of European cooperation in the economic and scientific-technical fields and propose, to this end, the establishment of a special working group of the signatory states of the Budapest Appeal

and the supplementation of the draft of the document on economic and scientific-technical cooperation presented by the USSR.

It should also be considered whether, regardless of the presentation of our position in writing to the USSR and the already scheduled consultation with the GDR, it would be appropriate to hold consultations with other Warsaw Pact countries at the level of deputy ministers or department directors even before the meeting of foreign ministers concerning the European conference and German affairs.

II. It should be assumed that during the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries, there will arise the issue of these countries' policy towards GFR. The formal basis for raising this issue is provided by the protocol of the Warsaw meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in February 1967.<sup>6</sup> Such an initiative may be taken in particular by the GDR, which, as we know from unofficial statements by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade W.S. Semyonov, raised this issue in connection with Comrade Gomulka's proposal<sup>7</sup> of 17 May this year.<sup>8</sup> (During the last consultations with the USSR, the GDR side did not return to this issue). Regardless of this, there is a need on our part to consult on further proceedings regarding talks with the GFR. However, the matter is not suitable for discussion among the foreign ministers of all seven countries of the Warsaw Pact, as Romania is not a signatory to the February 1967 protocol.

Thus, two options suggest themselves:

1) to hold a meeting of the foreign ministers of the six countries which signed the February 1967 protocol: the meeting could take place on the eve of or the day after the meeting of the seven countries;

2) to hold bilateral consultations on this matter with the other five countries which signed the February 1967 protocol.

The bilateral form of consultation is supported by the fact that a premature revision of the 1967 agreements on the full normalisation of relations with the GFR (both in the case of a relaxation of the conditions for this normalisation and their possible tightening) would not be in our interest.

We will submit the theses for consultation with socialist countries on German matters in a separate memo.

We enclose:

- 1) Draft of Polish memorandum to the USSR government,
- 2) Polish draft of principles of an agreement on collective security and cooperation in Europe,
- 3) Polish draft of principles of an agreement on the renunciation of the use of force,
- 4) Completed draft of communiqué from the meeting of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> This refers to the protocol signed at the conclusion of the meeting of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries in Warsaw on 9 February 1967, which was devoted to the policy of socialist countries towards the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

<sup>7</sup> First Secretary of the PZPR Władysław Gomułka, [dodis.ch/P18141](https://dodis.ch/P18141).

<sup>8</sup> On 17 May 1969, First Secretary Gomułka proposed that the Polish People's Republic and the FRG begin talks on normalising mutual relations.

<sup>9</sup> The enclosed drafts are not published in the present volume. For the drafts, cf. PL-AMSZ, z. 26, w. 33, t. 321. For all Polish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2901](https://dodis.ch/C2901).

[dodis.ch/75699](https://dodis.ch/75699)

Austria

*The Austrian Ambassador in Helsinki, Pichler, to Foreign Minister Waldheim*<sup>1</sup>

CONVERSATION WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM  
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, N.V. PODGORNÝ

Helsinki, 14 October 1969

At today's reception for the heads of mission, hosted by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the occasion of his five-day official state visit to Finland, I had the opportunity to exchange a few words with Mr Podgorny.<sup>2</sup> After extremely friendly remarks about his visit to Austria at the time and the very special kindness with which he and his daughter were received there, as well as mentioning that you, Mr Federal Minister, will also be coming to Helsinki shortly, Mr Podgorny turned to the subject of the European Security Conference. He said that the Soviet Union was particularly pleased to note that Austria was the first country to respond positively to the Finnish initiative.<sup>3</sup> Based on the election results in the Federal Republic of Germany, he was confident that the planned conference would also yield positive results. The West Germans seem to be politically mature enough to reject right-wing extremism. The talks between Gromyko and Brandt in New York<sup>4</sup> were very refreshing, and Moscow had the impression that the future German federal government would reconsider its foreign policy from a new perspective. Brandt seemed to be grounded in reality, moving away from the romantic approach of Kiesinger<sup>5</sup> and his predecessors. Everyone can be assured that the Soviet Union wants nothing but peace, both in Vietnam and in the Middle East, and especially, of course, in Europe. Any kind of aggression (!) must be prevented.

1 Austrian State Archives/Archiv der Republik (AT-OeStA/AdR), BMAA, Political Reports Helsinki 1969. Ambassador Pichler to Foreign Minister Waldheim, Helsinki, 14 October 1969, Zl. 86-Pol/69. Translated from German. This report was written by the Austrian Ambassador in Helsinki, Erich Pichler, [dodis.ch/P46541](https://dodis.ch/P46541), and arrived in Vienna on 22 October 1969. A short extract from the report was brought to the attention of Foreign Minister Kurt Waldheim, [dodis.ch/P15484](https://dodis.ch/P15484), and Federal Chancellor Josef Klaus, [dodis.ch/P15312](https://dodis.ch/P15312), cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/75699](https://dodis.ch/75699).

2 Nikolai Podgorny, [dodis.ch/P15544](https://dodis.ch/P15544), Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

3 Cf. QdD 30, doc. 6, [dodis.ch/76726](https://dodis.ch/76726), and doc. 7, [dodis.ch/76727](https://dodis.ch/76727).

4 In a conversation with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](https://dodis.ch/P489), on 22 September 1969, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](https://dodis.ch/P15409), referred to the FRG government's positive answer to the Finnish CSCE invitation and indicated hope that the conference would be well prepared and improve East–West relations and the lives of the population. Cf. Dokumente zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1969, doc. 297. On 21 October 1969 Brandt was elected Chancellor of the FRG.

5 Kurt Georg Kiesinger, [dodis.ch/P15408](https://dodis.ch/P15408), Chancellor of the FRG until 20 October 1969.

Mr Podgorny also said that the SALT talks would begin soon. I repeated Austria's invitation to hold them in Vienna, to which President Podgorny replied that the location was not the most important thing, but rather the fact that the talks were taking place at all.

Mr Podgorny also touched on the bilateral political and economic relations between Austria and the Soviet Union, which he described as good and friendly. He considers the agreement on natural gas supplies, which was concluded so quickly<sup>6</sup> – in contrast to the subsequent talks with Italy, which are constantly encountering new difficulties – to be advantageous for both sides.

Finally, the Soviet President asked me to convey his best regards to Federal President<sup>7</sup> and Federal Chancellor.<sup>8</sup> I would ask you, Federal Minister, to pass these on accordingly.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Contracts on deliveries of 1.5 bill. cubic metres of Soviet natural gas annually to Austria and of 5 bill. cubic metres annually to Italy were signed by the Soviet state gas export company Soyuznefteeksport with the Austrian state-owned Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung OMV on 1 June 1968, and with the Italian Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi ENI on 10 December 1968.

<sup>7</sup> Austrian President Franz Jonas, [dodis.ch/P15529](https://dodis.ch/P15529).

<sup>8</sup> Austrian Federal Chancellor Klaus, [dodis.ch/P15312](https://dodis.ch/P15312).

<sup>9</sup> For all Austrian documents in this volume, cf. [dodis.ch/C2929](https://dodis.ch/C2929).

[dodis.ch/77045](https://dodis.ch/77045)

Canada

*The Department of External Affairs to the Canadian Embassy in Moscow*<sup>1</sup>

## ESC – CANADIAN PARTICIPATION

Extract • Confidential

Ottawa, 1 November 1969

In light of fact that Warsaw Pact ministers have just met in Prague to discuss European Security Conference it seems to us to be too late to mount sort of approach which you have suggested to each prospective member of ESC, although we shall of course consider carefully implications of whatever emerges from their meeting (on which we do not yet have a full report). In any event we are doubtful whether such an approach would necessarily strengthen Canadian claim to take part in ESC and related meetings as a matter of right.

2. In saying this we have in mind following considerations: (a) that by public statements on May 12<sup>2</sup> and June 23<sup>3</sup> in House of Commons SSEA<sup>4</sup> has made very clear that we would expect to take part in ESC from outset; (b) that extent of our interest should be evident from fact that we have given a written reply to Finnish memo of May 5<sup>5</sup> and that reply has been made known to every capital in Europe (either through NATO or by direct approaches in capitals); c) that our NATO allies, judging from reports from Canadian delegation NATO, stand firm in support of Canadian and USA participation as a matter of right; [...] (d) that from a number of capitals outside NATO or WPO we have had clear indications of support (e.g., Spain, Yugoslavia, Finland) for Canadian participation.

3. In circumstances we are not certain that our position would be improved by canvassing prospective ESC participants, by attempting to draw up a box score showing amount of support and endeavouring to use this to persuade USSR that we have a right to attend. We do not wish to be in a position of arguing matter with USSR in a way which might suggest acceptance of view that USSR holds key to our participation (i.e., timing if not fact of it). Even USSR itself does not claim this role, arguing rather that it is something for European countries to decide. In

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9054, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 4 (YOURTEL 3631 OCT24). *This telegram No. S-1292 from the Canadian Department of External Affairs was sent to the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. The facsimile contains some handwritten additions that have been transcribed in the document; likewise, certain words have been struck through. These changes would have been reflected in the final version received in Moscow. For the original version, also including the complete list of the addressees, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77045](https://dodis.ch/77045).*

<sup>2</sup> [Canada, House of Commons Debates, 28th Parliament, 1st Session: vol. 8, 8564–8565.](#)

<sup>3</sup> [Canada, House of Commons Debates, 28th Parliament, 1st Session: vol. 10, 10535.](#)

<sup>4</sup> Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, [dodis.ch/P46270](https://dodis.ch/P46270).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 9, [dodis.ch/77044](https://dodis.ch/77044).

<sup>6</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77045](https://dodis.ch/77045).

any event we doubt USSR would concede for time being any more on our participation than it has done; Gromyko, as you have pointed out, indicated when in Ottawa that USSR would not insist on a preliminary conference to decide on North American attendance. It is also relevant that in talks with Gromyko SSEA said that countries concerned had been canvassed, that there seemed to be general support for Canadian participation, and that he hoped Soviet Union would recognize this.

4. On question of making a distinction between security problems and other matters we believe that best position for us to take is that we have an interest in and a right to attend a European security conference or any other related meetings. We do not think that the sort of distinction that France seems to be toying with (i.e., between security questions and others) would be easy to maintain in practice and we assume our allies would support us in resisting some sort of second class status for Canada. Perhaps best way to avoid this is to speak clearly and often about importance of "North American participation" thereby linking our participation firmly with that of USA, since Eastern side must recognize that any effort to downgrade role of USA in respect of future of Europe can only serve to diminish prospects of serious results and reinforce suspicions of propaganda motivation.

5. As things stand it seems that high level meeting on November 5 could provide a welcome opportunity from purely Canadian point of view to set forth some elements of our position: (a) Canada by any standard, given its population and resources, has played an important role in this century in affairs of Europe; (b) we recognize, notwithstanding outbreaks of violence elsewhere, that Europe is still most likely origin of any major conflict between East and West; (c) accordingly when there is talk of European security and future of Europe we feel that we are directly involved and that we have a right to participate in an ESC or related meetings as a country with a direct concern – not as a bystander; (d) in this context we feel a responsibility to be an active participant in European questions with a view to making whatever distinctive contribution we can towards bringing about a genuine détente and a political settlement in Europe based on principles of mutual respect and international cooperation among all countries concerned.<sup>7</sup>

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7 For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).



[dodis.ch/32405](https://dodis.ch/32405)

Switzerland

*Meeting of the Federal Political Department's Working Group on 16 December 1969*<sup>1</sup>

## EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

Confidential

[Bern,] 29 December 1969

*Mr Micheli* briefly explains the purpose of this meeting (assessment of Eastern initiatives in favour of a European security conference; formation of a working group, for which authorisation has already been granted by the Federal Council)<sup>2</sup> and gives the floor to *Mr Miesch* for introductory remarks.

*Mr Miesch* refers to the working paper<sup>3</sup> distributed to those present and the documents mentioned therein, and limits himself to a few remarks:

Eastern initiatives in favour of a European security conference are not new (Rapacki Plan,<sup>4</sup> etc.), but they are now being presented with a certain insistence. As is well known, NATO has already submitted proposals in the military sector in Reykjavik, which have recently been confirmed in Brussels (disarmament, troop reductions).

What is interesting about the appeals made by the Warsaw Pact countries is the fact that they reflect the differing interests of the USSR on the one hand, and its allies on the other. Romania and Poland are pinning their hopes on such a conference to gain greater freedom of movement in foreign policy.<sup>5</sup> Hopes that can probably be considered delusions.

Moscow was initially reluctant, but has since expressed a general interest in holding such a conference. The Kremlin faces the problem of keeping the Eastern Bloc under control. The Soviet attitude is strongly propagandistic in nature,

1 Swiss Federal Archives CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#540\* (B.72.09.15.1). Translated from German. These minutes have been written by Karl Fritschi, [dodis.ch/P16389](https://dodis.ch/P16389), of the Political Service East of the Federal Political Department (FPD). The meeting was attended, amongst others, by the Head of the Political Affairs Department Pierre Micheli, [dodis.ch/P86](https://dodis.ch/P86), as Chair, the Legal Advisor to the FPD Rudolf Bindschedler, [dodis.ch/P1396](https://dodis.ch/P1396), the Heads of the Political Service West Michael Gelzer, [dodis.ch/P2735](https://dodis.ch/P2735), of the Political Service East Hans Miesch, [dodis.ch/P2757](https://dodis.ch/P2757), of the Political Studies Section Albert Natural, [dodis.ch/P2696](https://dodis.ch/P2696), as well as of the Finance and Economic Affairs Service Pierre André Nussbaumer, [dodis.ch/P2824](https://dodis.ch/P2824). For the full list of meeting attendees, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/32405](https://dodis.ch/32405). This document was also published in German in: *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS)*, vol. 24, doc. 188, [dodis.ch/32405](https://dodis.ch/32405).

2 Cf. DDS, vol. 24, doc. 154, [dodis.ch/32403](https://dodis.ch/32403).

3 Cf. the memorandum by Karl Fritschi of 11 December 1969, [dodis.ch/32406](https://dodis.ch/32406).

4 Proposal for nuclear disarmament and demilitarization in Central Europe presented on 2 October 1957 by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki, [dodis.ch/P15318](https://dodis.ch/P15318). Cf. also the memorandum by Albert Natural of 1 April 1969, [dodis.ch/32404](https://dodis.ch/32404).

5 For Romania's stance on a European security conference cf. DDS, vol. 24, doc. 140, [dodis.ch/32536](https://dodis.ch/32536). On the Polish stance cf. QdD 30, doc. 10, [dodis.ch/76894](https://dodis.ch/76894), as well as the telegram from Swiss Ambassador in Warsaw, Pascal Frochaux, [dodis.ch/P5382](https://dodis.ch/P5382), from 2 December 1969, [dodis.ch/75207](https://dodis.ch/75207).

as evidenced by the very early date proposed for the conference leaving NATO countries no opportunity to take a position on it beforehand.

The Soviet Union is likely driven by the following motives in this matter:

The USSR wants to act as a peacemaker – not only in Europe, but also in East Asia – a role that will be particularly welcome next year, the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the UN. It is undertaking peace and security initiatives in Europe at a time when the CSSR crisis is barely over. A deep mistrust is therefore justified. Moscow also wants to consolidate the status quo in Europe, sow discord in the Western camp and counteract an excessive concentration of economic power in the West.

The USSR apparently wants to assign an active role to the neutral countries and use them as figureheads for a security conference.<sup>6</sup>

The two Eastern proposals for discussion concerning the renunciation of violence and cooperation are vague and are mainly comprised of slogans. The draft text on the renunciation of violence aims to regulate important aspects of the German question and sanction the Brezhnev<sup>7</sup> Doctrine; the text on cooperation fails to mention cultural relations. Unlike Poland, the Soviet Union appears to show no interest in disarmament issues.

NATO members are sceptical about the initiatives and proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact countries. In their latest statement, they place particular emphasis on disarmament measures and advocate prior bilateral talks (e.g. between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR and other Eastern European countries). They expect the East to show signs of goodwill first. NATO has made no comment on the question of the date, but has indicated that certain arrangements must be made before a conference can be held and that the climate for such a pan-European meeting is not yet favourable.

For Switzerland, it is clear that it cannot participate in the resolution of issues that originated during the Second World War. However, our country cannot remain completely on the sidelines, because solving European peace and security problems should not be left entirely to the major powers.

The Federal Council has provisionally established its general position on the conference project.<sup>8</sup> The head of the department has recently emphasised the importance of creating an atmosphere of mutual trust prior to the conference.<sup>9</sup> He also stressed that such a conference must recognise the national sovereignty of all states, i.e. the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each state.

The question now arises as to whether a working group should be set up to examine the issues facing Switzerland in connection with a European security conference. Should this group be created now, and should it be formed within a single department or across departments? The working paper mentioned above lists some of the issues that this working group would have to deal with.

6 Cf. the letter of Swiss Ambassador in Moscow Jean de Stoutz, [dodis.ch/P2695](https://dodis.ch/P2695), to the FPD of 1 December 1969, [dodis.ch/75208](https://dodis.ch/75208).

7 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

8 Cf. DDS, vol. 24, doc. 154, [dodis.ch/32403](https://dodis.ch/32403).

9 This probably refers to the draft declaration by Federal Councillor Willy Spühler, [dodis.ch/P2111](https://dodis.ch/P2111), intended for the 45<sup>th</sup> Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Paris on 12 December 1969, [dodis.ch/77669](https://dodis.ch/77669). However, that part of the programme has been postponed, cf. [dodis.ch/75205](https://dodis.ch/75205).

*Mr Micheli:* We can prepare for a possible conference in two ways:

– externally, on the basis of bilateral contacts that have already taken place but have remained at a general level. For example, the Dutch have shown great interest in discussing this issue with us (at the beginning of February, the Director-General for Political Affairs at the Dutch Foreign Ministry, Mr de Ranitz, will visit us);<sup>10</sup>

– internally among the departments.

When considering whether the working group to be formed should be created solely within the FPD or whether representatives from other departments should also be involved, it should be assumed that this body will have a dual role. The working group will have to deal with two sets of issues: on the one hand, the political aspects of the proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact and NATO and, on the other, questions of cooperation in all possible areas. Since the latter group of issues covers the fields of economics, trade, science and culture, contacts with other departments may need to be sought here.

The Federal Council has already commented on the political issues, stating that Switzerland cannot participate in resolving problems that have their roots in the last world conflict.<sup>11</sup> It is, nevertheless, far from easy to distinguish between these problems and those that did not arise during the Second World War, since they are interwoven.

Furthermore, the working group is considering what stance our country should take on the issue of renouncing violence. Is it appropriate for neutral states to participate in the exchange of declarations renouncing violence? Should they take the initiative in this regard or rather exercise restraint?

In the areas of economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, there is a question around whether neutral countries, including Switzerland, can play a specific role, which would seem to accord with French ideas. In addition, there is the issue of whether this cooperation should be discussed and agreed upon within the framework of a European security conference at all, or whether it would be more appropriate to first seek and improve this cooperation in other multilateral frameworks or at the bilateral level.

*Mr Bindschedler* basically agrees with the assessment of the situation regarding the European security conference given at the outset. The only thing that needs to be added is a reference to the Soviet desire for stability in Europe, because the USSR is seeking greater freedom of action in the East due to China. Furthermore, the two Eastern documents on renunciation of violence and cooperation are not draft treaties, but mere declarations, i.e. verbal manifestations.<sup>12</sup>

When considering what such a conference should aim to achieve, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that there is nothing behind it. In their current form, the proposals are a deception because they do not seek to resolve any funda-

<sup>10</sup> On the visit of Jan de Ranitz, [dodis.ch/P43901](https://dodis.ch/P43901), on 19 and 20 February 1970, cf. [dodis.ch/75216](https://dodis.ch/75216).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 24, doc. 154, [dodis.ch/32403](https://dodis.ch/32403).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. the memorandum by Swiss Secretary-General of the FPD Micheli dated 31 October 1969, [dodis.ch/75209](https://dodis.ch/75209), and the memorandum by the Head of the Political Service East Miesch dated 10 November 1969, [dodis.ch/75210](https://dodis.ch/75210).

mental problems. On the contrary, these problems are being covered up with a verbal edifice constructed in their place. Renunciation of violence is merely a new term for a non-aggression pact, and as is well known, non-aggression pacts have been worthless in the past. Incidentally, the principle of renunciation of violence is enshrined in the UN Charter and is now considered customary law in general international law. Both the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR have recognised the principles of the UN Charter. An exchange of declarations on renunciation of violence is therefore superfluous since it is merely repetition.

A system of collective security is – if effective at all – more so universally (UN Charter) than at the regional level (cf. the Treaty of Locarno, which lasted no longer than six or seven years). The necessary superiority of the defenders of the law over the aggressor is even less evident at the regional level than it is at the universal level; likewise, the flexibility of groups of states is even more lacking. Moreover, we can well envisage who the presumptive aggressor might be – a member of the system.

As far as the dissolution of the blocs is concerned, Switzerland has no interest in this because it itself benefits from the existence of the NATO alliance. Countries such as Yugoslavia and Romania are deluding themselves if they believe in this dissolution. The events in Czechoslovakia have clearly shown where their limits lie.

The Soviet Union is not interested in disarmament measures such as clearing foreign bases and mutual troop reductions because it needs to keep its satellites in check. Yet even if the Americans and Russians withdrew, the distances involved would create a dangerous situation for Europe, which American precautions such as the *Big Lift*<sup>13</sup> would do little to change. Such a situation is by no means desirable for us.

Disarmament is primarily a matter for the superpowers and is, therefore, an unrealistic postulate in the context of a European security conference.

The East would be prepared to make a declaration in favour of independence and non-interference. However, we know what that is worth. The Brezhnev Doctrine provides the most recent example of this. The West would have to insist that these principles also apply among its respective allies, but this is something that the East would keep hardly.

If nothing is left behind the political and military postulates, then the obstacle to cooperation is the difference between the economic systems of East and West. Here, it is not trade-related factors (customs duties, etc.) that play a role, but political factors.

No conference is necessary to improve mutual trade relations. Trade can take place bilaterally; in a multilateral framework, the European Economic Commission in Geneva could deal with these issues. Everything else is Eastern *window dressing*.<sup>14</sup> The same applies to science. Furthermore, the East does not want normal cultural relations because it fears Western influence.

All things considered, what remains are many empty words and – somewhat dangerously – the creation of illusions that we recognise from the 1920s and 1930s.

The question now is what Switzerland should do.

<sup>13</sup> Operation “Big Lift” was a US Armed Forces airlift exercise across the Atlantic in autumn 1963.

<sup>14</sup> English in the original.

Do we want to cement the status quo, the division of Germany, which may be desirable for us in terms of power politics, but is somewhat artificial, and the sanctioning of conditions in the Eastern Bloc? Problems also arise with regard to the policy of neutrality, because the issues that should be reserved for the peace conference are difficult to define. This is also evident in the question of renouncing violence. It would be sensible to hold a peace conference first, and only then resolve the remaining problems.

There is a fear that Swiss initiatives would favour one party at the expense of the other. It is difficult to find a middle ground. Initiatives thus have a one-sided effect. In any case, their impact will be minimal.

One postulate remains of interest: a security conference would provide an opportunity to have neutrality recognised. The issue of the recognition of neutrality has not been settled, or at least not clearly, with regard to the Soviet Union, the United States and the UN.

We could align ourselves with countries that have the same interests or that support us. With regard to the neutral countries, however, it should be noted that Austria does not need recognition of its neutrality, Sweden probably does not want it because of its specific neutrality policy, and Finland has to pursue a special policy in this regard.

There are also risks that

- the USSR would want to use the issue of recognition of neutrality for its own purposes (cf. Soviet initiatives in the early 1950s: creation of a one-sided “neutral zone” at the expense of the West);
- recognition of neutrality would be linked to conditions;
- our position would be weakened if this recognition did not come about.

Scepticism is therefore warranted, even if the question of recognition should not be excluded from our discussion from the outset.

The conclusion is that it is particularly important for Switzerland to be present at such a conference, should it take place.

The working group is faced with the question of its composition. It can be assumed that discussion about a European security conference will focus exclusively on foreign policy issues; everything else is window dressing. The working group should therefore be composed of representatives from the FPD; a representative from the Trade Division may also be consulted.

*Mr Miesch:* The Federal Council has not yet decided on Switzerland's participation in a European security conference. In response to the appeals of the Warsaw Pact states, an overly positive stance has been avoided. The Finnish initiative was not an invitation, but merely a consultation.<sup>15</sup> The head of department has emphasised the importance of taking a realistic stance on these initiatives and proposals. The task of the working group will be to make recommendations on Switzerland's position to the Federal Council and, in particular, to inform the new head of department about the conference project.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 6, [dodis.ch/76726](https://dodis.ch/76726).

<sup>16</sup> On 1 February 1970, Federal Councillor Pierre Graber, [dodis.ch/P4171](https://dodis.ch/P4171), replaced Federal Councillor Spühler as Head of the FPD.

*Mr Micheli:* The working group will indeed have to clarify the two main issues: 1. Participation or not, 2. If so, preparation for this participation.

*Mr Nussbaumer* comments on Mr Bindschedler's remarks about the cooperation proposed by the East in the field of trade. This partly concerns the question of most-favoured-nation treatment, which is already the subject of discussions within the GATT and the OECD. There is no agreement on this between Europe and the United States in the West. The US grants most-favoured-nation status to Poland and is, in principle, prepared to extend it to other Eastern European countries if Europe does the same. The most important Western European countries have not granted most-favoured-nation status to the East, mainly in order to have a bargaining chip in negotiations. It is unlikely that a solution in this area could be found at a European security conference.

Switzerland has granted most-favoured-nation status to the Eastern European countries, apart from four minor restrictions:

- strategic goods, for which we observe the principle of “courant normal”;<sup>17</sup>
- price monitoring for textile imports;
- egg imports;
- clearing.<sup>18</sup>

As these restrictions have virtually no impact on our trade with the East, Switzerland is not in the firing line on this issue. Our country is more interested in resolving these problems bilaterally. We are therefore prepared to abandon individual clearing arrangements; we should take this opportunity to try to negotiate something in return. All in all, therefore, Switzerland has no immediate economic interest in a major conference.

From a political standpoint, it is nevertheless significant that certain reform tendencies are evident in the economic sector in the East. In Hungary, for example, attempts are being made to move gradually and in the long term from a compulsory plan to an indicative plan, albeit with safeguards in place in case this goes too far. The needs of the market are to be taken into account to a greater extent. Similar trends can also be observed elsewhere. Such reform efforts could have political repercussions that must also be taken into account in connection with the security conference.

*Mr Natural:* If the conference goes ahead, there is no reason for Switzerland not to participate, because our country must protect its interests.

Scepticism is certainly warranted, but it is also possible that a European security conference could mark the beginning of a process that could lead to a peace treaty. If Switzerland is not involved from the outset, it would be difficult to “join in” later (cf. the situation in Western European unification efforts).<sup>19</sup> Our interest in the conference is therefore certainly justified.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 24, doc. 189, [dodis.ch/33136](http://dodis.ch/33136).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 24, doc. 20, [dodis.ch/32396](http://dodis.ch/32396).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 24, doc. 33, [dodis.ch/33238](http://dodis.ch/33238); doc. 68, [dodis.ch/33241](http://dodis.ch/33241), and doc. 180, [dodis.ch/33243](http://dodis.ch/33243).



We see two trends in the Eastern Bloc: the USSR wants to cement the status quo, while Romania is seeking to dissolve the blocs with the same conference. The question as to whether a European security conference will go in one direction or the other therefore deserves consideration. A European security conference presupposes détente between East and West. However, history teaches us that détente causes difficulties for the Soviet Union (cf. Beria,<sup>20</sup> Khrushchev,<sup>21</sup> Budapest, Prague).

Even if Switzerland is to show great interest in the conference, it will not want to put forward any initiatives of its own in this regard.

*Mr Gelzer* also believes that the conference proposal warrants a great deal of scepticism. However, due to statements made by the government, the public has the impression that Switzerland's attitude is entirely positive.<sup>22</sup> The question therefore arises as to whether, in view of the prevailing scepticism, a certain degree of restraint on the part of the authorities would be appropriate.

*Mr Miesch*: Responding to the interpellations by Mr Renschler in the National Council and Mr Hefti in the Council of States will provide an opportunity to clarify the Federal Council's position.<sup>23</sup>

*Mr Micheli* summarises the discussion and, based on the exchange of views, proposes that a working group be set up within the FPD, with the involvement of a representative from the Trade Division.<sup>24</sup> Should it prove necessary at a later stage, representatives from the FDHA, the FMD and possibly the FDTE could also be involved.

The working group is composed of the following gentlemen:

Ambassador Bindschedler, Chair; Minister Miesch; Minister Gelzer; Minister Diez; Natural; Nussbaumer; Fritschi; a representative of the IO;<sup>25</sup> a representative of the Trade Division.

The first meeting of the working group will take place at the end of January.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>20</sup> On the removal from power of the Soviet Minister of the Interior Lavrentiy Beria, [dodis.ch/P2163](https://dodis.ch/P2163), in July 1953, cf. DDS, vol. 19, doc. 69, [dodis.ch/9557](https://dodis.ch/9557).

<sup>21</sup> On the removal from power of Soviet Prime Minister and First Secretary of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev, [dodis.ch/P14485](https://dodis.ch/P14485), in October 1964, cf. DDS, vol. 23, doc. 47, [dodis.ch/31312](https://dodis.ch/31312).

<sup>22</sup> Press Release of the FPD of 24 July 1969, [dodis.ch/77668](https://dodis.ch/77668).

<sup>23</sup> For Federal Councillor Graber's response of 15 June 1970 to Interpellation 193/10282 European Security Conference tabled by National Councillor Walter Renschler, [dodis.ch/P29759](https://dodis.ch/P29759), on 2 June 1969, cf. [dodis.ch/75124](https://dodis.ch/75124); for his response of 23 June 1970 to Interpellation 203/10430 European Security Conference tabled by Councillor of the States Peter Hefti, [dodis.ch/P31801](https://dodis.ch/P31801), on 26 November 1969, cf. [dodis.ch/75126](https://dodis.ch/75126).

<sup>24</sup> The Delegate for Trade Agreements and Special Missions of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs Albert Weitnauer, [dodis.ch/P2132](https://dodis.ch/P2132).

<sup>25</sup> The Head of the Division for International Organisations of the FPD Ernesto Thalmann, [dodis.ch/P997](https://dodis.ch/P997).

<sup>26</sup> For all Swiss documents in this volume, cf. [dodis.ch/C2935](https://dodis.ch/C2935).



[dodis.ch/76895](https://dodis.ch/76895)

Poland

*The Department of Studies and Programming to Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs  
Winiewicz, Wolniak and Willmann<sup>1</sup>*

THE HITHERTO POSITION OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ON THE  
POLISH DRAFT OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY ON SECURITY  
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Secret

Warsaw, 3 July 1970

The original text of the Polish “draft of basic principles of the Treaty on Security and Cooperation in Europe” was presented to the deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries at a meeting in Moscow on 24 October 1969, with a request for their opinions. The text had previously been consulted with the USSR government, and at the aforementioned meeting, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. S. Semyonov<sup>2</sup> stated that he had been authorised to communicate the support of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the Polish draft (Urgent Memo No. 475/JW/69 of 26 October 1969).<sup>3</sup>

At the Prague meeting of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries (30–31 October 1969), Minister St. Jędrychowski<sup>4</sup> reiterated his request for comments on the draft.

The first country to present its comments to us after the Prague meeting was the German Democratic Republic. In a conversation with Deputy Minister J. Winiewicz on 3 February this year, the GDR Ambassador to Poland, Comrade Rossmeisl,<sup>5</sup> stated that the German comrades had studied our draft with great interest and considered it to be in line with the general policy of the parties and governments of the Warsaw Pact countries, as well as with the joint declaration of the socialist countries on peace and security in Europe of 4 December 1969 (Urgent Memo No. 70/JW/70 of 3 February this year).<sup>6</sup>

1 Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republik of Poland (PL-AMSZ), DSiP 61/77, w. 1. This document has been translated from Polish by Anna Sadowska. This supplementary memorandum was sent to the Polish Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Józef Winiewicz, [dodis.ch/P43250](https://dodis.ch/P43250), Zygfryd Wolniak, [dodis.ch/P44012](https://dodis.ch/P44012) and Adam Willmann, [dodis.ch/P44778](https://dodis.ch/P44778). In a cover letter dated 4 July 1970, the Director of the Department of Studies and Programming at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Józef Czyrek, [dodis.ch/P44031](https://dodis.ch/P44031), stated: “The Department of Studies and Programming hereby submits a memorandum on the previous and current position of the Warsaw Pact countries on the Polish draft of the basic principles of the Treaty on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The memorandum supplements the material on this subject dated 31 March this year.”, cf. PL-AMSZ, DSiP 61/77, w. 1.

2 Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Semyonov, [dodis.ch/P13452](https://dodis.ch/P13452).

3 Cf. PL-AMSZ, DSiP 60/77, w. 1.

4 Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Jędrychowski, [dodis.ch/P573](https://dodis.ch/P573).

5 Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Warsaw Rudolf Rossmeisl, [dodis.ch/P81413](https://dodis.ch/P81413).

6 Cf. PL-AMSZ, z. 26 w. 33 t. 321.

The German comrades have conveyed for our consideration the following suggestions of amendments:

1. In Part II, point 1 of the draft (commitment not to use force, to recognise and respect existing borders, not to interfere in internal affairs, etc.), they would prefer us to use the exact wording of the UN Charter in order to avoid unnecessary discussion with our Western partners.

2. In Part II, point 2 (holding consultations in the event of a threat to peace), they suggested changing the text so that it could not be used by anyone to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist countries by unilaterally recognising the situation in those countries as a “threat to peace”.

3. In Part II, point 7 (negotiations on regional disarmament), they proposed a change in the wording to specify that regional disarmament should also cover American forces, as the military forces of a non-European state.

During talks in Warsaw (9–12 March this year), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People’s Republic, J. Peter,<sup>7</sup> informed us of the HPR government’s acceptance of the Polish draft and pointed to the West’s interest in the issues covered by the draft (Urgent Memo No. 156/D.I/70 of 18 March this year).<sup>8</sup>

Minister J. Peter had previously expressed his opinion to the Ambassador of the Polish People’s Republic in Budapest that, while he agreed with the Polish draft of the Agreement, he believed that it should not be the object of discussion at the first European Conference (ciphergram No. 14018 of 11 December 1969).<sup>9</sup>

The position of the Socialist Republic of Romania on the Polish draft was communicated to us by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ecobescu<sup>10</sup> on 24 February this year (ciphergram No. 2085 of 25 February this year).<sup>11</sup>

In addition to expressing fundamental support for our initiative, Deputy Minister Ecobescu particularly emphasised the need to shape European security on the basis of “sovereignty and independence, equality of rights and mutual benefits, and non-interference in internal affairs.”

Moreover, he stressed the need for individual countries to take action to promote easing of tensions in Europe and ruled out the possibility of negotiations concerning the document proposed by Poland – or any other document stipulated for consideration by European Conference – at the inter-bloc level.

The Romanian side suggested that the draft presented by Poland should include clear wording on the link between security and cooperation based on “fundamental generally recognised principles... the indivisibility of security and peace, the condemnation of both aggressive war and the use or threat of force in general, and any form of interference in the internal affairs of other states.”

The Romanian side also expressed:

– its desire to receive the full text of the Polish draft (we had only provided the countries of the Warsaw Pact with a draft of the basic principles of the Agreement),

<sup>7</sup> Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs János Péter, [dodis.ch/P15513](https://dodis.ch/P15513).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. PL-AMSZ, DSiP 23/78 w. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. PL-AMSZ, ZD 6/77.

<sup>10</sup> Romanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicolae Ecobescu, [dodis.ch/P81414](https://dodis.ch/P81414).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. PL-AMSZ, ZD 6/77.

– willingness to hold consultations with the Polish side (whenever it is considered useful) on the initiative to conclude the Treaty on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

To date, we have not received any comments on our draft from the governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Taking into account the comments made by some Warsaw Pact countries, a number of amendments have been made to the original text of the draft of basic principles of the Treaty on Security and Cooperation in Europe, clarifying the wording and adapting the text – wherever we considered it possible – to the wishes expressed by our Warsaw Pact partners. Some amendments were made on the basis of conclusions from consultations with non-Warsaw Pact countries, although in principle they are limited to adapting the wording of the text to the formulations used in international documents.

Based on comments submitted by the GDR government:

– we have brought the text of Part II, point 1 closer to the wording of the UN Charter, while retaining the phrase on the recognition and respect of borders, which is not explicitly included in the UN Charter,

– we have reworded Part II, point 2 with the objective of limiting the possibility of interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries.

We consider concerns that the wording of Part II, point 7 does not state precisely enough that any reduction in armed forces would also apply to American forces stationed in Europe as unfounded, particularly in the light of the disarmament proposals contained in the memorandum adopted by the Budapest Conference.

The opinion expressed by the HPR government that the draft of the Treaty should not be a subject of the first European Conference is in line with our earlier position on this matter. As a result of the Prague Conference arrangements, we treated the draft as a platform for discussion on broader, forward-looking solutions, following the possible pan-European acceptance of the documents put forward by that conference.

We have taken into account, as far as we deemed possible, the proposals put forward by the SRR government, in particular those concerning the introduction of expressions referring to the link between security and cooperation and the shaping of the European security system on the basis of state sovereignty.

They have been included in both the draft of the preamble and the operative part of the Treaty.

At the meeting of deputy ministers in Budapest and the consultation of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries (19–20 and 21–22 June this year), we reiterated the proposal to present a draft of the basic principles of the Treaty on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Declaring that this draft was in line with the agreed position expressed in the Bucharest Declaration, the resolutions of the Karlovy Vary Conference<sup>12</sup> and the Budapest Appeal, we suggested that it be presented at the first European Conference as a programme for building a collective

<sup>12</sup> This refers to the conference of communist parties in Karlovy Vary (24–26 April 1967), during which a decision was made not to establish relations with the Federal Republic of Germany until it recognised the GDR and the existing borders.

security system in Europe, following the adoption of proposals on the renunciation of force and the expansion of pan-European cooperation. At the same time, we suggested that the presented draft be discussed at subsequent meetings of European states.

The countries represented at the Budapest meeting, with the exception of Romania to a certain extent, stated, however, that multilateral and individual efforts should now focus on convening a European Conference with the agenda proposed in the memorandum of the Warsaw Pact countries and that, in the immediate phase of dialogue with the West, they should not go beyond the theses contained in the memorandum.

Taking this position into account, we believe that in further campaign for the adoption of the Budapest memorandum proposal by other interested countries, the presentation of ideas contained in the draft Agreement on Security and Cooperation in Europe should not be abandoned. Participating in the dialogue as a signatory to the memorandum provides a convenient platform for promoting the ideas contained in our draft of the Treaty.

For tactical reasons, however, it would be unreasonable at this stage to continue further action on the draft principles of the Treaty as a formulated document, delaying the return to it – after certain modifications – to one of the next phases of the dialogue.

Enclosures:<sup>13</sup>

1. Original text of the draft of basic principles of the Treaty.
2. Revised text of the above-mentioned draft (red underlining indicates newly introduced text or editorial changes).<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Enclosures are not published in this volume. For the enclosures, cf. PL-AMSZ, DSiP 61/77, w. 1.

<sup>14</sup> For all Polish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2901](http://dodis.ch/C2901).

[dodis.ch/76729](https://dodis.ch/76729)

Finland

*Memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*[MULTILATERAL GATHERINGS IN HELSINKI ON THE ARRANGEMENT  
OF THE SECURITY CONFERENCE]

[Helsinki,] 24 November 1970

In the Finnish memorandum of May 5, 1969,<sup>2</sup> relating to a conference on European Security, it was considered essential that all Governments concerned would participate in such a conference and that the success of the conference should be guaranteed in advance to the greatest degree possible through careful preparations. At the same time, the Finnish Government declared its readiness to act as host for such a conference.

Subsequently the Finnish Government has emphasized, that the participation of Governments in various stages of the present process of consultation and negotiation does not imply recognition under international law, of existing political circumstances in Europe.

It is to be noted with satisfaction that in their reactions to the Finnish initiative the Governments responsible for Security in Europe have in principle taken a positive attitude to these views of the Finnish Government.<sup>3</sup>

During the present process of negotiations, the Finnish Government, pursuing its policy of neutrality, has explored the possibilities for common understanding, essential in questions pertaining to Security in Europe. This necessity of common understanding has been underlined in our bilateral contacts as well as in Nordic meetings. The reception of the Finnish memorandum, the talks conducted so far by Ambassador Enckell<sup>4</sup> as well as other information available on the present status of the process of negotiations and consultations between the Governments concerned, indicate that, while there exists a basic political will to advance the cause of European Security, further efforts are still needed in order to find such a consensus of substance as would enable the Governments responsible for the Se-

<sup>1</sup> Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (FI-UMA), F 7B, ETYK. *Original in English. This aide-mémoire from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated 24 November 1970, was sent to European governments and the governments of the United States and Canada, via the Heads of missions in Helsinki. It is a Proposal on discussions between the heads of missions in Helsinki and the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the arrangements for the security conference.*

<sup>2</sup> For the memorandum distributed via Finnish embassies to European countries, the US and Canada concerning the organising and hosting of the preparatory meeting on European Security Conference, cf. QdD 30, doc. 6, [dodis.ch/76726](https://dodis.ch/76726).

<sup>3</sup> For the Initial reactions of foreign powers to the Finnish Government memorandum on the European Security Conference, dated 7 May 1969, cf. QdD 30, doc. 7, [dodis.ch/76727](https://dodis.ch/76727).

<sup>4</sup> Finnish Ambassador-at-Large for questions dealing with European security Ralph Enckell, [dodis.ch/P46566](https://dodis.ch/P46566).

curity of Europe eventually to carry out a common action designed to strengthen Security in Europe.

During the current year the Finnish Government has been exploring ways and means to make use of multilateral contacts in addition to bilateral ones in order to proceed towards a common understanding. In our view the discussions relating to a conference on European Security have reached a phase where it might be appropriate that the Governments concerned, as part of their endeavours to promote European Security, would instruct the Heads of their Missions in Helsinki or other representatives to have consultations on the arrangement of the Security conference with the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and if agreed, to do so in multilateral gatherings in Helsinki.

The purpose of these consultations would be to intensify without commitment the exchange of relevant information. The participation in these consultations would not as such constitute a stand on the issue of holding a conference on European Security. These consultations might enable the Governments concerned to obtain necessary Information permitting them eventually to define their position on the possibilities of convening such a conference.<sup>5</sup>

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5 For all Finnish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2902](https://dodis.ch/C2902).

[dodis.ch/76896](https://dodis.ch/76896)

Poland

*Memorandum from Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Trepczyński<sup>1</sup>*[THE USSR'S POSITION ON TAKING FURTHER STEPS TOWARDS  
CONVENING A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE]

Warsaw, 11 October 1971

On the 9<sup>th</sup> of this month, I received the Ambassador of the USSR, Comrade S. Pilotovich,<sup>2</sup> who presented his government's position on taking further steps towards convening a European Conference.

According to the Soviet comrades, the signing of the four-party agreement on Berlin<sup>3</sup> has opened up new possibilities for the preparation of the European Conference. Among other things, conditions have arose for multilateral consultations. In the opinion of the Soviet comrades, the proposal to hold these consultations, put forward by Finland on 24 August this year, was favourably received by France, the Scandinavian countries and several other European states.

Taking into account this new situation, as well as the next session of the NATO Council<sup>4</sup> planned for December this year, the USSR government believes that a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries should be held to further activate preparations for the European Conference. This meeting could take place in the second half of November this year, provided that this date suits all member states.<sup>5</sup>

Comrade Pilotovich then informed me that the Soviet ambassadors to countries – potential participants in the European Conference (apart from the Warsaw Pact countries) – will be instructed to hold talks with the foreign ministers of those countries in order to present the Soviet government's position on the preparations for the Conference. During these talks, the ambassadors will express the view that during numerous bilateral contacts, it was made possible to achieve a certain convergence of positions between individual countries and even to achieve

1 Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (PL-AMSZ), DSiP 62/77, w. 1. This document has been translated from Polish by Anna Sadowska. This urgent memorandum was signed by the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Stanisław Trepczyński, [dodis.ch/P81262](https://dodis.ch/P81262), and addressed, amongst others, to the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) Edward Gierek, [dodis.ch/P46565](https://dodis.ch/P46565), to the Secretary of the PZPR Edward Babiuch, [dodis.ch/P48153](https://dodis.ch/P48153), the Chairman of the Council of State Józef Cyrankiewicz, [dodis.ch/P11764](https://dodis.ch/P11764), and to Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz, [dodis.ch/P15494](https://dodis.ch/P15494). For the full distribution list, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76896](https://dodis.ch/76896).

2 Stanislav Pilotovich, [dodis.ch/P81265](https://dodis.ch/P81265).

3 This refers to the four-party agreement regulating the legal status of West Berlin, signed on 3 September 1971 by the USA, France, Great Britain and the USSR.

4 The NATO Council meeting took place from 9 to 10 December 1971 in Brussels.

5 The meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries took place from 30 November to 1 December 1971 in Warsaw.



consensus on issues such as the composition, venue and agenda of the Conference. The ambassadors further state that the achievement of a four-party agreement on Berlin is an important step towards ensuring peace and an atmosphere of mutual trust, creating favourable conditions for the convening of the European Conference. The USSR government believes that European countries should not allow these favourable conditions to be wasted. According to the USSR, the Berlin agreement removes all obstacles artificially created by the Western side. The USSR ambassadors are then to state that their government shares the Finnish government's view on the advisability of holding multilateral consultations and that it welcomes the fact that the governments of France, the Scandinavian countries and several others have responded favourably to this initiative.

According to the USSR government, multilateral consultations should take place in Helsinki as soon as possible. In order for these consultations to be effective, they should be held at the level of deputy foreign ministers, who may be accompanied by heads of relevant departments of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs; alternatively, other governments could be represented by their ambassadors in Helsinki.

During the consultations, issues such as the date of the European Conference, its agenda and procedural matters would be agreed upon. According to the USSR government, the participants in the multilateral consultations should set the shortest possible time for convening the Conference.

If Western interlocutors raise the question of whether the issue of arms reduction in Europe will be included in the agenda of the European Conference, the USSR ambassadors should reply that, in their government's opinion, this would not be expedient, as this issue should be considered separately, since there is a possibility of addressing it even before the Conference is convened.

If the interlocutors express the opinion that multilateral consultations will only be possible after the Berlin issue has been completely resolved, the USSR ambassadors will vigorously oppose this view. They will express their hope that, given the favourable situation in Europe, the December session of the NATO Council will remove all existing conditions and agree to hold the Conference in the near future.<sup>6</sup>

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6 For all Polish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2901](https://dodis.ch/C2901).

[dodis.ch/76942](https://dodis.ch/76942)

United States

*National Security Advisor Kissinger to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird<sup>1</sup>*

PRESIDENTIAL GUIDANCE ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE  
REDUCTIONS AND A CONFERENCE ON COOPERATION AND SECURITY  
IN EUROPE

Top Secret

Washington, 5 April 1972

The following guidance has been approved by the President.

The contents of NSDM 142<sup>2</sup> remain valid, except as affected by the directives in this memorandum.

*Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE)<sup>3</sup>*

The United States' position should be to proceed in preparing an Allied position for CSCE that reflects a maximum consensus. It would be preferable, however, that the East–West multilateral preparatory phase not begin until after the US Presidential elections. The possibility of a high level Allied meeting prior to the

<sup>1</sup> Nixon Library (US-RMNPL), National Security Council Institutional Files, Policy Papers (1969–1974), National Security Decision Memorandums, Box H-208, NSDM 151 – NSDM 200 [Originals]. This National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 162 was signed by US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846), and sent to Secretary of State William P. Rogers, [dodis.ch/P15538](https://dodis.ch/P15538), and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, [dodis.ch/P15540](https://dodis.ch/P15540). Copies went to the Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, [dodis.ch/P81269](https://dodis.ch/P81269), and to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disclaimer Agency (ACDA) Phillip Farley, [dodis.ch/P49891](https://dodis.ch/P49891). This document is printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, vol. XXXIX, *European Security*, 1969–1976, [doc. 89](#).

<sup>2</sup> In NSDM 142, dated 2 December 1971, Kissinger provided “Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a European Conference” to the US Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the ACDA. Kissinger noted that President Nixon had “concluded that we are not prepared for definitive decisions with respect to MBFR or CES and that our general approach should be to proceed slowly while developing consensus within the Alliance on positions which clearly maintain our security.” NSDM 142 is printed in *FRUS*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, *European Security*, [doc. 81](#).

<sup>3</sup> In [NSDM 142](#) (cf. footnote above), Kissinger noted Nixon’s decisions on the European Conference proposal: “We should insist that the final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin be signed before agreeing to any multilateral preparations for a European Conference. Following the signing of the Berlin Protocol, the U.S. should urge a meeting of NATO countries at the Deputy Foreign Minister level to coordinate a common approach to the issues that may be raised by the other side before going into preparatory talks. At present, Western preparations on substantive issues are insufficiently developed to enter into multilateral East–West contacts. The U.S. will be prepared to contribute to the work of the Alliance on substantive points by submitting more concrete proposals for Western consideration. In particular, security issues (other than MBFR) that might be topics in a Conference will be given more emphasis. The U.S. has no interest in a conference in 1972 and all preparatory work within the Alliance and with Eastern and other European countries should be geared to this consideration. The U.S. does not wish to alter its current position of keeping MBFR and a European Conference separate.”.

beginning of the multilateral preparatory talks should be kept open, though such a meeting is not a condition for US participation in CSCE.

In dealing with both CSCE issues and procedures, Allied unity should take precedence. US policy is that a careful multilateral exploration should precede the opening of a Conference. These preparatory explorations should be substantive rather than purely procedural. Allied interest in curtailing the multilateral preparatory phase may be taken into account, provided there is an understanding in the Alliance that during this phase some substantive discussions will be conducted on each of the agenda items proposed by the Alliance.

As noted above the US would not object to a general discussion on Military Security Issues in CSCE, but it would not be acceptable to aim for agreements that limited or reduced forces in Europe. Rather, the US would prefer to limit discussion to some general measures of constraint that might be suitable for adoption by European states. Such constraints might be related, in CSCE, to a declaration of principles governing relations between states.

#### *MBFR*

The US continues to support separate and distinct negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe; an exploratory discussion as the first step toward such negotiations continues to be US policy. In the period between now and the NATO Ministerial meeting on May 30–31, the US will continue to support the Allied proposal for an exploratory mission led by Mr. Brosio.<sup>4</sup> After the President's meetings in the USSR, the US would be willing to consider a review of alternatives to the Brosio mission.

#### *MBFR and CSCE*

Concerning the relationship between MBFR and CSCE, the US position is that the former is not an issue that should be negotiated by the CSCE. Should the preparatory discussions of CSCE begin before any exploration of MBFR with the USSR or other Warsaw Pact countries, the US objective in these circumstances would be to use the fact of CSCE preparations to establish contacts for the simultaneous exploration of MBFR. The establishment of a special group of states directly involved in MBFR in Central Europe would be an acceptable procedure for exchanging views on MBFR. Alternatively, or in addition, the US would be willing to consider a general discussion in CSCE of Military Security Issues, including some general aspects of MBFR; in this context, however, the main objective would be to reach an understanding that MBFR negotiations will be initiated in a separate forum by a specified date.

In general, the relationship between MBFR and CSCE should be minimal. No authority should be established by CSCE over the course or content of MBFR negotiations. The overall objective of the US is to obtain a commitment from the USSR to begin discussion of MBFR before the CSCE has concluded its work.

<sup>4</sup> NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio, [dodis.ch/P13829](https://dodis.ch/P13829).

*Allied Consultations*

The reaction of the NATO Allies to this approach should be sought promptly. The goal of consultations should be to develop a consensus in advance of the NATO Ministerial meeting.

An interagency paper on collateral constraints that might be appropriate for discussion at a CSCE should be developed and forwarded to NATO as soon as possible. A separate paper on constraints suitable to MBFR should also be prepared for submission to NATO.<sup>5</sup>

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5 For all documents of the United States in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2904](https://dodis.ch/C2904).

[dodis.ch/77012](https://dodis.ch/77012)

Federal Republic of Germany

*Cabinet Proposal by Federal Foreign Minister Scheel<sup>1</sup>*

GUIDELINES OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONFERENCE  
ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

Confidential

Bonn, 18 Mai 1972

1) In the opinion of the Federal Government, the efforts to build understanding in Europe have reached a degree that evinces the possibility of a successful “Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe” as a further contribution to détente on the continent; the Treaty of Moscow,<sup>2</sup> the Treaty of Warsaw<sup>3</sup> and the Quadripartite Agreement or Four Power Agreement on Berlin<sup>4</sup> have played a crucial part in this development.

2) The multilateral East–West consultations in preparation for the CSCE can begin only when the success of the Berlin negotiations is ensured through the fixing of an agreed date for the signing of the Final Protocol.<sup>5</sup> The Federal Government cannot deviate from this requirement.

3) The Federal Republic of Germany will continue to actively participate in the preparatory work for the CSCE together with our Western partners, and in bilateral exploration with the Eastern European and non-aligned countries. It also intends to play an active role in the multilateral consultations in preparation for the conference.

<sup>1</sup> Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (DE-PA/AA), B 130, vol. 8582 (II A 3), File reference: II A 3-84.10/3-761/72. Translated from German. This Chapter III Guidelines of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was forwarded to Cabinet Ministries by State Secretary Paul Frank, [dodis.ch/P46511](https://dodis.ch/P46511), on behalf of Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, [dodis.ch/P15413](https://dodis.ch/P15413). This document was also published in German in *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (AAPD) 1972, doc. 138.

<sup>2</sup> Treaty concluded by the FRG and the Soviet Union on 12 August 1970 in which both parties committed to the principles of the non-use of force and the inviolability of frontiers.

<sup>3</sup> Treaty concluded by the FRG and Poland on 7 December 1970 in which they agreed on the Oder-Neisse Line as the western frontier of Poland, on the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and on the renunciation of territorial claims. Other provisions concerned the emigration of ethnic Germans.

<sup>4</sup> Agreement concluded by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France on 3 September 1971 which reiterated the common responsibility of the Four Powers regarding Berlin as a whole, safeguarded civilian traffic between the FRG and West Berlin, confirmed the right of the government in Bonn to represent West Berlin in matters of foreign policy and made it easier for West Berliners to travel to East Berlin. Cf. *United Nations Treaty Series* (UNTS), vol. 880, pp. 116–148.

<sup>5</sup> The Final Protocol of the Quadripartite Agreement, marking the Agreement’s entry into force, was signed on 3 June 1972.

4) For the arrangements for the multilateral preparations, the Federal Republic of Germany refers to the Finnish Government's aide-mémoire dated 24 November 1970,<sup>6</sup> according to which participation in the preparations does not imply recognition of the political status quo in Europe nor an obligation to attend the conference. The Federal Government and the three Western powers will review whether and in what way reservations should be declared, similar to the previous disclaimers regarding non-recognition under international law and the preservation of the Three Powers' rights, if the GDR participates in the multilateral preparations.

The preparations must be thorough and show a sufficient consensus on procedural and substantive issues, in order for tangible results to be achieved at the conference itself on substantive issues of security and cooperation. The Federal Government will endeavour to establish German as one of the languages of the conference.

5) The Federal Government is prepared to accept Helsinki as the venue for the multilateral East-West consultations, provided that Finland does not take any unilateral steps to our detriment in its Germany policy. Agreeing to Helsinki as the venue for the preparations does not entail any commitment to it as the venue for the conference itself (Vienna is also a possibility for this).

6) The Federal Government will represent the interests of West Berlin – insofar as matters of security and status are not affected – at a CSCE. It will ensure that Berlin's close ties to the Federation and its opportunities for development are not diminished by decisions made at the conference. Should new international bodies be founded following the CSCE, the Federal Government will keep open the option of proposing Berlin as their headquarters.

7) The Federal Government will do everything in its power to promote the cohesion of the Western alliance and the enlargement of the European Community before, during and after a CSCE. It is of the opinion that the issues of security and cooperation in Europe are pressing issues that should be resolved through joint efforts via a CSCE rather than individually by each country, as this could lead to the erosion of Western cohesion.

8 a) In the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)<sup>7</sup> of December 1967, NATO described defence and the pursuit of détente as complementary elements of the Alliance's policy. At that time, the Alliance agreed both to continue the necessary defence efforts and to review all political measures designed to bring about a just and lasting order in Europe, end the division of Germany and promote security in Europe.

b) The Federal Government advocates mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). It considers the project of a CSCE to be a possible international frame-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 15, [dodis.ch/76729](https://dodis.ch/76729).

<sup>7</sup> Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance of 14 December 1967, [dodis.ch/77582](https://dodis.ch/77582), written by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, [dodis.ch/P15124](https://dodis.ch/P15124).

work within which this approach to détente by the Alliance can be asserted and promoted. Endeavours must be made for the members of the Alliance to develop common visions on issues relating to their common security.

c) In the interest of security, it is important for gradual and parallel progress to be made between East and West in the non-military and military areas of security. This will avoid a situation where non-military results in the West create an impression of greater security, leading to a reduction of military efforts, while no such development takes place on the Soviet side.

d) The Federal Government is therefore of the opinion that the openness of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European governments to détente in Europe must primarily be measured by whether they are also open to discussing the handling of military issues. It is therefore necessary, in the interest of security in Europe, for MBFR explorations to take place as part of the multilateral preparations for a CSCE, if they have not already begun, and for a binding agreement on the beginning of MBFR negotiations to be reached at or parallel to a CSCE at the latest.

e) At a CSCE, certain elements of the MBFR complex must be addressed (joint declaration on MBFR principles and criteria, stabilising measures such as notifications of troop movements, manoeuvre observers, limitation of military movements). MBFR negotiations in the stricter sense will have to take place outside of the conference as a whole, between the directly affected parties only.

9) The Federal Government firmly believes that the European Community has an important role to play at a CSCE regarding most issues of economic, scientific and technical cooperation that could be addressed there. It will work to persuade the Community and its member states to submit constructive proposals to the countries of Eastern Europe for expanding their cooperation, although this will involve the other side taking certain measures as well. It will furthermore block all attempts that might be made to hinder the enlargement of the Communities and will ensure that the Community plays the role due to it in connection with a CSCE and in any subsequent bodies.

10) The topics covered by the preparations for a CSCE and at the conference itself should, in the view of the Federal Government, include the following:

- A. Principles of international relations, including the non-use of force
- B. Aspects of military security, e.g.
  - a) confidence-building measures,
  - b) MBFR principles.
- C. Improvement of communication (people-to-people contacts and exchange of information)
- D. Cooperation in the fields of
  - a) trade and finances,
  - b) industrial cooperation,
  - c) development assistance,
  - d) science and technology,



- e) transport,
  - f) energy,
  - g) the environment and urban planning,
  - h) cultural relations,
  - i) tourism.
- E. Procedural issues (type of conference and institutionalisation)

11) With the “Principles of international relations”, the participants in the CSCE should, in the view of the Federal Government, chiefly emphasise the role of international law as a foundation of their peaceful coexistence; they should work to bring about the greatest possible common understanding of these principles. The Federal Government places particular importance on the principle that belonging to a particular social order must not affect peoples’ right to decide their own fate free of external constraints, nor supply a pretext for interventions, as well as on the recognition of the right to self-determination, of universal human rights and of individual basic freedoms as fundamental principles of international coexistence and as a starting point for the free movement of people, ideas and information.

12) In the view of the Federal Government, there are few areas where improved cooperation will really have an effect if there is not at the same time an improvement in communication. This is a crucial element in all true progress in the East–West relationship; the extent to which it is realised is the most important, clearly visible benchmark of détente and cooperation. We must therefore strive to win as much acceptance as possible for this idea at a CSCE – including with regard to the same question in the relationship between the two states in Germany. As this issue is an especially delicate one for the Eastern European countries, we must introduce it as cautiously as possible. As well as a general easing of travel restrictions, one integral part of the Western proposals relating to economic cooperation, for example, must be the question of Western company representatives setting up in the East, and contact possibilities for them.

13) The Federal Government has long done its best to foster cooperation with Eastern Europe despite the structural differences complicating an expansion of trade with these countries. During the preparations for a CSCE and at the conference itself, it will bring to bear its considerable experience in this area and search energetically and imaginatively for potential new solutions. It is of the view that the interests of the Eastern European countries should be taken into consideration as far as possible in this process, in order to lift the varying levels of the individual Eastern economies towards greater export power and competitiveness. However, it is unlikely that the two primary concerns of the countries of the East, namely full import liberalisation and state loans with low interest, or with interest subsidies for long-term loans, can be satisfied at a European Security Conference – in the former case, partly in light of EC obligations.

14) Not least for this reason, it is therefore in the interest of the Federal Republic of Germany to centre industrial cooperation in the discussion of economic issues at a CSCE. Even the willingness to discuss this issue in detail at the CSCE will send out a strong message and attract significant publicity. The mere fact of an exchange of views between East and West on all material questions arising in this connection (capital contributions, company representations, fiscal and legal issues) will help to remove the impediments to cooperation often resulting from a lack of information. The differing economic systems are not an insurmountable obstacle to such industrial cooperation. However, the success of this cooperation will likely depend on a significant expansion of the Eastern partners' room for manoeuvre, given that they belong to a relatively rigid economic and administrative system. The Federal Government will work within the Alliance and at the consultations with our EC partners to ensure that all aspects of industrial cooperation – including the most intensive form, the founding of joint ventures in Eastern Europe – are thoroughly explored. In this connection, as in general, it will advocate the greatest possible harmonisation of views among the Community's member states, including in the fields of cooperation that do not yet fall within the remit of the EC, that takes into account all of their interests. At the same time, the interests of the other trading partners must not be disregarded.

15) Cooperation for the benefit of developing countries can also contribute to détente between East and West. The aim of such cooperation should be to improve the situation of developing countries in economic and social terms, in line with the aims of the Second UN Development Decade.<sup>8</sup> This could be supported by the coordination of aid between both sides and the best possible use of resources in East and West for the effective development needs of the Third World. Cooperation should enable a rapprochement between the two sides with regard to fundamental issues. Endeavours must also be made to observe the principle of independence in supplies and services for public aid.

16) In the fields of science and technology, transport, energy and environmental protection – including from urban planning perspectives – there are also numerous opportunities for closer East-West cooperation. The same applies to the cultural sphere. Specific multilateral projects that may be considered are increased youth exchange, agreements on the recognition of school and university diplomas, and agreements on copyright. Declarations of principle on greater freedom of movement could enliven bilateral cultural exchange.

17) In the view of the Federal Government, commissions and sub-commissions should be formed for the points listed in section 10 of the agenda, insofar as this appears expedient, which will thoroughly discuss the matter perhaps at an advanced stage of the multilateral preparations, and certainly at the conference itself. The same is provided for in the French conference plan, in which the Federal Government has a certain interest – following the multilateral consultations,

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8     *The Second UN Development Decade ran from 1971 to 1980.*

the Foreign Ministers will come together, then the commissions will consult for a number of months, before the Ministers meet again to hold final consultations on the outcome of this work and to approve it.

The decision on the conference model can, however, only be made following the multilateral East–West consultations. The Federal Government and its allies share the opinion that the creation of any new international bodies should be made dependent on the progression of the conference.

18) Within the Federal Government, the Federal Foreign Office will continue to coordinate the preparatory work. An Inter-Ministerial Working Group will be founded under the lead responsibility of the Federal Foreign Office in good time before the beginning of the multilateral East–West consultations, which are expected to begin in the autumn of this year in Helsinki.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> For all documents of the FRG in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2909](https://dodis.ch/C2909).

[dodis.ch/77038](https://dodis.ch/77038)

European Community

*Speech by President of the European Commission Mansholt at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of EC Member and Acceding Countries in Luxembourg<sup>1</sup>*

#### PREPARATIONS FOR THE CSCE

Confidential

Luxembourg, 27 May 1972

Mr. President,<sup>2</sup>

First, I would like to welcome the report of the Political Committee<sup>3</sup> on economic cooperation within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.<sup>4</sup> To begin with, I would like to express the Commission's support for the general guidelines that are being proposed for adoption. The Political Committee has considered several concerns expressed by the Commission in the document submitted on 19 July 1971.<sup>5</sup>

In this regard, I would like to recall three points that seem essential to me. The first is the determination of the ten countries to take a joint initiative to present to the Eastern countries "a well-balanced and attractive offer." The second is the importance of a constructive role for the Community at the Conference, for the future of cooperation between the Community and the countries of Eastern Europe. The third point, in the Commission's view, constitutes a major political commitment. The report of the Political Committee states that active economic cooperation "must be based on the reality of a Europe in the process of formation, without calling it into question in the hope of achieving a pan-European agreement. In other words, this means that improving European cooperation must not have the effect of slowing down the development of the Community.

The Commission believes that one of the most important outcomes of the Conference should be the political recognition of the fact that the Community, in its present reality and in its future development, constitutes an essential element of cooperation, peace, and security in Europe.

<sup>1</sup> Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), KM-47. *Translated from French. This speech by the President of the European Commission Sicco Mansholt, [dodis.ch/P15891](https://dodis.ch/P15891), was delivered at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Member and Acceding Countries of the European Community in Luxembourg.*

<sup>2</sup> Luxembourgish Foreign Minister Gaston Thorn, [dodis.ch/P15471](https://dodis.ch/P15471).

<sup>3</sup> The Political Committee (Davignon Committee): Established in 1970 following the Report presented by Belgian diplomat Étienne Davignon, [dodis.ch/P46618](https://dodis.ch/P46618), this committee of senior diplomats (political directors from member state foreign ministries) worked on European Political Cooperation, [dodis.ch/R34388](https://dodis.ch/R34388). In 1972, it was active in coordinating foreign policy positions, preparing for the 1973 Copenhagen summit, and defining the "European identity".

<sup>4</sup> Cf. HAEU, EN-73. Political Committee report on the CSCE, May 1971.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. HAEU, CEUE\_SEGE SEC(1971)2362, Commission document of 19 July 1971 – SEC(71)2362, entitled "Possible initiatives of the European Communities in view of the Security Conference."

I would now like to make a few comments on the progress of the work of the Political Committee and its expert groups. I will first recall the position taken by the Commission in its document of 19 July, which my predecessor, Mr. Malfatti,<sup>6</sup> emphasised on several occasions. We believe that, for the economic topics that may be addressed at the Conference, our work within the present framework is intended to establish an initial political orientation. Indeed—and the report of the Political Committee that we are discussing today reminds us of this—once this political orientation has been defined, matters that fall within the competence of the EEC must be handled by the competent institutions of the Community “at the appropriate time and according to their own procedures.”

It seems to me, Mr. President, that it is now extremely necessary for this initial political orientation to be established as soon as possible.

Given what is envisaged for the start of the CSCE preparations and the state of discussions in other relevant forums – such as NATO – we must set a precise timetable for our work, both in terms of political cooperation and within the Communities themselves.

First, I note that the Political Committee and its groups already have, through the documents submitted by the Commission and various delegations, all the necessary elements to establish a political orientation. It would be impractical, within the framework of political cooperation, to engage in a technical examination of issues that must be handled by the Community institutions. At the same time, the ad hoc group can undoubtedly rely on the support of the Commission’s services to obtain the concrete information that may help it define its political orientation.

Secondly, I note that the Economic Committee of the Atlantic Council<sup>7</sup> has made significant progress in preparing the economic topics to be addressed at the CSCE. The interim report that will be submitted to you in a few days in Bonn, for the Atlantic Council session, will contain very detailed proposals in the economic field. However, some of these proposals – in areas that fall strictly within the competence of the Communities – are entirely at odds with what the Commission proposed to you on 19 July 1971 and with the guidelines adopted by the Political Committee in its report last October. These include, for example, issues relating to customs tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and generalized preferences. According to the information I have received, final decisions on these matters could be made within NATO before the summer holidays. Is it conceivable that such decisions could be taken within NATO, on Community matters, without prior deliberation by the Community and without it having had the opportunity to determine its position?

Based on these considerations, I propose that we adopt the following guidelines and timetable:

1. The present meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs should approve today, as proposed by the Political Committee, that further work will be

<sup>6</sup> Speech by President of the European Commission Franco Maria Malfatti, [dodis.ch/P46629](https://dodis.ch/P46629), Munich, 19 November 1970.

<sup>7</sup> The Atlantic Council is an American think tank in the field of international affairs, favouring Atlanticism, founded in 1961.

guided by the principles set out in paragraphs 7 to 11 of the Committee's October report.

2. The Political Committee should be tasked with urgently identifying, with the assistance of the ad hoc group, the matters addressed by the NATO Secretariat that require political evaluation before the end of July. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the conclusions of the Political Committee can be promptly reviewed or confirmed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
3. For matters falling within Community competence, the appropriate Community institutions – primarily the Council – will be seized of them by the Commission, considering the agreed guidelines, starting from next September. In the meantime, practical arrangements will be made to ensure the smooth conduct of this work, particularly under conditions of satisfactory confidentiality.
4. We expect that the Member States and acceding countries participating in NATO will provide instructions to their representatives to ensure that the Community's positions are not prejudged in the Economic Committee or in the NATO Council before the completion of the work of political cooperation and the Community institutions.

I will now turn to the final subject addressed in the Political Committee's report, starting from paragraph 12: relations between the EEC, COMECON, and their members.

The Commission welcomes this initial analysis and looks forward with great interest to the synthesis document to be prepared by the British delegation.

To the preliminary guidelines identified by the Political Committee, I would like to add one observation. In our view, the framework that Eastern countries may choose for their relations with the Community is a matter for those countries themselves. It is not for us to decide whether we should have relations with COMECON or with each of its member countries individually.

The current reality – and Romania's approach to the Community seeking inclusion in the system of generalized preferences is proof of this – is that COMECON has competences and structures fundamentally different from those of the EEC. If, in the future, COMECON's structures and competences were to develop, then we would be faced with a new situation and, as the Political Committee states, such new developments would have to be examined as any new situation.<sup>8</sup>

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8 For all documents of the European Community in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2912](http://dodis.ch/C2912).

[dodis.ch/75731](https://dodis.ch/75731)

Israel

*The Director of the North American Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Elizur to the Israeli Ambassador in Ottawa, Meron<sup>1</sup>*

THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Secret

Jerusalem, 28 May 1972

Consultations on this issue have recently begun in the Ministry,<sup>2</sup> and it was agreed that we should return to the discussion and sum it up after the Moscow summit,<sup>3</sup> when the position of the two Great Powers becomes clearer.

In the meantime, information and assessments should be gathered from various sources. The questions that interest us in particular are: what is the position of the various countries regarding the inclusion in the Conference agenda of a special item on the situation in the Mediterranean, the situation in the Middle East, and inviting Mediterranean countries outside of Europe to participate in the Conference, such as Arab countries from the Maghreb or also from the Mashreq.<sup>4</sup> Since we cannot prevent the issue of the situation in the Mediterranean from being raised, the most convenient alternative from our perspective is that the discussion be limited to the situation in the Mediterranean in general, and that the Middle East conflict should not be explicitly raised or discussed in detail. We must also try to prevent the invitation of any Arab country to the conference. In the event that an invitation is extended to any Arab country, from the Middle East or the Maghreb, we will demand Israel's participation.

For your convenience, we are enclosing a copy of the basis for the discussion that took place here (684 dated 22.5.72 from the Director of Europe A [Department])<sup>5</sup> as well as another circular (710 dated 28.5.72).<sup>6</sup>

I propose that you hold a comprehensive discussion with an appropriate senior official in the Canadian Foreign Ministry about the Conference, since Canada has taken a great interest in this subject. During the course of this conversation, please try to establish their intentions and opinions regarding the Mediterranean

<sup>1</sup> Israel State Archives (ISA), MFA5317/29. Translated from Hebrew. This letter No. 1319 was signed by the Israeli Director of the North American Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Michael Elizur, [dodis.ch/P81201](https://dodis.ch/P81201), and sent to the Israeli Ambassador in Ottawa, Theodor Meron, [dodis.ch/P81203](https://dodis.ch/P81203). Copies were sent to the Israeli advisor to the Foreign Ministry Simcha Pratt, [dodis.ch/P81204](https://dodis.ch/P81204), and to the Europe 1 Department.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the summary of the consultation, 25 May 1972, in the same file.

<sup>3</sup> The summit between United States President Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](https://dodis.ch/P13584), and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543), held on 22–30 May 1972.

<sup>4</sup> The eastern part of the Arab world, as opposed to the Maghreb in North Africa.

<sup>5</sup> Nissim Yaish, [dodis.ch/P51234](https://dodis.ch/P51234).

<sup>6</sup> For both documents, cf. ISA, MFA5317/29.



and the Middle East. Incidental to this general conversation, it is advisable to put it on record to them that in our opinion, including a discussion on the Middle East, and especially inviting the two parties, will turn the conference into an arena for unpleasant and fruitless discussions, in the style of UNCTAD, the UN, etc. ... which will disrupt the work of the Conference, detract from its seriousness, and reduce its chances of success.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> For all Israeli documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2908](https://dodis.ch/C2908).

[dodis.ch/76897](https://dodis.ch/76897)

Poland

*Memorandum from Deputy Foreign Minister Czyrek<sup>1</sup>*POLAND'S ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE EUROPEAN  
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION

Secret

Warsaw, 20 June 1972

*I. Current status of the CSCE*

The ratification of the USSR–GFR and Poland–GFR<sup>2</sup> treaties and the entry into force of the accord on West Berlin constitute the full implementation of the most important prerequisites for strengthening European security. At the same time, they remove the grounds for further delay by NATO countries towards starting multilateral preparatory consultations. The NATO Council communiqué of 31 May this year expressed readiness to enter into these talks and accepted Helsinki as their venue.

However, the communiqué did not specify the date of their commencement. This confirms the assessment that attempts to postpone these talks will continue. The reasons given for further delays will be: the need to wait for the results of the US elections, the conclusions of the summit of “the ten”,<sup>3</sup> and possibly the elections in the GFR. It seems, however – such is the prevailing view at present – that the West will not be able to delay these talks beyond the second half of November.

The West is preparing for the conference in terms of content – the foreign ministries of most countries are working towards this, and the relevant bodies in NATO and the EEC are preparing their positions.

This indicates that the West has accepted the fact that the conference must take place. It also indicates that there is a desire to develop a unified position, despite the fact that the score has been written for different voices. It also proves the correctness of the assessment that the struggle is moving from the stage of convening the conference to the stage of its course and results. In this struggle, almost every Western country, in addition to common goals, has set itself specific tasks, the implementation of which is intended to secure its own interests.

<sup>1</sup> Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (PL-AMSZ), DSiP 63/77, w. 1. This document has been translated from Polish by Anna Sadowska. This urgent memorandum was signed by the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Józef Czyrek, [dodis.ch/P44031](https://dodis.ch/P44031). It was published in Polish in: *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne* (PISM) 1972, doc. 127.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the normalisation agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Soviet Union signed on 12 August 1970 in Moscow and the agreement on the foundations for the normalisation of mutual relations between the Polish People's Republic and the FRG concluded on 7 December 1970 in Warsaw (the agreements were ratified in 1972).

<sup>3</sup> This refers to the planned meeting of representatives from 10 Western countries (six EEC member states as well as Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland and Norway), which took place in Paris from 19 to 21 October 1972 (ultimately without Norway's participation).

The coming months, until the start of multilateral preparatory talks, will be filled with bilateral dialogue between individual European countries and another round of bilateral talks conducted by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs with interested countries. These will provide more insight into the intentions of individual countries in relation to the conference and the multilateral phase of preparations.

## *II. Difficulties and dangers.*

An analysis of the NATO Council communiqué of 31 May 1972 and the positions taken by Western countries in the course of the consultations which we have conducted allows us to identify two groups of difficulties and dangers:

- 1) difficulties still related to the convening of the conference itself,
- 2) dangers resulting from the substantive positions of some Western countries being prepared for the conference.

### *Re 1.*

The NATO countries have effectively created a new condition for the conference, in the form of making their participation dependent on “good preparation” and obtaining confidence during the multilateral preparatory phase that the conference will yield positive results. Therefore, it should be expected that the West will seek to prolong the multilateral talks under the pretext of the need for substantive discussion of the issues on the conference agenda. It must be assumed that we will not avoid a substantive exchange of views in Helsinki, as many issues are controversial, starting from the composition of the conference (not only the equal participation of the two German states, but also the issue of observers from non-European countries and international organisations), through the venue of the conference, and, above all, the conference agenda. The danger lies in the fact that it is difficult to determine at all whether the conference has been sufficiently prepared. There is also no reason for NATO to be the evaluator. There are also no measurable evaluation criteria.

The second potential obstacle in the hands of the West is the issue of parallelism in the disarmament negotiations. Although NATO has abandoned its demand to include arms reduction (MBFR) on the agenda, which happened under the influence of the Brezhnev<sup>4</sup>–Nixon<sup>5</sup> talks, there remains the demand for discussion of “certain military aspects of security” at the conference. The SC<sup>6</sup> position that talks on arms reduction should be conducted separately from the CSCE is accepted, but there is a tendency (especially in the GFR) to precede the start of the conference with the initiation of multilateral disarmament negotiations. This is to be a “test” of the intentions of the USSR and other SC; just as the West Berlin issue was a “test” before.

Another difficulty concerns ensuring the full and equal participation of the GDR in all stages of the conference. There is still a significant divergence in positions. NATO maintains its position that multilateral preparatory talks should be conducted at the level of heads of mission in Helsinki. This puts the GDR at a dis-

<sup>4</sup> General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

<sup>5</sup> United States President Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](https://dodis.ch/P13584).

<sup>6</sup> Socialist countries.

advantage compared to other countries, as the GDR has a trade representation in Helsinki (the same applies to the GFR, but its international position and influence are greater than those of the GDR). It is doubtful whether before the beginning of the multilateral talks Finland will succeed in simultaneously raising the level of its relations with two German states to the rank of embassies. The GFR has – so far successfully – opposed this. Our formula for conducting multilateral talks in Helsinki at the level of heads of mission or other government representatives rules out the possibility of discriminatory treatment of the GDR.

A number of difficulties may also arise in relation to various procedural matters (e.g. the language of the conference and preparatory talks), reflecting differences in political positions.

*Re 2.*

The main dangers stem from the fact that the CSCE will be a platform for the struggle between two socio-political systems, exacerbated by the fact that each country will seek to secure its place and interests in the future Europe.

There is no doubt that the West as a whole will seek to weaken the unity of the socialist community. This goal will be served by tendencies to emphasise certain principles (sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs) at the expense of other principles (respect for integrity and borders), certain projects of pan-European economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation.

It is no coincidence that the “freer exchange of ideas, people and information” is being promoted by the West as one of the main tasks in relation to the CSCE. The initiators of this proposal would like to gain greater opportunities for ideological infiltration, undermining the foundations of the socialist system and loosening the cohesion of the socialist community by exploiting the positive phenomenon of increased interpersonal contacts resulting from easing of tensions and the development of cooperation.

It is now clear that the West (with the exception of France and some smaller NATO and neutral countries) would prefer to limit itself to a single conference that would settle certain political and economic matters on the basis of a *modus vivendi* and would not allow the process of building a new security and cooperation system to begin. Hence the reluctance to accept the proposal to establish a permanent security and cooperation body. It must also be taken into account that the West will want to compensate for any issue that is beneficial to the SC with appropriate concessions on our part. This applies, for example, to the abolition of trade discrimination or the liquidation of Radio Free Europe.

Another kind of danger is the attempt to link to the CSCE the problem of security in the Mediterranean, which is connected with the conflict in the Middle East. The possible connection of these issues would make the resolution of security and cooperation problems dependent on the resolution of the complex Middle East matter.

It also seems that it will be impossible to completely avoid discussing certain disarmament questions at the conference. While the disarmament negotiations themselves will probably take place separately, certain general principles of these negotiations and confidence-building measures will certainly be found among the topics of discussion at the CSCE.

A particular and major danger arises from the GFR's concept of subordinating the CSCE to the national interests of the GFR. The GFR has the most advanced conference model among Western countries, as we have learned from recent consultations with the Bonn Foreign Ministry.<sup>7</sup> Its danger lies in skilfully combining the class interests of Western Europe with the national interests of the GFR. The GFR strives to make its goals the goals of NATO and the whole Western Europe. These goals include:

- recognition of the status quo in Europe as a form of “modus vivendi”,
- confirmation of the right to reunify the German nation on the basis of the right to self-determination (recognition of the status quo in order to change it in the future – as Bahr<sup>8</sup> recently said),
- developing pan-European cooperation, especially cooperation between the two German states,
- a “freer” exchange of ideas, people and information, especially with regard to the GDR.

A warning sign that this position is gaining NATO support is the NATO Council communiqué of 31 May 1972 and the support expressed there for the Bundestag resolution. The GFR is already formulating reservations that the CSCE cannot change the legal status of the countries participating in the conference, and that the CSCE itself cannot replace or pre-empt a peace conference.

In this situation, the struggle for full international recognition of the GDR has particular importance. This is becoming the main task of our foreign policy, resulting from Poland's *raison d'état*. From our point of view, the outcome of this struggle will determine the significance of the CSCE.

### *III. Our goals and tasks*

Our goals related to the CSCE stem from Poland's national interests as a member of the socialist community. We are pursuing them and will continue to pursue them in the following areas:

1. bilateral cooperation with the USSR and development of a consultation system,
2. participation in working out the community's position (in bilateral and multilateral forms),
3. bilateral dialogues with Western countries,
4. bilateral contact with the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (in July, we will hold another consultation within the framework of the second round of talks to be conducted by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs),
5. multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki, which will most likely begin in November this year.

<sup>7</sup> This probably refers to the visit of Deputy Minister Czyrek to the FRG, which took place from 3 to 5 June 1972.

<sup>8</sup> State Secretary in the Chancellor's Office and Minister for Special Tasks of the FRG Egon Bahr, [do-dis.ch/P39530](https://dis.ch/P39530).

Our general objectives connected with the conference are fully expressed in the joint documents (in particular the Prague Declaration of January 1972) of the Warsaw Pact states.<sup>9</sup> These are:

1. *Ensuring further easing of tensions and normalisation of relations in Europe* based on the peaceful coexistence of states with different political systems and respect for the territorial integrity of states. We have treated and continue to treat the CSCE as the most effective instrument for developing positive processes in Europe. From our point of view, the most important thing would be to achieve confirmation at the conference by all European states of the principles of security and relations between states as formulated in the Prague Declaration, with particular emphasis on the principle of territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders. For this confirmation to be of value to Poland, it cannot be temporary or limited in time.

2. *Further strengthening of the international position of the GDR.* The fundamental results of the conference will depend on progress in this matter. Even if we succeed in completely resolving the issue of international legal recognition of the GDR before or during the conference, we must nevertheless ensure the GDR's full participation in the conference and its resolutions. At the same time, we must prevent attempts by the GFR to steer the conference in such a way as to emphasise the "unity of the German nation" or to create conditions that would facilitate the implementation of long-term policy of German unification, pursued by Bonn and signalled in relation to the CSCE by putting forward, among other principles, the "right to self-determination".

3. *The conference should begin the process of building a new system of security and cooperation.* For this reason, we should strive not only to have the relevant documents adopted by the first conference (e.g. a system of mutual commitments excluding the use of violence or the threat of its use), but also to ensure the continuity of this process by establishing a permanent security and cooperation body. The goal of ending the division of Europe into blocs should be put forward, and the readiness should be indicated to dissolve the Warsaw Pact (in accordance with its Article 11) after the entry into force of the collective security system.

4. *The conference should remove obstacles to the development of economic and scientific-technical cooperation.* Poland has particularly much to gain in this area, given the structure of our trade turnover, geographical location and dynamic programme of socio-economic development. This applies to the development of trade, industrial cooperation, scientific and technical exchange and the protection of the human environment. The conference should establish the principles of cooperation based on equal rights and benefits, as well as the directions for its development. We must be vigilant in this area so that the conference agreements do not lead to a weakening of the socialist integration of the CMEA and, in particular, do not facilitate the GFR's policy of attracting the GDR.

5. *In the ideological sphere,* the conference should bring about better positions to continue the offensive by the SC. We must counter Western concepts with a constructive programme, which, by preventing the West from conducting ideological

<sup>9</sup> This refers to the declaration adopted at the conclusion of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries, which took place in Prague from 25 to 26 January 1972.

diversion, would serve to further ease tensions and gain increasing support from the societies of Western Europe for our vision of Europe. In this context, we will seek to liquidate "Free Europe" and Radio "Svoboda". The aim is therefore to seize the proposal for "freer exchange" and give it the direction we desire.

6. Our general approach to the problems of the CSCE should promote *the emancipation of Western Europe from the USA*, while at the same time diversifying the countries of Western Europe. This goal would be served by the establishment of diplomatic relations between all European countries, which could be taken care of on the occasion of the CSCE. (With the exception of the special case of diplomatic relations between Poland and the GFR, which cannot wait until the conference).<sup>10</sup>

Taking the above objectives and tasks as a starting point, we have developed proposals for our position on specific issues of the CSCE, which are enclosed.

#### *IV. Imminent tasks concerning the CSCE*

The tasks listed in Part III will be implemented in stages, some of them only at the conference. Currently, the following tasks may be considered as the most urgent:

1. improving the system for working out a common position of the SC on substantive and procedural issues regarding the CSCE; our proposals are intended as a contribution to the process of developing this position,
2. bringing about the setting of a precise date for the start of multilateral preparatory consultations in Helsinki; this seems to be more important than the start of the consultations itself,
3. conducting a second round of talks with the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the enclosed instructions, emphasising the need for the Finns to propose a date for the start of multilateral consultations and to present suggestions for the procedure of these consultations, ensuring as far as possible their efficient and not too long course,
4. continuing the dialogue on the CSCE with the main Western European countries and countries working constructively towards the conference, while delving deeper and deeper into the substance of the issue,
5. attempting to persuade the USA and Canada to hold preparatory talks with Finland on the CSCE, conducting consultations with these countries i.a. for this purpose,
6. further exploring of the subject matter of CSCE by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other institutions, especially the issues of economic, scientific-technical, cultural and environmental cooperation; this task will be carried out with the help of the Interministerial Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, established by order of the Prime Minister of the Polish People's Republic,

<sup>10</sup> Diplomatic relations between the Polish People's Republic and the FRG were established on 14 September 1972.



7. From our findings, it appears that we will not be able to avoid raising certain disarmament issues or issues closely related to disarmament at the conference. Therefore, we have prepared theses for our position on these issues in the context of the needs resulting from the CSCE. The concept of our position on arms reduction in Central Europe will be the subject of a separate memo and will be presented separately.

V. In connection with the anticipated start of multilateral preparatory talks for the CSCE in Helsinki this autumn, there is a necessity to determine the composition of the Polish delegation to these talks.

We propose that Comrade Adam Willmann,<sup>11</sup> Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic to Finland, be the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Polish People's Republic and head of the Polish delegation to these talks, and that Comrade Józef Wiejacz,<sup>12</sup> Deputy Director of the Department of Studies and Programming of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be his deputy.

We also envisage the participation of Comrade Andrzej Skowroński,<sup>13</sup> Counsellor of the Embassy of the Polish People's Republic in Helsinki, and a group of experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the principle of interchangeability, comprising: Comrades T. Biegański,<sup>14</sup> A. Szyc,<sup>15</sup> Pastecka-Neneman,<sup>16</sup> Woźnowski,<sup>17</sup> Freyberg.<sup>18</sup>

Enclosures:<sup>19</sup>

- 1) Legal and political aspects of European security.
- 2) Pan-European economic and scientific cooperation.
- 3) Cooperation in the field of culture and information.
- 4) Cooperation in the protection of the natural environment.
- 5) Institutional problems of the CSCE.
- 6) Conference model and concept of multilateral preparations.
- 7) Instructions for Ambassador Willmann for conducting the second round of talks with the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The issue of disarmament in the context of the CSCE.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Polish Ambassador in Helsinki Adam Willmann, [dodis.ch/P44778](https://dodis.ch/P44778).

<sup>12</sup> Polish Deputy Director of the Department of Studies and Programming at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Józef Wiejacz, [dodis.ch/P48184](https://dodis.ch/P48184).

<sup>13</sup> Counsellor at the Polish Embassy in Helsinki Andrzej Skowroński, [dodis.ch/P81415](https://dodis.ch/P81415).

<sup>14</sup> Polish expert appraiser in the Department of Studies and Programming of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tadeusz Biegański, [dodis.ch/P81416](https://dodis.ch/P81416).

<sup>15</sup> Polish expert at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Szyc, [dodis.ch/P81417](https://dodis.ch/P81417).

<sup>16</sup> Polish expert at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jadwiga Pastecka-Neneman, [dodis.ch/P81418](https://dodis.ch/P81418).

<sup>17</sup> Polish scientific consultant in the Department of Studies and Programming of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jan Woźnowski, [dodis.ch/P81419](https://dodis.ch/P81419).

<sup>18</sup> Polish Minister Counsellor in the Department of Studies and Programming of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Piotr Freyberg, [dodis.ch/P81420](https://dodis.ch/P81420).

<sup>19</sup> Enclosures are not published; for the enclosures, cf. PL-AMSZ, DSiP 63/77, w. 1.

<sup>20</sup> For all Polish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2901](https://dodis.ch/C2901).

[dodis.ch/34499](https://dodis.ch/34499)

Switzerland

*Memorandum from the Federal Political Department*<sup>1</sup>SUMMARY OF SWITZERLAND'S POSITION ON THE VARIOUS ISSUES  
RAISED BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION  
IN EUROPE*Extract* • Confidential

Bern, 20 June 1972

*Introduction*

The idea of a security conference, revived in 1969 by the Warsaw Pact countries, was initially more of a slogan than a detailed proposal for negotiation. It was only gradually, and in close alignment with developments in the international and European situation, that this idea took shape and the interested states were able to develop a clearer vision of the many implications of such a conference.<sup>2</sup> This organic process, desired by the Western and neutral countries alike, is not yet complete; it was, and still is, necessary because of the fundamental ambiguities inherent in the concept of European security, and even of security itself. It follows that the Swiss position described below cannot represent a set of definitively established attitudes; it reflects the current views of the Political Department, which, when the time comes, will have to be submitted to the Federal Council.<sup>3</sup>

*Substantive issues**I. Political and security issues*

*a) Collective security pact:* a collective security system in the narrow sense (with mandatory military sanctions) is hardly compatible with our neutrality and would in any case be even less likely to be effective at European level than it was in the past at universal level. The suggestion of such a system, put forward at the time by the Warsaw Pact countries, seems to have been abandoned; in any case, it is no longer on the agenda today.

<sup>1</sup> Swiss Federal Archives CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1982/58#431\* (B.72.09.15.1). Translated from French. This memorandum has been written by Blaise Schenk, [dodis.ch/P15229](https://dodis.ch/P15229), responsible within the Federal Political Department (FPD) for the European Security Conference. This document was also published in French in: *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS)*, vol. 25, doc. 144, [dodis.ch/34499](https://dodis.ch/34499).

<sup>2</sup> On the positions of the Western states regarding the European Security Conference, cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 156, [dodis.ch/34494](https://dodis.ch/34494). On the positions of the Eastern European states, cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 157, [dodis.ch/34496](https://dodis.ch/34496). For the table compiled by the Political Secretariat of the FPD on the positions of the states concerned regarding the CSCE and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in December 1971, cf. [dodis.ch/34575](https://dodis.ch/34575).

<sup>3</sup> For the proposal from the FPD to the Federal Council on 1 November 1972, cf. QdD 30, doc. 31, [dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487). For the development of the Swiss position, cf. QdD 30, doc. 13, [dodis.ch/32405](https://dodis.ch/32405); the report of the FPD's Working Group on Switzerland and the European Security Conference of 7 July 1970, [dodis.ch/34490](https://dodis.ch/34490), and the minutes of the Ambassadors' Conference held from 30 August to 2 September 1972, [dodis.ch/34597](https://dodis.ch/34597).

*b) Collective declaration of renunciation of force:* such a declaration already exists (UN Charter, “Ostverträge”). On its own, it would not provide any additional security, even if it were to take the form of a treaty. In order to give concrete expression to the principle of renunciation of force, it would have to be accompanied by precise definitions of concepts such as aggression, intervention, etc. However, any attempt in this area would inevitably lead to an East–West confrontation over the “Brezhnev Doctrine”<sup>4</sup> and consequently to a deterioration of the political climate;

*c) System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes:* a SPSPD<sup>5</sup> is a necessary complement to the renunciation of force. An initiative by Switzerland in this area is entirely justified, because

- it does not call into question our neutrality;
- it takes into account the interests of small states vis-à-vis large ones;
- it emphasises the rule of law in international relations;
- it allows us to revive a Swiss tradition that was very much alive before the last war;<sup>6</sup>

– it is in line with the Security Conference: one cannot be against the peaceful settlement of disputes, just as one cannot be against détente;

*d) East–West “code of conduct”:* this idea put forward by some Westerners, namely an agreement on measures to curb subversion, espionage and propaganda, has strong echoes of the Cold War and risks causing a head-on collision with the Eastern countries. The subject is therefore a sensitive one, and we cannot decide on our position on the “code of conduct” until we know how the conference will unfold and how the Westerners will present their proposal.

## *II. Political issues of direct interest to Switzerland*

a) Should we seize this opportunity and try to have our neutral status recognised by the powers participating in the Security Conference? This is a very delicate question, but one that nevertheless deserves to be asked; it could possibly be examined in depth, depending on how the Conference unfolds.

b) Should we do the same with regard to our future agreement with the EEC,<sup>7</sup> so that it is approved by the USSR? Certainly not, both because, on the one hand we do not need Moscow’s blessing and on the other it would also be inappropriate to give the USSR a say in the matter at a time when it finally seems willing to recognise the “reality” of the Common Market (a say that the United States might also use).

<sup>4</sup> General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

<sup>5</sup> For the Swiss project of a System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, cf. the memorandum of the FPD’s Legal Advisor Rudolf Bindschedler, [dodis.ch/P1396](https://dodis.ch/P1396), of 14 July 1971, [dodis.ch/34503](https://dodis.ch/34503), as well as the memorandum of 5 April 1972, [dodis.ch/34505](https://dodis.ch/34505).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. the tag Public arbitration, [dodis.ch/D1352](https://dodis.ch/D1352).

<sup>7</sup> On the free trade agreement concluded between Switzerland and the European Economic Community on 22 July 1972, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/T2064](https://dodis.ch/T2064).

*III. Military issues*<sup>8</sup>

The issue of force reduction and regional disarmament in Europe primarily concerns the two blocs. Our neutrality prohibits us in principle from intervening in such matters, and the armed forces of a neutral state are not negotiable.

However, Switzerland should not stand aside from these negotiations. It is in Switzerland's interest to be informed of plans and discussions and, if the opportunity arises, to offer its good offices and even make proposals on possible control mechanisms. It also has a duty to its public not to pursue an empty chair policy in an area that is likely to be of great interest to us.

Given the caution we must exercise in any military negotiations, we would have preferred it if the discussion on force reduction were to take place within the framework of the Security Conference, in which we will participate fully. In this way, our reluctance to participate in the work of a possible ad hoc committee on military issues would have been less apparent.

a) *MBFR*: the trend emerging from NATO's recent communiqué on the relationship between the Conference and the MBFRs is not moving in the direction we would like.<sup>9</sup> It has been decided – and the USSR appears to approve of this new approach – to open exploratory MBFR negotiations in parallel with the Conference, but separate from it. Switzerland's direct participation in this is out of the question, especially as the US and the USSR tend to limit the circle of participants to the Central European states with a military interest. However, the content of the discussions in this restricted group will certainly be communicated to the other participants in the Security Conference. In any case, we have been assured that we will be kept satisfactorily informed, as the Federal Republic of Germany has readily agreed to provide us with this service.<sup>10</sup>

b) *Military confidence-building measures*: given that several NATO members (especially smaller states) are opposed to a complete separation of the MBFR and the Conference, they have been granted the concession that NATO has approved in principle the idea of a military component to the Conference. This would examine certain measures prior to a reduction in forces: exchange of information on troop movements or observers during military manoeuvres, for example. When the time comes, we should examine the modalities of possible Swiss participation in the work of an ad hoc conference committee dealing with these special measures. In any case, NATO countries are still far from agreeing among themselves on the content of this military component, and the Warsaw Pact's reaction to this idea is not yet known.

*IV. Cultural cooperation*

We are interested in cultural cooperation insofar as it can contribute to improving the movement of people and information. We cannot oppose the strictly "apolitical" form of cooperation that the Eastern European countries will undoubtedly

<sup>8</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 92, [dodis.ch/34573](https://dodis.ch/34573).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the telegram by Swiss Ambassador in Luxemburg Max Feller, [dodis.ch/P16242](https://dodis.ch/P16242), to the FPD of 1 June 1972, CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1982/58#431\* (B.72.09.15.1).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. the minutes of the meetings between a delegation from the FPD and the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn on 7 and 8 June 1972, [dodis.ch/77676](https://dodis.ch/77676).

propose (exchanges of ballet troupes, European plan to save Venice, etc.), but we must try to prevent this concept from replacing the other (measures to facilitate the movement of people and information).

Furthermore, the fact that culture falls primarily within the remit of our cantons and that we have not concluded a bilateral cultural agreement limits our room for manoeuvre in any case, should the Conference move towards some kind of codification of cultural relations. One way of avoiding this codification would be, for example, to encourage cooperation between the UNESCO National Commissions of the participating countries; these are relatively flexible instruments that can facilitate human contacts between East and West, although we should not harbour any illusions about their scope for action.

*Movement of people and information:* as a liberal and open country, Switzerland can only welcome improvements in this area and will therefore support reasonable initiatives (without putting any forward itself, as this could give the impression that we are acting in concert with NATO, which has also included this idea in its programme). Given that ideas circulate on their own, we will give preference to initiatives that emphasise the movement of people, especially if humanitarian considerations are at stake (e.g. facilitating contact between separated families). However, Eastern countries are very wary of any idea of liberalising the exchange of people and information, which they automatically interpret as ideological penetration attempts by the West. This notion will therefore be difficult to translate into concrete arrangements that are acceptable to all. Nevertheless, we should insist that such arrangements cover areas where their implementation can be verified (for example, it would be relatively easy to monitor the implementation of an agreement on contacts between separated families, whereas an agreement on the abolition of exit visas would be easy to circumvent).

#### *V. Economic cooperation*<sup>11</sup>

The universal nature of our economic relations requires us to maintain a certain level of trade with Eastern countries, even though the prospects for developing such trade are minimal due to structural obstacles such as our partners' foreign trade monopoly, import planning, etc. Nor can we remain indifferent to the efforts of our Western competitors to conquer the markets of Eastern European countries.<sup>12</sup> Finally, we must expect sustained interest in trade issues from Eastern European countries, as they are increasingly concerned about the progress of Western economic integration, and in particular the prospect of soon having to negotiate with a united Western front pursuing a common trade policy within the framework of the Ten.

a) *Revaluation of the UN/ECE:*<sup>13</sup> it is highly unlikely that the Security Conference will provide an opportunity for liberalisation of East–West trade; the conditions for negotiations in this area are far from being met and, in any case, the Conference is not the appropriate forum. On the other hand, it could offer an oppor-

<sup>11</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 174, [dodis.ch/34571](http://dodis.ch/34571).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 176, [dodis.ch/35755](http://dodis.ch/35755).

<sup>13</sup> For information on Switzerland's accession to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in March 1972, cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 78, [dodis.ch/34673](http://dodis.ch/34673).

tunity to lay the groundwork, in particular by drawing up a list of obstacles to the development of trade (the Common Market countries are already working on this). An activity of this nature is in line with that of the UN/ECE, a point of contact between East and West whose objectives coincide to a large extent with those of an economic component of the Security Conference. It would therefore be desirable to upgrade this body which, without participating as such in the Conference, could be entrusted with tasks within the framework of the latter. In any case, it would be pointless for the Conference to create a new body similar to the UN/ECE, which would duplicate its work.

*b) Other forms of cooperation:* tourism, transport, the environment, industrial and technological cooperation could also be included on the Conference agenda. We have no objection to this, given that most of these areas are already included in the UN/ECE's list of activities. Tourism in particular, which is both an economic stimulus and a source of human contact, could potentially provide the basis for a Swiss initiative.<sup>14</sup>

In all areas of cooperation (whether cultural or economic in the broad sense), limited and concrete arrangements are preferable to ambitious declarations of intent or voluminous reports with no practical significance. The danger of the "cooperation" aspect of the Security Conference is that it masks disagreement or lack of agreement on security issues; it even risks replacing the "security" component, which, as we have seen, will be virtually stripped of the aspect of force reduction. However, it would be unfavourable, even dangerous, for the Conference on Security and Cooperation to become a conference on cooperation, likely to create the illusion of détente in Europe by sidestepping the real problems.

[...] <sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Cf. the working paper by Erwin Bischof, [dodis.ch/P46600](https://dodis.ch/P46600), of the FPD's Finance and Economic Affairs Service of 13 December 1972, [dodis.ch/34578](https://dodis.ch/34578).

<sup>15</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/34499](https://dodis.ch/34499). For all Swiss documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2935](https://dodis.ch/C2935).



[dodis.ch/76946](https://dodis.ch/76946)

Japan

*The Japanese Ambassador in London, Yukawa, to Minister for Foreign Affairs Fukuda*<sup>1</sup>

MINUTES OF THE 13<sup>TH</sup> CONFERENCE OF JAPANESE AMBASSADORS  
TO EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

*Extract* • Secret

London, 24 June 1972

The following are the main points of the opinions expressed at this conference:

[...]²

3. *East–West Relations*

(a) *European Security Conference*

With the progress of events against the backdrop, such as the ratification of both the German-Soviet and German-Polish treaties, the entry into force of the Berlin Agreement, and Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, preparations for holding this conference are expected to proceed. A preparatory conference may be held around November of this year, and the main conference could be convened next spring or later.

However, regarding this conference, there are differing expectations between the Soviet Union and the West, and between the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Even if this conference is held, concrete results cannot be expected, and any conclusions reached will likely be a product of parties sleeping in the same bed but dreaming different dreams.

Egypt, China, Cuba, and others have already expressed their desire to participate as observers in this conference. Japan also needs to consider how to deal with this conference, including the question of whether or not to attend as an observer.<sup>3</sup> In doing so, it will be necessary to fully consider Japan's stance on an Asian collective security system plan, which is the Soviet Union's next objective.

(b) *MBFR*

Specifically, during the preparatory phase for the main conference in Helsinki, preliminary discussions will likely begin in the form of exchanges of views

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (DA-MOFAJ), 2013-0752. *Translated from Japanese. This telegram No. 884 by the Japanese Ambassador in London Morio Yukawa, [dodis.ch/P81200](https://dodis.ch/P81200), was sent to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Takeo Fukuda, [dodis.ch/P48220](https://dodis.ch/P48220), in Tokyo.*

<sup>2</sup> Only the sections related to the CSCE are transcribed. For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76946](https://dodis.ch/76946).

<sup>3</sup> Subsequently, observer participation was actually considered, but ultimately not implemented.



among experts. However, these negotiations involve complex issues and are expected to be protracted. Furthermore, there is strong opposition from France and other Western countries. The Soviet Union also requires the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe to maintain control over those countries, making concrete progress in these negotiations unlikely.

*(c) Germany's Ostpolitik*

Future negotiations for the basic relations treaty are expected to be difficult due to fundamental differences between the two Germanys. West Germany seems to leverage East Germany's strong desire for United Nations membership, requesting and expecting the Soviet Union to exert its influence on East Germany to advance the matter. The Soviet Union, from the perspective of its policy of détente, may also make effort to persuade East Germany. It is highly probable that these negotiations will be concluded as early as this year, or at least by next spring. Consequently, the issue of both Germanys joining the United Nations will become a reality after next spring, and once both have joined, Western countries will likely move to recognise East Germany.

Further progress is expected in the normalization of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, negotiations between West Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria are also anticipated to proceed in earnest.

[...]⁴

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⁴ For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76946](https://dodis.ch/76946). For all Japanese documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2905](https://dodis.ch/C2905).

[dodis.ch/77039](https://dodis.ch/77039)

European Community

*Motion for a resolution presented by the Dutch Member of the European Parliament  
Berkhouwer<sup>1</sup>*

DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE ALLIANCE  
OF LIBERALS AND DEMOCRATS FOR EUROPE, CONCERNING THE  
PREPARATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION

[Brussels,] 6 July 1972

*The European Parliament,*

Noting the new conditions of détente created in Europe by the recent German-Soviet Moscow Treaty,<sup>2</sup> the German-Polish Warsaw Treaty,<sup>3</sup> and the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin;<sup>4</sup>

1. *wishes* that multilateral consultations take place as early as this autumn in Helsinki, with a view to preparing the European Conference on Security and Cooperation;

2. *invites*, consequently, the Member States of the Community to adopt a common position that can be presented in Helsinki by a single spokesperson, par-

<sup>1</sup> Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), CM2/1975 No. 728 (PE 30.651). Translated from French. This document No. 101/72, consists of a Draft Resolution submitted by The Dutch member of the European Parliament Cornelis Berkhouwer, [dodis.ch/P56800](https://dodis.ch/P56800), on behalf of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, [dodis.ch/R44056](https://dodis.ch/R44056). Between 1953 and 1958, the Group grew significantly thanks to the accession of a large number of independent, non-attached members. In 1959, it became the second largest political group in the European Parliament, surpassing the Socialist Group, a position it maintained until 1963. Following the departure of the Gaullists, it again became the Parliament's third largest group. The document concerns the preparation of the CSCE and has been extracted from a file of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities concerning the Final Act of the CSCE. The file notably brings together a series of documents from the European Parliament that were transmitted to the Council in the framework of interinstitutional cooperation. This particular document includes a resolution of the European Parliament and a covering letter signed by the President of the European Parliament, Walter Behrendt, [dodis.ch/P81421](https://dodis.ch/P81421) and addressed to the Dutch President of the Council of the European Communities Wilhelm Schmelzer, [dodis.ch/P43055](https://dodis.ch/P43055).

<sup>2</sup> The Moscow Treaty was signed on 12 August 1970 between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Soviet Union. It represented the first concrete achievement of the new policy of rapprochement with the East – Ostpolitik – pursued by the Chancellor of the FRG Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](https://dodis.ch/P15409), since taking office. The treaty entered into force on 3 June 1972.

<sup>3</sup> The Warsaw Treaty (Warschauer Vertrag) was an agreement between West Germany and the People's Republic of Poland, signed on 7 December 1970 and ratified by the German Bundestag on 17 May 1972. Under the terms of the treaty, both parties committed themselves to nonviolence and accepted the existing border, the Oder-Neisse Line.

<sup>4</sup> The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, signed on 3 September 1971 by France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, helped to ease Cold War tensions over the divided city. It guaranteed transit between West Berlin and the FRG, improved communication links, and acknowledged the ties between West Berlin and the FRG, while prohibiting any unilateral changes to the city's status.

ticularly in the commercial, scientific, and technical fields, without undermining Atlantic solidarity;

3. *considers* that the time has come to ease economic and cultural barriers and to achieve genuine free movement of persons and ideas throughout the European continent;

4. *regards* the Moscow Anti-Ballistic Missile Agreement<sup>5</sup> as a first step towards the balanced and controlled limitation – followed by reduction – of nuclear and conventional weapons.<sup>6</sup>

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5 The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, was a key arms control agreement signed on 26 May 1972 in Moscow (USSR) by United States President Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](https://dodis.ch/P13584), and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543). The treaty entered into force on 3 October 1972. It bound the United States and the Soviet Union to strict limits on the deployment of antiballistic missile systems in order to maintain strategic stability.

6 At its sitting of 15 November 1972, the European Parliament adopted, on the basis of an interim report by the member of the European Parliament Lucien Radoux, [dodis.ch/P38987](https://dodis.ch/P38987), on behalf of the Political Committee on the CSCE, cf. HAEU, PE0-1461, a resolution on the preparation of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation and on the draft resolution submitted by Mr Berkhouver on behalf of the Liberal and Allies Group, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77039](https://dodis.ch/77039). For the minutes of the sitting containing the Parliament's resolution, as well as the interim report of its competent committee in the four official languages of the Communities, cf. HAEU, PE0-3125. Session du 13 au 17 novembre 1972. For all documents of the European Community in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2912](https://dodis.ch/C2912).

[dodis.ch/76979](https://dodis.ch/76979)

Israel

*The Israeli Ambassador in Vienna, Patish, to Assistant Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Meroz and to Director of the Europe I Department Yaish<sup>1</sup>*

MEIR–KREISKY MEETING

*Extract* • Classified/Personal

Vienna, 19 July 1972

Each of you separately requested authoritative information about the Prime Minister-Kreisky<sup>2</sup> meeting, and I hope that the personal response will not be marred by this letter addressed to both of you...

This brief summary is based on what the Prime Minister told me immediately after her conversation with Kreisky. I myself participated only in the beginning of the conversation.

1. Kreisky began with his “business”, his handling of the steel affair,<sup>3</sup> which caused him to be late for the conversation.

2. He immediately moved on to the issue of the Conference on European Security, trying to explain that, even without this conference assuming a role as a mediator in the conflict in the Middle East, merely raising the problem as being of concern to Europe could be useful. The Prime Minister raised objections and repeatedly asked how, given the failure of mediators,<sup>4</sup> he believed that the Europeans would succeed with good offices that would explicitly define them as not being mediators. Here an exchange of words developed, in which the Prime Minister’s puzzlement increased and Kreisky’s explanations focused mainly on his attempt to convince the Prime Minister that a conference that focuses on West–East [relations] and neutrality within the framework of the general effort for détente would be beneficial to the negotiating atmosphere between the parties.

3. Kreisky does not believe in direct negotiations and hardly believes in “proximity talks” and only emphasises the influence of outside factors in bringing [both

<sup>1</sup> Israel State Archives (ISA), MFA5317/30. Translated from Hebrew. This letter was signed by the Israeli Ambassador in Vienna, Itzhak Patish, [dodis.ch/P52067](https://dodis.ch/P52067), and sent to the Assistant Director-General for Europe of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yohanan Meroz, [dodis.ch/P51231](https://dodis.ch/P51231), and to the Director of the Europe I Department Nissim Yaish, [dodis.ch/P51234](https://dodis.ch/P51234).

<sup>2</sup> The 12<sup>th</sup> Socialist International Congress was held in Vienna from 26 to 29 June 1972. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, [dodis.ch/P27735](https://dodis.ch/P27735), represented the Israeli Labour party, [dodis.ch/R30447](https://dodis.ch/R30447), at the congress and met with the Chancellor of Austria Bruno Kreisky, [dodis.ch/P2507](https://dodis.ch/P2507). She also described the meeting and the aspirations of Malta to mediate in the Middle East in a government meeting on 9 July 1972, cf. [dodis.ch/77763](https://dodis.ch/77763).

<sup>3</sup> In the summer of 1972 Austria signed a trade agreement with the European Communities, which had an important impact on the steel industry.

<sup>4</sup> Probably refers to the mission of the UN Special Mediator Gunnar Jarring, [dodis.ch/P16747](https://dodis.ch/P16747), and unsuccessful attempts in 1971–1972 by the US State Department to advance an agreement between Israel and Egypt on Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai Peninsula.

sides] together. The Prime Minister's response: If so, let the factors work to explain the need for flexibility to Egypt as well.

*Summary:*

The Prime Minister definitely saw the conversation as fruitless. Her impression was that Kreisky was personally clinging to an idea that he himself felt how slim the chances were of its acceptance at the European conference. The value of the conversation was more in its businesslike tone, in the absence of tension (which had existed between the two in the past) and in the sceptical but polite stance of the Prime Minister, in the face of Kreisky's forced attempts to "sell" her an idea that did not seem realistic.

As for Kreisky's visit to Israel, he did say something like this during the week of the [Socialist] International, as for its implementation, we will wait and see.<sup>5</sup>

Regarding the Kreisky affair, I will emphasise once again that his concluding speech after the public evening in Vienna, at which the leaders of the International appeared, including the Prime Minister, surprised everyone with its expression of friendship for Israel and deep respect for the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister was also impressed by the sincerity of his words and their pro-Zionist formulation.

[...] <sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Handwritten addition in the original document: meaning – there is still a question mark.

<sup>6</sup> For the complete version of the document in Hebrew, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76979](http://dodis.ch/76979). For all Israeli documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2908](http://dodis.ch/C2908).

[dodis.ch/77046](https://dodis.ch/77046)

Canada

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Halstead to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Ritchie<sup>1</sup>*

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Confidential

Ottawa, 3 August 1972

You asked me recently what we were doing to work up positions aimed at using the CSCE to promote Canadian interests in our relations with both Western and Eastern Europe.

2. As a preliminary let me set down briefly my understanding of what those Canadian interests are, using "Foreign Policy for Canadians"<sup>2</sup> as a starting point:

(a) to promote trade and financial relations with Western Europe and to the extent possible with Eastern Europe in the interest not only of Canada's own economic growth but also of maintaining a stable and prosperous international community;

(b) to foster cooperation with likeminded countries in Europe and to encourage freer exchanges with countries with different political and social systems in the interest of a more stable international order, greater social justice and an improved environment;

(c) to expand scientific, technological and cultural relations on the basis of mutual benefit with the countries of both Western and Eastern Europe in the interest of the quality of life in Canada;

(d) to contribute to the security of Europe and to the lessening of tensions there in the interest of maintaining global peace and hence Canadian security; and

(e) in general, to seek concrete forms of mutually beneficial cooperation with these relatively developed countries for the purpose of diversifying Canada's external relations, reducing our vulnerability to and dependence on the USA and thus strengthening our independence, unity and identity.

3. Canada has from the beginning taken a positive, though I think realistic, approach to the proposal for a CSCE. It has been our position that such a conference, if carefully prepared and held only after sufficient common ground has been found to offer reasonable prospects for its success, could be a useful part of the general negotiating process whereby East and West are proceeding step-by-step to tackle the underlying causes of division and tension in Europe. It has been our

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9088, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 22. This memorandum signed by Canadian Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs John Halstead, [dodis.ch/P44664](https://dodis.ch/P44664) was addressed to the Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Albert Ritchie, [dodis.ch/P17963](https://dodis.ch/P17963).

<sup>2</sup> [Europe: Foreign Policy for Canadians \(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970\)](#).

calculation that this process is itself of benefit to Canada because it tends to lower international tensions, to strengthen international peace and security, and in the process to allow a country like Canada greater freedom for international manoeuvre. It has also been part of our calculation that, in fostering this process, Canada should seek out and exploit opportunities for promoting our particular interests in Europe. That is why we have insisted on the right to participate just as fully in the "cooperation" as in the "security" dimension of CSCE. The particular way in which we pursue Canadian interests in the conference will of course depend on the opportunities which we find.

4. Considerable work has already been done to translate these interests into Canadian positions with respect to a wide range of issues raised by CSCE. The results of this work so far are summarized in the attached collection of position papers.<sup>3</sup> However it might be useful if I indicated briefly what I think some of the main problems and opportunities are and how we might deal with them from now on.

5. It seems likely that the subject matter of the conference deliberations will be divided into three groups: security questions; economic questions; and cultural, scientific and other forms of cooperation.

#### *Security questions*

6. Under the heading of security questions the main matters for consideration will probably be:

- (a) some form of declaration of the non-use of force;
- (b) some form of ratification of the post-war European boundaries (including the FRG/GDR boundary and the western boundaries of the USSR);
- (c) some code of conduct or declaration of principles governing relations between States; and
- (d) some confidence building measures and some reference to MBFR.

7. Concerning the non-use of force, the main Canadian purpose will be to ensure that whatever is adopted is as realistic as possible, of general application and not capable of being used in a one-sided way against us. Concerning the ratification of the post-war European boundaries, the main question it will raise for Canada will probably be the implication of recognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. Concerning the declaration of principles, Canada may have a particular problem if others (e.g., the FRG) press to include the principle of self-determination. Concerning confidence building measures and the relationship of CSCE with MBFR, we are prepared to go along with whatever formula commands general NATO support. In fact there seems to be wide agreement that it would be useful to discuss at CSCE a limited number of practical measures (such as the reciprocal notification of military manoeuvres) which would build mutual confidence but that it would be unwise with respect to MBFR to go farther than to give a general blessing from the CSCE to the idea of roughly parallel negotiations elsewhere on force reductions.

3 Cf. LAC, RG25, vol. 9088, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 21.



*Economic questions*

8. While NATO background studies have been dealing with a broad range of questions such as hindrances and aids to East–West trade, industrial cooperation, financial cooperation and the problem of development aid, it is still too early to say just what the economic aspects of the CSCE will comprise. It is already clear, however, that there will be two orders of problems of general interest to all NATO countries. The first is the question of how the group of ten countries comprising the enlarged European Community will handle their dealings with Canada and other non-EEC members of NATO. So far the tendency of the EC has been to formulate their own positions before being prepared to consult with others. This has proved to be a time-consuming procedure which may be too unwieldy for the faster moving pace of the CSCE.

9. The second and related problem is the question of what the Western strategy should or could be. At an earlier stage it was thought that the conference would be an inappropriate forum for the negotiation of economic matters but more recently the EC seems to have come round to the view that the conference may indeed provide a useful opportunity for serious economic negotiations. The EC members have belatedly begun preparing position papers which contemplate bargaining with the Communist countries for mutual concessions in the economic field rather than merely preparing defences against their economic demands. In fact however, it seems most unlikely that anything like a common NATO position will be formulated on these matters, if only because EC interests are not the same as USA interests; and of course Canadian interests are something else again.

10. As for specific Canadian interests, it is planned to undertake between now and the middle of September an intensive analysis of the issues identified in the background papers prepared in NATO, with a view to recommending policies and tactics best designed to achieve our purposes. This work will be undertaken by PAG<sup>4</sup> in consultation with ECL<sup>5</sup> and other divisions concerned.

*Cultural, scientific and other forms of cooperation*

11. Under the third heading it is expected that the CSCE may deal with such matters as:

- (a) cooperation in pure and applied science and technology;
- (b) cultural exchanges; and
- (c) cooperation to improve the environment.

12. In this context Canadian efforts will in general be employed to promote the following objectives:

- (a) to remove obstacles to the freer movement of people, ideas and information;
- (b) to adopt a problem-oriented approach, making use as appropriate of existing international organizations;
- (c) to avoid bloc-to-bloc arrangements and to preserve the opportunity to deal bilaterally with individual countries of Eastern Europe; and
- (d) to respect the principles of reciprocity and mutual benefit.

<sup>4</sup> The Policy Analysis Group in the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

<sup>5</sup> The Commercial Policy Division in the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

13. It seems likely that one of the main issues in this area of the conference's deliberations will be the question of freer movement of people, ideas and information. It is an issue to which Canada attaches great importance, not for propaganda reasons but because we believe this opportunity should not be missed to obtain some real improvements in the situation by means of concrete measures of liberalization, for example by reducing obstacles to leaving one's country, lifting restrictions on marriage and re-uniting families, removing radio jamming, freeing the circulation of publications and relaxing the censorship of foreign films. Our tactics will be to use low-key persuasion in favour of a gradual process leading toward generally accepted international behaviour rather than a frontal attack against the repressive practices of the Communist regimes.<sup>6</sup>

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6 For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).

[dodis.ch/76736](https://dodis.ch/76736)

Portugal

*Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Patrício at the Dinner in Honour  
of NATO Secretary-General Luns in Lisbon<sup>1</sup>*

OFFICIAL VISIT OF THE NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL

*Extract*

*[Lisbon, 19 September 1972]*

*[...]²*

My country attaches great importance to NATO. We have demonstrated this over the years. This importance stems from the fact that the alliance is the foundation of peace in the Europe to which we belong. [...]

The relative importance of Portugal's contribution to NATO becomes even more striking when one considers that the Organisation covers only a part of the Portuguese Nation within its collective defence scheme. The European part of Portugal is the very reason for our participation in the alliance, and it is within this context that the benefits and responsibilities arising from our status as signatories to the Atlantic Pact are exhausted.

But the fact that we have heavy defence responsibilities on other continents, where a large portion of our territories are located and where millions of Portuguese live and build their future—people we must defend, using only our own means and resources, from unjust external attacks caused by the same *[Soviet]* imperialism whose threat led to the creation of the alliance—in no way diminishes our willingness to collaborate with the Organisation and the loyalty and sincerity of our purposes in the common defence effort of Europe.<sup>3</sup>

The same positive spirit of solidarity animates Portugal's current participation in the tasks of preparing the conditions upon which a peaceful and collaborative life among all the peoples of Europe depends. These tasks dominate the alliance's activities today. The new atmosphere of détente that has fortunately been created on the European continent has allowed us to enter a new phase in the life of the Atlantic alliance. NATO member countries will soon be able to begin preparatory

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archive and Library of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal (PT-DAR), "Visita oficial do Secretário-Geral da N.A.T.O." in *Portugal*. Boletim de Informação, No. 52, September–October 1972, pp. 63–66. Translated from Portuguese. This speech by the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs Rui Patrício, [dodis.ch/P15498](https://dodis.ch/P15498), was delivered at the dinner in honour of NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns, [dodis.ch/P14246](https://dodis.ch/P14246), at the Palácio das Necessidades, in Lisbon, on the occasion of the latter's official visit to Portugal in September 1972.

<sup>2</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76736](https://dodis.ch/76736).

<sup>3</sup> Increasingly challenged in international forums such as the UN for refusing to decolonize its overseas territories, Minister of Foreign Affairs Patrício finds in NATO, of which Portugal is a founding member, a less hostile stage for his African policy. In his speech in Lisbon honouring Luns, he stresses that Portugal is aligned with the path this organisation is taking towards détente with Eastern Europe but reserves the right to defend itself against attacks it is suffering in Portuguese Africa, caused, he claims, by the same Soviet imperialism.

talks in Helsinki for the long-awaited conference on security and cooperation in Europe. And they can do so with the political and moral strength that stems from their own doctrine, developed years ago, and from their constant past initiatives in favour of détente, peace, and cooperation in Europe.

Since the Harmel Report,<sup>4</sup> this doctrine has established its principles, and since then the Allies have never lost the initiative in making realistic and well-founded proposals for détente, peace, and cooperation. The Allies can thus defend valid principles in Helsinki, which will certainly count on public opinion support, and can present realistic and well-intentioned proposals. But it is very important that in this new and decisive stage of the alliance's evolution, cohesion and strong solidarity among all the Allies remain.

For our part, the ongoing political consultations we hold, both within multi-lateral bodies and bilaterally with other allies, show us that we share the overall objectives to be achieved in Helsinki. We are also guided by the same principles that the Allies are striving to enshrine.

And we can only lament that these principles cannot have a widespread application throughout the world.

Indeed, respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every State; the right of every people to determine their own laws freely and to choose, without external interference, their own political and social institutions; progress in the movement of people, ideas and information; the development of economic, technical and scientific exchange, as well as the expansion of cultural relations, are undoubtedly desirable principles and trends in relations between the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe.

But they are no less valid on other continents where the interests and will of the peoples who inhabit them are thwarted by incitements to violence and confrontation and by aid to subversion and aggression which, because they come from communist powers, may cast some doubt on their sincerity in adhering to the policy of dialogue and cooperation in Europe.

Not only in this aspect or from this perspective, what happens beyond the Tropic of Cancer may be of interest to the Allies of the North Atlantic. The security of the maritime traffic lines that supply Europe through the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, in the face of the increasing Soviet naval threat and the expansion of communist penetration and influence in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, are issues that have been raising concerns in many minds that it would be unwise not to take into due account.

The entire world was recently shaken with astonishment and horror by a savage and senseless terrorist act.<sup>5</sup> But the reaction of public opinion will be of no use if measures inspired by general rules of universal application are not taken. Terrorism, violence, and aggression are not only condemnable when they are

4 The 1967 "Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance", [dodis.ch/77582](http://dodis.ch/77582), by the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, [dodis.ch/P15124](http://dodis.ch/P15124). Secretary-General Luns, in his speech of thanks to Foreign Minister Patrício, refers to the Harmel Report as "the cornerstone of the alliance's détente policy" (In Idem, "Visita oficial do Secretário-Geral da N.A.T.O." in Portugal. PT-DAR, *Boletim de Informação*, No. 52, September–October 1972, p. 67).

5 The Munich massacre at the 1972 Summer Olympics, which claimed the lives of eleven Israeli athletes at the hands of the Palestinian group Black September.

launched against our interests, our political conceptions, or the causes that are sympathetic to us. Only the observance by all States of the rules of healthy international coexistence can allow peace among peoples and respect for human life and the security of nations.

[...] <sup>6</sup> I raise my glass so that NATO continues to be the guardian of peace in Europe and I offer my best wishes for the personal happiness of its distinguished Secretary-General and Mrs. Luns. <sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76736](https://dodis.ch/76736).

<sup>7</sup> For all Portuguese documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2897](https://dodis.ch/C2897).

[dodis.ch/76947](https://dodis.ch/76947)

Japan

*The Japanese Permanent Representative to the International Organisations in Geneva,  
Kitahara, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE AND MBFR (AMBASSADOR'S VIEW)

Secret

Geneva, 30 September 1972

Regarding outgoing telegram No. 1614,<sup>2</sup> concerning my observation on this matter as seen from here, the following is reported as a reference for the Ambassador's Conference.

1. The thought of the European Security Conference was originally proposed by the Soviet Union after World War II as a measure against the upcoming threat of Germany. After approximately 20 years, with changes in European and global situations, the possibility of its realization has finally emerged. The current aims of the Soviet Union include maintaining the status quo in Europe after World War II, the consolidation of the division between East and West Germany, the weakening of NATO through détente in Europe, and further strengthening the Soviet position against the People's Republic of China by easing tensions in Europe.

What is noteworthy through the background of this Conference, albeit belatedly, is how persistently and consistently Soviet diplomatic policies are carried out. While the future operational format of this Conference is still unclear, the Soviet Union is likely considering holding ministerial-level councils twice a year, with ministers from each country speaking individually, in order to dispel the traditional impression of NATO versus Warsaw Pact.

Despite the mine blockade measures off the coast of Vietnam, the Soviet Union welcomed the visit of the American president and advanced discussions on European security. This suggests that the Soviet Union strongly needed to achieve Western recognition of the status quo in Europe, thereby strengthening its own position within the Eastern European sphere.

2. Regarding the above, the position of Western countries is by no means unified. Originally, most countries had doubts about holding this meeting, however eventually responded to the Soviet call. The reason is that in democratic countries, it is difficult for the government to outright reject such calls, considering the

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (DA-MOFAJ), 2013-0752. *Translated from Japanese. This telegram No. 1625 sent by the Japanese Permanent Representative to the International Organisations in Geneva Hideo Kitahara, [dodis.ch/P47987](https://dodis.ch/P47987), was addressed to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, [dodis.ch/P42106](https://dodis.ch/P42106) on 30 September 1972. This telegram was sent with an "urgent (priority handling)" classification.*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. DA-MOFAJ, 2013-0752.

trends in public opinion and especially the press, when such meetings are called for under the “rhetoric” of peace and détente.

It cannot be overlooked that underlying the general psychology of Westerners, while absolutely desire to avoid war in Europe, a strong mindset prevails that alongside armaments, political discussions and cultural exchanges should be used to change the nature of the Soviet Union, even if they feel this may be a vain hope.

For the Western side, simply accepting the status quo offers no advantage, so they intended to launch a counteroffensive through cooperation in economic and cultural exchanges. However, it is questionable how advantageously and effectively Western Europe can act in the economic sphere. Rather, considering the future, the United States or Japan, more so than Western European countries, appears to have greater potential for economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, concerning the exchange of people and thought, it depends on upcoming negotiations, but it is not without doubt how far the iron wall can be broken in terms of human traffic and exchange of ideas.

3. Eastern European countries would generally wish to increase their degree of independence and freedom from the Soviet Union through the European Security Conference or Mutual Force Reduction. Depending on the future development of negotiations, some improvement may be seen compared to the period from the end of World War II to the present day.

However, it is premature to expect such progress to be realised shortly. Even if the negotiations on Mutual Force Reduction were to begin in the near term, it would be difficult for political liberalization to progress in Eastern European countries where Soviet troops are permanently stationed.

4. Today, with the possibility of Mutual Force Reduction talks taking place in parallel with the European Security Conference, it is important to note that the relationship between the United States and Western European countries may change to some extent from now on. In other words, the United States and the Soviet Union, as nuclear superpowers, have reached a point where they must engage in direct dialogue. As contacts between them become increasingly close, various subtle points may emerge in the coordination of opinions between the United States and Western European countries regarding relations with the Soviet Union.

Discussions between the United States and other Western European countries within NATO will naturally continue. However, when it comes to deciding on actual issues, it is expected that more will be made through direct dialogue with the Soviet Union led by the United States. Along with that, Western European countries would effectively be asked for their approval after the decision.

In this regard, Western European countries, in particular West Germany, have traditionally taken the position of bearing any cost for the stationing of United States troops in Europe, though this stance may shift if force reduction talks advance. Furthermore, it has been heard that in the past, when there were economic frictions between the United States and Western Europe, the United States side would sometimes bring up defence issues, such as force reduction, as a means of pressure. It is also interesting to see how the issue of United States defence of Western Europe will be handled between Western Europe and the United States in the future, especially in relation to economic issues.



In any case, the proposal for Mutual Force Reduction is naturally seen as inevitably shifting the balance in favour of the Soviet side, as long as it includes the withdrawal of United States forces. The question is what the West, particularly at the insistence of the United States aimed to achieve in getting the Soviet Union to accept this proposal at this time. It must not be forgotten that the key point of the Soviet aim to weaken NATO is to drive a wedge between the United States and Western European countries.

5. The conference of European Security and the negotiations on Mutual Force Reduction are primarily European issues. It will be crucial for Japan to constantly monitor the nature of cooperation between the United States and Western Europe, and the trends in their respective stances, in relation to the issues with the Soviet Union.

Please forward this message, along with the telegram quoted at the beginning, to the diplomatic missions in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, Germany, and other relevant countries. (The telegram quoted has only been forwarded to Belgium.)<sup>3</sup>

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3 For all Japanese documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2905](http://dodis.ch/C2905).

[dodis.ch/77134](https://dodis.ch/77134)

Türkiye

*The Turkish Ambassador in Helsinki, Batu, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

# THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Top Secret

Helsinki, 4 October 1972

1 – I am submitting my observations on the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe as required by the instructions. We have provided detailed information on various occasions regarding the efforts Finland, where I am assigned, has made over the past three years to realize this Conference project – and more specifically, to hold the meetings in Helsinki—and the outcomes it seeks from the conference: The Finnish Government does not appear particularly interested in the issue of the balance of power in Europe, which is the subject of the conference for everyone, but is attempting to use the conference as an opportunity to assert its neutrality and, to this end, has embarked on side initiatives related to the conference topic. It is possible to understand and even appreciate Finland's stance, having been forced to defend its independence against Russia alone for many years. Since it will be the host during the preparatory meetings, and on the other hand, it must emphasise at every opportunity that it is in a special position in terms of the success of foreign policy, it seems that maintaining complete neutrality on issues related to the essence and even the procedure of the Conference would be in Finland's best interest. We can certainly hope that it will act in this manner.

2 – We see that their points of view regarding the conference have changed significantly over the past three years and are still changing. Even if they belong to one of the blocs, it is certain that each separate country has different national interests in a political "arrangement" covering Europe. It may not be possible for a country concerned to determine a definite course of action on a long-term "settlement" without knowing the ulterior motives of the others and without being able to calculate the developments that are likely to occur in the balance of power in the near and distant future. At this stage, I believe we must first and foremost examine our country's interests by analyzing the current situation and the likely developments.

3 – The fact that the strongest factor driving the Soviet Union towards a "settlement" path in Europe is its conflict with China is becoming clearer every day.

<sup>1</sup> Turkish Diplomatic Archives (TDA), K0001585-G0010544-211097. Translated from Turkish. This letter No. 267/188-72 referring to the crypto circular No. 955 regarding the impressions of the Turkish Ambassador in Helsinki, Hâmit Batu, [dodis.ch/P49733](https://dodis.ch/P49733), on the CSCE was sent via courier to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 October 1972. It is deduced that this document was written by Ambassador Batu in order to narrate the meetings in detail regarding the CSCE that took place in Helsinki.

I am personally inclined to believe that Russia has shown a sensitivity in this matter that exceeds expectations. In the eyes of the Russians, China, which has resumed an active foreign policy on a global scale after the liquidation of the Cultural Revolution, is pursuing a policy of encircling against the Soviet Union in Europe, as it did in Asia. In fact, China is striving to strengthen its political ties with all the countries neighbouring the Soviet Union through a long-term policy. Yugoslavia and Romania in Europe were able to reciprocate the efforts of China in this direction. Russia always keeps in mind the possibility that other socialist countries in Eastern Europe may resort to the same remedy if they find the opportunity. With China's strengthening in Asia and Japan gaining an independent policy and exerting its considerable economic weight, the Soviet Union is left facing unknowns in the rapidly changing power balance struggle on this continent. The era of dual influence in Asia seems to be over. After the "prise de contact" represented by Nixon's<sup>2</sup> trip to Beijing, the necessity of reaching an agreement with the US has become an increasingly important factor in the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

Under these circumstances, while the Soviet Union wants the status quo to be accepted as the final outcome in Europe, it is making a great effort to resolve the security issues that form the basis of the Europe issue directly with the US as far as possible. It will try to take maximum advantage of the US's tendencies in this direction: if necessary, it is prepared to make significant concessions to the US in other areas. It seems that it views the reaction that this approach will provoke, namely the possibility of the European Union occurring, as the lesser evil from its perspective. We can assume that Russia believes that the conflicts of interest between the Western European countries, particularly the competition between France and the Federal Germany to occupy the position of executive power in the European Community, will always provide it with room for political maneuvering.

4 – Ostpolitik pursued by Brandt constituted a development that gave the Soviet government broad opportunities for influence in this regard. For West Germany, Ostpolitik was an initiative that, in addition to creating hope for the unification of Germany, provided the opportunity to finally take the initiative in Europe at the very end of the De Gaulle<sup>3</sup> era and to make its presence felt in European affairs. The Soviet Government appears eager to maintain its position of always having the final say in French-German relations and, consequently, in Europe, by skilfully leveraging the traditional French-Russian political friendship and the new Soviet-German rapprochement.

If the Soviet Union can reap these benefits from Ostpolitik, it is certain that they are also taking on enormous risks. In our opinion, if they had not encountered such powerful problems in Asia, they would not have taken the great risks that Brandt's<sup>4</sup> policy created for them. In this mutually pursued policy, the Soviet Union and the Federal Germany are engaging their vital, non-negotiable interests. They are gambling with them in a high-stakes game: Brandt seems to base his policy on the belief that once peace prevails in Central Europe, Germany's economic

2 United States President Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](https://dodis.ch/P13584).

3 French President from 1959 to 1969 Charles de Gaulle, [dodis.ch/P460](https://dodis.ch/P460).

4 Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1969 to 1974 Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](https://dodis.ch/P15409).

and cultural appeal will result in the restoration of old ties; that the unstoppable flow of history will loosen the bonds that bind the satellites to Russia. The Soviet Government, however, is confident that it can prevent these developments through the dominance it has established over its satellites and the discipline it has imposed.

5 – The subject of the European Conference coincides with Federal Germany's policy. What positive outcome could be expected from the Conference for the West other than enabling or facilitating progress towards independence in Eastern European countries? The only outcome that appears favourable to the West in terms of security is the acceptance of "confidence building measures," but even this would only serve that purpose. The conclusion that follows is that if Europe generally expects to benefit from this Conference and wants to achieve results, the condition for this, which means a "price" for some European countries, will be the strengthening of Federal Germany within the Western European community. Indeed, while the removal of obstacles preventing exchange and contact with the Eastern European countries and the initiation of a more liberal stance in Eastern Bloc can be considered a desirable outcome for Europe as a whole, Federal Germany is likely to benefit most from this due to its geographical and economic position and will be able to take significant steps forward in its struggle to take its natural place in Europe.

In this situation, it is easy to understand that some European countries will only be able to accept this outcome, which Europe can expect from the Conference as a whole, to varying degrees. I believe we need to try to determine Türkiye's long-term interests within the framework of this possible change in balance.

6 – Türkiye's goal is to try to maintain the strongest possible ties with an increasingly powerful European Union. However, Türkiye faces two problems with this policy, which is necessary for security: it seems unlikely that European Union will achieve the desired stability. On the other hand, given that Türkiye is geographically distant from Western Europe and is in a "périphérique" position in Europe, we also feel that the ties established between Türkiye and Western Europe will need to be reinforced with other measures to ensure security. Given that the main problem in Turkish foreign policy is the pressure and danger created by Russia's proximity, strengthening Germany in Central Europe as much as possible could constitute a welcome political development insofar as it alleviates the pressure on Türkiye. According to the only constant geopolitical factor, we believe that the presence of a strong Germany in Central Europe is in Türkiye's interests. It can be said that this is "to a certain extent" true even for the Eastern European countries, which share the same regime but face the problem of independence from Russia under today's political conditions, despite the memories of World War II. In the foreseeable future, the pressures threatening independence for all these countries, and for Türkiye as well, will come not from Germany, but from the nuclear superpower Soviet Union.

It is possible to think that Germany's strengthening and a gradual "disengagement" in Eastern Europe could be a development that would benefit Türkiye the most compared to other Western group countries and give a new dimension to our security policy.

Therefore, the success of the efforts to achieve results at the Conference that will contribute to this goal is of particular importance to us due to our geographical situation.

Given that Türkiye is still a developing country, there are certain specific difficulties in fully participating in these efforts: our country cannot completely open its doors to "the exchange of information and ideas, and the free movement of people" in order to protect itself against destructive activities. However, we must consider that, generally speaking, our criteria, taking into account that the acceptable outcome of the Eastern Bloc is already very limited, it is in our interest to persistently support these initiatives in certain cases, as they will contribute to developments that are politically very important for us, I believe.

We will be able to contribute to the realization of developments in this direction by extending the relations we have established with Romania today to other Eastern European countries when the time comes. Given that the Soviet Union occupies large parts of two continents, the Asia-Europe political balance must be considered as a whole today, for the reasons mentioned above, we must also bear in mind that China's diplomatic activities in Eastern Europe and even our political ties with China could play a major role in creating this new balance.

7 – Even before preparatory work has begun, the Soviet Government is coming to the Conference as the winner of the first round. Acceptance of the status quo is essentially a foregone conclusion at this point. Russians, along with a commitment that could give greater certainty to this issue, will push for the acceptance of a few principles formulated in "vague" terms and demand that this matter be concluded as soon as possible. It is expected that they will not compromise on matters of principle, striving to keep their allies in line with strict discipline in this venture, which is vital to their interests. Since we do not know how the West intends to establish the connection it deems necessary between the Conference and the "MBFR" negotiations, or how the differing points of view of the allies on procedural and tactical matters will be reconciled, I will confine myself to touching on a few points in this regard. After the status quo issue was addressed before the public, it would be very difficult to effectively discuss and conclude the principles that Europe wanted to accept and the "confidence-building measures" in the military sphere. After presenting the idea of "accepting the current situation" to the European public opinion, it cannot be expected that Russians would make concessions on other issues. Accordingly, the West must put forward a *détente* philosophy that logically links the acceptance and maintenance of the current situation in Europe to the acceptance of certain principles and "freedoms," ensuring that the conference topics are continuously and openly reflected within this framework. Public opinion must be able to see, if not primarily, then at least simultaneously, the other side's evasive stance regarding the partial acceptance of freedoms, rather than the West's resistance to the acceptance of the "current boundaries" in the negotiations. Apart from the issue of a certain increase in economic exchanges, the demands of the West are contrary to the vital interests of the Soviet Union. In this situation, since it is possible and probably not easy to accept definitive principles that are not "vague" the positive outcome we can expect from the Conference is that the concepts put forward by the West will take root in

people's minds through effective propaganda, gradually creating an atmosphere that will make it increasingly difficult for events such as the military intervention in Czechoslovakia to recur. Under these conditions, the tactic for the West to follow might be to try to prolong the meetings and discussions as much as possible.

Otherwise, even if the preparatory meetings soon reach an impasse and fail, this could still constitute a diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union. We can assume that some countries belonging to West Group will not be overly upset by such an outcome. During the talks, it is certainly a frightening possibility that some others, considering that the Soviet Union should not be overly "irritated," may appear inclined to accept compromise formulas that would render the principles important to the West meaningless. Certainly, some of the Western countries, individually, will occasionally be unable to refrain from certain behaviours they see as necessitated by their bilateral relations with Russia, partly due to the influence of competition.

Despite all the preparations to be made, there is a risk of getting stuck on slippery ground in the initial stages, in line with the initial concept on this matter, we believe that it may be prudent to conduct preparatory work in a fully closed and "confidential" manner, to limit minutes to very brief summaries, and to organize meetings in a way that allows for a broad exchange of ideas.

8 – Since the matter of Mediterranean has been analyzed in all its aspects in the document dated 18 July 1972 distributed by the relevant department of our Ministry at the European Conference, we would like to mention only one point on this subject. The neutral countries in the Mediterranean have been able to maintain their neutrality games under the protection of the shield provided by Türkiye as a member of NATO, yet they have not refrained from accusing Türkiye of being a "military bloc member." We sense that they feel compelled to look more closely at the stark realities of security in light of developments that will lead to a dangerous shift in the balance of power in Europe. Already filled with anxiety, they are putting forward some tentative ideas. Since the subject is not amenable to propaganda, it is doubtful that these initiatives will yield beneficial results. In our normal diplomatic contacts in these countries, making the security problems raised by the European Conference a subject of continuous discussion could be very beneficial in paving the way for more serious behaviour and initiatives in the future.

9 – While we have no information about the latest developments regarding the tactics that Western countries will pursue, we believe that we must take into account that political developments in the coming weeks could change many things: Developments in Soviet-US bilateral relations as a result of Nixon's visit to Moscow, events such as the holding or postponement of 10s' summit meeting, decisions taken if the meeting of the 10s is held, the stance of individual countries and, consequently, the identified tactics will inevitably have an impact on their implementation, if nothing else. On the one hand, the problems between West-Europe and the US, and on the other hand, between the members of the Western Alliance, have not been resolved yet. Therefore, it seems somewhat doubtful and probably difficult that the West will be able to come to the negotiations in two months' time under the current conditions, with a propaganda strategy based on Article 7 and a credible détente philosophy. No matter how meticulously prepared the proposals

and demands to be put forward in closed meetings and the tactics to be followed may be, for the reasons stated above, there is a possibility that the principles and views to be put forward will be turned into “vague statements” at the negotiating table. Given that the Eastern Bloc has already secured most of what it wanted so far and is unlikely to compromise on issues that harm its interests, we can perhaps expect more benefits from the Conference in the long term, in terms of the impact it will have on European public opinion, than from the negotiations themselves.<sup>5</sup>

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5 For all the Turkish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2919](https://dodis.ch/C2919).



[dodis.ch/77040](http://dodis.ch/77040)

European Community

*Proposal to the European Commission for a Position of the European Communities  
(Political Principles)<sup>1</sup>*

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Secret

Brussels, 9 October 1972

*Introduction*

1. For some time, the Commission has participated in part of the preparatory work carried out within the framework of political cooperation in view of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Since this work constituted a whole requiring reflection within an overall framework, it covered both Community and non-Community matters. However, it has always been understood among all participants in political cooperation that, at the appropriate time, matters relating to areas of Community competence would be transferred to the Community framework and dealt with by the Community institutions according to their own rules, in order to reach conclusions of the Council adopted on a proposal from the Commission. By defining its position in this way, the Community will at the same time create a more solid and coherent basis for the action of the Member States in other forums also engaged in preparatory work for the CSCE.
2. Following the guidelines established by the political cooperation bodies during the overall work, with the participation of the Commission, the latter proposes that the Council adopt the conclusions set out below, as well as those contained in the document concerning the "economic cooperation" section (Document SEC(72) 3304/4),<sup>2</sup> as elements of the common position in view of the CSCE for matters falling within the Community's field of competence. These may be supplemented depending on the progress of the work.

The multilateral preparatory phase of the CSCE will probably begin at the end of November. The Community's position must therefore be defined and made operational in time, which would also make it possible to assert the Community's position in subsequent political cooperation of work, and in other forums.

<sup>1</sup> Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), CEUE\_SEGE-SEC(1972) 3304 final. *Translated from French. This communication (Copy No. 33) comes from the archives of the Secretariat of the European Commission (Registry Service). This document consists of a confidential communication addressed to the Council and concerns the Commission's position regarding the CSCE.*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. HAEU, CEUE\_SEGE-SEC(1972)3304.

## II. Principles that must Guide the Community's attitude

3. The Community, in its current reality and in its future development, represents a politically and economically essential entity for European cooperation and security. It can therefore play a constructive role in the effort to organize closer cooperation between countries with different social systems, which is the objective of the CSCE.

The positions to be adopted by the Community in preparation for the CSCE and at the Conference itself must therefore be open positions, based on mutual advantage, which implies the need for appropriate reciprocity.

4. This general approach, which underpins the proposals contained in the document on the cooperation aspect, may encounter resistance from the Soviet Union and its allies. Despite some easing this year of its traditionally negative position, the Soviet Union continues to ignore the Community.

Considering the various possibilities, it is already possible to establish principles that must guide the attitude of the Community and the Member States towards this policy. The utmost clarity is required in this respect, so that there can be no ambiguity about the determination of the Member States to defend, in their relations with Eastern countries and at the CSCE, the policies implemented by the Community and to uphold the political and legal commitments they have undertaken in favour of European integration. As regards the common commercial policy, the Council already adopted in 1969 the rules that will apply, from 1 January 1973.

5. The normalization of relations between the Community and the Eastern countries must be one of the outcomes of the CSCE. This means that bilateral relations should develop between the Community and the Eastern countries on the same basis as those that have long existed between the Community and other third countries. The development of such relations is an essential element of the normalisation in Europe sought by the Conference. The Community and the Member States must adopt an attitude capable of encouraging, as far as possible, such development.

However, it is excluded that the Member States should pay any economic or political price for this. In any case, acceptance of the Community cannot be a subject of negotiation, and even less a form of compensation. The Community exists independently of this "non-recognition," and it neither requests nor needs to request recognition from the Warsaw Pact countries.<sup>3</sup>

6. The Community must participate in the work of the CSCE for all matters falling within its field of competence. This is required not only because of the legal obligations arising from the Treaty of Rome,<sup>4</sup> but also to make the integration policy of the Member States convincing and credible. If the

<sup>3</sup> *Warsaw Pact, (May 14, 1955–July 1, 1991) treaty establishing a mutual-defence organisation (Warsaw Treaty Organisation, [dodis.ch/R14957](http://dodis.ch/R14957)) composed originally of the Soviet Union and Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania (Albania withdrew in 1968, and East Germany did so in 1990).*

<sup>4</sup> *Two treaties were signed on 25 March 1957 – the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, [dodis.ch/R9899](http://dodis.ch/R9899), and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, [dodis.ch/R9898](http://dodis.ch/R9898).*

Soviet Union and its allies were to show reluctance in this regard, a firm stance must be maintained. Should Eastern countries refuse to deal with the Community, the Member States must exclude from the CSCE agenda all subjects falling within the Community's competence.

The modalities of this participation by the Community will be decided at the appropriate time.

7. The differences in conception, structure, and competences between the Community and COMECON<sup>5</sup> are such that it hardly seems possible at present to establish any analogy between the two institutions. The issue at stake is therefore that of relations between the Community and the Eastern countries, and this issue cannot be resolved by establishing relations between the EEC and COMECON. As long as this problem remains unresolved, the Community must neither take the initiative nor accept any suggestions from the Soviet Union aimed at opening relations with COMECON.
8. The Community and the Member States must ensure that they do not encourage deeper integration within the Eastern bloc that would strengthen the Soviet Union's hold over the other people's democracies. To this end and given that Western countries have limited ability to influence processes within the socialist system, the policy outlined above towards COMECON appears the most appropriate. This is particularly so if it is combined with a constructive position, based on mutual advantage, regarding the economic cooperation aspect of the CSCE – one that is likely to encourage the various people's democracies to diversify their current external economic relations.
9. It cannot be ruled out that the Soviet Union and its allies may attempt, during the CSCE or in their bilateral relations with Member States, to organize cooperation in such a way as to hinder the Community – either by imposing narrow limits on the Community competences they are prepared to accept, by emphasizing the supposed advantages of pan-European cooperation between states, or by seeking to obtain indirectly a right of oversight over Community affairs. Any such initiative must be rejected by the Member States.

This applies to the question of creating permanent bodies following the CSCE. Since the Conference itself will not be able to organize concrete cooperation or to begin negotiations as such, the question of follow-up to the Conference will certainly arise. The Member States will need to exercise great caution regarding the role and mandate of such possible bodies.

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<sup>5</sup> The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, often abbreviated as COMECON [dodis.ch/R11549](https://dodis.ch/R11549), was an economic organisation from 1949 to 1991 under the leadership of the Soviet Union that comprised the countries of the Eastern Bloc along with a number of communist states elsewhere in the world.

The Community's freedom of action and autonomy must be fully safeguarded. Preference should be given to existing institutions, notably the ECE.<sup>6</sup> Beyond this, Member States should only indicate their willingness to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the possibility of creating bodies with a purely technical purpose and a clearly defined mandate.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, [dodis.ch/R1871](https://dodis.ch/R1871), is one of the five regional economic commissions reporting to the UN Economic and Social Council, [dodis.ch/R218](https://dodis.ch/R218).

<sup>7</sup> For all documents of the European Community in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2912](https://dodis.ch/C2912).

[dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487)

Switzerland

*Proposal from the Federal Political Department to the Federal Council<sup>1</sup>*SWITZERLAND AND THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE)*Extract • Confidential*

Bern, 1 November 1972

[...]<sup>2</sup>*II. Swiss policy on the CSCE since 1970<sup>3</sup>**a) Bilateral preparatory contacts*

Preparation through bilateral consultations played a more important role in the CSCE than is usual at international conferences. This is hardly surprising, since the initiative launched by the Warsaw Pact states concerns the crucial area of European political balance. Too ambitious and ambiguous not to be received with caution by the West and too vague from the start to form a basis for negotiation, the proposal from the Eastern countries required in-depth reflection on the intentions of the USSR and its allies, on the advisability of initiating an East–West dialogue through a multilateral conference, and then, once the advisability had been accepted, on how to organise this dialogue.

At first sporadic, our bilateral consultations with other interested countries have intensified since 1970 as the situation described at the beginning of this report has evolved. The CSCE has been on the agenda of almost all the talks held by the Head of the Political Department with his counterparts abroad: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden.<sup>4</sup> As these talks also focused largely on our

<sup>1</sup> Swiss Federal Archives CH-BAR#E1004.1#1000/9#788\*. Translated from French. This proposition has been written by Blaise Schenk, [dodis.ch/P15229](https://dodis.ch/P15229), responsible within the Federal Political Department (FPD) for the European Security Conference, and signed by the Head of the FPD, Federal Councillor Pierre Graber, [dodis.ch/P4171](https://dodis.ch/P4171). In accordance with the proposal, the Federal Council decided at its meeting on 8 November 1972 that: "Switzerland will take part in the preliminary multilateral consultations due to begin on 22 November 1972 in Helsinki with a view to preparing for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe." For this decision No. 2011, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487). This document was also published in French in: *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS)*, vol. 25, doc. 172, [dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487).

<sup>2</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 22, [dodis.ch/34499](https://dodis.ch/34499).

<sup>4</sup> For the talks of Federal Councillor Graber with foreign ministers Rudolf Kirchschläger, [dodis.ch/P15488](https://dodis.ch/P15488); Pierre Harmel, [dodis.ch/P15124](https://dodis.ch/P15124); Väinö Leskinen, [dodis.ch/P15439](https://dodis.ch/P15439); Maurice Schumann, [dodis.ch/P7260](https://dodis.ch/P7260); Alec Douglas-Home, [dodis.ch/P13965](https://dodis.ch/P13965); Gaston Thorn, [dodis.ch/P15471](https://dodis.ch/P15471); Joseph Luns, [dodis.ch/P14246](https://dodis.ch/P14246); Walter Scheel, [dodis.ch/P15413](https://dodis.ch/P15413), and Torsten Nielsson, [dodis.ch/P13823](https://dodis.ch/P13823), cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 156, [dodis.ch/34494](https://dodis.ch/34494).

negotiations with the European Community, we were able to demonstrate that Switzerland's European policy is not directed exclusively towards the West, but towards Europe as a whole.

Our bilateral contacts at the level of the Secretary-General of the Political Department were also valuable in preparing for the CSCE: Austria, Finland, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Italy, as well as Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and the USSR.<sup>5</sup> One of the benefits of visiting the capitals of Eastern Europe was that it confirmed our view of the diversity of these countries' concerns, their desire to move closer to the West within the limits permitted to them, and their intention to use the CSCE for this purpose in the long term.

Finally, 1972 saw the emergence of a new form of consultation, which had become necessary due to the increasingly specialised nature of the issues raised by the CSCE: discussions at senior official level, led on the Swiss side in almost all cases by the Legal Advisor of the Political Department. This enabled us to hold talks with CSCE specialists from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Spain, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and Yugoslavia.<sup>6</sup> The specific advantage of such meetings was that they allowed us to discuss certain issues in detail, in particular our plan for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the organisation of the CSCE's preparatory phase (see below). In addition, we had the opportunity to establish personal contacts with those whom the Swiss delegation will inevitably meet again in Helsinki and perhaps even beyond the preliminary phase; these contacts are all the more useful given that the CSCE is the kind of conference whose outcome is also decided behind the scenes.

Our bilateral exchanges of views at all levels and in all directions have been indispensable. Without them, we would now be faced not only with a lack of information, but also with the impossible task of sketching out an overall concept for the CSCE and, above all, with isolation, which is a particular threat to the neutral and non-aligned European countries at a time of peaceful confrontation between the two blocs' security policies. We have, of course, held close consultations with the neutral countries, but we have also had to accept the obvious fact that the real laboratory of the CSCE lies elsewhere. In fact, almost all of the Western preparations for the Conference are being coordinated within the appropriate bodies of NATO<sup>7</sup> and the European Community<sup>8</sup> (the CSCE is, moreover, the issue on which consultation has yielded the most positive results within the Political Cooperation Committee of the Nine, formerly known as the Davignon Committee). However, thanks to ongoing bilateral contacts, we have been able to keep up to speed with their work; the Federal Republic of Germany, which is at the heart of

5 For the talks of Secretary-General of the FPD Ernesto Thalmann, [dodis.ch/P997](https://dodis.ch/P997), with his counterparts from Austria, Finland, Sweden and Italy, cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 156, [dodis.ch/34494](https://dodis.ch/34494); on his contacts with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia, cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 157, [dodis.ch/34496](https://dodis.ch/34496). On the visit by Thalmann's predecessor Pierre Micheli, [dodis.ch/P86](https://dodis.ch/P86), in Moscow in January 1971, cf. [dodis.ch/35577](https://dodis.ch/35577).

6 For the various meetings attended by Rudolf Bindschedler, [dodis.ch/P1396](https://dodis.ch/P1396), and other senior officials of the FPD, cf. the file CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1982/58#431\* (B.72.09.15.1).

7 Cf. QdD 30, doc. 35, [dodis.ch/76986](https://dodis.ch/76986).

8 Cf. QdD 30, doc. 30, [dodis.ch/77040](https://dodis.ch/77040).

the MBFR issue, has declared its willingness to keep us regularly informed on this subject;<sup>9</sup> Italy is playing the same role with regard to the activities of the former Davignon Committee, where it has championed our project for the peaceful settlement of disputes<sup>10</sup> (this collaboration on CSCE matters has been seen by both sides as a welcome distraction from the labour issues that tend to dominate Italian-Swiss relations).<sup>11</sup> Finally, all these bilateral contacts have been instrumental in publicising our project for the peaceful settlement of disputes and thus ensuring its Swiss authorship, commenting on it and gathering valuable feedback for the next stages of the process.

*b) Internal preparations for the CSCE*

The work of the Political Department has so far focused mainly on developing a draft system for the peaceful settlement of disputes (abbreviated to SPSPD). As will be seen below, the field of peaceful dispute settlement is particularly well suited to an initiative from Switzerland. This does not mean that we underestimate the importance and possibilities of our country's participation in other areas of the CSCE: economic, cultural and even military.<sup>12</sup> However, we felt it preferable in the immediate term, i.e. with a view to the preliminary multilateral talks on the CSCE, to concentrate our efforts on a proposal of a political and legal nature. This has the merit of being the only concrete suggestion made to date to flesh out the "security" aspect of the Conference, which is the most important in our view.

We will always be able to intervene in the debate on economic cooperation when the time comes; moreover, our bilateral contacts have shown us that most states have not yet explored this aspect of the CSCE in any depth. The Trade Division of the Department of Economic Affairs has undertaken studies on this subject and will express its views in due course.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, we have established regular cooperation with the Group of General Staff Services of the Military Department, which is currently examining what Switzerland's position might be on a possible military component of the CSCE.<sup>14</sup> In any case, those aspects of the Conference that fall more specifically within the remit of other departments of the Federal Administration will be examined in detail in the report to be submitted to the Federal Council with a view to Switzerland's participation in the CSCE itself.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the minutes of the meetings between a delegation from the FDP and the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn on 7 and 8 June 1972, [dodis.ch/77676](https://dodis.ch/77676), as well as of the meeting between Federal Councillor Graber and the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Walter Scheel, [dodis.ch/P15413](https://dodis.ch/P15413), on 28 September 1972, [dodis.ch/36950](https://dodis.ch/36950).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. the minutes of the meetings between a delegation from the FDP at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome on 20 and 21 July 1972, [dodis.ch/36259](https://dodis.ch/36259), as well as of an Italian delegation's visit in Bern on 23 September 1972, [dodis.ch/77677](https://dodis.ch/77677).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 177, [dodis.ch/35595](https://dodis.ch/35595).

<sup>12</sup> For a summary of Switzerland's position on the various issues raised by the Security Conference, cf. QdD 30, doc. 22, [dodis.ch/34499](https://dodis.ch/34499).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 174, [dodis.ch/34571](https://dodis.ch/34571).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 92, [dodis.ch/34573](https://dodis.ch/34573).



*System for the peaceful settlement of disputes (SPSD)*<sup>15</sup>

The general considerations in favour of a Swiss initiative in this area can be summarised as follows:

- having decided to participate in the CSCE, Switzerland has a duty to assert its presence there;
- our country has a tradition and experience in the peaceful settlement of disputes that make it particularly well suited to such an initiative;
- as the principle of peaceful dispute settlement is universally recognised, our initiative does not call into question our neutrality;
- as international relations today are marked by a certain decline in the rule of law in favour of “Realpolitik”, a small state such as ours must not miss the opportunity offered by the CSCE to reaffirm the primacy of law over force;
- Since the “security” aspect of the Conference has produced only vague and ambiguous proposals, it is desirable to introduce a concrete element that would enable the debate on European security to be steered in a clear and precise direction.

It is this last point that we have developed in the preamble to our draft (see text appended to this report).<sup>16</sup> If the CSCE were to produce a solemn declaration on the renunciation of the use of force, it would add nothing new in terms of security, since this principle is already set out in the UN Charter and is part of general international law. We believe that the CSCE should try to go a step further by giving concrete expression to the concept of renunciation of force through a dynamic mechanism that takes into account of new problems that may arise in Europe (whereas the principle itself is by definition static). We therefore envisage a system that combines two modes of peaceful dispute settlement: on the one hand, arbitration for the resolution of disputes concerning the interpretation of existing law (justiciable disputes) and, on the other hand, institutionalised negotiation for the resolution of disputes requiring a change to existing law (non-justiciable disputes). These two modes of settlement correspond to two bodies with distinct characteristics: an arbitral tribunal for justiciable conflicts and, for non-justiciable conflicts, a commission of inquiry, mediation and conciliation. In the event of a dispute, recourse to one of the two procedures should be mandatory for states that have acceded to the system, unless they have been able to agree on another mode of settlement. The ruling handed down by the arbitral tribunal should also be binding on the parties to the dispute, whereas the final report of the commission of inquiry can only be optional, since there is currently no supranational authority capable of imposing a new law on a sovereign state.

Since the beginning of the year, we have kept neutral states informed of our preparations for the SPSP. Subsequently, our ambassadors were instructed to verbally inform all states expected to participate in the CSCE.<sup>17</sup> At present, most of them are in possession of the draft text. The reactions to our initiative can be broadly divided into three categories:

<sup>15</sup> Cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/T1874](https://dodis.ch/T1874).

<sup>16</sup> For the draft proposal for a European system for the peaceful settlement of disputes of 5 April 1972, cf. [dodis.ch/34505](https://dodis.ch/34505), and the facsimile [dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. the circular by Secretary-General Thalmann to the Swiss embassies of 9 May 1972, [dodis.ch/77678](https://dodis.ch/77678).

– the majority of states approve both the content of the draft and the appropriateness of submitting it to the CSCE; they see the SPSP as a necessary test to reveal whether or not there is a willingness among participants to agree on common rules; although our idea has little chance of being realised in the current political and legal context, they nevertheless agree with us that, convinced of the soundness of this idea, we must demonstrate our conviction by working tirelessly towards its realisation;

– some states, particularly the Anglo-Saxon ones, approve of the content and tactical appropriateness of the draft, but raise objections of form: For example, the fact that the arbitration procedure we have envisaged may compete with that of the International Court of Justice; the fact that we do not intend to limit the jurisdiction of the two bodies by means of reservations regarding the nature and origin of disputes;

– a minority of states, mainly those in Eastern Europe, but also some Western states, consider that the draft fails to take account of the fundamental antinomy between “Western” international law and “socialist” law and that it is therefore questionable in terms of both its content and its form; It is easy to counter this objection by pointing out that the very aim of the CSCE is to overcome the division of Europe into two political and legal systems and that Switzerland will certainly not be minded to make a proposal that would perpetuate this division.

The states that examined our draft most closely did not fail to raise issues to which we have not yet provided answers: for example, the minimum number of accessions required for the system to enter into force, the relationship between the two procedures, and the composition of the two bodies. We replied that all these issues, as well as the procedural questions mentioned above, would have to be discussed at a later stage, at the CSCE itself, and that it would be premature to seek a solution to them at the preparatory stage of the Conference. Our immediate concern is to ensure that our proposal is included in general terms on the Conference agenda (see next chapter).<sup>18</sup>

#### *Free movement of persons, ideas and information*

Liberal and open to the world, Switzerland is in favour of increased exchange of people and ideas between the various parts of Europe. A tentative move in this direction has recently been observed: the CSCE must try to encourage this by increasing and diversifying the forms of dialogue. As far as we are concerned, it is difficult to take initiatives in the field of human and cultural contacts, while Western countries, especially France, intend to emphasise this aspect of East-West relations.<sup>19</sup> We may be able to support some of their proposals, provided they do not arouse the mistrust of the Eastern countries. We must bear in mind that progress in this area requires maximum patience and caution: given the current attitudes of the Kremlin leaders and the balance of power between the USSR and its allies, the emancipation of the latter depends on the goodwill of Moscow, whose tolerance margin is very narrow. The aim is therefore to encourage the Eastern European countries to make use of this margin — which they will try to do themselves —

<sup>18</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 34, [dodis.ch/76975](https://dodis.ch/76975).

but without giving the impression that the liberalisation desired by the West is directed against the USSR.

From our point of view, improving the movement of persons takes priority over the exchange of information and ideas. We are thinking in particular of the sometimes tragic situations caused by the political division of Europe: separation of spouses and fiancés, separation of parents and children, etc. We therefore wonder whether Switzerland, which is well placed in this regard, should not draw the CSCE's attention to the problem of family reunification and possibly make suggestions in this regard, from an essentially humanitarian perspective.

[...] <sup>20</sup>

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**20** For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487). For the beginning of the preliminary consultations, cf. the statement of Swiss Ambassador in Helsinki, Samuel François Campiche, [dodis.ch/P1323](https://dodis.ch/P1323), of 1 December 1972, [dodis.ch/34497](https://dodis.ch/34497); the telegram from the Swiss Embassy in Helsinki to the FPD of 7 December 1972, [dodis.ch/34498](https://dodis.ch/34498), and the minutes of the meeting of the CSCE Working Group held on 19 December 1972, [dodis.ch/34501](https://dodis.ch/34501). For all Swiss documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2935](https://dodis.ch/C2935).

[dodis.ch/76974](https://dodis.ch/76974)

NATO

*Report by the Chairman of the Political Committee at Senior Level Kastl<sup>1</sup>*

STEERING BRIEF FOR THE MULTILATERAL PREPARATORY TALKS  
(AND THE CSCE)

NATO Confidential<sup>2</sup>

Brussels, 7 November 1972

Attached at Annex is the proposed Steering Brief for the multilateral conversations concerned with preparations for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as foreseen in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Bonn Communiqué.

2. The Steering Brief is based on the United Kingdom draft of 21<sup>st</sup> July as well as on the contributions and comments made by other delegations during discussions in the Political Committee<sup>3</sup> at senior level.

3. Most delegations believe that it would be useful if consideration of the Steering Brief can be concluded and the document itself approved, if possible, by the Council,<sup>4</sup> before the multilateral preparatory talks begin at Helsinki. A number of delegations are also of the view that the Steering Brief, being of major importance, would be appropriate for consideration by Ministers at their meeting in December.<sup>5</sup>

*Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks (and the CSCE)*

1. The Steering Brief is intended to assist the national representatives of the Allied countries during the multilateral preparatory talks at Helsinki [and also at a CSCE itself] [if it is agreed to hold such a conference].<sup>6</sup> The eventual wording of many parts of the Brief must depend upon the nature of agreements yet to be reached within the Alliance on a number of individual topics. Account will also need to be taken of the positions adopted by other prospective participants in

1 NATO Archives (NA), North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)67, IS-CHRONO-462. The original of this document is in English and has been publicly disclosed. This report was signed by NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, Jörg Kastl, [dodis.ch/P80335](https://dodis.ch/P80335). It is part of a chronological series of documents issued by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), known with the NATO Reference "C". The NATO Reference "M" refers to Memoranda documents. These documents are organized by year, in this case 1972 as noted in the parenthetical. This is the 67<sup>th</sup> NAC Memoranda issued in 1972.

2 NATO Confidential is used to mark documents containing information that would be demining to NATO if disclosed without authorization.

3 The Political Committee is made of representatives of each delegation to discuss political developments and provide recommendations and consultation to the NAC and Secretary-General.

4 The NAC which acts as the principal decision-making authority of the Alliance.

5 Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Records Chronological Series, C-R(72)60, 15th January 1973, IS-CHRONO-490, and NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Verbatim Records Chronological Series, C-VR(72)60, 7th December 1972, IS-ROOM16-1467.

6 Square brackets were added by hand in the original.

the talks, as these become known. Moreover, Allied negotiators should be left a reasonable degree of flexibility. In sum, the Steering Brief is not intended to be the last word on how the Allied governments should conduct themselves in the CSCE context. Each Government will of course have to make its own decisions; the Brief is intended to be a guide, not a rule.

#### *Soviet Aims*

2. It is reasonable to assume that the USSR has a genuine political interest in bringing about a general relaxation of tension vis-à-vis the West (1) to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war, (2) to secure its Western flank in case of trouble in the East and (3) to achieve, if possible, some greater degree of flexibility in the allocation of domestic resources. Properly prepared, a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should constitute an important factor in the process of reducing tension. It should help to eliminate obstacles to closer relations and co-operation among the participants while maintaining the security of all. However, since the idea of an “all-European conference” originated with the Soviet Union, and since the Alliance is in effect reacting to a proposal of the Warsaw Pact,<sup>7</sup> the Allies need first to examine what the motives were for putting it forward.

3. Some of the original Soviet aims may well have changed since the sixties, and others may, at least partly, have been met. Thus in continuing in 1972 to demand a Conference, the Soviets may to some extent be the prisoners of their past policies and priorities. This consideration underlines the need for a flexible Alliance strategy in the multilateral preparatory talks and at the Conference.

4. Even if the German-Soviet and German-Polish Treaties and the Berlin Agreement have to some extent met Russian demands to “formalize” the status quo in Europe, the first Russian objective probably remains to set the seal on what they call the “results of the Second World War”, and further entrench the stability of the Soviet system. The Russians would thus hope to obtain formal acceptance by all European countries and the US and Canada of:

- a) the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe;
- b) the inviolability of present frontiers; and
- c) the permanence of the division of Germany as guaranteed by the full acceptance of the GDR as a sovereign state.

5. Other important Soviet objectives are:

- a) to promote rapprochement and co-operation with the West under conditions which would best suit the Soviet aim of enhancing their political, economic and social system;
- b) to generate an atmosphere of détente which would weaken the West’s determination to maintain effective arrangements for its defence;

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<sup>7</sup> *Annotation in the original:* Contained in the “Bucharest Declaration” of 1966 and repeated subsequently, notably in the “Budapest Appeal” of March 1969.

- c) to undermine the trans-Atlantic link, with the particular aim of encouraging the progressive withdrawal of US troops;
- d) to weaken the Alliance by undermining belief in its usefulness, by pressing for the “abolition of blocs”, and by advocating a new security system;
- e) to gain, in the more political atmosphere of a CSCE, advantages in the fields of trade, science and technology etc., which they have not been able to secure bilaterally or through negotiations in the Economic Commission for Europe;
- f) to exert influence over the policies of Western countries with a view to making them more accommodating, and to oppose the drive, towards greater economic and political integration in Western Europe by insisting on the idea of “all-European co-operation”;
- g) to set up, at a CSCE, a permanent body of all the states taking part, but one which would function largely in a West European context.

6. Those East European countries which are members of the Warsaw Pact may be expected to follow the Soviet lead at a Conference even though they may not necessarily attach the same importance to all of the objectives listed in paragraph 5 above. This would not, of course, preclude these countries from attempting to modify the terms of certain of the proposals under discussion to make them more compatible with their own particular national interests.

#### *Western Aims*

7. Western aims at a Conference must be partly positive and partly negative. It would be wrong for the West to take up a defensive attitude in its approach to the Conference or to appear anything but constructive. It is therefore as well to set out the positive aims first. These are:

- a) to secure genuine improvements in reducing the barriers within Europe, especially by promoting freer movement of persons, information and ideas and by developing co-operation in its various aspects between Eastern and Western Europe;
- b) to achieve appropriate confidence-building measures [and a joint declaration on mutual and balanced measures relating to the levels of armed forces in Europe];<sup>8</sup> and
- c) to increase, at least to some extent, the freedom of manoeuvre of the East European countries vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by reducing the scope for the application in practice of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” of limited sovereignty.

8. Western defensive aims are the converse of the Soviet aims set out in paragraph 5 above. They are:

- a) to maintain unity, on which Western security chiefly depends;

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8 *Square brackets added by hand in the original.*

- b) to seek to avoid unjustified reactions that would undermine parliamentary and public support in Allied countries for necessary defensive efforts;
- c) to persuade Western public opinion of the need for caution at the Conference and for a balance of mutual advantage to be struck in whatever emerges from it;
- d) to frustrate any attempt to slow down or prejudice the movement towards Western European integration; and
- e) to refute the Soviet concept that peaceful co-existence is not inconsistent with an unremitting ideological struggle [or with efforts to subvert non-Communist states]<sup>9</sup> and to maintain that all the principles of equality between states and non-interference in internal affairs must apply to relations between states with the same political and social systems.

9. In general, the Allied countries should attempt to go beyond the solemn reaffirmation of general precepts that are already widely accepted as essential to the orderly conduct of international relations and attempt to achieve some tangible progress through specific understandings on concrete issues even though these may be difficult to negotiate. Careful preparations will thus be indispensable to a satisfactory outcome.

10. At this juncture it is hard to judge which countries are likely to do better at a Conference. The Eastern countries have the advantage of greater internal discipline, and the power to appeal over the heads of governments to Western public opinion. On the other hand the Western countries exercise an attraction and dynamism through their political system and economic achievements. The Western countries can be more easily divided and thus weakened among themselves, but in the long run they may run lesser risks in going to a Conference.

11. The Allied countries will not enter upon the talks with positions that are identical in every detail, and the Soviets will, of course, attempt to play upon the differences which exist and to exploit them to their own advantage. The Allied countries should thus consult closely during the talks in order to limit Soviet opportunities for tactical manoeuvres of this kind.

#### *Tactics for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks*

12. The views of the Allies about how to handle the Conference itself must affect their tactics at the multilateral preparatory talks. The Western countries need so far as possible to stake out the issues for discussion at the multilateral preparatory talks and at the Conference in their own terms. The Russians must not be allowed to impose their definition of the object of the Conference and thus the criteria by which its success will be judged. This requires the West to take a firm line, but one which at the same time allows for flexibility in order to exploit the possibilities for progress which may exist. Constructive proposals addressed to specific problems will be an essential element of this approach. Western countries must seek to ensure that problems at issue are discussed in an unprovocative but businesslike way.

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9 Square brackets added by hand in the original.



13. In drawing up their proposals and formulating their attitudes, the Western countries must take particular account of the different attitudes of the East European countries. This will not be easy. The West should be careful not to seek blatantly to drive wedges between Soviet and East European positions. The latter in any event vary from one country to another. The East Europeans will almost certainly exaggerate the possible benefits which they will claim for their ideas and proposals. On some occasions they will be used as stalking horses by the Russians. On others they may calculate that any change in the situation could only benefit them. Western countries should not bend their own fundamental requirements to meet East European wishes, although they should show themselves sympathetic to their aspirations.

14. The positions of the neutral and non-aligned countries differ very much one from the other and they have in varying degree much greater freedom of manoeuvre than the countries of Eastern Europe. They will, however, often be under varying degrees of pressure from the East to demonstrate their neutrality by dissociating themselves from Western positions, and this might happen even in areas where their political, economic and social interests put them clearly on the Western side of the fence. It will be necessary to keep in close touch with them and to take account of their initiatives; and to prevent the establishment of a neutral "bloc" finding virtue in taking positions half-way between those of East and West.

15. The Western countries should not commit themselves to East-West talks more than one step at a time, although it seems likely that once multilateral preparatory talks start there will be certain political difficulties for the West in disengaging from them. They should maintain the position that progress towards a Conference and success at it will depend upon obtaining mutual advantages at each step. They should also make it clear as necessary that they have certain security requirements on which there can be no compromise.

16. The aim of Allied Governments at the multilateral preparatory talks would be to ensure that their proposals were fully considered at a Conference and to establish that enough common ground existed among the participants to warrant reasonable expectations that a Conference would produce satisfactory results. At the minimum this means that there should be agreement on:

- a) the formulation of Agenda items in such a way as to exclude any ambiguity as to their contents;
- b) the broad purposes and terms of reference of any committees, commissions or working groups which [Ministers] might be [recommended] to set up for the detailed negotiation of Agenda items as defined in (a);
- c) procedures for the Ministerial Conference; and
- d) its date and venue.

17. [Moreover, when establishing whether the reasonable expectations of satisfactory results referred to above have been fulfilled, due consideration should also be given to whether progress has been accomplished in MBFR explorations.]<sup>10</sup>

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10 *Square brackets added by hand in the original.*

18. Both in discussion and in drafting at the multilateral preparatory phase and in bilateral discussions associated with the multilateral preparatory talks and the CSCE, the Western representatives should express their positions clearly and with appropriate vigour. The Western representatives should ensure that the terms of reference of committees, commissions or working groups [at the Conference itself]<sup>11</sup> embrace a definition of substantive negotiating objectives for each item and sub-item on the Agenda, including the issues which the Allies have identified in their Agenda papers. It is, furthermore, not necessary for all the documents emanating from the preparatory talks to be wholly agreed. Whenever full agreement cannot be reached, it would be better to have opposing views clearly set out than to compromise Western positions in advance. Nevertheless, the proceedings of the multilateral preparatory phase should be *ad referendum* until the conclusion.

19. The Allies must bear in mind the influence of procedures on substantive questions and vice versa. Preparations for a CSCE should be seen as a step-by-step process which is controlled by governments at all times and which does not follow a fixed timetable. At all times it will be important to maintain a rough balance between the discussion on items which interest the East and those which interest the West. Above all, it will be necessary to ensure that there is a balance not only in the discussion, but also in the conclusion of points which correspond to the desiderata of the various participants in order to avoid certain participants, especially the Eastern countries, from getting their points agreed first and then objecting to the Western points. But no arguments about balance should be admitted in such away as to debar Western representatives from raising at the Conference itself questions to which they attach importance.

20. The precise formulation of the Agenda needs to be studied further in the Alliance but there might be tactical advantage in the Alliance countries proposing, at least initially, an Agenda based on the following four broad areas: questions of security; principles governing relations between states: freer movement and cultural relations; economic and technological co-operation. It should be the Western position that there must be on balance favourable results for the West in each of these separate areas, subject to final review at a later stage where advantages in trade-offs between some of these areas could not be excluded. It would be wrong for the Russians to claim, for example, tangible benefits in the economic and technological field in exchange for wording in the political field which would remain a dead letter as far as they were concerned. There would therefore be advantage in keeping those subjects, e.g. trade and technological co-operation, on which the Russians will hope to get practical concessions from the West, separate from the vaguer and more political subjects, such as principles governing relations between states, on which the Russians might make paper concessions that would have no effect in reality. This division should be reflected in the terms of reference of any commissions.

21. The following paragraphs set out tentatively Western attitudes towards these four main areas for discussion at a CSCE and towards the balance between them.

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11 Square brackets added by hand in the original.

22. *Security* considerations should be a priority imperative for the Western countries during the discussion of the different Agenda items. The Eastern countries may try to argue that the problem of “security” could be dealt with at the Conference simply by the signature of a declaration the non-use of force, or perhaps a more elaborate declaration of principles. The Western countries should make it plain that security is a highly complex problem with political and military aspects. The production of a declaration (however drafted: see paragraph 24 below) would affect the root causes of tension only marginally, if at all.

23. The Western countries [could][must] also look at [certain] military aspect of the problem, but in such a way as not to prejudice the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. These aspects could include:

- a) [a Joint declaration on mutual and balanced measures relating to the levels of armed forces in Europe];
- b) confidence-building measures.

Each would have to be negotiated in detail [at the Conference]<sup>12</sup> in a commission set up for the purpose.

[None of these is likely to be of substantial military significance. But they would act as tests of political will, and would be important in terms of public opinion as the means by which Western countries could draw attention to the problem of military security in Europe and to the existing disparity between military forces of the East and West, thereby pointing out that the questions of military security are still not yet answered by a CSCE.]<sup>13</sup>

*or*

[They would help reduce political and military tensions in Europe and may thus help prepare the ground for a greater co-operation among the participants. The discussion of a joint declaration would also serve as a link between MBFR and the Conference. It is important for the Western countries to test the political will of Warsaw Pact countries in the field of MBFR and adjust accordingly their positions vis-à-vis the Conference. The two proposals would also be important in terms of public opinion as the means by which Western countries could draw attention to the problem of military security in Europe.]<sup>14</sup>

24. The negotiation of a document acceptable to all on *principles of relations between states attending a CSCE*<sup>15</sup> will be a lengthy and difficult process. Any document should take account of existing texts, e.g. the UN Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (which itself took six years to negotiate) and various bilateral statements. The West should firmly refuse to accept a Soviet text (which would undoubtedly give legitimacy to Soviet pretensions) merely in order to have a spurious “success” at the Ministerial Meeting. The achievement of a satisfactory Declaration is desirable, but it would be preferable to have no Declaration rather than one which

<sup>12</sup> Square brackets added by hand in the original.

<sup>13</sup> Square brackets added by hand in the original.

<sup>14</sup> Square brackets added by hand in the original.

<sup>15</sup> Annotation in the original: One Delegation would prefer this paragraph to appear earlier in the Steering Brief.

enunciated undesirable doctrine. The language of any agreed Declaration should be clearly incompatible with any doctrine of limited sovereignty. [Nor should the West subscribe to the Soviet thesis that any Declaration should be in legal and binding form.] Failing a Declaration, there could be a Report setting out the arguments on both sides.

25. As to the field of *freer movement and cultural relations*, freer movement is of crucial interest in and for the West and Alliance members should therefore argue for it with determination despite the known opposition of Warsaw Pact members to discussing this subject at the CSCE. Freer movement might be tackled concurrently on four separate levels:

1. first, and most importantly, as a separate Agenda item, under which specific proposals could be discussed, and thus the task of a [Conference]<sup>16</sup> commission;
2. as a subject for Ministerial statements at the Conference proper;
3. as a subject of a separate declaration or for inclusion in a Declaration of Principles;
4. in the context of any other appropriate item, as suggested in the relevant Western Briefs; however, discussion in such a context should not make it possible for others to demand that the subject be dropped as a separate Agenda item.

The Western aim should be to achieve practical improvements which will benefit not only small minorities (e.g. businessmen and scientists) but Eastern Europeans as a whole. We must not rest content only with proposals for cultural exchanges. Such proposals have value, especially if a wider concept of culture than the traditional one is generally accepted. However, they are in many cases best negotiated bilaterally and, in any case, cannot substitute for our proposals for [freer movement][freer human contacts and the broader dissemination of information].<sup>17</sup>

26. The field of *economic/technological* co-operation has the greatest number of potential items for detailed negotiation. Discussion of the economic Agenda of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe can provide an important opportunity to identify existing obstacles to international economic co-operation and to provide the impetus for practical negotiations, in bilateral or other multilateral fora, for their elimination or relaxation. Moreover, a careful subject-by-subject examination of the economic issues might open up new prospects for East/West trade, which in the recent past has made great advances. Although the positions of the Western countries on trade and economic co-operation with the Eastern countries differ in some respects, the problems they face in this regard are, by and large, identical. Consequently, it is in their interest to harmonise through flexible and pragmatic consultation their respective positions.

27. In conducting the negotiations the West should remember that in almost every case it has potentially more to give than to receive and that therefore it is in a strong bargaining position. Allied Governments should adopt a hard-headed

<sup>16</sup> Square brackets added by hand in the original.

<sup>17</sup> Square brackets added by hand in the original.

business-like attitude. As a general rule, all concessions should be justified in terms of the real advantage to be expected in equivalent counter-concessions. Without deviating from this guiding principle, the West should be aware that there is political advantage in reducing the extent of autarky both in the Soviet Union and in the CMEA countries generally, although there is a corresponding risk that they may become more efficient competitors in the process. Throughout the negotiations it will be essential not to make concessions at the expense of Western European integration.

#### *Continuing Institutions*

28. In the Prague Declaration of January 1972 the Warsaw Pact proposed to set up at a CSCE, a permanent body of all CSCE participants to ensure that joint work would continue in the aftermath of the Conference. In general, Alliance members have serious reservations concerning the establishment of such a body, but because the Warsaw Pact countries and especially the Soviet Union are likely to press strongly for their proposal, Alliance participants will probably have to accept at least to study it. It might be that some limited and non-permanent institutionalized arrangements will appear useful should progress be made at a CSCE on issues of interest to the Allies. Before any decision is taken in this respect there should be detailed consideration of the substance of the problems that might be remitted to any continuing institution. Such arrangements might have either or both of the following:

- a) to carry forward the process of negotiation;
- b) to give effect to decisions reached at the Conference.

In no circumstances should the West agree to establish continuing institutions until their terms of reference have been worked out in detail and until it is clear that they will have a genuine job to do.

29. The most appropriate place to consider such terms of reference would be in the working groups set up for detailed negotiation of Agenda items (e.g. security, economic, cultural). This would ensure that the question of permanent bodies is considered in the context of substantive issues and not in the abstract. There should not be a separate working group to examine the idea of a permanent body *per se* but, in responding to Soviet demands, that the question of a permanent organ be inscribed as a separate item on a CSCE Agenda, the Allies should propose that this matter be examined initially by the working groups in order to determine whether any permanent machinery could prove useful and, if so, precisely what tasks such machinery would carry out.

30. It is the view of the Allies that better co-operation in the context of existing international organisations, including the United Nations, could contribute to a better climate which would make the implementation of CSCE decisions easier. In any event, the West does not want a political court of appeal, which might give the Russians scope to interfere in our affairs. Rather there might be a number of institutions tailored to individual subjects. Where suitable institutions already exist, e.g. ECE,<sup>18</sup> for certain measures of technological co-operation, use should be

18 *Annotation in the original:* The GDR is not a member of the ECE.

made of them: otherwise new ad hoc institutions could be established. But they should have the minimum of bureaucratic Infrastructure. In every case it will be important to ensure both through the agreed terms of reference and through the composition and administrative arrangements for such institutions that they are suitably “balanced”. In other words the arrangements must ensure that the Western bargaining position in each case is no less strong than the Eastern one. The point could be emphasised that the new institutions are experimental in nature, and that the Allies would reserve the right to withdraw from them if they were found not to be fulfilling the purposes for which they were established.<sup>19</sup>

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**19** For all NATO documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2907](https://dodis.ch/C2907).

[dodis.ch/76730](https://dodis.ch/76730)

Finland

*Memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

[MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS COMMENCING  
ON NOVEMBER 22, 1972, AT 15.00 A.M. IN HELSINKI]

Helsinki, 9 November 1972

The bilateral consultations which the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs have so far carried out have enabled the Finnish Government to conclude that the views presented in the Finnish memorandum of November 24, 1970,<sup>2</sup> have gained extensive support and that a wide measure of understanding exists on the desirability of holding the proposed multilateral preparatory talks on questions of European Security and cooperation.

Having regard to the existing understanding the Finnish Government suggest that the Heads of Mission accredited in Helsinki of all the Governments responsible for European Security would participate in multilateral consultations commencing on November 22, 1972, at 15.00 p.m. in Helsinki. The Finnish Government would appreciate it, if information concerning names and functions of all officials to be present at these consultations would reach the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs as early as possible.

*Procedural Information<sup>3</sup>**Opening of the Multilateral Consultations*

The Consultations will be opened in Dipoli Conference Building, in Otaniemi, on November 22, 1972, at 15.00 p.m. After the opening the meeting is expected to elect its chairman and proceed to its work.

*List of Governments invited to attend the Multilateral Consultations*

Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United King-

<sup>1</sup> Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (FI-UMA), F 7B, ETYK. *Original in English. This memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is dated 9 November 1972. It is an Invitation to the Heads of missions accredited in Helsinki to negotiations on the arrangements for the European Security Conference.*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 15, [dodis.ch/76729](https://dodis.ch/76729).

<sup>3</sup> This Procedural information Document is an annex to the Finnish memorandum dated 9 November 1972, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76730](https://dodis.ch/76730).



dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia, and Finland.

*Languages*

Simultaneous interpretation services are made available in plenary meetings, upon request, in the following languages: English, French, German, Italian, Russian, and Spanish.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For all Finnish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2902](https://dodis.ch/C2902).

[dodis.ch/76975](https://dodis.ch/76975)

France

*Memorandum from the Political Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

POLITICAL COOPERATION OF THE NINE: PREPARATION OF THE CSCE

Paris, 9 November 1972

The attached documents on the preparation of the CSCE have been drawn up by the political cooperation working bodies of the Nine and, without prejudice to certain points, approved on 7 November by the Political Committee for submission to the Ministers at their meeting on 20 and 21 November. Subject to the said reservations, these documents reflect the harmonized points of view of the Nine on the CSCE itself and its preparations. In reality however, they are for the most part based on French reference documents and it would be more accurate to say that they illustrate the alignment of our eight partners with our own views in this area.

For simplicity's sake, this memo will only address the main points of each document: overall conception of the preparatory talks (document C.P. (72) 57), draft agendas and draft mandates of the committees and sub-committees of the CSCE (Annex I), comparative stocktake of work on the CSCE or the sub-committee of the Nine and the Atlantic Alliance (Annex II), and practical considerations on the unfolding of the preliminary work (Annex III).<sup>2</sup>

1. At our initiative, our partners agreed to add a chapter at the beginning of the report, entitled "General considerations on the preparatory talks and on the Conference", the purpose of which is to assert a shared point of view of the Nine that implicitly rejects the consequences of the adoption by the United States and the Soviet Union of a "programme of events" or a negotiating calendar on the CSCE and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). The report notes four points that appear essential:

– it is "practically certain"<sup>3</sup> that the Helsinki preparatory talks will commence on 22 November;

– The Nine reaffirm that the date of the CSCE depends on the outcomes of the preparatory work alone and that "this principle is not affected by the mention of June 1973 as a reasonable date to convene the Conference".

1 Diplomatic Archives of the French Foreign Ministry (FR-AMAE), 436QO [Europe, organismes internationaux et grandes questions internationales, 1961–1976], 214. *Translated from French. This memorandum No. 21/DPCSCE was very probably drafted by Jacques Andréani, [dodis.ch/P51175](https://dodis.ch/P51175), tasked with setting up a CSCE unit within the Europe Directorate.*

2 The annexes mentioned could not be located.

3 It is unclear whether the report in question existed in English, and the quotations taken from it have been translated.

– The Nine note that it is “necessary that no prior calendar can be invoked in order to apply a time limit to the Conference other than that resulting from the normal completion of the tasks it has set itself”, which means that they do not accept the idea that the CSCE should end before September 1973 to enable MBFR negotiations to commence on that date.

– The Nine advocate for the possibility of overlapping, both of the Helsinki preparatory talks and exploratory talks on force reductions and of the CSCE and the MBFR negotiations.

Lastly, again at our initiative, our partners have decided to set out these considerations to the countries taking part in the CSCE preparatory talks by 22 November.

2. A satisfactory compromise has been reached between our views and those of the Netherlands concerning the organisation of the CSCE in three stages and at two levels. The agreed text notes that “it is now recommended that this hypothesis be confirmed by the governments before the beginning of the preparatory talks”, i.e. at the meeting of the Ministers on 20 and 21 November. Moreover, we could mention this organisation in Helsinki at the time that appears most appropriate, probably at the beginning of the preparatory talks and without waiting, as the Netherlands would prefer, to have sufficient assurances as to the readiness of some of our interlocutors to discuss our proposals relating to the agenda of the CSCE.

3. Our partners, including the Netherlands, have come around to our views on the practical unfolding of the preparatory talks, including their informal nature, the choice of consensus for decision-making rather than a voting system, and not using working committees for detailed study of this and that point on the agenda.

4. Concerning the draft mandates of the committees and sub-committees, all our proposals have been accepted, apart from two.

- a) Firstly, the mandate of the sub-committee on “collateral” or “stabilization” measures, for which we accepted only a literal reproduction of article 11 of the Bonn communiqué, while the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany wanted to extend it to a list of effective measures that could be envisaged to this effect and add the drafting of a “joint statement on problems concerning the level and activity of armed forces in Europe”.
- b) Following difficult discussions with the Netherlands and Italy on the mandate of the committee addressing cultural and human aspects and that of the sub-committee on developing human contacts, our partners agreed to adopt our title (“Development of human contacts, broadening of cultural exchanges and wider flow of information”) rather than “free movement of persons, ideas and information and strengthening of cultural relations” in return for the following wording of the mandate of the committee:  
 “The committee is tasked with examining all possibilities that could foster the development of human contacts, with increasing cultural exchanges and with widening the flow of information. Its task includes drawing up mutually approved procedures that can foster *“greater freedom of movement and exchanges”* between persons and drafting a long-term programme wid-

ening the flow of information and increasing cultural exchanges, including those in the field of pure science”.

The French delegation expressed a reservation concerning the inclusion of the underlined words which figured, along with the same reservation, in the mandate of the sub-committee on developing human contacts. The delegations from Italy and the Netherlands, meanwhile, accepted this wording with a counter-reservation and intend, should this compromise wording not be approved, return to a wording of the mandates using the words “*free movement of persons*”.

That said, our partners’ acceptance of our title and our beginning of the mandate of the committee on the human dimension of the CSCE, is for us a major source of satisfaction that should taken into account before we make a final decision on the proposed compromise wording. Similarly, it is important to underline that we have been able to exclude from these mandates, despite the favour they enjoyed from some of our partners, a series of proposals submitted to the political committee by the Netherlands and Italy, such as the suppression of exclusion zones, the issue of passports, and the scrambling of radio programmes. Only a proposal concerning “the access of the nationals of a State to the diplomatic missions located in the territory of that State” remains, concerning which we have expressed a reservation of opposition.<sup>4</sup>

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4 For all the French documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2906](http://dodis.ch/C2906).

[dodis.ch/76986](https://dodis.ch/76986)

NATO

*Note by the Chairman of the Political Committee at Senior Level Kastl<sup>1</sup>*

MULTILATERAL PREPARATORY TALKS IN HELSINKI CONCERNING  
A POSSIBLE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE,  
OUTLINE SCENARIO

NATO Confidential

Brussels, 14 November 1972

The Political Committee at Senior Level has examined suggestions by delegations regarding an outline scenario for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks in Helsinki, and has also reviewed such information as is presently available on the approach being taken to this subject by other intending participants.

2. The Council will find attached at Annex I a text reflecting the outcome of discussion to date in the Senior Political Committee, which has concentrated on the early stages of MPT. The Committee agreed that the text at Annex I should be forwarded to the Council with a view to its being made available to the members of Allied delegations in Helsinki on an urgent basis.

3. Annex II reflects preliminary thoughts that have been expressed in the Committee on certain other important questions concerning MPT, but these have not yet been examined fully and will require closer and continuing study.

4. The Council is invited:

- i. to consider and approve the Outline Scenario for the early stages of MPT attached at Annex I;
- ii. to note that examination of the points referred to in Annex II and of other related matters will continue urgently in the Political Committee at Senior Level.

This document includes: 2 Annexes

*ANNEX I to C-M(72)73*

*Multilateral preparatory talks: outline scenario*

*I. Introduction*

The basic aim of the Allied Governments at MPT would be to ensure that their proposals were fully considered at a Conference and to establish that enough

<sup>1</sup> NATO Archives (NA), North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)73, IS-CHRONO-463. *The original of this document is in English and has been publicly disclosed. It was signed by NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Jörg Kastl, [dodis.ch/P80335](https://dodis.ch/P80335).*

common ground existed among the participants to warrant reasonable expectations that a Conference would produce satisfactory results. In so doing, they will wish to keep the talks as informal and flexible as possible and to avoid anything that would resemble a “pre-Conference”.

## II. *Questions of timing*

### a) *Duration of MPT*

All Allied Governments agree that no time-limit should be set for conclusion of the talks and are prepared to insist on this point. As against this, the Soviets are expected to hold that MPT should be concluded as quickly as possible, even by the latter part of December.

### b) *Possible Recesses*

It was widely felt that if the talks were to recess before the Ministerial Meeting on 7<sup>th</sup>–8<sup>th</sup> December, this would be useful for practical reasons. The achievement of a recess, and its presentation, would be matters for further consideration, having regard in particular to possible sensitivity over the Ministerial Meeting appearing as the reason for such a recess. As for a Christmas recess, with the talks resuming in the latter part of January, the latest date for adjournment would be 20<sup>th</sup> December, according to the Finns.

### c) *Frequency and Length of Meetings*

Except insofar as they might contribute to achieving a recess in early December, the questions of the frequency and length of meetings have not been addressed in the present context, since contacts in Helsinki will be necessary in order to arrive at some general understanding. As noted in paragraph 377 of C-M(72)24(Revised),<sup>2</sup> Volume One, it is important that at every stage time is left between meetings or groups of meetings for reporting to governments, consultation among Allies and the issuance of fresh instructions.

## III. *Sequence of events*

### 1. *Preliminary Contacts*

Some Allied Governments believe it would be useful if there were to be an informal gathering of Heads of Delegation on or before the opening day to exchange views on the scenario for MPT and on specific subjects such as those mentioned in Annex I to C-M(72)47(Final),<sup>3</sup> including rules of procedure. The Finns would prefer to resolve such questions through a series of prior bilateral contacts with individual Heads of Delegation, the outcome of which would be registered at the opening of the talks. It has been reported that the Danish Ambassador in Helsinki<sup>4</sup> plans to give a cocktail party

<sup>2</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)24(Revised), 16th May 1972, IS-CHRONO-460.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)47(Final), 17th October 1972, IS-CHRONO-461.

<sup>4</sup> Adam Tobias Tscherning, [dodis.ch/P51534](https://dodis.ch/P51534).

on 20<sup>th</sup> November to clear, the procedure for the election of officers (see 2(b) below).

2. *Opening Ceremonies.* (According to one recent report, the Finns have indicated that they are planning to hold these in public.)

a) *Welcoming Address and Reply*

Although the general Allied preference would have been for a senior Finnish Foreign Ministry official to give the address of welcome, so as to avoid solemnifying the occasion unduly, it is expected that the Finnish Foreign Minister will in fact give the address. Allied Governments consider that the reply to such an address could best be limited to a single response by the Dean of the diplomatic corps in Helsinki, who is Ambassador of Denmark. They would not want opening statements to be made by delegations at that point, as the Soviets are understood to wish, and will endeavour to discourage any such idea. Allied Governments will, however, consider the appropriateness of responding in kind if the Soviet Union or other participants were to insist on taking such action, particularly if the intention was that any statements made would be released to the Press immediately.

b) *Election of Officers*

The Ambassador of Denmark might appropriately propose a Finnish nominee as [provisional]<sup>5</sup> Chairman for the talks, pending resolution of the question of rules of procedure. If there were to be a Vice-Chairman, the same approach could be followed; he should be a Finn, whose role would be to deputise for the Chairman in the latter's absence, the Finns intend to appoint one of their Foreign Ministry officials as Executive Secretary. The latter's role – as being responsible to the Chairman (Finnish view) or to the Heads of Delegation at all times (Allied view) – needs to be defined precisely.

3. *Adoption of rules of procedure [and confirmation of officers]*<sup>6</sup>

Most Allied Governments feel that this point could appropriately be the first item on the second day of the talks. However, the situation regarding the question of adopting rules of procedure as such, described in the Cover Note to C-M(72)47(-Final),<sup>7</sup> remains essentially unchanged.

4. *Adoption of Order of Business*

The Warsaw Pact states will probably wish to make general political statements before, or at least in parallel with, consideration of an order of business. Allied participants may prefer to settle the order of business first, as is indeed foreseen in the two models of draft rules of procedure in Annex II to C-M(72)47(Final).<sup>8</sup> A possible order of business is reflected in point 5 below and by the points that have

<sup>5</sup> Brackets added manually in the original.

<sup>6</sup> Brackets added manually in the original.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)47(Final), 17th October 1972, IS-CHRONO-461.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)47(Final), 17th October 1972, IS-CHRONO-461.



been mentioned separately in Annex II to the present document, for the reasons stated in the Cover Note.

5. *Statements by each Delegation of substantive and Procedural views*

a) *Statements*

Allied participants would strongly prefer that all general statements by Heads of Delegation be held over until the preceding points have been resolved. If this proves impossible, they will consider whether a response in kind would be appropriate.

As regards the content of general statements, Allied participants will of course be free to cover all points which they consider it appropriate to raise. It is suggested, however, that it might be useful to include language reflecting the aim of the multilateral talks as defined by the Ministers in paragraph 9 of the Bonn Communiqué of 31<sup>st</sup> May, 1972.<sup>9</sup> Consideration may be given to the possibility of circulating the texts of general statements in Helsinki.

b) *Tabling of Papers*

Allied participants will of course be free to draw upon Agenda papers developed within the Alliance, as foreseen in paragraph 7 of the Introduction to C-M(72)24, Volume One.<sup>10</sup> The question of when Allied countries might wish to table papers at the talks requires further consideration, and will depend to some extent on the course followed by other MPT participants in this regard; Allied participants should be ready to respond in kind to the tabling of papers, should this prove necessary.

IV. *Press Coverage*

Attention has been drawn to the difficulties which are likely to arise from the presence of a great many journalists in Helsinki.

It would be the preference of the Allied countries to minimise the amount of publicity surrounding the talks. This will, however, not be at all easy, particularly if, as is probable, the Soviet Union follows a policy of actively stimulating press coverage. It will therefore be important for Allied countries to be ready, if required, to conduct a positive and effective press handling operation to ensure that their viewpoint is fully presented.

*ANNEX II to C-M(72)73*

Because of pressure of time, it has not yet been possible for the Senior Political Committee to examine in detail the subjects listed below, which might constitute the further development of the Order of Business mentioned in Annex I to the present document. They are included at the present stage only for purposes of information.

(i) *General Headings for a CSCE Agenda*

<sup>9</sup> Cf. [dodis.ch/77754](http://dodis.ch/77754).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)24, Volume One, 28th April 1972, IS-CHRONO-460.

Paragraph 13 of the Brussels Communiqué of 10<sup>th</sup> December, 1971,<sup>11</sup> lists the following areas of discussion at a conference: (A) Questions of Security, including Principles Governing Relations between States and certain military aspects of security; (B) Freer Movement of People, Information and Ideas, and Cultural Relations; (C) Co-operation in the Fields of Economics, Applied Science and Technology and Pure Sciences and (D) Co-operation to improve the Human Environment. One delegation has accordingly proposed that the Agenda for a CSCE should be:

- (A) Questions of Security, including Principles Governing Relations between States and Certain Military Aspects of Security;
- (B) Freer Movement of People, Ideas and Information, and Cultural Relations;
- (C) Co-operation in the Economic, Scientific and Technical, and Environmental Fields,

The list of chapter headings in C-M(72)24, Volume One (Revised)<sup>12</sup> provides a comprehensive point of reference in this regard.

(ii) *Drafting of mandates for working bodies*

The question of mandates is clearly inter-related with that of the phrasing of the headings for a CSCE Agenda. One delegation has suggested that to manage this work effectively, participants in multilateral preparatory talks may need to form separate working groups, perhaps corresponding to the main Agenda headings, to prepare draft mandates for each proposed committee. An integral part of this process would be the development of Agenda sub-items and the identification of specific measures. It has been further suggested that the draft terms of reference for each committee might be organized according to the following outline:<sup>13</sup>

- (1) General negotiating objectives;
- (2) Specific Measures;
- (3) Implementation.

Lastly, it has been suggested by one delegation that draft mandates might be prepared for the following committees and sub-committees:

- (1) *Security Questions*
  - A. Inter-State Principles
  - B. Confidence-Building Measures
- (2) *Freer Movement and Cultural Relations*
  - A. Freer Movement of People
  - B. Freer Movement of Ideas
  - C. Cultural Relations
- (3) *Economic, Scientific, Technological and Environmental Co-operation*
  - [A. Industrial Co-operation

<sup>11</sup> For the Final Communiqué of 9 and 10 December 1971 in English and French, cf. [dodis.ch/77756](http://dodis.ch/77756).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)24, Volume One (Revised), 16th May 1972, IS-CHRONO-460.

<sup>13</sup> Annotation in the original: An illustrative draft mandate for a Committee on Economic, Scientific, Technological and Environmental co-operation, circulated by the United States Delegation on 24th October, 1972, is being examined by the Economic Committee.

B. Trade

C. Special Questions (i.e. items discussed in third section of Allied Agenda paper)

D. Scientific and Technical Co-operation

E. Environmental Co-operation]<sup>14</sup>

(iii) *Agreement on procedures for any subsequent phases, including type of Conference*

It is intended that this point would cover, in addition to the basic decision as to whether a CSCE is to be held, the questions of: when and where working bodies would meet and for how long, who would participate in them and to whom they would report when and where a CSCE, if agreed upon, would convene; and what the format and procedures for a Conference should be.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Brackets manually added in the original.

<sup>15</sup> For all NATO documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2907](http://dodis.ch/C2907).

[dodis.ch/76737](https://dodis.ch/76737)

Portugal

*Monograph of the Head of the Atlantic Pact Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
for the Competition for Promotion to Embassy Counsellor<sup>1</sup>*

PORTUGAL AND THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION  
IN EUROPE

Extract • Confidential

[Lisbon, 22 November] 1972

[...]<sup>2</sup>

As a European nation with its main problem centred on Africa,<sup>3</sup> with its metropolis located at one end of the continent, without territorial problems comparable to those of other countries and distant from Central Europe, it is natural that the Security Conference and the reduction of forces do not assume the same degree of importance for Portugal as they do for many other European nations.

These reasons explain why Portugal was one of the NATO members least committed to accepting the conference: being Soviet-inspired and not feeling as strongly as others the need for détente with the communist bloc, the assessment of its real intentions was based more on its attitude of open hostility towards Portuguese policy in Africa.

For similar reasons, a possible reduction of forces in Europe is of fundamental interest to Portugal due to the impact that a possible increase in hostility towards Portuguese policy could have, both in Africa and in relation to Europe, in this case through the strengthening of Soviet influence in nearby regions, such as North Africa. Perhaps it could be said that the CSCE and the MBFR<sup>4</sup> are of more indirect importance to Portugal.

The defence of Portugal's overseas territories has been the key priority of Portuguese policy, conditioning to a large extent the main problems facing the coun-

1 Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal (PT-DAR), PT/AHD/ S3/E26/ P6/ 34472. Translated from Portuguese. This document is the unpublished 284 pages' monograph written by Duarte Pereira e Castro, [dodis.ch/P81197](https://dodis.ch/P81197), for the competition for promotion to Embassy Counsellor, in 1972. His experience in Francophone Africa during the decolonization process and in the UN, increasingly hostile to Portugal's decision to maintain its empire at all costs, is clearly visible in his reflections on the Portuguese position regarding the CSCE in the final years of what was the longest dictatorship in Western Europe in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (1926–1974). On the other hand, the author's experience in NATO affairs, of which Salazar's Portugal was a founding member, allows him to present, with firsthand knowledge, the evolution of NATO countries' positions towards "détente". This is a position that Portugal ultimately followed, despite its lack of interest in rapprochement with communist countries, hostile both to the anticommunist Portuguese dictatorship and to its African policy.

2 We publish here the Chapter Four of the document (pp. 278–284), which bears the same title of the full report. For the complete document, cf. [dodis.ch/76737](https://dodis.ch/76737).

3 The ongoing wars in Portuguese Africa against the national liberation movements in Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique (1961–1974).

4 Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction.

try in terms of its economic development, internal cohesion and even its very survival as a nation, since it is difficult to imagine how it could survive, on the one hand without the *raison d'être* of its existence in recent centuries,<sup>5</sup> and, on the other, without the size to counterbalance the growing power of its immediate neighbour in Europe.

The preparation and implementation of the CSCE come at a time when the country is going through one of its most serious crises, which, while partly determined by factors common to those afflicting countries most closely linked to ours, is further aggravated by specifically Portuguese reasons that, in one way or another, end up being associated with the overseas problem.

With the years having demonstrated the unfeasibility of a Portuguese military defeat in Africa, hostility towards our policy is now directed towards the metropolis, taking advantage of the fatigue created by the defence effort, the urgency and anxiety for economic and social development that this effort hinders, and even the difficulties inherent in all changes of political command.<sup>6</sup>

In this context, the CSCE is likely to be even more damaging to Portugal than to most other Western nations, due to the worsening of the divisive environment favourable to the intensity of forces, both external and internal, acting against national integrity: principles and declarations approved by the Conference which, although referring to Europe, could serve as a pretext for demands on Portugal that affect its African interests; decisions on the levels or movement of military forces which, if not clearly defined in terms of their application, may also be likely to complicate national defence efforts; agreements on greater freedom of ideas, information or culture, which may allow for an increase in the already significant subversive activity felt in the country, examples of which include the radicalisation of the attitude of part of the clergy, the trend towards the Marxisation of education, protest action in schools, social unrest, growing resistance to military service and even the impressive increase in the national publication of subversive literature.

On the positive side, the conference may perhaps provide an opportunity for Portugal to develop economic relations with Eastern Europe. On another level, it seems highly doubtful that it could serve as an example for a similar future attempt in Africa, resulting in more rational relations with our African neighbours.

In addition to the interests it must defend with its allies, it seems that Portugal's priority is to oppose any attempt by the CSCE to undermine NATO security and to create a permanent body from the Conference that would allow greater interference by third parties in national affairs. Given the clear lack of unity among Western countries, everything indicates that, once again, it will be in line with British positions that national interests will be best defended, as England

<sup>5</sup> *The conviction that, without its colonial empire, Portugal's very survival as an independent country would be at risk was a belief shared by many Portuguese. The major breach in this widespread conviction occurred with the prolonged wars in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique against the national liberation movements of those future countries, without a military solution in sight. The Portuguese regime, however, refused any negotiated political solution and faced increasing international hostility in multilateral fora, which made the work of Portuguese diplomats particularly difficult.*

<sup>6</sup> *Refers to the replacement of the Portuguese Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar, [dodis.ch/P2115](https://dodis.ch/P2115), by Prime Minister and the facto dictator Marcelo Caetano, [dodis.ch/P15496](https://dodis.ch/P15496), in 1968.*

seems to be the European country most aware of the dangers surrounding the CSCE and the MBFR and of the need for rapid restructuring of Western defence, in anticipation of less American support and a non-decrease in the Soviet threat: in this regard, it should be remembered that since the closure of the Suez Canal, the strategic value of the Portuguese metropolis has increased considerably, as has that of our positions in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> For all Portuguese documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2897](https://dodis.ch/C2897).

[dodis.ch/76987](https://dodis.ch/76987)

NATO

*NATO Secretary-General Luns to the North Atlantic Council<sup>1</sup>*

## CSCE: UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS

Nato Confidential

Brussels, 30 November 1972

Consensus has been achieved within the Alliance on a wide range of issues relating to a CSCE and to the preparatory talks. This is reflected in a series of documents, many of which appear on the Agenda for the forthcoming Ministerial meeting.<sup>2</sup>

2. However, there remain some issues both of a procedural and substantive nature on which it has not yet been possible to arrive at a consensus and which Delegations feel should be set out briefly for the consideration of Ministers. I should therefore like to set out the following list of such points, as I see them.

*A. Procedural questions**Development of Mandates for Committees*

3. Agreement exists among Allied Governments on the need, at the multilateral preparatory talks, to develop mandates for committees. With this in mind, illustrative texts for such mandates have been transmitted to Ministers, although it has not yet been possible, because of time pressure, to examine these texts in detail within the Alliance. The understanding has indeed been expressed by some Delegations that, pending such detailed examination, it would be desirable for Allied countries to abstain from tabling draft mandates in Helsinki. There is moreover no agreement as yet on the way in which mandates could best be negotiated at the multilateral preparatory talks – i.e. on whether or not working groups should be established for this purpose.

<sup>1</sup> NATO Archives (NA), Private Office Fonds, Private Office Memoranda Series, PO/72/423. *The original of this document is in English and has been publicly disclosed. This memorandum PO/72/423 is the 423<sup>rd</sup> memoranda from the Private Office of the Secretary-General dated 1972. It was signed by the Nato Secretary-General Joseph Luns, [dodis.ch/P14246](https://dodis.ch/P14246). The Secretary-General is the top-ranking civil servant of NATO responsible for steering consultation and decision-making and implementation. He is also the chairperson of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), principal spokesperson, and Head of the NATO International Staff. This memorandum was addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the Council, consisting of the Ambassadors from all member countries of NATO in the NAC, [dodis.ch/R24629](https://dodis.ch/R24629). This document includes one annex.*

<sup>2</sup> *Annotation in the original:* The Annex hereto sets out the current status of NATO documentation concerning the question of a CSCE, as compared with the last comprehensive report to Ministers, cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)24, Volume One, 28th April 1972, IS-CHRONO-460.



*Format of a CSCE*

4. One view favours a CSCE in three phases. According to this view, a Conference would open with a meeting of Foreign Ministers who would establish committees which would then meet to prepare texts for adoption at a concluding meeting, again at the level of Ministers. Another view holds that committees should work on the preparation of such texts during the multilateral preparatory talks and that a meeting at Ministerial level should be convened only once this task has been accomplished.

*B. Substantive questions**Military Aspects of Security*

5. While all Allied Governments agree that a CSCE should deal with certain military aspects of security, views differ on what precise proposals should be advanced and how, if at all, they should be related to the discussion, in a separate forum, of MBFR. It is agreed that certain Confidence-Building Measures should be proposed. However, some Delegations do not share the majority view that, in addition, it would be useful to discuss and agree on a joint declaration on the levels and activities of armed forces in Europe. Moreover, several Delegations believe that the precise content of Confidence-Building Measures as well as of a joint declaration can be determined only in the light of developments at the multilateral preparatory talks, a Conference itself and the exploratory talks on MBFR.

*Nature of Declaration on Principles*

6. The development of a consensus on the nature, and indeed on the content, of a declaration on Principles is less urgent than in the case of the questions listed in the preceding paragraphs. Specifically, it appears still too early to define a position as to: what form any such declaration should take; how binding it might be; and how Allied countries might refer to it during multilateral talks with the Eastern countries and other participating states. However, Allied Governments agree that, if such a declaration on Principles is formulated in a CSCE context, the emphasis should be on the political character of the document rather than on its legal status. In general, it is felt that the whole question should be kept under review in the light of the further evolution of the talks in Helsinki and the availability of more complete information about the views of other participants.

*Soviet Proposal regarding permanent machinery*

7. In view of the fact that the Soviets are expected to press their proposal for inscription on a CSCE Agenda of an item on the establishment of permanent machinery, Allied Governments may wish to ensure that they take a common approach to this question. The subject has been touched on in paragraphs 28–30 of the Steering Brief for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks<sup>3</sup> and will be studied further within the Alliance.

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3 Cf. [dodis.ch/77759](http://dodis.ch/77759).

*Annex to PO/72/423**Current Status of Documentation Regarding CSCE*

The contents of document C-M(72)24, Volume One(Revised)<sup>4</sup> stand, unless otherwise indicated below. Holders of that document are asked to refer to the Table of Contents appearing at the beginning of Volume One.

*Part One: Dossiers on Possible Agenda Items*

- Chapter 1* Principles Governing Relations between States. Supplemented by the text of a possible draft Declaration (C-M(72)72(Revised)).<sup>5</sup>
- Chapter 2* Certain Military Aspects of Security. Superseded by C-M(72)82,<sup>6</sup> containing agreed Agenda and Guidelines Papers on Confidence-Building Measures and a second section, not yet agreed, containing draft Agenda and Guidelines Papers on a Joint Declaration on the Levels and Activities of Armed Forces in Europe.
- Chapter 3* Freer Movement of People.  
Unchanged.
- Chapter 4* Freer Movement of Information and Ideas.  
Unchanged.
- Chapter 5* Cultural Relations.  
Superseded by C-M(72)70(Revised)<sup>7</sup> containing a new dossier on Cultural Relations.
- Chapter 6* Economic Co-operation (and Volume Two of C-M(72)24).<sup>8</sup>  
Superseded by C-M(72)68(Revised),<sup>9</sup> containing a Guidelines and Agenda Paper as well as a series of concrete measures.
- Chapter 7* Co-operation in Applied Science and Technology.  
Unchanged.
- Chapter 8* Co-operation in Pure Science.  
Unchanged.
- Chapter 9* Co-operation to Improve the Human Environment.  
Unchanged.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)24, Volume One (Revised), 16th May 1972, IS-CHRONO-460.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)72(Revised), 30th November 1972, IS-CHRONO-463.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)82, 24th November 1972, IS-CHRONO-463.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)70(Revised), 27th November 1972, IS-CHRONO-463.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)24, Volume One, 28th April 1972, IS-CHRONO-460.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)68(Revised), 28th November 1972, IS-CHRONO-462.

*Part two: Procedures: Multilateral CSCE Preparations*

Supplemented by C-M(72)47(Final)<sup>10</sup> on Rules of Procedure, by C-M(72)73(Revised)<sup>11</sup> on an Outline Scenario, by C-M(72)67(Revised),<sup>12</sup> the Steering Brief (1)<sup>13</sup> and by C-M(72)86(2nd revise)<sup>14</sup> on the question of a CSCE Agenda, committees and illustrative mandates.

*Part Three: Allied Consultations during the Multilateral Phase*

Supplemented by the agreement reached at the Council meeting of 16<sup>th</sup> November, 1972, as reflected in the following summing up by the Chairman:

*A. Consultations*

- Co-ordination of Allied Governments' positions at Helsinki on important policy questions will continue in the framework of the Council. This represents a continuation of past practice.
- Practical and discreet ad hoc arrangements for consultations on day-to-day questions, as necessary and appropriate, will be worked out on the spot in Helsinki amongst the 15 Allied Delegations. These arrangements will be in the nature of an open-ended group, and not a caucus.

*B. Information*

- National reports from Helsinki would be transmitted by Permanent Representatives to the Secretary-General as appropriate. The Secretary-General will draw upon these reports in Council meetings.
- This pragmatic formula may be reviewed in due time as necessary.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)47(Final), 17th October 1972, IS-CHRONO-461.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)73, IS-CHRONO-463.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)67(Revised), 21st November 1972, IS-CHRONO-462.

<sup>13</sup> *Annotation in the original:* The Steering Brief sets the stage for MPT and deals with much more than purely procedural matters.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. NA, North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(72)86(2nd revise), 1st December 1972, IS-CHRONO-463.

<sup>15</sup> For all NATO documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2907](http://dodis.ch/C2907).

[dodis.ch/77047](https://dodis.ch/77047)

Canada

*The Department of External Affairs to the Canadian Delegation to NATO*<sup>1</sup>

CSCE AGENDA: FREER MOVEMENT

Confidential

Ottawa, 5 January 1973

We agree with general line you propose in your reference telegram for use in discussion in senior PAC<sup>2</sup> meeting. You should also draw as appropriate on this telegram.

2. We remain convinced of the correctness of Canadian position on this subject and unconvinced by any argument so far made for acceptance of human contacts formula for initial presentation in Helsinki. We hope you will repeat to our allies how strongly we feel on this subject as demonstrated once more by reference in yesterday's Throne Speech<sup>3</sup> (PST-27 January 4 refers). We wish record to show when these exercises are complete that we consistently and firmly opposed watering-down of established NATO position before negotiation of CSCE agenda and mandates had begun. It has never been satisfactorily explained to us why EEC countries are so insistent on human contacts wording. Your approach in senior PAC and subsequently in NAC should be to meet so-called arguments of EEC countries and ask key questions which will expose logical inconsistencies and bring to light real motives.

3. Some EEC countries have asked that we should agree to EEC formula for sake of maintaining NATO solidarity. It is legitimate to ask whether they put more stock in NATO or in EEC solidarity. NATO solidarity must be created before it can be maintained and we are being asked to accept a wording which was formulated without consulting us or asking for input. It seems to us that this way of proceeding is anything but conducive to solidarity of NATO.

4. While there is talk of maintaining NATO solidarity there is also objection to use of wording appearing in NATO communique<sup>4</sup> on grounds it has overtones of bloc to bloc approach. This seems to us contradiction in logic. If there is to be NATO solidarity NATO ministerial language should be used. If there is objection

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9089, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 28. (YOURTEL 20 JAN3/73). *This telegram No. GEA42 was sent from the Canadian Department of External Affairs to the Canadian Delegation to NATO on 5 January 1973. The facsimile of this document contains some handwritten additions that have been transcribed. Likewise, certain words have been struck through. For the original version, also containing the complete list of addressees, cf. the facsimile [do-dis.ch/77047](https://dodis.ch/77047).*

<sup>2</sup> This is likely a reference to the Political Advisors Committee within the North Atlantic Council of the NATO, cf. [dodis.ch/R44003](https://dodis.ch/R44003).

<sup>3</sup> [Canada, House of Commons Debates, 29th Parliament, 1st Session: vol. 1, 4.](#)

<sup>4</sup> Cf. [dodis.ch/77765](https://dodis.ch/77765).

in principle to use of such language one cannot talk about NATO solidarity and each NATO member will be free to table own wording.

5. Argument that wording suggested by us would be regarded as provocative by USSR is supported by no evidence that we have been able to obtain either privately or publicly. Indeed there is evidence from Helsinki to contrary. It greatly underestimates intelligence of Russians to argue that it will be easier for them to accept one wording rather than another. They are fully aware of what words are intended to convey and, whatever agenda item may be, they will assume that West intends it to cover same content.

6. We certainly cannot accept tactical argument that more direct wording we propose would be less likely to achieve our objectives. This approach is inconsistent with tactics being employed with respect to many other aspects of CSCE. Anyone with experience of negotiating with USSR is aware that concessions are not extracted by unilateral softening of positions. If we wish to achieve balanced result, it must be bargained for and concessions must not be made until there is indication that other side is also prepared to make deal. We cannot accept argument that although title of agenda item may be weak, points we wish to achieve are included in mandate. The mandate has yet to be negotiated. If we do not table agenda item covering all we wish committee to discuss, other side will be justified in demanding elimination from mandate of those aspects they can claim are not in agenda item. This strengthens argument for starting with comprehensive title and mandates. Title could then be watered down by agreement provided mandate was retained without deletions.

7. You should draw attention of senior PAC to Brezhnev statement on December 21 to 50<sup>th</sup> celebration meeting in Moscow where he indicated acceptance of some of position in draft mandate. (See Moscow telegram 5253 [*sic*] of December 22/72).<sup>5</sup> It would be too bad if we did not take advantage of this to obtain broadest possible agenda item. Brezhnev's use of words "contacts between peoples" indicates we are in good bargaining position to obtain satisfactory mandate provided we do not compromise "freer movement" wording gratuitously.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9089, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 28. *The correct number of the telegram was 3253.*

<sup>6</sup> For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).

[dodis.ch/77194](https://dodis.ch/77194)

Israel

*The Director of Europe I Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yaish  
to Assistant Director-General Meroz<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE – MIDDLE EAST – MEDITERRANEAN

Secret

Jerusalem, 19 February 1973

A. Our position was – and remains – that the inclusion of the *Middle East* on the CSCE agenda should be opposed. We brought this position to the attention of the friendly countries participating in CSCE and justified it, from our point of view, mainly by the following three arguments:

1. A discussion on the subject in a forum in which 34 countries participate would require the participation of the parties to the conflict and as a result the entire situation would turn into a new edition of a UN debate with all the unpleasant consequences and futility that it entails.
2. Solving a delicate and complicated problem like the Middle East conflict requires methods of quiet diplomacy. A discussion in CSCE with the participation of several dozen parties cannot but hinder and sabotage those efforts that are being made through quiet channels to try to start serious negotiations.<sup>2</sup>
3. The most serious damage that can be caused by a discussion in the CSCE is that the Arabs will find in such a process another reason to postpone the “moment of truth” when they will see no other option but to enter into serious negotiations – in the hope or illusion that salvation will still come from the CSCE.

B. Regarding the discussion on *the security of the Mediterranean*, we believed that we could not take a position opposing it, since the chances of success are extremely slim. In the talks, we therefore took a non-committal position, but at the same time we expressed a general understanding of the principle that there is a connection between the security of Europe and the security of the southern borders of the continent, that is, the Mediterranean.

C. On 16.1.73, the Austrian representative officially raised his government's request to put the Middle East question on the agenda of the CSCE. It is known

<sup>1</sup> Israel State Archives (ISA), MFA 5317/31. Translated from Hebrew. This memorandum No. 327 signed by the Director of the Europe I Department Nissim Yaish, [dodis.ch/P51234](https://dodis.ch/P51234), was addressed to the Assistant Director-General for Europe of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yohanan Meroz, [dodis.ch/P51231](https://dodis.ch/P51231).

<sup>2</sup> Probably refers to various diplomatic initiatives to advance negotiations between Israel and Egypt in 1972–1973. In February 1973 the Egyptian National Security Advisor Hafez Ismail, [dodis.ch/P81361](https://dodis.ch/P81361), visited Washington.

that the Austrian proposal was explicitly supported by Spain and Yugoslavia and, in a vaguer form, by Malta.

So far, various representatives have expressed general opposition to discussing issues “outside Europe,” but we are not aware of any explicit statement from the West or the neutrals regarding a discussion of the Middle East. Only the Eastern bloc, headed by the USSR (but excluding Romania), has explicitly expressed opposition to the discussion of the Middle East issue.

The summary of the talks conducted by our representatives in various capitals indicates that there is general reluctance to discuss the Israeli-Arab conflict in the Middle East, but in the vast majority of cases it was not explicitly stated that in practice they would oppose raising the issue.

D. Our ambassador in Helsinki<sup>3</sup> indicates that in a situation where decisions are made by consensus, there is a theoretical possibility that a decision may be made, in the absence of opposition, if none of the participants expresses opposition in clear words.

When we come to determine that in the current situation the majority in the West and the entire Eastern bloc are disassociating themselves from the idea of a discussion on the Middle East, we must take into account the fact that the Arabs have not so far activated their diplomatic pressure mechanism in favour of the idea.

It must be assumed that in the event that the Arabs activate their well-known pressure machine (as they do in the UN) there will be few countries left that will dare to actively oppose this. We know that, for example, with regard to countries such as Switzerland, Turkey and Greece, their intention to oppose may not withstand Arab pressure, especially if no progress is made towards a solution in other diplomatic arenas.

E. So far, Arab pressure has taken the form of Maghreb (Algerian-Tunisian) activity in the direction of a special discussion on security in the Mediterranean. This Maghreb activity has borne fruit in that while in the first phase of the Portico,<sup>4</sup> reference to the Mediterranean was limited almost exclusively to the coastal states, and this was usually relatively marginal, in recent weeks there has been a growing recognition and many statements that the CSCE should include the Mediterranean region in its area of explicit interest.

Although it is not yet clear how the issue fits into discussions on European security, doubts are beginning to appear as to whether it is possible to draw a line somewhere in the middle of the Mediterranean and say that what happens north of this line is of no interest at all and does not concern the countries south of the line.

The issue of co-operation on environmental issues constitutes another factor and a reason for blurring the boundaries, with many countries claiming that it is impossible to ensure co-operation on this issue without the participation of all the countries bordering the Mediterranean.

F. The representatives of the Maghreb have recently been careful to avoid mentioning the Middle East and have tried to give the impression that they are only

<sup>3</sup> Israeli Ambassador in Helsinki Katriel Katz, [dodis.ch/P81354](https://dodis.ch/P81354).

<sup>4</sup> A shorthand expression for the preparatory consultations of the CSCE, coined by Katriel Katz and adopted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry.



interested in the problems of the western Mediterranean basin. It cannot be ruled out that this tactic will ultimately lead to their participation in the work of a committee or subcommittee of the CSCE that will discuss the Mediterranean issue, and that they will be allowed, in the first stage, to submit papers and explain their views officially to that subcommittee.

G. In my opinion, selective action is required in several capitals in order to prevent decisions being made that go against our line and to introduce the Arab factor into the circle of consultations, using ingenious tactics.<sup>5</sup>

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5 For all Israeli documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2908](https://dodis.ch/C2908).

[dodis.ch/76948](https://dodis.ch/76948)

Japan

*Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*ISSUES IN THE SOVIET UNION'S ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY PLAN:  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE CSCE CONCEPT*Extract* • Confidential

Tokyo, 5 March 1973

The idea of a collective security system among Asian countries was first proposed under the Brezhnev<sup>2</sup> regime at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in June 1969. With the CSCE approaching and a ceasefire in Vietnam achieved, it is predicted that the Soviet side will promote his plan of an Asian collective security more than ever as a means of expanding its influence in Asia. Comparing the Asian collective security plan with the concept of European security co-operation reveals the following issues:

*I. Differences*

1. The implementation of thought of the Security and Co-operation in Europe, in terms of its development, originated when the Polish Foreign Minister<sup>3</sup> presented it at the United Nations in late 1964, a relatively unstable period in Soviet domestic politics as the Khrushchev<sup>4</sup> regime transitioned to the Brezhnev regime, and the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty Organisation supported this Polish proposal in January 1965. (Note: While collective security arrangements for Asia and Europe were proposed in the 1950s, no such proposals were made for some time thereafter.) As this fact shows, initially there were some countries in East Europe that strongly desired the holding of a European security conference for motives different from those of the Soviet Union, and these countries had a leading role. However, unlike the Eastern European countries, the Asian communist bloc, with the exception of Mongolia, did not have Soviet troops stationed in their own countries and had established an independent foreign policy. Therefore, it appears they saw no significant merit in holding an Asian collective security conference.
2. Western nations view the CSCE as a "double-edged sword" in a sense. While it offers advantages to the Soviet Union, it also carries the po-

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (DA-MOFAJ), 2013-2184. *Translated from Japanese. This report was established by the Analysis Division of the Research and Planning Department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 5 March 1973.*

<sup>2</sup> General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

<sup>3</sup> Adam Rapacki, [dodis.ch/P15318](https://dodis.ch/P15318).

<sup>4</sup> Soviet Prime Minister and First Secretary of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev, [dodis.ch/P14485](https://dodis.ch/P14485).

tential to (1) weaken the cohesion of the Soviet-Eastern European bloc by granting significant autonomy to Eastern European countries, and (2) while strengthening cooperation between the Western and Eastern blocs carries the risk of diminishing Western vigilance towards the Soviet Union and undermining the NATO framework, it may simultaneously foster the growth of dissident movements opposing regimes within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

However, among the liberal countries of Asia, there is no conception of using the collective security plan for Asia proposed by the Soviet Union as an opportunity to launch an offensive against the Soviet Union.

3. There are considerable differences in the Soviet aims for the CSCE and for Asian collective security plan. (See attached table)<sup>5</sup>
4. The Soviet Union, in the process of promoting the concept of the CSCE, sought to achieve objectives such as: (1) respecting the existing frontiers in Europe, (2) recognizing East Germany as a sovereign state under international law, and (3) exclusion of any opportunity for West Germany to gain access to nuclear weapons. (Note: These aforementioned three points were included as requirements in the Statement by the European Communist and Workers' Parties in April 1967, which outlined: "The following points are required for creating a system of collective security") Since the emergence of the Brandt<sup>6</sup> administration, the Soviet Union had largely achieved its initial objectives even before the CSCE was held.
5. One of the aims of the Soviet Union's Asian collective security plan is believed to be the "consolidation of the status quo," including borders. However, People's Republic of China objects to the current Sino-Soviet border for reasons such as: (1) the Sino-Soviet border is stipulated by unequal treaties, and (2) the Soviet Union is violating even those unequal treaties. In addition, there is the Northern Territories issue between Japan and the Soviet Union, and in Korea, there are movements towards unification of North and South Korea, indicating that "consolidation of the status quo" is fraught with problems.
6. People's Republic of China has already expressed opposition to the Soviet Union's Asian collective security plan, and the plan without China's participation is unlikely to function as "security." If an Asian collective security plan excluding China were to be realised, it would take on the character of an anti-China encirclement bloc. (Under the current Sino-Soviet confrontation, it is difficult for Asian countries surrounding China to adopt a pro-Soviet stance. As an argument for this, it would be a reference that the North Korean, North Vietnamese, Burmese, Thai, and Japanese Communist Parties did not participate in the International Meeting of Communist

<sup>5</sup> The table attached for reference has been omitted. For the complete document in Japanese, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76948](http://dodis.ch/76948).

<sup>6</sup> Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](http://dodis.ch/P15409).

and Workers' Parties in June 1969 held in Moscow, and in Asia, only the Indian and Ceylonese Communist Parties participated.)

7. While two systems – NATO and the Warsaw Pact – exist in Europe regarding the concept of the Security and Co-operation, in Asia, neither the “East” nor “West” blocs have a unified “military bloc,” and individual mutual assistance treaties form the basis.
8. Economic and social backgrounds differ greatly among Asian countries. In addition, most major conflicts in the past two years have occurred in Asia and not in Europe. The situation in Asia is extremely unstable and fluid compared to Europe.
9. Various Asian countries are already exploring regional cooperation initiatives, and the Soviet Union's plan, which is not necessarily considered part of “Asia,” has not always been well received by them.

## *II. Similarities*

Comparing the “concept of the Security and Co-operation in Europe” and the “Asian collective security plan,” significant dissimilarities exist, primarily due to the differing objective conditions in Asia and Europe that shape their respective backgrounds. On the other hand, from the perspective of Soviet tactics and strategy, considerable similarities can be observed between the two.

### *1. Main Agenda of the Conference*

Despite differences in expression, the Asian security plan, like the European security concept, can be considered to have two main agendas: (1) the non-use of force and (2) the development of cooperation in economic, scientific, and technological fields. More specifically, when establishing the Asian collective security plan, as with Europe, it is believed that the Soviet side will insist on incorporating the following points into the declaration in some form: (1) inviolability of borders, (2) non-use of force, (3) cooperation for peace and good neighbourly relations, (4) mutually beneficial relations between states, (5) disarmament, and (6) support for the United Nations. (For specific expressions, refer to the “Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe” at the 1972 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact.)

### *2. Process Towards the Conference*

If the process is to follow a similar path to the promotion of the European security concept, the Soviet Union is expected to promote the Asian security plan in the following steps:

- (1) First, a general framework will be proposed, whereupon its specifics will be developed while observing the reactions of various countries
- (2) The call for a security conference helps create the image of the Soviet Union as a “peaceful nation.” Therefore, the proposal itself is significant, and it will be repeatedly put forward as a diplomatic tool until the conference is held.
- (3) To create a supporting country for Soviet plan outside its sphere of influence, and to have this country make preparations or act as a spokesperson

for Soviet desires. (In Western Europe, Finland holds this position, and in Asia, the Soviet Union is seen as utilizing India. It is also presumed that the Soviet Union desires Japan to fulfill this role if possible.)

(4) Bilateral relations will form the basis.

(In Western Europe, the Soviet Union engaged in individual negotiations with countries such as Germany, France, and the United States. There, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to convene the European Security Conference. This approach prompted the relatively passive United Kingdom to become more involved. Similarly, separate negotiations are expected in Asia before the conference, and the Soviet-Indo and Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaties will likely be utilized in this context.)

[...] <sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The table attached for reference is omitted. For the complete document in Japanese, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76948](https://dodis.ch/76948). For all Japanese documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2905](https://dodis.ch/C2905).

[dodis.ch/77131](https://dodis.ch/77131)

Türkiye

*The Turkish Ambassador in Helsinki, Batu, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

[CSCE]

Secret/Very Urgent

Helsinki, 7 March 1973

1. The report regarding the negotiations and other backroom contacts between my colleague Ali Hikmet Alp<sup>2</sup> and the Westerners is in the second article.

2. Since the consultations began on 25 February, four meetings were held among the Western Powers in total, two of which were upon the request of the Germans. Although during these meetings tactical issues, which were previously reported with our telegrams, were discussed; some interesting attitudes and impressions also emerged. These and other noteworthy impressions from private contacts can be summarized as follows:

a) Americans systematically avoid appearing in the foreground at public meetings and prefer to interact with everyone bilateral, discreet contacts. It seems that the active role taken by the 9s, and especially by France, has served their purposes well, at least up to this stage. Vest says he finds the performance of Westerners generally very satisfactory. Meanwhile, he will also have contacts with Soviet Delegation soon.

b) Although the French appears to be leading the 9s, their stance this time seems more reassuring and consistent. One of the French Delegates also regularly attends the 14s' meetings.

c) Germans undoubtedly maintains their status as the most sensitive Delegation. While being careful not to confront Soviets and the other Easterners directly, they are also doing everything they can to ensure the unity of the Western front in the negotiations. The fact that they called the 14s to two urgent meetings after the Poland Initiative also points to this.

d) Now, not losing the initiative advantage the Westerners gained with their initial proposals and continuing to negotiate with the Easterners on this basis are seen as two important issues. In recent days, it was thought that the advantage would be lost due to the Easterners taking turns to create counterproposals in paragraphs, so the 9s decided to amend the proposal in the Security article without compromising on the fundamentals. Today (5 March), at the working dinner host-

1 Turkish Diplomatic Archives (TDA), K0001660-G0011488-162808. Translated from Turkish. This cipher telegram No. 38, printed in 15 copies and signed by the Turkish Ambassador in Helsinki Hamit Batu, [dodis.ch/P49733](https://dodis.ch/P49733), was sent to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as to the Turkish Delegation to NATO in Brussels on 7 March 1973. It was received, decrypted and registered in Ankara on 8 March 1973. This telegram summarises the consultations on the CSCE. It can be deduced that this telegram was composed in order to recount the behind-the-scene consultations among Western parties.

2 Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy in Helsinki Hikmet Alp, [dodis.ch/P51182](https://dodis.ch/P51182).

ed by Norwegian Ambassador...<sup>3</sup> this approach was generally approved. Italians, who made the initial proposal, will bring the revised proposal.

e) Before dinner, Italian Ferraris<sup>4</sup> approached me and asked if there were any other points we considered important besides the principle of not using force not to be given special place. I told him that he knew the principle we considered most important was compliance with agreements, and that if we did not see this in the proposal, my instruction was to immediately and definitively “VETO” the proposal, whether it came from 9s or anyone else. He said he knew this and that our view had now been fully accepted within the 9s, essentially conceding that the principle did not have any aspect that undermined the Brezhnev Doctrine. In his personal opinion, the Soviets would be able to accept both this and the principle of “Self-Determination.”

f) It became clear that the second purpose of Norwegian Ambassador’s working dinner was to convince us that all three stages of the Conference should be held in Helsinki. The Scandinavians are giving their full support. The Americans say they can accept Helsinki, still fearful of the MBFR-Conference relationship. The majority are focusing on Lausanne, Geneva, and Vienna. Although the Austrians intend to propose Vienna, they are not taking the initiative because the MBFR talks are still being held there. Switzerland is also waiting for Austria’s decision to propose Lausanne. There is complete consensus that all the commissions should be held in a single city. I also stated that we had no objection to the first phase being held in Helsinki, and although no final decision had yet been made, we did not prefer Helsinki for the Commission phase, and that we considered it necessary for all commissions to be held in the same city. The Portuguese said that at least four countries would veto the Commission phase being held in Helsinki.

g) The Neutrals complained that the work was progressing slowly. Brunner,<sup>5</sup> the second-in-command of the Swiss Delegation, proposed a special meeting among the parties that had submitted proposals on the Mediterranean issue. The Italian and I accepted this proposal in principle. Although some of the 9s saw this as a danger of it being the beginning of the small groups proposed by the Swiss, it was ultimately accepted that there was a difference in substance and that there was no obstacle to the delegations that essentially wanted to do so holding private meetings. This will enable us to maintain contact with the very active Swiss. Brunner, who is a little bit excitable by nature, said that if the Swiss proposal on the arbitration institution was not accepted for discussion, they would block the entire Security article.

h) On Ambassador’s recommendation, I mentioned to the Dutch that, it was necessary to give his proposals on “Military Aspects of Security” a new “coiffure” and that we had some opinions on the matter. When he said that a text could be prepared along the lines of the first model in the well-known document and referring to the MBFR, I stated that this would serve our purpose as well. He has also been in contact with the Yugoslavs on this matter. We have also been in con-

3 Norwegian Ambassador in Helsinki Knut Thommessen, [dodis.ch/P81445](https://dodis.ch/P81445).

4 Deputy Head of the Italian Delegation to the CSCE Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, [dodis.ch/P48092](https://dodis.ch/P48092).

5 Swiss Deputy Chief of the Political Secretariat at the Political Department Edouard Brunner, [dodis.ch/P19047](https://dodis.ch/P19047).



tact with the Yugoslavs and received the text they prepared. We will meet in the coming days. The Dutch also said that Vest<sup>6</sup> would try to change the unpopular American proposal, and that the French would eventually be left alone and forced to join us.

I) Yugoslavs are more numerous than before /all of them/ are lobbying, maintaining contact with us, and offering cooperation in every area. This seems possible in many areas. I told the economic experts I met that our final position has not yet been determined, and that our next expert who will come during the discussion of the 2<sup>nd</sup> basket will be more authorized. He said he discussed labour issues, Europe's underdeveloped regions, and technology transfer with the Germans, and that they accepted all of these as normal. He said he would further investigate this stance, which conflicts with German's initiatives in NATO.

j) Again, the Romanians, one of the largest delegations (it is noteworthy that all Easterners arrived with large delegations), is persistently offering cooperation and consultation. Yesterday, Iav,<sup>7</sup> one of their experts, presented a lengthy draft proposal they had prepared on security issues. While it contains many points that could be considered objectionable to us, it also shows a softening of their previously sharp stance on certain issues. The general opinion among Westerners, as we have stated, is that while we must be cautious about the Romanians stance, we should not discourage them.

k) Consultations are increasingly shifting towards private contacts and back-room activities. Working dinner invitations have increased beyond the capacity to accommodate them. It appears that this will intensify over the next two weeks. The issue of taking a break from meetings is already a significant topic. The prevailing view among Westerners and neutrals is to work until 30 March and then take a break until 24 April.

I) It appears that the tendency of the 9s to form a bloc is beginning to bother some Westerners and neutrals considerably. In particular, Canadians have been saying in private meetings and discussions over the past few days that this is beginning to become excessive, that they need to coordinate with us more systematically, and that they should not come with decisions already made.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> US Delegate to the CSCE George Vest, [dodis.ch/P55050](https://dodis.ch/P55050).

<sup>7</sup> Not identified.

<sup>8</sup> For all the Turkish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2919](https://dodis.ch/C2919).

[dodis.ch/76988](https://dodis.ch/76988)

NATO

*Report by the Chairman of the Political Committee at Senior level Kastl<sup>1</sup>*

## SITE OF A CSCE

Nato Confidential

Brussels, 29 March 1973

At its meeting on 26<sup>th</sup> March, the Senior Political Committee discussed the site or sites for the three stages of a CSCE.

2. There was general agreement that the first stage of a CSCE could take place in Helsinki. It was the view of the Committee that there was no objection to Allied delegations, who wished to do so, letting the Finnish Authorities know bilaterally and informally that they were agreeable to Helsinki. No formal acceptance of Helsinki as the site for the first stage should however be given.

3. With regard to the second and third stages there were varying views on the siting of these. Suggestions were made in favour of Vienna and Geneva (and possibly other Swiss centres) as well as Helsinki. A large majority considered that any decision on the third stage was in any case premature. A large majority of delegations also favoured colocation of all the Committees in the second stage.

4. The Council is invited to note these views and in particular the consensus with regard to Helsinki for the first stage, and the agreement in the Senior Political Committee that the Finns might be informed bilaterally and informally of this.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> NATO Archives (NA), North Atlantic Council Fonds, Council Memoranda Chronological Series, C-M(73)29, IS-CHRONO-464. The original of this document is in English and has been publicly disclosed. This document C-M(73)29 was signed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Jörg Kastl, [dodis.ch/P80335](https://dodis.ch/P80335).

<sup>2</sup> For all NATO documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2907](https://dodis.ch/C2907).

[dodis.ch/75743](https://dodis.ch/75743)

Italy

*The Director-General for Political Affairs Ducci to Minister of Foreign Affairs Medici*<sup>1</sup>

CSCE: BORDER ISSUE

Confidential

Rome, 2 April 1973

1. In preparation for the CSCE, the Western powers, in the Nine and in NATO, agreed on the following wording of the principle of the prohibition of the use and threat of force, which was included in the Western draft Mandate for the First Committee of the future Conference:

“The non-use of force or threat of force, particularly with regard to the inviolability of borders”.

This wording corresponds to that used in the United Nations Charter (1945) and the United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations among States (1970). Both of these international instruments were drawn up with the cooperation and full support of the Soviets, who have never contested their validity.

Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation to the Helsinki Preliminary Talks requested that, in the European context, the issue of borders be separated from the prohibition on the use or threat of force. It insisted that the separation be clear-cut, firmly opposing any attempt to establish a direct or indirect link between the two concepts.

This attitude has exposed the USSR's intentions regarding the objectives it intends to achieve at the CSCE.

In fact, inviolability separated from the use or threat of force means the immutability of borders even by peaceful means (agreements, plebiscites, consensual unions of states, etc.). And the term that the Soviets want to use, at least in the Russian language, is precisely that of untouchability (or indestructibility).

Politically, this is dictated primarily by the USSR's need to obtain approval for the perpetuity of the current line in Central Europe and, at the same time, a guarantee that in future no change in the political and territorial status quo in Europe can take place against its will or without its express approval.

Obtaining such recognition from the West would provide the USSR with a valuable precedent for its territorial disputes with China (and also Japan).

<sup>1</sup> Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Historical Diplomatic Archives (IT-ASDMAE), DGAP, Uff. XIII (ex III), CSCE, b. 131, fasc. Ufficio CSCE Affari Politici, 1975. Translated from Italian. This note was signed by the Italian Director-General for Political Affairs Roberto Ducci, [dodis.ch/P48086](https://dodis.ch/P48086), and addressed to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Giuseppe Medici, [dodis.ch/P15459](https://dodis.ch/P15459).

2. The interests of Western countries are antithetical. They have in fact agreed to the Soviet desire to open dialogue in order to promote dynamic and structured coexistence, and therefore cannot consider acceptable a conference outcome that merely crystallises the current situation. This is all the more evident given that the Soviets – in addition to calling for the creation of a *European* principle of the inviolability of borders – are resisting the affirmation in the European context of the principles, already enshrined by the United Nations, of respect for human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination.

Despite this, there has been some yielding among Westerners with regard to the commitments made within the Community and NATO. While (in addition to Italy) the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Turkey, Canada and other smaller Atlantic and non-Atlantic countries have maintained their position that it is fundamentally and diplomatically inappropriate to accede to Soviet demands, abandoning the line already set by their respective governments, France and the FRG have shown themselves to be more accommodating.

For France, this can be explained by a constant feature of French policy which, on occasion, prevails over the very need to safeguard the possibilities of full European integration: that of preventing German reunification. In this respect, the interests of Paris and Moscow coincide, and it is difficult to prevent a certain convergence in negotiations based on these underlying political motives.

The reasons for the FRG's position were less clear, but it was possible to ascertain them during the latest consultations. Bonn feared that it would arouse excessive suspicion on the part of the USSR – so soon after the agreements – if it maintained a position that Moscow considered an attempt to diminish the significance of the recognition of the border between the two German states and between Germany and Poland. Bonn's reasons are quite understandable, and we cannot therefore expect it to play a leading role on this fundamental aspect of the negotiations. Nevertheless, the other Western countries have its solidarity and gratitude for this action, from which the FRG is bound to reap direct political benefits.

After some initial hesitation (perhaps due to concerns about its territorial disputes with Spain and Ireland), Great Britain recognised the validity of the position taken by the majority of NATO and EEC countries.

3. The clarifications that emerged in Brussels in recent days (at the Atlantic Council and the Political Committee of the Nine) have therefore served to verify the substantial unity of the Western platform, which has left France virtually isolated.

The conclusion reached so far is limited to the decision not to prejudge the issue of the current preliminary phase and to leave it open – as it is the fundamental political point of the Conference – for the final phase (May–June).

The Soviets will certainly continue to insist that future European public law be based essentially on a non-negotiable territorial and political status quo. The success of such a thesis presents a serious threat to Western countries. In fact, once the USSR has succeeded in identifying the concept of European peace with that of the security of the Soviet bloc, it will be able to more clearly call Western coun-

tries to account – in the future permanent pan-European body – for any attitude that it does not like (with the inevitable amplification at the domestic level where there are strong communist parties), especially with regard to the unification of Western Europe.

If this possibility for the USSR were to be compounded by a type of MBFR that limits the military sovereignty of Europeans (as explained in a separate note), crowning the future with a strategic agreement between the two superpowers, Europe – the cradle of civilisation, home to the world empire until fifty years ago – would decline to a region with “limited sovereignty”: that of each of the superpowers for one area, and of both for the whole.

4. The *querelle* over the inviolability of borders has unexpectedly given the West a significant negotiating advantage, which it would be wrong not to exploit as much as possible. We believed that it would be possible to get some of our ideas across by opposing the Soviet Union’s clear desire to set up a permanent pan-European body, which the West didn’t like. We didn’t need to use this bargaining chip because the USSR gave us another one by unexpectedly insisting on the absolute autonomy of the inviolability of the current European borders.

If, for more general reasons, it is deemed appropriate, *in due course* and in any case as late as possible (because the Conference has not yet opened), to reach an accommodation with the Soviets, the Westerners – if they are able to negotiate skilfully – will have enough in their hands to obtain from the Soviet camp recognition of the principles that are most dear to them:

- human rights;
- the self-determination of peoples (and the rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine);
- a certain opening up of the closed Soviet world to human exchanges, ideas and information.<sup>2</sup>

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2 For all Italian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2915](http://dodis.ch/C2915).

[dodis.ch/76943](https://dodis.ch/76943)

United States

*Member of the National Security Council Staff Sonnenfeldt to National Security  
Advisor Kissinger<sup>1</sup>*

## WRAP UP OF CSCE

Secret

[Washington,] 10 April 1973

The preparatory talks are now in recess until April 25. In this last round a fair amount of progress was made in negotiating mandates, and the issues are probably sufficiently narrow that they can be resolved in the next round, provided the Allies do not become too intrigued with pressing the Soviets to the wall on minor issues.

The Soviets ended the round with a burst of impatience and some harsh language about stalling tactics. Apparently, they do not hold us responsible, (at least not in official contacts); we have in fact tried to prod the Allies to step up the pace. Nevertheless, it is likely that the Soviets are becoming disquieted by the drift of CSCE, and will toughen up in the next round.

The main issues seem to be the following.

1. *Security – Principles*

The Soviets have insisted that one clear, unqualified principle is the “inviolability of existing borders in Europe.” This is anathema to Bonn, and all of the Allies (with some French hesitation) have pressed for a link between renunciation of force and inviolability of boundaries—thus circumventing the de jure confirmation of existing borders.

The Germans, realizing that the Soviets are becoming tougher, have moved to a compromise that would maintain some tenuous linkage, but want to trade this concession for something on human contacts, or some expression on the principle of self-determination and human rights.

We should not have to do anything on this; the Germans can be expected to make their concession, probably in advance of, or during the Brezhnev visit.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nixon Library (US-RMNPL), National Security Council Files, Box 1335, National Security Council Secretariat, National Security Council Unfiled Materials, 1973 (5 of 12). *This document is printed in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, European Security, doc. 133. This document is also classified as “Sensitive” and “Exclusive eyes only”. This memorandum was sent by member of the National Security Council Staff Helmut Sonnenfeldt, [dodis.ch/P45573](https://dodis.ch/P45573), to the US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846) on 10 April 1973.*

<sup>2</sup> General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543). He visited West Germany to meet with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](https://dodis.ch/P15409), from 18 to 21 May 1973.

## 2. *Military Security – Confidence Building*

There are two issues: (1) a linkage between CSCE and MBFR, and (2) whether confidence building measures should include “restraints” on major “movements” rather than on maneuvers.

– We, the French and the Soviets are holding out against any direct link between CSCE and MBFR that might be made in a declaration. Almost all the other participants, in one way or another, want to emphasize military security.

– The probable outcome is some rhetorical reference to European military security, and some patronizing but affirmative references to the value of arms control, including MBFR. This would be satisfactory to us. The Soviets will probably find a way to live with it, but the French may balk at a blanket approval of various negotiations that they are boycotting or oppose.

The “movements” question is exceedingly pedantic. Our ritual formula includes maneuvers, exercise and major military movements that should be pre-announced. The Soviets resisted “movements,” partly because they did not know what exactly was involved. Upon examination we are not so sure of what the phrase really means, but some Allies, abetted by the Romanians and Yugoslavs, see a further restraint on the Soviets.

Presumably, we will end up with a definition of “movements” that refers to “across national boundaries,” but we may have to take a softer position with the Soviets, since there are all kinds of “movements” that we have no intention of announcing.

## 3. *Human Contacts*

As expected, the more we go into detail, the more the Soviets resist. Their tactic seems to be to cover whatever is agreed on “freer movement” with a general qualification limiting “European programs” to those that do not interfere with sovereignty, or internal legislation, or have as their purpose stimulating war propaganda, etc.<sup>3</sup>

– The Soviets apparently are making their own tactical linkage between “inviolable” frontiers and human contacts, hinting that if they get their point on frontiers they will make concessions on human contacts.

– The outcome seems to be a compromise that includes the Western language on freer movement, but does not commit the Soviets to adopt all the measures.

3 On 29 March 1973, the Soviet representative to the Working Group on human contacts Valerian Zorin, [dodis.ch/P11993](https://dodis.ch/P11993) tabled a Soviet draft mandate in committee. According to a draft translation provided in telegram 833 from the US Embassy in Finland to the US Department of State dated 29 March 1973, it reads in part: “The committee is entrusted with preparing a draft final document on the question of expanding cultural cooperation and contacts among organisations and people and the dissemination of information.” The translation continued: “Such cooperation should be implemented with respect for the sovereignty, laws, and customs of each country and facilitate the strengthening of peace and mutual understanding among peoples in Europe. It should not be utilized for propaganda or war, enmity and hatred among peoples, racial and national superiority.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams, [no film number], [Telegram 833 from Helsinki, March 29, 1973](#)).



#### 4. *Economic Cooperation*

The contentious issue is the Eastern insistence that among the principles for European economic cooperation there be a principle of extending MFN and non-discrimination. The West opposes this, though the reasons are not quite clear. It may be that the EC wants to emphasize regional principles rather than bilateral concessions such as MFN. (We probably should shift to MFN as a principle in CSCE. It might be a face-saving way for the Soviets to revoke their emigration tax; if there is a declaration that includes freer movement of people and the MFN principle, the Soviets might have a plausible pretext for dropping their educational tax.)

#### 5. *Permanent Machinery*

This has been surprisingly quiescent. The Soviets apparently accept that it cannot be reasonably discussed until later. The Allies are, however, divided on the tactics. The French want to make a gesture toward some sort of coordinating committee that will have in its mandate future arrangements including another CSCE. The other Allies are thinking of a similar committee but do not want to concede on another CSCE, at least not yet. Our position has been that we cannot keep the idea of permanent machinery off the agenda, but should reduce its substance to an ad hoc sort of arrangement without any authority in the security area.

– We are somewhat hobbled on this issue. The State bureaucracy, especially USNATO, taking an earlier lead from the White House, has treated permanent machinery as anathema. Turning to a more conciliatory position – which we have already conceded to the Soviets – is proving difficult.

#### 6. *Soviet–US*

Despite what the Soviets may be saying in your channel, as far as we can tell our Delegation has managed to steer carefully between the Soviets and the Allies. We have supported the Allied position, but tried to move the process toward a completion by June. We have supported the Soviets on excluding military security and on some form of permanent machinery.

You will recall that the Soviets badly undercut us by surfacing the fact that a draft declaration was given to you privately.<sup>4</sup> This is particularly touchy because both the Germans and French have the same draft as the British now have from us; each seems to be waiting to see who makes the first effort to move toward the Soviet draft.

I will do a separate memorandum incorporating the comments from State and the UK on the Soviet draft.

#### 7. *Dates*

We have been operating on the sequence given you in Moscow: namely, starting CSCE at the Ministerial level in late June. This could be a conflict with the Brezhnev visit, and you may wish to raise this problem of a target date with the Soviets. We are planning on about 7–10 days of speeches, and the endorsement of the agenda and mandates.

<sup>4</sup> On Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin's, [dodis.ch/P42138](https://dodis.ch/P42138), provision of the draft to Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846), cf. FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, *European Security*, [doc. 132](#).

At Tab A is a brief State wrap up of CSCE.<sup>5</sup>

At Tab B is a reporting telegram from the Delegation.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> For the attached but not printed memorandum from Executive Secretary of the US Department of State Theodore Eliot, [dodis.ch/P81290](https://dodis.ch/P81290), to Henry Kissinger, dated 9 April 1973, cf. US-RMNPL, National Security Council Files, Box 1335, National Security Council Secretariat, National Security Council Unfiled Materials, 1973 (5 of 12).

<sup>6</sup> For the attached but not printed telegram 940 from the US Embassy in Finland to the Department of State dated 6 April 1973, cf. US-RMNPL, National Security Council Files, Box 1335, National Security Council Secretariat, National Security Council Unfiled Materials, 1973 (5 of 12). For all documents of the United States in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2904](https://dodis.ch/C2904).

[dodis.ch/77041](https://dodis.ch/77041)

European Community

*Report of the General Affairs Committee submitted at the 19<sup>th</sup> Session of the Assembly of Western European Union<sup>1</sup>*

HARMONISATION OF POLICIES OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
IN PREPARATION FOR THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

[Brussels,] 3 May 1973

[...] <sup>2</sup>

*Draft Recommendation on the harmonisation of policies of Western European countries in preparation for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe*

The Assembly,

Considering that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe can constitute a step towards detente and disarmament in Europe;

Considering therefore that a successful conclusion of the conference must be one of the aims of the policy of all European States;

Considering that in no event must its success be at the expense of strengthening the European union provided for at the Paris summit conference;

Welcoming the fact that the nine member countries of the EEC pursued a concerted policy during the preliminary talks in Helsinki;

Noting that it is for the WEU Council to consider the implications in Europe for the defence policy of the member countries of the organisation,

*Recommends that the Council:*

1. In the preparatory talks in Helsinki, pay special attention to ensuring the security of Western Europe, with particular regard to:

- (a) the balancing of any force reductions in Europe;
- (b) the maintenance of the stability on the north-eastern flank of Europe;
- (c) the maintenance in full of the modified Brussels Treaty and all its implications;

<sup>1</sup> Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), WEU-36.019. *Original in English and French. This document No.603 is a report and was submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Rapporteur Paul de Stexhe, [dodis.ch/P81425](https://dodis.ch/P81425), during the first part of the 19<sup>th</sup> Session of the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) on 3 May 1973. It was adopted unanimously by the Committee. This document consists of the Draft Recommendation on the harmonization of policies of western European countries in preparation for the CSCE, as well as an explanatory memorandum submitted by rapporteur de Stexhe.*

<sup>2</sup> *The Table of contents has been omitted, as well as the list of the members of the Committee. For the complete document in the English as well as in the French version, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77041](https://dodis.ch/77041).*

2. Ensure in any event that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe opens the way to the free movement of persons and ideas between all European countries;

3. Maintain as regular a dialogue as possible with the Assembly on the evolution of the current negotiations.

*Explanatory Memorandum (submitted by Mr. de Stexhe, Rapporteur)*

*I. Introduction*

1. The Assembly of Western European Union has already had several opportunities of considering the prospects of a conference on security and co-operation in Europe and in particular when it examined the reports by Mr. Sieglerschmidt and Mr. Nessler.<sup>3</sup> The last occasion was in December 1972 when it adopted a recommendation on Europe and the evolution of East-West relations urging, inter alia, that the Council:

“Invite member States to make an effective contribution to preparatory work on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe so that the participation of the EEC countries is concerted and constructive in application of the decision of the Heads of State and of Government.”

2. Since then, the situation has developed quickly in three respects:

- (i) Obstacles preventing an agreement between the Federal Republic and the GDR have been removed and a treaty on relations between the two German States has been concluded. Although the application of the treaty still presents certain difficulties, most of the Western European countries are preparing to establish diplomatic relations with the GDR.
- (ii) Negotiations between Ambassadors in Helsinki in preparation for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe started on 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1972. Preparatory talks have also been held in Vienna since January 1973 with a view to negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions by the two alliances.
- (iii) The nine-power consultations on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe have proved effective, and the results achieved will be analysed in this report.

3. Your Rapporteur will not therefore revert to matters covered in earlier reports but will confine himself to the most recent developments.

4. In view of the nature of these developments, this report has been written in the light of the decisions taken at the Paris summit conference, attention being concentrated on the nine-power consultations. It is evident that the questions to be dealt with at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe come within the field of responsibility of several organisations, none of which, by membership or terms of reference, is in a position to consider all the problems raised by the Helsinki negotiations. Nor is there any reason why the EEC countries should keep other European countries, neutral or not, members of the Council of Europe

<sup>3</sup> *Parliamentarian of the Federal Republic of Germany Hellmut Sieglerschmidt, [dodis.ch/P81426](http://dodis.ch/P81426), and French politician Edmond Nessler, [dodis.ch/P45515](http://dodis.ch/P45515).*

or not, out of the preparatory talks in Helsinki if they wish to take part, at least in certain fields.

5. Thus, the Political Committee of the Council of Europe recently adopted a report on East West relations in Europe submitted by Sir John Rodgers<sup>4</sup> (Document 3230) recommending *inter alia* that the Committee of Ministers:

“Seek and promote the co-ordination of the policies of member States in the preparation of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.”

6. Your Rapporteur fully endorses this recommendation and believes such co-ordination should be extended to countries which have hitherto been kept out of the Council of Europe because of their political régimes but which are directly concerned by security and co-operation in Europe. This is the case in particular of Mediterranean countries such as Spain and Portugal.

7. However, to avoid all the European organisations considering the same matters at the same time and in the same way, each must keep to its own specific field at both intergovernmental and parliamentary assembly level. Thus the Council of Europe's field covers cultural, technical and juridical matters, whereas the Ministers of the Nine are responsible for everything connected with the Rome Treaty. The North Atlantic Council handles the truly military aspects of European security where military co-operation between Europe and the United States is concerned and WEU the policy of defence and general political matters involving the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.<sup>5</sup>

8. Governments may be expected to hold their consultations in the most convenient manner at any given moment. Parliamentary assemblies are not tied to these particular arrangements, their task being to consider the conference on security and co-operation in Europe as it affects the application of the treaty for which they are responsible. It is on these grounds that your Rapporteur is able to devote the closest attention to nine-power cooperation in the political field since this involves the implementation of the political provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, just as the principal military provisions are implemented in the framework of NATO.<sup>6</sup>

9. Finally, it must be remembered that the present report has had to be drafted immediately after the close of the third round of preliminary talks in Helsinki, which ended on 6<sup>th</sup> April. The fourth round will be held at the end of April and the beginning of May and it is planned that the conference proper should start during the second half of June 1973. The essence of the Helsinki talks is moreover being kept secret, as is necessary in the course of negotiations. For these various reasons the information your Rapporteur is able to present here is necessarily fragmentary and his conclusions therefore provisional.

<sup>4</sup> British Parliamentarian John Rodgers, [dodis.ch/P81427](https://dodis.ch/P81427).

<sup>5</sup> The Treaty of Brussels, also referred to as the Brussels Pact, was the founding treaty of the Western Union between 1948 and 1954, when it was amended as the Modified Brussels Treaty and served as the founding treaty of the WEU until its termination in 2010.

<sup>6</sup> The NATO, [dodis.ch/R2837](https://dodis.ch/R2837), is an intergovernmental military alliance between 32 member states – 30 in Europe and 2 in North America.

*II. Decisions taken at the Paris summit conference<sup>7</sup>*

10. Although the idea of a conference on European security was first broached eighteen years ago, it was not until 10<sup>th</sup> December 1971 that the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Brussels, announced its willingness to hold multilateral talks as soon as possible in preparation for such a conference.

11. In Bonn on 31<sup>st</sup> May 1972, the Atlantic Pact countries proposed that exploratory multilateral talks be held as soon as possible on balanced force reductions by the two blocs. These talks were to be held parallel with the preparatory multilateral talks on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

12. When Mr. Kissinger<sup>8</sup> visited Moscow on 12<sup>th</sup> September 1972, the Soviet Union agreed to the principle of starting exploratory talks on force reductions in January 1973, and the United States consequently agreed that the multilateral talks on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe should start in Helsinki on 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1972. The NATO Permanent Council agreed to this date on 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1972, and on 9<sup>th</sup> November the Finnish Government invited 32 European countries, the United States and Canada to meet for this purpose in Helsinki as from 22<sup>nd</sup> November.

13. The West had always handled the question of a conference on security and co-operation in Europe in the framework of NATO since the western powers considered that all matters concerning force reductions should be considered side by side with problems connected with the European States' frontiers or economic and cultural relations.

14. It became apparent, however, that although NATO was a suitable framework for co-ordinating all matters affecting defence policy it was unsuitable for the preparation of a conference whose agenda included a large number of questions outside the terms of reference of the Atlantic organisation. Also, if western positions had been worked out solely in the framework of NATO it would inevitably have led to a confrontation between two military blocs, which would probably not have contributed to the success of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

15. For these reasons, once they had agreed to co-ordinate their foreign policies on a permanent basis, the nine countries which are now members of the European Economic Community<sup>9</sup> included in their agenda preparatory discussions on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

16. At the summit conference in Paris on 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> October 1972, the Heads of State or Government took two decisions concerning co-operation in the field of foreign policy and, consequently, the preparation of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

17. First, in paragraph 14 of their communiqué, they set out the following guidelines for their co-operation:

<sup>7</sup> Held in 19–20 October 1972 in Paris where heads of state and government decisions on cooperation in the field of foreign policy and security.

<sup>8</sup> US Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846).

<sup>9</sup> The European Community (EC) was an economic and political association formed in 1957 (as the European Economic Community), [dodis.ch/R9899](https://dodis.ch/R9899), to foster integration among Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

“The Heads of State or of Government agreed that political co-operation between the member States of the Community on foreign policy matters had begun well and should be still further improved. They agreed that consultations should be intensified at all levels and that the Foreign Ministers should in future meet four times a year instead of twice for this purpose. They considered that the aim of their cooperation was to deal with problems of current interest and, where possible, to formulate common medium- and long-term positions, keeping in mind, *inter alia*, the international political implications for and effects of Community policies under construction. On matters which have a direct bearing on Community activities, close contact will be maintained with the institutions of the Community. They agreed that the Foreign Ministers should produce, not later than 30<sup>th</sup> June 1973, a second report on methods of improving political co-operation in accordance with the Luxembourg report.”

18. Second, in paragraph (vi) of the communiqué, they set out the aims which they would pursue in their relations with the Eastern European countries:

“The member States of the Community, in the interests of good neighbourly relations which should exist among all European countries whatever their régime, affirm their determination to pursue their policy of détente and of peace with the countries of Eastern Europe, notably on the occasion of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, and the establishment on a sound basis of a wider economic and human co-operation.”

### *III. The nine-power preparations<sup>10</sup>*

19. No time was lost in applying these decisions since the nine Foreign Ministers met on 20<sup>th</sup> November 1972 to discuss political co-operation and particularly preparations for the talks which were to start in Helsinki on 22<sup>nd</sup> November. For all the economic aspects of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, they were assisted by members of the European Commission.<sup>11</sup>

20. In reality, the meeting on 20<sup>th</sup> November was merely a culmination of two years' consultations in the framework of the Political Committee, the *ad hoc* committee dealing with questions of economic co-operation and NATO. However, by 20<sup>th</sup> November it was time for the Community to take certain fundamental decisions and also to decide on procedure for the preparatory multilateral talks. All the member countries had accepted the principle that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe was not to be a confrontation between blocs, but opinions varied as to the effect the application of this principle would have on the policy to be pursued. Although the Community is in no way a military bloc since it has no defence organisation of its own, it is economically at least, a homogeneous body and its members must not forget this fact, even when one of them acts individually in negotiations outside the Community.

21. The Commission had submitted two documents to the Council, one of which dealt with the rôle which the Community should play in the forthcoming conference on security and co-operation in Europe. The Commission asked to be allowed to take part in the conference and in particular in the work of the commit-

<sup>10</sup> Refers to the nine members of the EC as of 1972.

<sup>11</sup> The European Commission is the executive cabinet of the European Communities.



tees set up to consider questions of economic co-operation. The other document set out the aims of Community policy in the framework of co-operation with the Eastern European countries.

22. So far, these documents have had only one reading by the Committee of Permanent Representatives<sup>12</sup> and no decision has been taken. The real question for the Ministers was whether, by following the guidelines laid down at the Paris summit conference, they would admit that the rôle of the Community as such went beyond the strictly commercial aspects of co-operation between the various European countries and, if so, how far Community responsibilities might extend in economic or even political fields.

23. The fact that the Community is to move rapidly towards an economic and monetary union will inevitably have repercussions on Community policy in the field of foreign policy. For instance, who has authority to speak for the Community and who will be the representative of the country which has the Chairmanship of the Council fulfil this rôle satisfactorily? Are there not grounds for making the Commission responsible for representing the Community as a whole in certain fields? This would imply some form of official recognition of the Community by all those taking part in the conference. A moot point is whether such formal recognition is worth the cost of concessions which otherwise might not be essential. It is now evident that the Soviet Union recognises the existence of Community Europe and the EEC has no need of more formal recognition.

24. At the meeting on 20<sup>th</sup> November, the Political Committee submitted a document proposing a harmonised nine-power approach in the various eventualities that might arise in the course of the multilateral preparatory talks with due regard to the items likely to be included in the agenda of the conference.

25. The nine Ministers agreed on most aspects of the agenda of the conference at which the following suggested questions might be considered:

- (i) security, i.e. principles governing relations between States and matters affecting the balance of forces;
- (ii) economic, scientific and technical cooperation;
- (iii) human and cultural relations.

26. With regard to the conference proper, the proposal that it should be held in three stages was adopted:

- (a) an opening session attended by the Foreign Ministers;
- (b) a period that might be quite long during which study committees would work out the final act;
- (c) a second ministerial session for adopting the final act.

27. The Nine agreed to turn down the Soviet proposal that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe should only be a summit meeting. Nor did they agree that a permanent body should be set up after the conference. However, they agreed on proposed terms of reference for the various study committees.

<sup>12</sup> COREPER is the Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union, [dodis.ch/R27374](http://dodis.ch/R27374), made up of the Head or Deputy head of mission from the EU member states in Brussels.

The Ministers decided to uphold these proposals at the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council.<sup>13</sup>

28. At the same meeting, the nine Ministers considered two other documents prepared by the Political Committee in co-operation with the Commission concerning harmonisation of the positions of the Nine in respect of economic and technical co-operation and the environment. When submitting these documents, Mr. Sicco Mansholt,<sup>14</sup> President of the Commission, emphasised that action taken by the Nine in this field should be not only harmonised but of a strictly Community nature, even if it extended beyond questions concerned with trade.

29. Although no official details have been given of the nine-power talks, it is an open secret that there were differences of opinion over these proposals.

30. (i) As regards security, France has always refused to recognise the need for a parallel approach to balanced force reductions and European security and, *a fortiori*, refuses to give priority to the question of balanced force reductions. It is not taking part in the Vienna negotiations on this question. Subsequent stands adopted by the French Government indicate that France's position is unchanged and whatever progress may have been made on 20<sup>th</sup> November, a settlement cannot yet be seen. In all probability, however, being primarily concerned with the military aspects of the talks with Eastern Europe, this matter can best be tackled in the framework of NATO rather than that of the Nine.

31. (ii) In the economic field, opinions also differ as to how Community cohesion can and should be expressed in regard to the outside world. No one challenges the need for the Nine to harmonise their positions but it is feared that if there is too much cohesion the Nine might give the impression that they are forming a bloc. Admittedly within their own sphere of responsibilities the European Communities do form a bloc, but it is to be feared that if the Community's interests are represented by a single body the Soviet Union might take this as an excuse for claiming to represent the interests of all the Eastern European countries and consequently not allowing the people's democracies to have a say at the conference, thus further strengthening Soviet positions in Eastern Europe.

32. (iii) Human and cultural relations are not the direct responsibility of NATO nor of the Nine. To study such relations in the framework of an economic or, *a fortiori*, military bloc might jeopardise co-operation which should be considered in the widest possible framework. Many consider the Council of Europe<sup>15</sup> to be the most appropriate framework at the present time.

33. In this connection, your Rapporteur wishes to recall the views expressed by Mr. Reverdin<sup>16</sup> in Document 3243 of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe:

"Politically, the conference on security and co-operation in Europe seems likely to be the major political event in Europe in 1973. One of our priority tasks

<sup>13</sup> The North Atlantic Council, [dodis.ch/R24629](http://dodis.ch/R24629), is the principal political decision-making body within NATO. It oversees the political and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance.

<sup>14</sup> The Dutch President of the European Commission Sicco Mansholt, [dodis.ch/P15891](http://dodis.ch/P15891).

<sup>15</sup> The Council of Europe (CoE), [dodis.ch/R2382](http://dodis.ch/R2382), is an international organisation that aims to uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Europe. It is Europe's oldest intergovernmental organisation, representing 46 European member States.

<sup>16</sup> The President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE Olivier Reverdin, [dodis.ch/P11967](http://dodis.ch/P11967).

should be to establish the Council of Europe's political approach and the rôle it might play in East-West relations.

Opinions on this subject differ. Some believe that the Helsinki conference, which is likely to be held in June this year, may bring about considerable changes in the European situation. We should take care to ensure that the Council of Europe is not left out of any such development in pan-European co-operation, particularly in certain technical and cultural fields where the Council has made considerable contributions. Some firmly believe that this can be done, whilst pointing out that a certain image dating from the cold war devalues the Council in the eyes of the East European countries. The absence of communist representatives in the Assembly, debates such as those on the "Free Europe" and "Freedom" radio stations, and the continuing existence of a committee on European non-member countries are mentioned as obstacles in this regard.

[...]

So far, member States have not wanted to use the Council of Europe as a framework for consultations in preparation for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, nor do they seem to intend to do so. However, the Working Party will need to consider the possibility – as referred to in the Committee of Ministers' communiqué – of East European countries participating in certain Council of Europe activities as well as the possibility of the Council's providing a framework for pan-European co-operation in the implementation of some of the results of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

With the conference on security and co-operation in the offing, it is also important that our governments should not agree to a new international body being set up in Europe as a result of the conference with responsibilities that more or less overlapped with those of the Council of Europe."

34. The Nine seem to have agreed that:

- (a) all proposals, whatever their origin, made during the conference concerning matters within the competence of the Community must be considered by the Community bodies concerned;
- (b) the EEC countries must not make any offers or proposals on such matters at the conference without prior discussion by the Community;
- (c) the Commission must be represented as from the start of the preparatory talks in order to apply this procedure and intervene as and when necessary.

35. This means that the Commission's role will not be to give the Community's point of view at the conference. This will be the task of the representative of the country chairing the Council. But at the same time it has been stipulated that for matters within the competence of the Community no proposals may be made other than on behalf of the Community as a whole, which means that the Community bodies must discuss each case as it arises and take appropriate decisions.

36. The Commission will therefore be in Helsinki but only to take part in internal Community consultations and not to represent it outside.

37. Conversely, no firm agreement seems to have been reached on the Community responsibilities which demand concertation. There is no problem where trade is concerned, but if the guidelines laid down at the Paris summit conference are interpreted in their broadest sense all matters relating to economic, technological or financial co-operation will have to be considered within the competence of the Community. The Nine will have to take a decision on this point without delay.

38. During the preliminary talks in Helsinki, the Nine were able to meet to consider jointly the questions arising from the talks, for instance at the ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 16<sup>th</sup> March when they welcomed the results achieved by nine-power co-operation and decided to improve their co-operation by holding regular meetings of their delegations in Helsinki and maintaining closer liaison between them and Brussels. They also agreed that in order not to avoid a fundamental distinction being drawn between “all-European” rights whereby the Soviet Union might have a say in the evolution of the EEC and international rights, as defined *inter alia* in the United Nations Charter.

39. It should be underlined that although nine-power consultations seem to have produced excellent results in Helsinki, talks between Europeans and Americans have fallen short of any such co-ordination of aims and hence approach. Everything indicates that the Americans no longer consider the success of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna to be a prior-condition for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. On the contrary, they believe the conference on security and co-operation in Europe should clear the way for the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions which are marking time due to the ill will of the Soviet Union and its allies and disagreement between the western countries. The United States Government is making it increasingly evident that its principal aim is the reduction of American forces stationed in Europe and it seems prepared to make any concessions necessary in Helsinki to break the deadlock in the Vienna negotiations. Moreover, it seems to grant greater importance to its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union than to collective talks such as those in Helsinki.

40. Distrust of American intentions referred to in no uncertain terms and with increasing frequency in the European press can but encourage the Nine to strengthen their solidarity, failing which they may one day find themselves faced with an American-Soviet agreement about which they have had no say. The need to continue the Helsinki talks is now greater than ever but so is the need for the Nine to proceed with the utmost caution and to co-ordinate their positions and approach to the greatest possible extent.

#### *IV. The first session of the Helsinki conference*<sup>17</sup>

41. The first session of the conference of Ambassadors was held in Helsinki from 22<sup>nd</sup> November to 15<sup>th</sup> December 1972. It was primarily concerned with organisational matters but it is evident that some of the principles agreed to already commit the conference proper.

<sup>17</sup> The 1972 Helsinki Conference initiated the CSCE; it led to the signature of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975. For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](http://dodis.ch/58821).

42. On 24<sup>th</sup> November, Mr. Toettermann,<sup>18</sup> Chairman of the conference, read out eight points on which all member countries had agreed:

- (i) all States will take part in the consultations on a basis of complete equality and independence;
- (ii) each country has one representative, but he can delegate his power to speak;
- (iii) the secretariat and technical services will be provided by the Finnish Government;
- (iv) decisions shall be taken by consensus, this being defined as there being no opposition;
- (v) working groups will be set up only by consensus;
- (vi) no official minutes will be kept but decisions taken and final texts will be published;
- (vii) meetings will be held *in camera* unless otherwise decided by consensus;
- (viii) the seven preceding points may be modified only by consensus.

43. It was apparent however that there had been insufficient co-ordination of the positions of the Community countries and it was not possible to avoid disagreement between them on a number of points. In general, the French Delegation wanted the talks between Ambassadors to be as flexible as possible and on no account to resemble an official conference. The French Delegation was therefore not in favour of a very detailed agenda being drawn up for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. It wished agreement to be confined to the broad lines of the agenda. Conversely, delegations from other EEC countries and the United States wanted a very detailed agenda to be drawn up and even wished the Ambassadors to reach preliminary agreement on each item.

44. Finally, in response to the Soviet proposal for an agenda including:

- (i) security, particularly the political aspects;
  - (ii) economic and cultural co-operation;
  - (iii) the creation of a permanent organisation,
- the West proposed the following agenda:
- (i) security;
  - (ii) economic co-operation;
  - (iii) cultural exchanges and the free circulation of ideas and persons.

45. However, there is no indication that the West has rejected the idea of setting up a permanent organisation and it is therefore probable that the matter will be considered at the conference. Distrust of such an organisation was not specific to the Nine since the United States adopted a similar position.

46. Finally, on one essential point no conclusion was reached during the first round of preparatory talks in Helsinki, i.e. the terms of reference of the commit-

18 Secretary-General of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Richard Tötterman, [dodis.ch/P46542](http://dodis.ch/P46542).

tees which will meet during the second stage of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. This was a fundamental difference between the western countries as a whole, which were anxious that a conference on security and co-operation in Europe should be held only if a detailed agenda is drawn up beforehand, and the Soviet Union and its allies.

47. There seem therefore to have been fundamental differences from the outset.

48. The Soviet Union considered the aim of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe was to make solemn declarations of a general nature on a political *status quo* in Europe, the creation of a nucleus of a permanent organisation and accessorially the promotion of economic co-operation.

49. In the West's view, the conference should go beyond general declarations which would in fact merely confirm declarations already adopted in the United Nations for instance. It should seek agreement on the interpretation of general principles governing specific problems, particularly with regard to improving security by emphasising noninterference, military measures, wider movement of persons, ideas and information and true economic co-operation.

50. To this end, methods of work would be quite different: rather than holding general assemblies where participants unilaterally state their views and which are not very suitable for real negotiations, all concrete problems should be entrusted to committees or working groups with detailed terms of reference.

51. Meeting in Brussels on 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> December 1972, the North Atlantic Council agreed on the following text to which France has therefore subscribed:

"Ministers affirmed that their governments would work constructively to establish necessary agreements in the multilateral preparatory talks, which have just started in Helsinki. They recalled that the aim of their governments at these talks would be to ensure that their proposals were fully considered at a conference and to establish that enough common ground existed among the participants to warrant reasonable expectations that a conference would produce satisfactory results. They considered that there should be agreement at these talks on the arrangements and guidelines necessary to enable such a conference to produce constructive and specific results. They noted that such results could be achieved only through the process of detailed and serious negotiation, without artificial time limits.

Ministers confirmed that it is the goal of their governments to increase the security of all Europe through negotiations concerning such questions as principles guiding relations between the participants and through appropriate measures, including military ones, aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability so as to contribute to the process of reducing the dangers of military confrontation; to improve co-operation in all fields; to bring about greater, more open and freer relationships between all people in Europe; to stimulate a wider flow of information and of ideas."

#### *V. The evolution of positions since 15<sup>th</sup> December 1972*

52. Events between the first and second rounds of negotiations in Helsinki, particularly the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December 1972 and Pres-

ident Pompidou's<sup>19</sup> visit to the Soviet Union in January 1973, showed that views were converging and facilitated the resumption of negotiations in Helsinki on 5<sup>th</sup> January.

53. In the quarrel over terms of reference in Helsinki, France adopted a less rigorous position than its partners but, conversely, during his talks with Mr. Pompidou, Mr. Brezhnev<sup>20</sup> seems to have come round to the idea that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe could be delayed in order to reach sufficiently definite agreement on the terms of reference of the committees.

54. This may be deduced from the communiqué issued after the talks:

"Emphasising once again the great importance which the USSR and France attach to an all-European conference on security and co-operation, the two sides proclaim their determination to do all they can to ensure that the multilateral preparatory consultations in Helsinki bring about an early mutual agreement and to ensure that the conference itself is convened as soon as possible in the coming months. Taking into account the fact that their views as formulated in the Soviet-French declaration on 30<sup>th</sup> October 1971 broadly coincide, and the profound character of the consultations between them, the Soviet Union and France will exert every effort in order to make an effective contribution to the holding of the conference."

55. The communiqué continues:

"The Soviet Union and France proceed on the basis of the fact that an all-European conference should not be made dependent on any other negotiations and that it is a major independent action of European and world politics."

56. This confirmed what had been inferred from France's refusal to agree to the paragraphs of the communiqué issued after the North Atlantic Council meeting on 8<sup>th</sup> December concerning exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe, which stated:

"Ministers hoped that these talks would make it possible to commence negotiations on this subject in the autumn of 1973. They noted that such a programme implied that talks on both mutual and balanced force reductions and on a conference on security and co-operation in Europe would be going on in the same general period of time."

57. However, from what President Pompidou told the press it could be understood that France's position with regard to the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions is perhaps not inflexible:

"Mr. Brezhnev and I had a long discussion on mutual and balanced force reductions. I recalled the position which I had explained in great detail in Paris. The Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union also set out his ideas on this conference, which led him to hope that France would take part. There was no question of France changing its position overnight, of course. But I noted the interest on the one hand the detailed information which I obtained from the Soviet Union on this occasion regarding its views on the conference, its procedure and aims, and on the other the Soviet Union's reasons for wishing France

19 French President Georges Pompidou, [dodis.ch/P15264](https://dodis.ch/P15264).

20 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).



to take part, and we agreed to discuss the matter further. Do not draw over-hasty conclusions from this."

58. Finally, the Soviet Union agreed to the West's proposal to call the preparatory conference for the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions on 22<sup>nd</sup> January, although it insisted that the meeting be held in Vienna and not in Geneva as planned and that all the European countries be invited to take part. The NATO countries agreed to the first condition but the second is still the subject of heated discussion since this would imply a complete change of course for the conference and also the extension of future force reductions to Southern Europe. These discussions did not prevent the Vienna meeting from being held but the negotiations seem to be marking time pending agreement on this point."

59. It is questionable whether, having been caught off-foot by the Soviet request, the NATO countries concerted their positions sufficiently prior to the Vienna negotiations. Again, does the Soviet Union really intend the negotiations to succeed?

60. Is it therefore essential from the very outset to establish close ties between the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions?

61. However, your Rapporteur feels that the minimum degree of confidence which is necessary between participants if the conference on security and co-operation in Europe is to succeed would be seriously jeopardised if it did not find an echo in Vienna.

#### *VI. The second and third rounds of preliminary talks*

62. Although there may have been some doubt after the first round of meetings in Helsinki from 22<sup>nd</sup> November to 15<sup>th</sup> December 1972 as to the depth of the nine-power consultations, the second round, which started on 15<sup>th</sup> January 1973, shows that the Nine are effectively applying the decisions taken at the Paris summit conference and have co-ordinated their positions in Helsinki, as most observers have noted, since it has been clearly demonstrated either that the representative of one EEC member country was speaking on behalf of the whole Community or that statements made by representatives converged, and this is not just a question of chance. The very nature of present nine-power political co-operation, apart from ministerial meetings or other outward manifestations, allows governments to collaborate closely when implementing policies, the broad lines of which have been agreed. Everything indicates that this was the case in Helsinki, thanks in particular to the regular meetings of delegates from the nine countries in preparation for the Ambassadors' meetings. These meetings seem to have been far more fruitful than those in the framework of NATO, especially since France did not attend the latter meetings regularly. However, the second round of preliminary negotiations has not brought out any major differences between the west countries, or even between them and most of the neutral European countries, on matters related to the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

63. From the very start, the Nine demonstrated their cohesion by presenting a joint proposal for an agenda for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. Within the three main heads already suggested by the western countries, this draft agenda sets out a number of important points and particularly the crea-

tion of ten sub-committees to study specific problems linked with the three main heads:

- (a) with regard to security matters a definition would have to be made of the principles governing relations between States, due account being taken of the United Nations Charter,<sup>21</sup> the principle of the sovereignty of States, human rights and international law;
- (b) with regard to economic co-operation, this proposal would imply increasing trade and industrial co-operation, seeking better use of natural resources and consideration of environmental problems;
- (c) finally, with regard to the free circulation of persons and ideas, the nine-power proposal provides for a general liberalisation of exchanges between persons and in particular for co-operation between States in the field of education.

64. Although this proposal was not put forward in the name of the EEC but by the Ambassadors of Belgium, Italy and Denmark, there can be no doubt that the Nine – in this first joint statement on foreign policy – have taken advantage of the suspension of the Helsinki talks to confirm a degree of cohesion in their foreign policy which was not so clear in December.

65. It is to be noted that the firm well-thought-out proposals were supported not only by the Nine and the Fifteen; they were also received with great interest by the neutral countries.

66. Yet no decisive progress was made during the second round of the Helsinki negotiations although the four main items on the agenda have been agreed to – security; economic co-operation; human contacts, cultural exchanges and information; institutional matters.

67. But the Soviet Delegation found the Belgian proposal too detailed and, while agreeing to the terms of reference of the main committees, it rejected those proposed for the sub-committees, although they are essential if sufficiently detailed and concrete results are to be achieved within a reasonable time.

68. With regard to security, the Soviet Union wished the terms of reference of the committee to include only the bases of sovereignty, equality of States, renunciation of force and nonintervention in the internal affairs of States, whereas the western powers endorsed the Swiss proposal to include human rights and self-determination as well. The principles of international law are contained in the United Nations Charter and the General Assembly resolution of 1970 on friendly relations between States. The conference cannot claim to elaborate new international law on different bases to those of the United Nations, thus opening the door to all kinds of contestation. Nor can it “pick” and choose among the principles defined by the United Nations for this would infer that Europe rejected any principles it did not retain. But Europe could form a permanent body to arbitrate in the event of disputes and thus, instead of being based solely on principles, as the Soviet

<sup>21</sup> *The Charter of the United Nations is the founding document of the UN. It was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945.*

Union proposes, European security would be given tangible, dynamic meaning as underlined by the Swiss and Austrian Delegates.

69. Conversely, the Soviet Union and some of the western countries do not wish the concept of European security to be extended to the whole Mediterranean area, nor do they consider that the military aspects of security should be examined in the framework of the Helsinki negotiations in view of the parallel negotiations in Vienna.

70. Your Rapporteur wonders whether this attitude towards the Mediterranean countries is in Europe's general interests: Europe's security is linked with the Mediterranean area and it would be appropriate for the countries concerned to examine the problems of security and co-ordination in that area in an appropriate framework.

71. There was the least difference on the question of co-operation, although the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia asked that restrictions on trade between European States be abolished and that all discrimination be stopped, and Czechoslovakia called for an improvement in relations between the EEC and COMECON.<sup>22</sup> In fact, the EEC's right to exist as a trade partner was questioned neither by the eastern countries nor by the neutrals and the British proposals for dealing concretely and pragmatically with economic problems and increasing joint industrial projects, and the Finnish proposal for dealing with economic matters on a regional basis seem to have raised no serious objections.

72. This was not the case for human contacts. The terms of reference of the committee concerned raised the greatest difficulties and the negotiators discussed this matter right up to the last minute without finding a satisfactory solution. Here the problem of State control over mass communication media in the eastern countries arises, and the Soviet Union and its allies – while expressing their support for any proposal for wider co-operation in the cultural field – asserted that, in the field of information, exchanges should “respect each country's laws and customs”. In fact, cultural relations could be considered only through the intermediary of the State authorities.

73. The eastern countries denounced such institutions as Radio Free Europe<sup>23</sup> or “anti-culture, hatred between nations and pornography” in order to ensure the maintenance of strict State control over mass communication media.

74. Yet this is a question of cardinal importance, for détente cannot be effective unless it helps to free mankind. As the Irish Delegate<sup>24</sup> emphasised at the last sitting of the second session, the denial of human contacts and the free exchange of information undermined the West's confidence in the Helsinki conference as a whole.

75. As the French Delegate<sup>25</sup> underlined at the same sitting, the Nine's position with regard to institutional matters, i.e. the creation of a permanent body to im-

<sup>22</sup> The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, [dodis.ch/R11549](https://dodis.ch/R11549), was an economic organisation from 1949 to 1991 under the leadership of the Soviet Union that comprised the countries of the Eastern Bloc along with a number of communist states elsewhere in the world.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. [dodis.ch/R27967](https://dodis.ch/R27967).

<sup>24</sup> Not identified.

<sup>25</sup> Not identified.

plement decisions taken at the conference and follow up its work, is meaningful only insofar as the conference achieves results.

76. The third round of preliminary talks ended on 6<sup>th</sup> April 1973 without any decisive progress having been made. A fourth round is now to be held at the end of April and the beginning of May and some observers openly speak of a fifth round. There is even some doubt as to whether it will be possible to hold the conference in June or July as initially planned.

77. Most questions relating to the material organisation of the conference seem to have been settled. In particular, it seems to be agreed that the conference should meet in Helsinki, but there are still serious differences over the drafting of the various items of the agenda for which a special working group exists. Its work seems fairly advanced where economic co-operation and security are concerned and the discussion on measures to improve confidence

78. But little progress has been made with consideration of item 3 on cultural co-operation and movements of ideas and persons and item 4 regarding post-conference measures has remained practically untouched.

79. In face of the most unreceptive attitude of the Soviet Delegation to item 3 the western countries have by no means reached a common position. The Soviet Union appears to consider that exchanges of official delegations and government statistics would be sufficient to comply with this item on the agenda whereas the West has always considered that the development of human contacts, exchanges of information and cultural relations should assume far greater importance and in any event extend beyond intergovernmental exchanges.

80. For the forthcoming rounds of preparatory talks, it will therefore be essential for the delegations of the western countries to receive detailed instructions from their governments on the positions they should adopt with regard to such exchanges. In this respect there should be active concertation, at least between the governments of the nine EEC member countries.

81. Similarly, the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna have so far come to naught and there is every reason to fear that the West's principle of parallelism between the Vienna and Helsinki negotiations is not being respected.

82. In this connection, too, it is evident that there are still major differences between the western countries calling for close concertation as a matter of urgency, failing which the Soviet Union will be able to approach the conference on security and co-operation in Europe in the knowledge that it has already attained all its objectives without having made the slightest concession.

### *VII. Conclusions*

83. At the present juncture it cannot be said that anything very positive has been achieved at the Helsinki talks. Whatever their claims, it is difficult to say exactly how far each country wishes to pursue the negotiations to a successful conclusion, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union. Some observers feel that, with the agreements between the Federal Republic and its eastern neighbours and the strategic arms limitation talks, the Soviet Union has already obtained all the benefits it could have expected of a conference on security and co-operation in Eu-

rope and that it now considers the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions and security and co-operation in Europe as of but secondary importance.

84. There is no need for the Western European countries to adopt a very different position. Although anxious to consolidate détente, they have even less reason to seek to obtain it at any cost now that they have managed for the first time to co-ordinate their foreign policies in this regard and can consequently hope to exercise a greater influence than in the past.

85. Finally, some observers fear that in their haste to see the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions concluded without delay, the Americans may step down from their positions on security and co-operation in Europe without sufficient concessions in return. It is therefore felt that the Europeans should be a little more exacting, particularly with regard to the capital question of the free movement of persons, ideas and information.

86. Your Rapporteur considers that at the preliminary talks agreement must be reached on a detailed agenda for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe which must not be confined to general declarations which each State subsequently interprets unilaterally; the means of applying these principles in practice must be spelled out. This leads to the need for agreement on working methods, i.e. consideration of specific problems, in committees capable of initiating genuine negotiations.

87. Here, mention may be made of the suggestions put forward by Mr. Michael Stewart,<sup>26</sup> Council of Europe Delegate to the Inter-parliamentary Union Conference in Helsinki on 27<sup>th</sup> January 1973, which might be summarised as follows:

- (i) The conference should reaffirm generally-accepted norms of international law, and should reject ideologically-grounded versions.
- (ii) There should be a renunciation of force and the threat of force in all relations among European States, particularly with regard to any territorial changes.
- (iii) The conference should afford the occasion for recognition not only of all European States but also of all multilateral, supranational organisations functioning in Europe which share the purpose of furthering international co-operation.
- (iv) The conference should affirm the right of self-determination of all European peoples and the right of all European States freely to choose the unique paths of their own development, foreign policy and alliance affiliation, as long as such choice does not contradict the basic principle of force renunciation.
- (v) The conference should affirm norms aimed at liberalising the movement of persons, ideas and information among all parts of Europe.
- (vi) The conference should affirm the close relationship between security and the twin goal of reduction of military forces without either of these elements being substituted for the other.

26 British Parliamentarian Michael Stewart, [dodis.ch/P15449](http://dodis.ch/P15449).

- (vii) Security in Europe cannot be separated from the question of détente which necessarily encompasses the United States and the Soviet Union.
- (viii) The conference should make arbitration compulsory in the event of disputes between European countries, with recourse to the International Court of Justice in the event of such disputes being within its competence.
- (ix) The conference should concentrate on those things which really are the common interests of mankind, particularly arms reductions, although the results to be achieved in this field must not be a prior condition for progress in other fields.
- (x) Mr. Stewart further stated that it is also in the common interest of mankind for there to be as wide as possible an exchange of knowledge. We live now in an age of very highly advanced scientific knowledge, whether it is for the conquest of disease or the conquest of space. We come to realise it is to the common interest of mankind, irrespective of ideologies, that that knowledge should be increased, and that is most likely to happen if we are ready to pool and exchange what knowledge we have in all those fields.
- (xi) It is to the common interest of mankind to prevent economic progress from being of a kind which destroys and pollutes the human environment, and that is a task which by its nature cannot be successfully performed by one nation, or even by a group of nations. Certainly, if it is to be done on the European continent, all the nations living on that continent must take part in that task.

88. He believes therefore that it is not vain for groups of countries with profoundly different philosophies to come together to identify where their common interest lies and what practical steps they can take to promote it.

89. In this respect your Rapporteur considers that the West should decide who should do what. The Nine of the EEC should deal principally with the economic aspects and the Fifteen of the Atlantic Alliance with the military and security aspects. The Council of Europe should play its statutory rôle in the human, cultural and juridical fields.<sup>27</sup>

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27 For all documents of the EC in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2912](http://dodis.ch/C2912).

[dodis.ch/76976](https://dodis.ch/76976)

France

*Memorandum from the Political Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

CSCE FRENCH-SOVIET TALKS 25–30 MAY 1973

Paris, 24 May 1973

Among the issues which may be raised by Mr Gromyko<sup>2</sup> in his meeting with Mr de Lipkowski<sup>3</sup> regarding the CSCE, the most important ones appear to be the following:

1) *Overall assessment of the multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki.*

Although a number of issues must be settled before we can conclude with the adoption of the final recommendations,<sup>4</sup> the Helsinki multilateral preparatory talks appear to have progressed sufficiently for our representatives on the ground to have agreed on 1 June as a “target date” for their conclusion.

In any event, we believe that these preliminary talks have already been a great success. Our satisfaction is first and foremost due to the hitherto positive atmosphere during these discussions. The Helsinki talks are a new and encouraging experience in European relations, and we greatly appreciate the participants’ desire to uphold the principle of equality among all States represented and to make their voices heard.

Furthermore, many important aspects have garnered the consensus of the participating States. This was how an agreement was reached on organizing a Conference which would enable in-depth discussions on specific problems regarding relationships between Participating States. We are also pleased to note that the Conference’s agenda, supplemented by the directives to the committees and sub-committees, includes not only the two essential issues of security and cooperation, but also that of contacts, whether in the area of culture, information or human relations.

Naturally, the progress made in Helsinki is primarily down to the will of all participating States to successfully conclude the multilateral preparatory talks and lay the best possible foundations for fruitful work at the Conference itself. But we also believe that our extensive consultations with the Soviet Union on this

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archives of the French Foreign Ministry (FR-AMAE), 99SUP [C. S.C. E., 1973–1978], 26. Translated from French. This memorandum No. 162/DPCSCE was written by Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alfred Siefer-Gaillardin, [dodis.ch/P81517](https://dodis.ch/P81517). He worked under the Head of the CSCE unit within the Europe Directorate, Jacques Andréani, [dodis.ch/P51175](https://dodis.ch/P51175).

<sup>2</sup> Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](https://dodis.ch/P489).

<sup>3</sup> The French Minister of State attached to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean de Lipkowski, [dodis.ch/P45301](https://dodis.ch/P45301).

<sup>4</sup> Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).



issue played a major role, both with regard to high-level policy makers from both States and to our delegations on the ground in Finland.

2. *Planned date for the CSCE ministerial phase.*

As Mr Jobert<sup>5</sup> has already stated to Mr Kizitchenko<sup>6</sup> in Paris, we are now reasonably hopeful that the Conference's ministerial phase can convene in Helsinki in early summer. Given the planned date for the completion of discussions in Helsinki, we believe that four or five weeks will be necessary to enable participating States to reach an overall decision on the conference's tasks and to finalize the positions that each party would like to set out during the ministerial phase of the CSCE. In our view, Monday, 2 July, for example, could be a feasible date.

3. *The "military aspects" of security.*

Among the important points yet to be included on the agenda, one has recently raised concerns in Paris, i.e. the issue of "military aspects" of security. The Soviet authorities are well aware of our views on this issue. They have just been detailed again by our representative<sup>7</sup> in Helsinki. From our many discussions with Moscow on this issue, we believed that our views fully matched those of the USSR, and welcomed our joint resolution to go no further than confidence-building measures. However, some of the recent positions expressed by the Soviet delegation in Helsinki in support of a detailed CSCE review of certain aspects of the negotiation on force reduction have led us to question whether our views are entirely in line. In any case, the French position is unchanged and will remain so; we will not accept that the Conference's appropriate working body can be tasked with reviewing anything other than confidence-building measures, hence excluding any reference or allusion to other European negotiations of a military nature.

4. *Inclusion of "major troop movements" among confidence-building measures.*

We believe it desirable to include among the confidence-building measures the military provisions which could be taken by a State and which could be considered by one of its neighbours as an attempt to intimidate it. It is to this end, without having requested anything in this area, that we accept the advance notice for major manoeuvres. However, in our view, this notion only partly covers the wider problem of certain major troop movements. Without prejudice to the exact wording of this latter point, and given that it is the responsibility of the Conference itself to determine the specific conditions for its implementation, we believe that notice of major troop movements addresses both the spirit of the confidence-building measures and the concerns of many Participating States.

5. *Soviet document on European security and relations between European States.* (See separate memorandum)<sup>8</sup>

6. *Soviet proposal to create a permanent advisory body.*

As we already expressed during our previous consultations with Moscow, in principle we do not oppose the Soviet proposal to create an advisory body open to all participating States after the Conference. However, we cannot prejudge any possible future for the CSCE without first knowing its outcome.

5 French Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel Jobert, [dodis.ch/P47096](https://dodis.ch/P47096).

6 Embassy Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Paris Vsevolod Kizichenko, [dodis.ch/P81518](https://dodis.ch/P81518).

7 Not identified.

8 Not located.

We thus agree that a point regarding the Conference's outcomes should be added to the agenda, given that a decision will not be taken until the Conference's second phase is nearing completion and based on the work done by its various committees.<sup>9</sup>

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9 For all the French documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2906](https://dodis.ch/C2906).

[dodis.ch/77048](https://dodis.ch/77048)

Canada

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Ritchie to Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp<sup>1</sup>*

## CSCE: CONCLUSION OF PREPARATORY TALKS

*Extract • Confidential**[Ottawa,] 6 June 1973*

It is expected that the multilateral preparatory talks (MPT – called by the Finns the “Helsinki Consultations”) will conclude on Friday next, June 8, with the approval of an agenda for the CSCE itself, as well as mandates for the committees and sub-committees which are to prepare the documents for the final conference.

Apart from the question of a date for the opening of the first (ministerial) stage, a subject which will be dealt with later in this memorandum, your approval is sought for our Ambassador in Helsinki to express Canada’s participation in the consensus required to pass the final document to Governments. (It is likely that participants will be asked to indicate, perhaps by June 20, to the Finnish Secretariat the formal approval of their Governments; if so, a separate memorandum will be prepared for the Cabinet<sup>2</sup> requesting that approval and seeking concurrence in the lines of policy which Canada should follow in the coming months at the CSCE.) Although we have not received the final document as a whole, the attached compendium of the mandates has been constructed from the individual elements which have attracted consensus in recent weeks, and which have been sent to us as “advance texts”.

It can fairly be said that the objectives which were set by Canada and by NATO have been achieved; in fact, we have, through perseverance and patience, gained more from the MPT than could have been thought possible last November when the talks opened.

The MPT provided an opportunity to test the Eastern side’s determination to hold a conference, and the price they were willing to pay. It became apparent that the West could set a figure which would achieve its principal objectives: an agenda which would permit matters of importance to be gone into thoroughly; relatively detailed committee mandates which set forth concrete proposals; and qualifying phraseology with respect to the principal Eastern points which should make it possible to deal with any public criticism that the CSCE will be designed solely to achieve Soviet ends. In terms of Canadian interests, the following items

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9090, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 35. This memorandum signed by Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Albert Edgar Ritchie, [dodis.ch/P17963](https://dodis.ch/P17963), was addressed to Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, [dodis.ch/P46270](https://dodis.ch/P46270) on 6 June 1973.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. [dodis.ch/77081](https://dodis.ch/77081).

from the draft mandates (which Ministers will be asked formally to approve at Helsinki in July) can be considered positive achievements:

- a) The facilitation of freer movement is mentioned in specific terms.
- b) "Particular attention" is to be paid to family contacts and regular meetings, to family reunification, to marriage between nationals of different states, and to travel for personal reasons.
- c) Proposals are to be prepared "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds".
- d) The outline of principles for relations between European states includes language which, if followed in a final document, will deny the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty.
- e) A satisfactory formulation of a mandate on "confidence-building measures" will include a commitment to study the question of prior notification of major military "movements" in addition to modification of the more restrictive "manoeuvres".

Although the WPO side will, by the holding of the CSCE, gain one of its principal objectives, the Western side has ensured that no commitments are implied by the mandates which will give so much to the other side that there will be serious difficulties in drafting conference documents. For example:

- a) A separation of "inviolability of frontiers" as a principle is qualified by words which require accord with U.N. principles.
- b) "Self-determination of peoples" is qualified in the same way.
- c) On the economic side, objectionable Soviet terminology has been replaced by relatively bland mandates which would provide a basis for useful co-operation in this field.
- d) The MPT did not accept the Soviet qualification in the human contact mandate of respect for state laws: this, for the public, would have amounted to a negation of the whole mandate.

For the foregoing reasons, it would seem reasonable to agree at the final plenary MTP session, to transmit the mandates to Governments. Accordingly (if you agree that this procedure is appropriate), as soon as the final documents are received, a memorandum for Cabinet will be prepared for your signature, requesting approval of the recommendations, and of the general line of policy to be followed at the first two stages of the CSCE.

[...]³

3 For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77048](http://dodis.ch/77048). For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).

[dodis.ch/76980](https://dodis.ch/76980)

Israel

*The Israeli Ambassador in Helsinki, Katz, to the Director  
of the Europe I Department Yaish<sup>1</sup>*

WHO MADE MINTOFF RUN?<sup>2</sup>

Classified

Helsinki, 12 June 1973

I thought I could hear from the Dutch ambassador,<sup>3</sup> who was the ambassador to Tunis for many years, whether it was Arabs who pushed Mintoff to take an extreme position in the Portico<sup>4</sup> despite the general opposition. The prevailing opinion here saw the source in Gaddafi's<sup>5</sup> money. Ambassadors based in the Maltese capital tried to find out there who was pushing Mintoff, and were unsuccessful. The matter remained a closely guarded secret with Mintoff, and even his ambassador Saliba<sup>6</sup> in the Portico, who was ordered to stick to the pro-Arab proposal, much to his displeasure, could not explain the motive.

My Dutch colleague accepts the explanation of the Luxembourg ambassador<sup>7</sup> in the Portico, that Mintoff was being pushed by the Chinese. The Luxembourg ambassador accompanied his foreign minister to Peking some time ago, and the guests were surprised by the harshness of the expressions that their distinguished hosts used in condemning the Portico and the CSCE. Mintoff was obliged to do a service for the Chinese in exchange for the money he received from them, and the Chinese were plotting to use his unusual proposal to prevent a consensus and thus prevent the meeting of the CSCE.

In the opinion of my Dutch colleague, the CSCE is of no interest to Gaddafi, while Tunisia and Algeria could be satisfied by the proposals of France. To strengthen the idea that the Chinese had a hand in the conspiracy, the Dutch ambassador brings up the "withdrawal affair". When the Maltese representative learned that they were going to use the tactic of obtaining a consensus in his absence and that a meeting of the CSCE would in fact be held without Malta, it was the Romanians (who are friends of the Chinese) who contacted Mintoff and

1 Israel State Archives (ISA), MFA5311/15. Translated from Hebrew. This letter No. 469 was signed by the Israeli Ambassador in Helsinki Katriel Katz, [dodis.ch/P81354](https://dodis.ch/P81354), to the Director of the Europe I Department Nissim Yaish, [dodis.ch/P51234](https://dodis.ch/P51234). Copies were sent to the Assistant Director-General for Europe Yohanan Meroz, [dodis.ch/P51231](https://dodis.ch/P51231) and the Director of the Europe 2 Department Yeshayahu Anug, [dodis.ch/P81654](https://dodis.ch/P81654).

2 The Leader of the Malta Labour Party and Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff, [dodis.ch/P43091](https://dodis.ch/P43091).

3 Dutch Ambassador in Helsinki Théodore Valck Lucassen, [dodis.ch/P81732](https://dodis.ch/P81732).

4 A shorthand expression for the preparatory consultations of the CSCE, coined by Katz and adopted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

5 Libyan Head of State Muammar Gaddafi, [dodis.ch/P44902](https://dodis.ch/P44902).

6 The Maltese representative at the CSCE Evarist Saliba, [dodis.ch/P54639](https://dodis.ch/P54639).

7 Luxembourgish Ambassador in Moscow and Helsinki Adrien Meisch, [dodis.ch/P43865](https://dodis.ch/P43865).

obtained his agreement not to sabotage the consensus and not to give up on participation in the CSCE. If your opinion is correct, how do you explain that Albania preferred to stay away from the Portico? – I asked. My colleague explained what seemed like a contradiction: if Albania had participated, everyone would have known who was behind it and would have devised procedures from the outset to block the possibility of sabotage on its part. Whereas Malta, which activated the mine only at the last stage of the Portico, was intended to cause the Portico to collapse, while exposing the contradictions within the camp of the CSCE. Only when this plot was about to fail were the Romanians' "good offices" activated at the last minute to allow Malta to remain inside and thereby perhaps bring benefit to the Chinese inside the CSCE at a convenient time. My Dutch and Luxembourg colleagues believe in their theory. However, in the absence of information, who is wise and who can say? Especially when it comes to esoteric wisdom.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. also a report from 31 July 1973 in the same file by the Israeli Ambassador in Copenhagen Moshe Leshem, [dodis.ch/P81355](https://dodis.ch/P81355), to Yaish, on the opinion of the Danish representative to the CSCE Skjold Mellbin, [dodis.ch/P51341](https://dodis.ch/P51341). The Danes thought that the Libyan theory was more convincing, citing a slip of the tongue by Mintoff mentioning Libya. For all Israeli documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2908](https://dodis.ch/C2908).

[dodis.ch/76770](https://dodis.ch/76770)

United Kingdom

*The British Ambassador in Helsinki, Elliott, to Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home*<sup>1</sup>

## CSCE: THE FIRST 200 DAYS

Extract • Confidential

Helsinki, 13 June 1973

[...] <sup>2</sup>

The Multilateral Preparatory Talks for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe began in the resounding concrete halls of the Finnish Students' Union at Dipoli, outside Helsinki, on 22 November, 1972. My colleagues, who vary considerably in their experience of multilateral diplomacy, found themselves sitting around a large hexagon of tables with microphones in front of them, advisers behind, and very little idea of what awaited them. It was fashionable at that time to speak of informal consultations between Ambassadors accredited to the same post; and we were unanimous in saying that our intention was not to have a pre-Conference.

2. When the preparatory talks concluded 199 days later, on 8 June, 1973, they had taken on a different pattern. The leisurely pace of the first two sessions, where the business was conducted in plenary meetings convened only once a day, gave way to a proliferation of formal and informal working groups and drafting committees; delegations were reinforced by various categories of expert advisers; and the final confusion of night sessions, compromise proposals and interpretative statements was in every way typical of a major international conference.

3. The preparatory talks can indeed be regarded as a Conference in their own right. Many issues of major importance in East-West relations received detailed consideration before agreement could be reached on the agenda of the Conference itself and on the terms of reference for the Committees and Sub-Committees which will meet during its second stage. The presence of neutral and non-aligned countries gave a particular flavour to the debates, and their special concerns complicated the task of negotiation, especially at the final stage; but the main issues were between East and West. It is, I believe, the fact that we, with our partners and allies, emerged from the process in a position of clear advantage.

<sup>1</sup> The National Archives (GB), FCO/41/1293. This despatch was signed by the British Ambassador in Helsinki Thomas Elliott, [dodis.ch/P81172](https://dodis.ch/P81172), and sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Alec Douglas-Home, [dodis.ch/P13965](https://dodis.ch/P13965). Copies went to the British Ambassadors in Paris, Brussels, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Moscow, Washington, Bucharest, Belgrade, East Berlin and to the British Representatives to NATO and the European Community.

<sup>2</sup> The introductory summary of the document's content has been omitted. For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76770](https://dodis.ch/76770).



4. The brief for the UK delegation at the outset of the preparatory talks restated the objectives agreed by NATO Ministers: to ensure that the proposals in which they were interested would be fully considered at the Conference, and to establish that enough common ground existed among the participants to justify the reasonable expectation that a Conference would produce satisfactory results. Hence, our aim was to seek agreement at the preparatory talks on:

- (i) an agenda which would allow Ministers to raise at the Conference proper the points to which they attached importance, and
- (ii) an organisational structure for the Conference which would ensure that the various items on the agenda received detailed examination before any decisions were taken.

In my view these objectives have been met.

5. A major difficulty in the early part of the discussions lay in convincing the Russians that an agenda drawn up in general terms, even with a separate agenda item covering human contacts and information (a point in effect conceded by Brezhnev<sup>3</sup> in his speech to the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Congress in Moscow in December), would not be sufficiently detailed to meet the requirements of Western delegations. We insisted that the preparatory talks should also specifically agree terms of reference for the Committees and Sub-Committees which would undertake the detailed work of the Conference at its second stage. The Belgians, Italians and Danes tabled on 15 January draft proposals (previously agreed among the Nine and in NATO) for the agenda and terms of reference. The recommendations that finally emerged from the talks are naturally less satisfactory to us than those original drafts. But it is remarkable how little has been given away.

6. The preparatory talks have in effect endorsed the essential features of the Western approach to the Conference. It will take place in three stages; and it will not produce results until the Committees and Sub-Committees at the second stage have undertaken a thorough examination of the subjects covered in their terms of reference. I have reported on their contents in telegrams to the Department, and the delegation has produced separately a fuller record of the main points of interest. But the following points are worth noting here as successes for the West.

- (i) The list of “principles of primary significance guiding the mutual relations of the participating States” includes:
  - (a) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; and,
  - (b) equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
- (ii) The terms of reference on principles contain two important sentences which are clearly incompatible with the Brezhnev doctrine. One refers to “those basic principles which each participating State is to respect and apply in its relations with all other participating States irrespective of their political, economic and social systems”; and the other provides that the document to be submitted for adoption by the Conference “shall express the determination of the participating States to respect and apply the principles equally

3 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](http://dodis.ch/P15543).

and unreservedly in all aspects of their mutual relations and co-operation in order to ensure to all participating States the benefits resulting from the application of these principles by all. ”

- (iii) The terms of reference for the Committee dealing with economic and related forms of co-operation provide the basis for a business-like examination of economic questions at the second stage of the Conference, and they place useful emphasis on reciprocity, and on information and contacts.
- (iv) The section of the terms of reference corresponding to the original Western ideas on “freer movement” contains a preamble which contradicts the traditional Communist line that progress in this field is limited by differences in political, economic and social systems; and which states that the Committee “shall not only draw upon existing forms of co-operation but shall also work out new ways and means appropriate to these aims”.
- (v) In addition, there are agreed references to facilitating freer movement and contacts between persons, as well as institutions and organisations, of the participating States; to marriages between nationals of different States and the re-unification of families; to the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, and to improving conditions for journalists working outside their own countries.

7. There can admittedly be no guarantee that the results of the Conference proper will justify the expectations raised by a reading of the terms of reference. Some of the formulae that were evolved did little more than paper over major differences of principle. Thus, the dispute between the French on one side and the Dutch and Yugoslavs on the other about the relationship between the military and political aspects of security (and so *inter alia* the possibility of a link between the CSCE and the MBFR) was composed by means of a neutral formula that in effect exports the dispute to a later stage of the Conference. Again, the Maltese demand that the Mediterranean Arab States should be permitted to participate in the Conference was deflected on the final day (after it had appeared likely to block a general consensus) by the adoption of wording which keeps open the possibility that these States might present their case to the Conference, and which may be so vague as to give Mr Mintoff<sup>4</sup> scope for lengthy argument at the first stage. More important, there is still room for months of discussion at the second stage on the precise decisions to be taken by Governments on the issues covered by the first three major sections of the terms of reference. The Russians fought hard for more restrictive texts, and gave ground only when they realised that they must pay the price of accepting them in order to get any Conference at all. If we are to build effectively on the foundations laid by the preparatory talks we shall have to exert and maintain similar pressure on them during the first and second stages of the Conference. I think it important, therefore, to consider in some detail what have been the main reasons for the relative success of the West so far.

8. The primary reason, I believe, was the careful advance preparation carried out in NATO and in the Political Consultations of the Nine. As a result we were

4 Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff, [dodis.ch/P43091](https://dodis.ch/P43091). Cf. QdD 30, doc. 48, [dodis.ch/76980](https://dodis.ch/76980).

able from the outset to adopt a business-like attitude to the Conference, and thus to win the sympathy of the neutrals and non-aligned. In sharp contrast the Warsaw Pact countries proved unable to produce any evidence of detailed planning for the Conference which they had so long promoted. Our advantage was confirmed when the Western proposals were tabled on 15 January. The East never explicitly accepted them as the basis for negotiation, but as the talks proceeded it proved as a matter of practice that the discussion tended to be based on them rather than on their own much more sketchy drafts. The West were thus able to maintain their ground until acceptable compromises were in sight.

9. The second reason was the success of the West in maintaining its cohesion throughout the long negotiations. Our advance preparations would hardly have been effective if our partners and allies had not been willing and able to put up a persistent defence of their joint proposals. They did so with varying degrees of commitment, and there were inevitably occasions when a delegation departed from the agreed line. But on the whole the West stuck together well, and the fact that they created an impression of harmony rather than of unison contrasted favourably with the rigid discipline of the East. Confusion could have resulted from the evident decision of the US delegation to maintain a low posture with the object of reconciling the two aims of avoiding public confrontations with the Russians and accusations of collusion between the super Powers. But that thrust the main burden of defending Western positions upon the Nine, and they passed the first real test of their ability to develop and execute a common policy with flying colours.

10. The idea that the preparatory talks should take the form of a *salon des ambassadeurs* soon evaporated, as far as the Nine were concerned. Even before the substitution of working groups for the plenary sessions, many of the Ambassadors had dropped out of the picture, lacking either the time or the inclination to acquire the volume of detailed knowledge needed for negotiations whose subject matter ranged from divided countries to divided families, from the social conditions of migrant workers to East/West industrial co-operation. Co-ordination between the Nine in Helsinki thus devolved on a number of deputy heads of delegation who had been involved from an early stage in working out the common positions of the Nine in the Sub-Committee and Ad Hoc Group reporting to the Political Directors. They were used to working together, and felt jointly involved in the papers they were defending. They were as a result able to form a cohesive nucleus which proved resilient to the strains of the negotiations, and to the unpredictable behaviour of the Belgian Presidency, which alternated in Helsinki between King Log and King Stork.<sup>5</sup> Their efforts were co-ordinated by meetings of the Nine in Brussels during the break between the various stages of the preparatory talks; and by detailed discussion of CSCE questions in the regular meetings of Political Directors. The latter were occasionally tempted to think too little about strategy and too much about tactical details which could have been left to delegations on the spot; and the timing of their meetings (perhaps unavoidably) appeared eccentric

<sup>5</sup> King Log and King Stork refers to a famous Aesop's Fable where frogs, bored with their peaceful lives, ask the gods for a king, first receiving a harmless log (King Log) which they find useless, then a predatory stork (King Stork) who eats them.

to those engaged in the day-to-day struggle at Helsinki. Yet without the discipline provided by common instructions from senior officials who were free to concentrate on the broader picture the Nine would have proved far less effective.

11. Much of the credit for the achievements of the Nine must go to the French delegation. Despite occasional lapses, they remained loyal to the positions worked out with their partners and defended them actively not only in debate but in private conversations with the Russians. If they had chosen to act as mavericks they could have confronted their EEC partners with an uncomfortable choice between an appearance of solidarity around the French flag and the maintenance of agreed positions. In the event, the French were especially effective in their deployment of the Western case on principles guiding relations between States and on most of the major issues relating to freer movement. Their attitude contrasted with that of the Dutch and Belgians who, for all their tough noises in meetings of the Nine and the Fifteen, were for the most part unwilling to expose their views in discussions with the East.

12. A third reason for the favourable development of the talks was the extent to which the neutrals gave sympathy and support to Western positions. The Austrians, Swedes and Swiss worked closely together, but without trying to establish a "neutral bloc" that might have made a virtue of taking decisions half-way between East and West. Instead they defended their own conception of a business-like Conference, and made it plain that on most issues, their values were those of the West. (Indeed, the Swiss, and sometimes the Austrians, found themselves often to the right of the NATO centre.) The support of these delegations was especially valuable to us in so far as it formed a focus for other neutral and non-aligned delegations; and we shall no doubt need to retain their confidence during the Conference itself. Bilateral consultations are time-consuming, but it would patently be useful to arrange an exchange of views with each of these three countries (and if possible also with the Yugoslavs) before the second stage of the Conference begins.

13. One final reason for the success of the Western tactics remains to be mentioned. The Nine refused to accept an opening date for the Conference until it was clear that the preparatory talks had produced satisfactory results. Before the beginning of the crucial fourth session, the Political Directors reaffirmed their determination not to accept an artificial timetable, and we were able to maintain to the end that the preparatory talks would conclude only when the results justified it. Hence, the West continued to exploit the Soviet anxiety to hold the Conference in the middle of the summer without themselves coming under time pressure on points of major importance. The implications for our strategy at the second stage of the Conference itself are obvious.

14. I turn now to the general shape of our dealings with the East during these negotiations. British relations with the Russians were still in an icy stage when the talks began, and this was reflected in our contacts with the Soviet delegation here. During the first and second stages the Russians reacted to most of our interventions as if they were deliberate attempts to obstruct progress towards a Conference, and they concentrated their bilateral attentions on the Americans, French and West Germans, trying to settle as much business as possible with them in the

corridors. That they failed is due to the loyalty shown by those three delegations to their partners and allies; and also to the fact that the neutral and non-aligned countries made it crystal clear that they (like the French) would not accept solutions privately concocted by the big Powers. (There is a moral here that might well repay thought in Washington as well as Moscow.) Meanwhile, we did our best to establish in the minds of the Russians the idea that, although we would fight hard in defence of our positions, our underlying attitude to the talks was a constructive one; and that we were in as good a position to influence the opinions of the Nine and the Fifteen as any other delegation. They reacted realistically; and during the third and fourth session of the talks, we were fully accepted as a delegation with whom the Russians thought it necessary and profitable to do business.

15. The other East European countries as a whole failed to make the most of the opportunities the Conference gave them. The Russians kept their allies under strict control and allowed them small discretion on points of importance. The Bulgarians, Czechs and Hungarians neither made, nor tried to make, an individual impact; while the Poles, although better equipped in diplomatic skills, disastrously allowed themselves to be manoeuvred by the Russians into defending an absurdly illiberal (and soon discarded) thesis on human and cultural contacts, and ceased thereafter to play a prominent role. The East Germans deserve a special word. Their main representative, Dr Siegfried Bock,<sup>6</sup> displayed an irrepressible intelligence and sophistication of manner which one may hope will be repeated at other conferences as the GDR gains in international experience. He was the only East European representative to take an active part in negotiations on questions of substance, and his relationship to the Russians was that of a member of a team rather than that of a subordinate. But often enough, when the Russians decided that the time had come to make another move towards the Western position, they left him stranded.

16. The Romanians were a case apart. They began the preparatory talks with a loud (and to the Russians no doubt embarrassing) advertisement of their independence and sovereignty. Yet as the talks proceeded it became clear that they had done no more than give premature indications of fall-back positions acceptable to the other Warsaw Pact countries; and that they were among the most rigid of the East Europeans on questions of freer movement and human contacts. Their reputation became tarnished, and in the closing stages of the talks their elegant prevarications (expressed in impeccable French) produced apoplectic reactions among both Eastern and Western delegations. They finally achieved a coup of a sort by persuading Mr Mintoff, on the basis of a formula proposed by the French weeks previously, not to block a final consensus; but they had by then lost much of the general sympathy they had won at the outset of the talks. The Yugoslavs, on the other hand, by maintaining a consistent line and pursuing their major interests with a balance of firmness and flexibility, emerged from the process with a high reputation. The contrast is instructive.

17. I should say a word finally about the Finnish record at the Conference. The vigorous pro-Western performance of their fellow neutrals, the Austrians, the

<sup>6</sup> Head of the Policy and Planning Department of the Foreign Ministry of the German Democratic Republic Siegfried Bock, [dodis.ch/P27632](http://dodis.ch/P27632).

Swedes and the Swiss, placed them in a position of some embarrassment. Finnish neutrality, which has yet to be recognised by the Soviet Union, by definition cannot be pro-Western; and the Finns were careful not to associate themselves with these three delegations. On the other hand, they did not allow themselves to be used as “Eastern neutrals” to provide a counter-weight. They may well have come under bilateral pressure to do so, as an intervention they made at the outset of the detailed discussions on human contacts and information suggested; but this was a solitary lapse and otherwise they kept resolutely silent. The Chairman of the preparatory talks, Richard Tötterman (Secretary-General of the Finnish MFA),<sup>7</sup> and the Executive Secretary, Ambassador Joel Pekuri,<sup>8</sup> performed their difficult tasks impartially and well, and the general organisation of the long and (for the Finns immensely expensive) talks was seldom faulty. I think it a reasonable reward for these efforts that the first and third stages of the Conference should take place in Helsinki. There was a risk that the decision of many of the Nine to support Geneva as the site of the second stage would cause the Finns offence; but the negotiations that achieved this result were handled with great skill by the Irish chairman,<sup>9</sup> and I was eventually assured by Mr Sorsa, the Finnish Prime Minister,<sup>10</sup> that the Helsinki–Geneva–Helsinki formula was the “best possible solution” to the problem.

18. It is to the Conference itself that the West have now to turn their attention. We entered the preparatory talks believing that the Conference was inevitable; that the dangers it comprised could probably be avoided; and that it might provide us with some modest benefits. In the light of the preparatory talks I would take a more optimistic view.

19. The Russians have pressed for the Conference for their own purposes. They hoped no doubt to get its blessing for the Brezhnev doctrine; and to exploit it in other directions as a means of dividing the West. The preparatory talks suggest that they did not judge the situation very accurately. From the first they found themselves in a forum where they could expect the regular support of only six out of thirty-four delegations; and where the neutral countries, because of the consensus rule, had much more incentive to express, and persist in expressing, their individual points of view than is the case in international meetings operating under majority voting procedures. In the early days of the talks I sometimes had the impression that the Soviet spokesmen were in a state bordering on panic as they found themselves in a negotiating position rather less strong than they had enjoyed in the UN in the early 1950s. As time went by they adapted themselves to the new situation, abandoned bullying tactics (which succeeded only in alienating the Swiss, the Maltese, and many other neutrals), and began to deploy their real diplomatic skills and experience. But they still remained in a defensive position; and one where their only hope of making their point was by rational argument rather than by the exercise of pressure. It was a stimulating experience for Western delegations to find the Russians, in the hearing of representatives

<sup>7</sup> Richard Tötterman, [dodis.ch/P46542](https://dodis.ch/P46542).

<sup>8</sup> Joel Pekuri, [dodis.ch/P46545](https://dodis.ch/P46545).

<sup>9</sup> Irish Ambassador in Stockholm to Sweden and concurrently to Finland Timothy Horan, [dodis.ch/P14087](https://dodis.ch/P14087).

<sup>10</sup> Kalevi Sorsa, [dodis.ch/P46536](https://dodis.ch/P46536).

of all their satellites, obliged to give a detailed defence of their domestic policies on, for example, the increase of human and cultural contacts, in order to answer criticism by Liechtenstein. For the Soviet spokesmen themselves the experience cannot have been so refreshing. It is no wonder that the Soviet leadership are still pressing for an early end to the Conference.

20. It should nevertheless be possible for the West at the Conference to exploit the psychological advantage gained at the multilateral preparatory talks. I know that we have never set much store by a declaration on principles guiding relations between States; and public opinion in the UK is rightly suspicious of elevated legalistic phrases with little practical content. But the relevant section of the terms of reference provides some encouragement for the view that we should be able to produce a document of political value if we are prepared to make a major effort to elaborate the principles. Perhaps more important, we can work for some improvement in Soviet behaviour in the area covered by the terms of reference on human contacts and information. In this field, which they have always hitherto insisted is appropriate only to bilateral discussion, we now have a means of exerting multilateral pressure on the Russians and their satellites; and we have never had anything of the sort before. At the least, we ought now to be in the position to oblige the Russians either to make some concrete (if modest) advances in this area or to expose the hollowness in practical terms of their professed desire for détente.

21. The importance of the Conference is not limited, however, to what it achieves in the field of East/West relations. It has become, as a result of the work done both before and during the preparatory talks, something of a test case for developing the co-ordination of foreign policy among the Nine. Many of our partners have reasons for wanting to go their own way in important aspects of their relations with the East. But they have shown during the preparatory talks a willingness to work as a group and an awareness of the negotiating advantages this provides. It should surely be a major objective of our policy to ensure that this lesson is reinforced in the course of the Conference itself. We shall not get our own way during the second stage without full preparation.

22. There is one final point. As the MPT showed, the Nine cannot be led from behind. In the early days of the talks the still uncertain state of our bilateral relations with the Russians, as well as tactical considerations relating to our position as a newcomer to the EEC, led the British delegation to play a cautious role. But the detached position of the French, the special preoccupations of the Germans, the eccentricity of the Italians and the public silences of Benelux increasingly made it necessary for us to give a lead, if the Nine were to continue to follow a positive line and enjoy the initiative in the talks. I believe that we shall find ourselves in a similar position in the second stage of the Conference itself; we shall have little choice but to act as one of the leaders of the West. And it is reasonable enough that we should do so. We can, evidently, make a greater contribution to the collective self-confidence of EEC and the more effective safeguarding and prominence of the Community countries' interests if we take a lead in urging and directing the full preparation of the position of the Nine than if we take a back seat. If Britain is not to act as a major European Power in the context of the CSCE she can hardly hope to be a Power anywhere.



23. I cannot conclude this despatch without expressing my gratitude and admiration for the work of the First Secretaries (including my own Head of Chancery, Mr Beetham)<sup>11</sup> who bore the whole burden of the detailed work of negotiation on our side. They were younger than any other delegation and more lively, led by Mr Brian Fall,<sup>12</sup> who played a significant role in shaping the course of the talks, they took a prominent part in working out the agreed terms of reference and the arrangements for the procedure and finances of the Conference. Their ingenuity, drafting ability and resilience during these protracted discussions were alike remarkable. I found it both a piece of good fortune and a pleasure to work with them.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Roger Beetham, [dodis.ch/P56350](https://dodis.ch/P56350).

<sup>12</sup> Brian Fall, [dodis.ch/P57474](https://dodis.ch/P57474), Deputy Head of the British Delegation. His full report on proceedings is reproduced in Richard Smith (ed.): *Preparing for Helsinki. The CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks*, London 2020.

<sup>13</sup> For full details of British involvement in the CSCE, cf. Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO): Series III, vol. II: *The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975*. For all British documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2898](https://dodis.ch/C2898).

[dodis.ch/77050](https://dodis.ch/77050)

Canada

*Conversation between Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 5 July 1973 in Helsinki<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE: CANADIAN-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS

Restricted

Helsinki, 5 July 1973

Bilateral consultation between SSEA and FM Gromyko July 5 was held at Canadian request under Protocol on Consultations.<sup>2</sup>

2. Asked by Gromyko how he assessed CSCE, SSEA said he was hopeful of good results, given business-like way delegations were going about work, but quick results should not be expected. Indeed on matters touching vital interests and policies of states, it would be better if negotiations took longer time; this would give greater possibility of satisfactory results.

3. Gromyko replied that if quick results were wanted, they could be obtained quickly. Proposals now being put forward, including Soviet draft and various explanatory documents, would provide basis for quick resolution of problems and preparation of final papers.

4. SSEA referred to Canadian submission to be made later in day, and advance copy passed to Gromyko as example of sort of subjects we would wish to see discussed at Stage II.

5. Gromyko then turned to main point on which he rang changes for most of rest of meeting. It seemed to him many countries did not want to talk about major issues of peace and disarmament but rather about contacts. There had been more contacts than ever before just prior to World War II but this did not prevent war. USSR thought present emphasis on contacts was way of avoiding really important issues. They did not underestimate significance of contacts – they had their place – but CSCE should put emphasis on important issues of preventing war and reducing tension: every square kilometer of Europe had its tanks, guns or bombs, but in practice nobody was doing anything to reduce them by one machine gun. In these circumstances, all that people were doing was worrying about somebody that could not marry someone else. If war came, all would be dead.

6. SSEA recalled that Canada had always maintained position that CSCE and MBFR should proceed together. Purpose of CSCE was to reduce tension; to do this,

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9090, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 36. This telegram No. 915 on the conversation between Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, [dodis.ch/P46270](https://dodis.ch/P46270), and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](https://dodis.ch/P489), was sent from the Canadian Embassy in Helsinki to the Canadian Department of External Affairs on 5 July 1973. For the complete list of addressees, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77050](https://dodis.ch/77050).

<sup>2</sup> The [Canada–USSR Protocol on Consultations](#), signed in Moscow on 19 May 1971, aimed to formalize regular, high-level consultations between the two countries.

it was not enough to declare that one would not go to war: we had to try to eliminate problems that caused peoples to go to war. One thing that caused tension was inability of families to travel. There was interrelation between impediments to contacts and high level of tension. Gromyko replied wars were not caused by problems of marriages, visas, travel or tourism; we were living on powder keg, which certain groups did not want to see removed. Such “politicians” (not, he specified, including Canadians) preferred to talk about visits to grandparents and not about issues of paramount importance.

7. SSEA agreed that questions of human contacts did not have immediate effect on war and peace questions, but effect on durable peace should not be underestimated. If people were not permitted to be in touch with others, they would wonder what other side was plotting. What were Russians afraid of? No-war declarations, resolutions on arms reductions, etc., were all very well, but situations they were trying to correct were results of mistrust – our major problem was to make people less suspicious of one another.

8. Gromyko repeated previous argument, then referred to visa questions etc., as “cheap propaganda pretext to cover lack of desire to get down to serious business,” but he did not impute these motives to Canadians. CSCE was appropriate forum for doing something positive. USSR would not refuse to deal with other issues, but those of paramount importance should be tackled now. Hitler did not invade Poland because a visa was not issued, nor were visas mentioned in Goebbels’ speeches.

9. SSEA pointed out that German people in 1930s were prepared for war by creation of hatred and sense of insecurity. Our idea was to reduce such suspicions and one way of doing so was through freer movement.

10. Gromyko reiterated that cause of war was insecurity of boundaries, and sense of proportion with contacts should be maintained. SSEA replied that he hoped more would come out of CSCE than declarations on inviolable borders, and renunciation of war and aggression.<sup>3</sup>

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3 For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).

[dodis.ch/76944](https://dodis.ch/76944)

United States

*Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon*<sup>1</sup>

## CSCE MINISTERIAL MEETING

Secret

7 July 1973

1. The CSCE Ministerial Meeting held at Helsinki July 2–7, in which we were joined by colleagues from 33 European countries and Canada, marked a further and reasonably successful step in this enterprise launched last November. We committed our governments to recommendations developed in six months of preparatory talks, and agreed to establish committee to develop texts covering principles governing relations between states, cooperation in economic and other spheres, and freer movement of peoples, ideas, and information.

2. In sessions free of contention and serious in tone, the Soviets and other Eastern countries laid heaviest stress, as expected, on principles governing relations, particularly inviolability of frontiers. I was joined vigorously by the FRG and other Allies in emphasizing renunciation of the use or threat of force, and making clear support for the principle of peaceful change in frontiers, if based on popular will.

3. At the same time, all Western and nonaligned states endorsed enhanced human contacts, the freer flow of information, and cultural and educational exchanges. Returning to positions they had earlier taken in the preparatory talks, the Soviets and other Pact states emphasized that contacts should take place in

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<sup>1</sup> Nixon Library (US-RMNPL), National Security Council Files, Country Files – Europe, [Finland vol. I \[May 1969–February 1974\]](https://dodis.ch/P15538). This Telegram No. 1895/Secto 45 was sent on 7 July 1973 18h42 Zulu time and was originally classified as Secret, Immediate and Nodis (No distribution). It was signed by US Secretary of State William P. Rogers, [dodis.ch/P15538](https://dodis.ch/P15538), and sent from the US Embassy in Helsinki to the US Department of State in Washington, DC. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the telegram: “To HAK.” (Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846)). US National Security Advisor Kissinger forwarded this telegram to United States President Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](https://dodis.ch/P13584), under cover of a 10 July 1973 memorandum, commenting: “This first phase was essentially procedural. It has been agreed in advance that no real substance would be taken up, and after a round of speeches a bland communiqué would be issued. Despite the Western solidarity on the border question and on greater human contacts the long preparatory session suggests that, in fact, it is an illusion to expect the Soviets to change their internal system as a result of a declaration in Helsinki, and none of the participants has been willing to risk the failure of the Conference on this point. As for holding the last phase at the summit, it is quite likely that as the conference proceeds there will be a growing desire on the part of many countries to attend a final summit. Though much work remains there is so little of substantive value involved in this conference it could be completed within 2–3 months, except for the interminable squabbling that is produced by trying to draft a declaration with the participation of 35 representatives, who are each pressing some particular national point of view. In any case, the first phase seems to have passed without any damage to the Western position, which is about all we can realistically expect from this exercise.” Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, *European Security*, [doc. 169](https://dodis.ch/doc.169).

conformity with national regulations, reflecting their desire to maintain existing barriers largely intact.

4. The united front of our Allies on both of the foregoing issues will make it difficult for the Soviets to achieve without real challenge their paramount objective of affirming through CSCE the immutability of present boundaries in Europe; they will be under considerable pressure to modify their present restrictive practices in the areas of human contact and the flow of information and ideas.

5. I have been struck, too, by the realistic attitude of our Allies, especially as reflected in the comments of Douglas-Home, Scheel, and Jobert.<sup>2</sup> While all share hope for some progress, it is clear that none believes CSCE will be a panacea. Nor are our Allies feeding euphoric public expectation. On the contrary, their cautious comments suggest they are trying to convey to public opinion in their countries that CSCE is only a limited step and that NATO's defenses must be maintained.

6. The reactions to the US position were favorable. The restatement of your position concerning the US commitment to Europe was especially welcomed by our Allies.

7. The next stage of the Conference will begin at committee level in September. The Soviets continued to press for concluding the Conference at a meeting at highest level toward the end of this year, but these points were not really debated. There continues to be substantial reserve about the level and the work remaining makes a considerably later date a more realistic prospect for the final phase.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Alec Douglas-Home, [dodis.ch/P13965](https://dodis.ch/P13965), Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Walter Scheel, [dodis.ch/P15413](https://dodis.ch/P15413), and French Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel Jobert, [dodis.ch/P47096](https://dodis.ch/P47096).

<sup>3</sup> For all documents of the United States in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2904](https://dodis.ch/C2904).

[dodis.ch/77018](https://dodis.ch/77018)

Federal Republic of Germany

*Circular from the Foreign Information Desk of the Federal Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

# CONCERNING STAGE I OF THE CSCE IN HELSINKI

[Bonn,] 10 July 1973

The first stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe took place in Helsinki from 3 to 7 July and was attended by Foreign Ministers from 35 countries.

## *I. Conference decisions*

The Conference adopted the Final Recommendations<sup>2</sup> proposed during the preparatory stage, including the tasks for the work of the Commission of Experts to be addressed in Stage II of the Conference. (For a copy of this text, please see the appendix to "Blauer Dienst" No. 16 of 14 June 1973.)<sup>3</sup>

It was also decided that Stage II would start with a meeting of the Heads of Delegations' Co-ordinating Committee in Geneva on 29 August. A date for Stage III was not set, nor was there a decision on whether this stage would be held at the level of Heads of State and Government or again at the level of Foreign Ministers. Helsinki will be the venue for Stage III.

## *II. Evaluation of Stage I of the Conference*

1) All of the delegations described the mandates as balanced and sensible. As is well known, these mandates contain rather detailed provisions on matters pertaining to economic, scientific, technological and environmental co-operation, as well as on human contacts and freedom of information. There are thus grounds for hope that the Conference will in fact lead to concrete results.

2) The tones and focus of the speeches were as expected after the discussions during the multilateral preparatory stage. The Warsaw Pact countries unanimously emphasised security matters. Their focus was on the principle of the inviolability of frontiers from the Soviet perspective. Foreign Ministers Gromyko,<sup>4</sup> Winzer<sup>5</sup>

1 Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (DE-PA/AA), B 6-ref. 993/L3/207. Translated from German. This circular No. 82 was signed by the Head of the Foreign Information Desk of the Federal Foreign Office, Gerhard Dohms, [dodis.ch/P81443](https://dodis.ch/P81443). This document was also published in German in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (AAPD) 1973, doc. 221.

2 Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).

3 "Blauer Dienst" (Blue Service), which was printed on blue paper, was a compilation of selected information from the headquarters of the Federal Foreign Office for the missions abroad. For supplement No. 47 to "Blauer Dienst", vol. 16, cf. [dodis.ch/77020](https://dodis.ch/77020).

4 Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](https://dodis.ch/P489).

5 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic Otto Winzer, [dodis.ch/P15515](https://dodis.ch/P15515).

and Olszowski<sup>6</sup> spoke at length about this principle. Winzer interpreted it as the “internationally binding recognition of territorial realities”, and said that it had to “be confirmed at multilateral level by the CSCE”.

However, the discussion on this topic during the multilateral preparatory stage, as well as the mandate on security matters, did have a certain impact on the East European countries. The Soviet Union presented a draft “General Declaration on the Principles of Security in Europe”<sup>7</sup> in which the principle of the inviolability of frontiers is no longer the first topic, as it was for a longer time in Warsaw Pact and bilateral declarations. Instead, the draft adheres to the order of the mandate, with sovereign equality and the non-use of force mentioned before the inviolability of frontiers. The right to self-determination and human rights are also mentioned in the Soviet texts – this was not the case in the past.

However, it is unlikely that much has changed as regards the overall concept. This was most apparent in the speech by Foreign Minister Gromyko. The Soviet Union is interested in détente. However, it regards détente as a calming of the political situation, and to this end wants the existing frontiers in Europe to be enshrined in law to the greatest possible extent. In order to achieve this, the Soviet Union has recognised that it will have to declare its willingness to provide certain things in return in the field of co-operation in commercial exchanges, human contacts and information. However, it will try to curtail the last two aspects in particular as much as possible. Its main concern is that contacts and a flow of information do not lead to “interference” in the East European countries’ domestic affairs.

The West presented its own concept with the necessary clarity. The English<sup>8</sup> and American Foreign Ministers<sup>9</sup> in particular underlined, as did we, that co-operation and contacts are a discrete part of the policy of détente. They said that the Conference must bring about concrete results in these fields, and not the repetition of familiar principles.

This concept was also supported by several non-aligned countries. They, too, underlined the military aspects of security. Yugoslavia and Sweden in particular put the focus on results. Romania also reiterated its earlier proposals on this field.

Several Western countries, such as the United States and Denmark, stated clearly that the inviolability of frontiers stems from the principle of the non-use of force and may not be allowed to curtail the right to the peaceful elimination of frontiers. Rogers’ statement on this is likely to have been perceived by the Soviet Union as a message that it cannot expect the Moscow Treaty to be exceeded in this matter.<sup>10</sup>

The disagreement on the proposal by Malta and Spain (point No. 7 in the Communiqué)<sup>11</sup> could have been avoided if Malta had been willing to agree to a solu-

6 Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Olszowski, [dodis.ch/P47109](https://dodis.ch/P47109).

7 For the “General Declaration on the Principles on Security in Europe and the Principles Guiding Relations between States in Europe” which was submitted in Helsinki on 4 July 1973, cf. [dodis.ch/77497](https://dodis.ch/77497).

8 British Foreign Secretary Alexander Douglas-Home, [dodis.ch/P13965](https://dodis.ch/P13965).

9 US Secretary of State William P. Rogers, [dodis.ch/P15538](https://dodis.ch/P15538).

10 Treaty concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Soviet Union on 12 August 1970 in which both parties committed to the principles of the non-use of force and the inviolability of frontiers.

11 For the Communiqué on Stage I of the CSCE in Helsinki of 7 July 1973, cf. [dodis.ch/77519](https://dodis.ch/77519).



tion that would also have been valid for the participation by other third parties (Israel).

3) The starting point for Stage II of the Conference<sup>12</sup> was thus clearly marked. The Soviet Union now also seems to recognise that this stage will be very important.

The concepts differ, but all participating States approved the mandates without reservation, thus creating a good basis for discussion during Stage II.

We can expect the negotiations to be difficult and lengthy. As during the preparatory stage, it will be important that the West, especially the nine countries of the European Community, remain united. Helsinki showed that this unity is not only of a tactical nature. Our concept is largely the same. This is a major pre-requisite for the success of the CSCE.

(The text of the Communiqué will be published in the Bulletin.)<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Stage II of the CSCE, which encompassed the work of the committees and sub-committees, began in Geneva on 18 September 1973.

<sup>13</sup> Published in: *Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn 1973, p. 884.* For all documents of the FRG in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2909](http://dodis.ch/C2909).

[dodis.ch/76775](https://dodis.ch/76775)

United Kingdom

*The British Ambassador in Helsinki, Elliott, to Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home*<sup>1</sup>

CSCE: STAGE I

Extract • Confidential

Helsinki, 16 July 1973

[...] <sup>2</sup>

The first stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe took place in Helsinki from 3–7 July. You, Sir, attended the Conference until the last day, accompanied by Mr Anthony Royle,<sup>3</sup> MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Sir Thomas Brimelow,<sup>4</sup> and other officials. Your impressions are recorded in Helsinki telegram number 735. In this despatch I have the honour to add some reflections of my own, in particular on the implications for the second stage of the Conference.

2. The Conference, which was organised by the Finns with their customary efficiency, despatched its initial business with reasonable expedition. After speeches of welcome from the Finnish Foreign Minister, Dr Ahti Karjalainen,<sup>5</sup> from President Kekkonen,<sup>6</sup> and from the Secretary-General of the UN,<sup>7</sup> it adopted in open session the final recommendations<sup>8</sup> of the multilateral preparatory talks at Dipoli. Contrary to expectation, there was no attempt by delegations with heterodox opinions to make interpretative or qualifying statements. On the first afternoon, however, when the Conference met in closed session for a procedural discussion, the Prime Minister of Malta<sup>9</sup> made his expected proposal that the Algerian and Tunisian Foreign Ministers<sup>10</sup> should be invited to express their views on the agenda to the first stage of the Conference. After an American attempt to draw attention to the fact that Israel had made a similar request had been shelved, the North

1 The National Archives (GB), FCO/41/1319. This despatch was signed by the British Ambassador in Helsinki Thomas Elliott, [dodis.ch/P81172](https://dodis.ch/P81172), and sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Alec Douglas-Home, [dodis.ch/P13965](https://dodis.ch/P13965). Copies went to the British Ambassadors in Moscow, Washington, Paris, Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels and Luxembourg and to the British Representatives to NATO, the European Community and in Geneva.

2 The introductory summary of the document's content has been omitted. For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76775](https://dodis.ch/76775).

3 Anthony Royle, [dodis.ch/P48782](https://dodis.ch/P48782).

4 Thomas Brimelow, [dodis.ch/P44792](https://dodis.ch/P44792).

5 Ahti Karjalainen, [dodis.ch/P15255](https://dodis.ch/P15255).

6 Urho Kekkonen, [dodis.ch/P15249](https://dodis.ch/P15249).

7 Kurt Waldheim, [dodis.ch/P15484](https://dodis.ch/P15484).

8 Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).

9 Dom Mintoff, [dodis.ch/P43091](https://dodis.ch/P43091). Cf. QdD 30, doc. 48, [dodis.ch/76980](https://dodis.ch/76980).

10 Abdelaziz Bouteflika, [dodis.ch/P42084](https://dodis.ch/P42084), and Mohamed Masmoudi, [dodis.ch/P19985](https://dodis.ch/P19985).

African issue was smartly referred to a working group; and the 35 Ministers settled down again in plenary to the business of making their general statements, which were not completed until the morning of 8 July. There followed a day's procedural wrangle, which reflected the failure of the working group to reach consensus either on the Maltese proposal or on language to describe that lack of consensus in a *communiqué*; but the points in dispute were papered over at the last minute, and the first stage finally ended only a little later than the time originally envisaged by the majority of non-Communist delegations.

3. On the face of it, then, the proceedings went relatively smoothly. Your own speech was widely praised, both by the Press and by delegates from all parts of Europe; (even a middle-ranking member of the Soviet delegation remarked to my Head of Chancery<sup>11</sup> that his "evaluation of the speech was positive"). Other interesting contributions were made by Herr Scheel<sup>12</sup> and M. Jobert<sup>13</sup> (who spoke in terms of undoubted elegance but rather more doubtful meaning); while Mr. FitzGerald,<sup>14</sup> in speaking of the future of Ireland and of the tasks of the Conference, displayed a tact and statesmanship missing from the references of the Foreign Ministers of Spain and Iceland<sup>15</sup> to the issues respectively of Gibraltar and the fishing dispute.<sup>16</sup> The fact remains, however, that even to those who knew that the first stage of the Conference was likely to be largely a formality, the proceedings were something of a disappointment. Few of the speeches other than those I have mentioned measured up to the occasion. A number of Western Ministers said little that was new, while the Ministers from the Warsaw Pact countries said far too much that was old. Mr Gromyko's<sup>17</sup> speech was written as if nothing had happened in the last nine months, and certainly seemed designed to ensure that nothing happened in the next. Again, too much time had to be spent inside and outside the plenary meetings on dealings with the irrelevant Maltese proposal. To make matters worse, it at length became plain when San Marino took the chair that the combination of a rotating Chairmanship (chosen by lot) with the complicated system of agreement by consensus was a recipe for the inefficient conduct of proceedings. The Conference ultimately, and after your departure, Sir, degenerated into an unseemly argument about a *communiqué* which appeared the more unnecessary and irrelevant the longer the process of its drafting extended.

4. What are the implications of all this for Stage II? I will take the Maltese proposal first. It fortunately proved possible to prevent any of the non-participants from being heard during Stage I; but the wording of the *communiqué* effectively exports the problem to the beginning of the second stage. The Maltese have put us all on notice that they will pursue their case with equal vigour in September in Geneva. There will be no hope then of simply setting the matter aside. It has to be remembered that in the interval between the end of the preparatory talks

<sup>11</sup> Roger Beetham, [dodis.ch/P56350](https://dodis.ch/P56350).

<sup>12</sup> Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Walter Scheel, [dodis.ch/P15413](https://dodis.ch/P15413).

<sup>13</sup> French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, [dodis.ch/P47096](https://dodis.ch/P47096).

<sup>14</sup> Irish Foreign Minister Garret FitzGerald, [dodis.ch/P50840](https://dodis.ch/P50840).

<sup>15</sup> Laureano López Rodó, [dodis.ch/P43295](https://dodis.ch/P43295), and Einar Ágústsson, [dodis.ch/P50148](https://dodis.ch/P50148).

<sup>16</sup> In July 1971 the Icelandic Government had unilaterally extended its fisheries limit to 50 miles, an action that had been referred to the International Court of Justice.

<sup>17</sup> Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](https://dodis.ch/P489).

and the start of Stage I the Maltese succeeded in mustering new and significant support for their case, notably from Spain, France and Italy. Again, although the Russians tried in the final procedural debates in the plenary to give the impression that the Maltese were in a minority of one, they were themselves most careful throughout the week to say nothing that could offend the Arabs, while arguing with consistent disingenuousness against the appearance of the Israelis. All this, however, may look rather worse from Helsinki than from Geneva. The absence of Mr Mintoff himself from Stage II, and the fact that publicity for that stage will be less glaring than for Stage I, may help in getting the matter settled. Provided that we can restore the unity of the Nine, there may be a case for agreeing promptly to hear the Mediterranean non-participants in the relevant Committees at the outset of the second stage, and thus defusing the problem from the beginning.

5. The implications of the stiff line taken in the East European speeches during Stage I are more serious. We had expected, as I suggested in my despatch of 13 June,<sup>18</sup> on the preparatory talks, to have in Stage II to refight many of the battles of Dipoli. I do not think, however, that we expected the Russians to try quite so firmly to put the clock back to 1972. In his speech Mr Gromyko indicated that he wishes to keep its hands stuck. Hardline speeches and tactics were *de rigueur*. One of the most instructive experiences of the week was to see how Mr Gromyko and Mr Kovaliev,<sup>19</sup> one of the two Soviet Deputy Foreign Ministers, instinctively turned to bullying tactics when they failed to get their way round the negotiating table. Half an hour of final debate on the Maltese proposal in plenary was too much for Mr Gromyko; and he promptly proposed the suspension of the principle of consensus.

6. It was ironical that when this drastic move met, as anyone might have calculated, with opposition from the smaller delegations, and there seemed small prospect of consensus on the wording of their precious *communiqué*, the Russians turned as if in desperation to Ambassador Mendelevich,<sup>20</sup> whose flexible negotiating style had probably achieved more at Dipoli than all the other Communist participants put together. He quickly reached a compromise with the Maltese. It was easy enough for other delegations to read the moral; but what will be interesting is whether the Russians will do so. It will be a test of Soviet intentions for Stage II whether M. Mendelevich is given an important negotiating task in Geneva.

7. Yet, though the Soviet line in Stage I was depressingly tough, it was unmarked by imagination or political insight, and it did not achieve any particular success. Mr Gromyko, for example, showed no more sign than the Soviet negotiators at Dipoli of realising that this was not just a routine East–West Conference and that the non-aligned countries (whom he did not mention in his speech) are also involved in the process of *détente*. His attack on the principle of consensus could hardly have been better designed to arouse neutral countries' suspicions and fears. In the wider field of public relations the Eastern failure was just as obvious. There was some reason to fear that, having given some ground to the West

<sup>18</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 49, [dodis.ch/76770](https://dodis.ch/76770).

<sup>19</sup> Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Kovalev, [dodis.ch/P45912](https://dodis.ch/P45912), was appointed Soviet Head of Delegation to Stage II.

<sup>20</sup> Lev Mendelevich, [dodis.ch/P54642](https://dodis.ch/P54642), a leading member of the Soviet Delegation.

at the preparatory talks, they would at least seek a major propaganda victory in Stage I. But their reactionary speeches, and the repetitive thinness of the proposals they actually tabled, gave the West much the better of the propaganda exchange. Again, the East made no attempt to invest the Conference with any special atmosphere of urgency or significance. In spite of their protestations before arriving in Helsinki, they quickly came to acquiesce in the Western view that Stage I should be a relatively short and formal affair. Although Mr Gromyko made a half-hearted attempt to prolong the first stage (in the name of "dignity") by suspending plenary meetings on the third and fourth days, he soon dropped the proposal in the face of a remarkable, and totally spontaneous display of united opposition by the West; and the Russians agreed with little discussion to the Western proposal that Stage II should not start until mid-September.

8. It may be optimistic to comment that, although the Russians publicly adopted rigid attitudes, they did not defend them very hard when it came to the crunch. It was no doubt inevitable that during the first stage they should give the impression of caring less about the substance of what the Conference decided than that the proceedings should be completed without a hitch. We can expect them to fight a good deal harder in Stage II, and to repeat many of the skirmishes that we hoped had been concluded on the Dipoli terrain. But I do not think we need be too apprehensive about the prospect. So long as Mr Brezhnev<sup>21</sup> is set on having his European summit meeting, he can be expected to pay a price to achieve it. Just as we were able to exploit the Soviet desire for a Conference to ensure that the MPT's final recommendations basically reflected Western plans, we should be able to exploit the Soviet wish for a summit at the third stage to ensure that Stage II concludes in a form that is favourable to us. What is essential is that the Nine should continue their cohesive approach, and maintain as close harmony with the other NATO countries and the non-aligned as they did at Dipoli.

9. It must be admitted that the handling of the Maltese proposal in Stage I created the impression that the Nine may find united action hard to preserve. The French and Italians certainly made little effort during the first stage to be faithful to what elements of unity there were in the Community position on the Mediterranean. But we must hope that they will draw the appropriate moral from the fact that they were roundly defeated, having failed to secure not only an invitation to Algeria and Tunisia, but also the formula for which they were fighting in the *communiqué*. We must hope too that the North African issue will prove to have been a very special case; and that if at the beginning of Stage II the Community can reach agreement on how to handle it, the advantages of united action will again become obvious to all the Nine.

10. The lesson is clear, as was the lesson of Dipoli, and I do not believe that anything that happened during Stage I need change it. In this forum of 35 European countries a Community united in policy can achieve the greater part of what it sets out to obtain. It is true, of course, that the Russians, if they wish, can bring the process of discussion to a halt by denying final consensus; but (to repeat a point in my despatch of 13 June)<sup>22</sup> they can hardly do so, provided that the West maintain

21 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

22 Cf. QdD 30, doc. 49, [dodis.ch/76770](https://dodis.ch/76770).

a reasonable line, without exposing the hollowness of their own professions of détente. They can hardly do so either without putting themselves in the position of obstructing the development of the European idea. No one who has sat through the apparently interminable debates of the last eight months in Helsinki would deny that there was a great deal of cynicism round the table. But no one could fail to notice, either, that there was a vague but genuine sentiment, not only on the part of Western delegates, that the barriers between European countries ought ultimately to become less significant than the links of their common civilisation. Stage I of the CSCE may not have achieved many tangible results; it may have been a demonstration rather than a discussion; but at least it showed that none of the Foreign Ministers of Europe (always excepting Albania) were ready to stand out against the idea of more regular and more orderly contacts between the Governments of Europe.

11. Mr Brezhnev, like other Heads of Government, is still free to prevent the development of this idea if he wishes. But each stage of the Conference is likely to make it increasingly difficult for him to contemplate (or indeed calculate) the consequences of withdrawal from the process. We in the West, on the other hand, may find it a difficult task to push the East into adopting a more civilised attitude towards the development of closer human and cultural contacts between the peoples of Europe. If the pessimists are right about the basic Soviet attitude, we may achieve little or nothing. But if we continue to follow the admirably clear lines of your speech to the Conference, we shall have little at risk if we press on with this task at Geneva.<sup>23</sup>

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**23** For full details of British involvement in the CSCE, cf. Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO): Series III, vol. II: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975. For all British documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2898](http://dodis.ch/C2898).



[dodis.ch/76981](https://dodis.ch/76981)

Israel

*The Israeli Ambassador in Helsinki, Katz, to the Assistant Director-General  
of the Foreign Ministry Meroz<sup>1</sup>*

ISRAEL AND THE THIRD BASKET OF CSCE

Classified/Personal

Helsinki, 20 August 1973

The Third Basket will be the subject of the most heated controversy at the CSCE and the result will also have an impact on the rights of the Soviet Jews and on the intervention of external parties on the question of the rights of the Soviet Jews.<sup>2</sup> Of course, Israel has a vital interest that the recommendations within the framework of the Third Basket should have a positive significance for the plight of the Jews in Eastern Europe.

It is therefore very important that the democratic countries know what they should demand on this matter when drafting the formulations in Phase Two of the CSCE. I assume that Jewish organisations that have influence with the democratic governments and organisations for human rights have already been activated on this issue.<sup>3</sup> I also assume that the Israeli ambassadors in the various capitals have expressed the position of the Jewish state in the Foreign Ministries.

However, I would like to express my opinion that we should refrain from a direct address by Israel to CSCE on this issue. An appeal to the CSCE by an external country on the *Jewish* issue would encounter opposition from the Soviet bloc, and the democratic countries will be unable to reach a consensus to discuss the Jewish problem, which is not on the agenda. On the other hand, it is likely that it will be easier for the Western countries to include in the consensus on the recommendations within the framework of the Third Basket general principles that would also have a positive significance for the Jews in distress in Eastern Europe.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Israel State Archives (ISA), MFA5311/15. Translated from Hebrew. This letter No. 637 was signed by the Israeli Ambassador in Helsinki Katriel Katz, [dodis.ch/P81354](https://dodis.ch/P81354), and sent to the Israeli Assistant Director-General for Europe Yohanan Meroz, [dodis.ch/P51231](https://dodis.ch/P51231).

<sup>2</sup> The longstanding ban on the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel was lifted in 1971, and small numbers began to leave. In the early 1970s a campaign for the religious, cultural and civil rights of Soviet Jewry, including the right to emigrate, was waged by Jewish organisations in the West, especially in the US and Great Britain.

<sup>3</sup> File MFA5311/16 includes reports on plans for protest action by Jewish organisations in Geneva in September 1973, ahead of the opening of the CSCE discussions, cf. (ISA), MFA5311/16.

<sup>4</sup> For all Israeli documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2908](https://dodis.ch/C2908).



[dodis.ch/38816](https://dodis.ch/38816)

Switzerland

*Report of the Swiss Delegation to the Preliminary Consultations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki<sup>1</sup>*

STATE OF PLAY ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND PHASE  
OF THE CONFERENCE

Extract • Confidential

[Bern, 27 August 1973]

[...]<sup>2</sup>

*C) Activities of the Swiss delegation<sup>3</sup>*

Our delegation was able to represent Switzerland in two capacities: as a participating state keen to promote its vision of the CSCE, and as a neutral state willing to offer its good offices to facilitate the preliminary consultations.

*1. Position as a participating State*

With regard to *procedural and organisational matters*, our delegation played an active role, especially during the first weeks of the Consultations, in ensuring that rules were established to protect the rights of small states: consensus, rotation of chairmanships, etc. These rules, which applied to the Consultations, were adopted more or less unchanged for the CSCE itself.

When drawing up the CSCE *agenda* – the main task of the Consultations – the Swiss delegation was instructed to give priority to securing the inclusion of a formula for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The text finally agreed upon after several rounds of negotiations, which appears in the attached “Draft Recommendations” reads as follows:

“The Commission will study proposals for a method of peaceful settlement of disputes between participating states and will undertake to develop such a method.”<sup>4</sup>

1 Swiss Federal Archives CH-BAR#E1050.12#1995/511#16\* (1). Translated from French. This report was distributed to the members of the National Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee and discussed at its meeting on 27 August 1973, cf. [dodis.ch/38842](https://dodis.ch/38842), pp. 31–42. At that meeting, the Head of the Federal Political Department (FPD), Federal Councillor Pierre Graber, [dodis.ch/P4171](https://dodis.ch/P4171), gave an overview briefing, in which he also touched on the CSCE, cf. [dodis.ch/40488](https://dodis.ch/40488). For an earlier version of the report dated 18 June 1973, cf. the Federal Council decision No. 1063 of 25 June 1973, [dodis.ch/38843](https://dodis.ch/38843). This document was also published in French in: *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS)*, vol. 26, doc. 32, [dodis.ch/38816](https://dodis.ch/38816).

2 For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/38816](https://dodis.ch/38816).

3 The delegation was led by the Swiss Ambassador in Helsinki, Samuel François Campiche, [dodis.ch/P1323](https://dodis.ch/P1323), and compromised the Deputy Head of the FPD’s Political Secretariat Edouard Brunner, [dodis.ch/P19047](https://dodis.ch/P19047), his collaborator Blaise Schenk, [dodis.ch/P15229](https://dodis.ch/P15229), as well as Hans-Jörg Renk, [dodis.ch/P47031](https://dodis.ch/P47031), and Pierre Friederich, [dodis.ch/P17413](https://dodis.ch/P17413), from the Embassy.

4 Cf. the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496), paragraph 21.

This formula may be considered satisfactory, as it will enable us, on the one hand, to submit a specifically Swiss proposal during the second phase of the CSCE and, on the other hand, to examine the establishment of a commonly agreed method for the peaceful settlement of disputes. This is the most concrete mandate in the entire “security” chapter of the agenda drawn up during the Consultations.

Our delegation’s secondary objective was, despite resistance from the Eastern countries, to obtain as substantial an agenda as possible on human contacts and the flow of information.<sup>5</sup> Our delegates were closely involved in difficult negotiations on the texts in question, during which they followed a consistent line faithful to our liberal tradition on the movement of persons and information.

The other areas on which the Swiss delegation had the opportunity to present its views are, on the whole, satisfactorily reflected in the agenda. These include the military aspect in particular, which is admittedly modest but will enable us, if necessary, to make our position known on the military aspects of European security;<sup>6</sup> and the reference to the link between the problems of Europe and those of the Mediterranean. Finally, in the area of economic cooperation, the proposals put forward for the agenda are flexible enough to accommodate our essentially bilateral approach to East–West relations.<sup>7</sup>

## 2. *Good offices of the Swiss delegation*

Neutral countries in general, and our country in particular, have had several opportunities to provide services that have facilitated the smooth running of the Consultations. Thus, during the second session of the Consultations, at a time when they were in danger of stalling because no delegation was willing to engage in a genuine discussion of the numerous and often divergent proposals concerning the CSCE agenda, the Swiss delegation was tasked with compiling and classifying all the proposals in question into a single document.<sup>8</sup> This work met with general approval and facilitated the start of detailed and concrete discussion of the texts at hand.

Shortly thereafter, when the drafting group responsible for developing the “security” chapter of the agenda was formed, Switzerland was again asked, along with Austria and Sweden, to have members of the three delegations coordinate the meetings of the group in question.<sup>9</sup>

If a chair had been appointed, several delegations would have demanded daily rotation of the chairmanship, with all the practical inconveniences this would have entailed; by appointing a Swiss, an Austrian, and a Swede as coordinators, the participants ensured continuity in the conduct of the proceedings.<sup>10</sup> The dele-

<sup>5</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 31, [dodis.ch/34487](https://dodis.ch/34487).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. the two reports by the Swiss Chief of Staff of the General Staff, Lieutenant general Jakob Johann Vischer, [dodis.ch/P39256](https://dodis.ch/P39256), dated 1 December 1972, [dodis.ch/34577](https://dodis.ch/34577), and August 1973, [dodis.ch/38897](https://dodis.ch/38897), on the military aspects of the CSCE, which were also discussed at the meeting of the National Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 25, doc. 176, [dodis.ch/35755](https://dodis.ch/35755), as well as the keyword East–West–Trade [dodis.ch/D293](https://dodis.ch/D293).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the telegram of the Swiss Embassy in Helsinki to the FPD of 25 January 1973, [dodis.ch/75151](https://dodis.ch/75151), as well as the working document of 29 January 1973, [dodis.ch/75154](https://dodis.ch/75154).

<sup>9</sup> For the first meeting of the editorial committee, cf. telegrams Nos. 106 and 110 from the Swiss Embassy in Helsinki dated 9 and 13 March 1973, [dodis.ch/78260](https://dodis.ch/78260) and [dodis.ch/78261](https://dodis.ch/78261).

<sup>10</sup> Edouard Brunner was appointed for Switzerland, Helmut Liedermann, [dodis.ch/P51320](https://dodis.ch/P51320), for Austria and Axel Edelstam, [dodis.ch/P46551](https://dodis.ch/P46551), for Sweden.

gations were generally in agreement that the formula thus adopted and put into practice for more than three months was entirely satisfactory.

In the same vein, but without any action on the part of the Swiss delegation, a campaign was organised during the last session of the Consultations in favour of Geneva as the location for the second phase of the CSCE.<sup>11</sup> The instigators of this movement, notably the Federal Republic of Germany, Romania, Italy, and Portugal, driven by various motives, succeeded in reaching a consensus on Geneva within a few weeks; it was not only the traditional advantages of Geneva that made their task easier: their initiative coincided, on the one hand, with a series of statements by the President of the Republic of Finland<sup>12</sup> that cast doubt on Finland's current policy of neutrality and, on the other hand, due to a series of industrial strikes whose effects were felt directly by the delegations present in Helsinki. In addition to these circumstances, there was the concern among many Western delegations about allowing Helsinki to have a monopoly on the CSCE, which could have had the effect of establishing Finnish neutrality as a model. Finally, with Vienna blocked by the MBRF and Stockholm unacceptable to the United States, Geneva was ultimately the only alternative to Helsinki.

## *II. Review of the first phase*

The CSCE met in Helsinki from July 3 to 7 at the level of foreign ministers of the 34 countries that participated in the Preliminary Consultations, along with Monaco. This first phase was an essential step between the pre-negotiation of the Helsinki Preliminary Consultations and the actual negotiations that were to begin in Geneva.<sup>13</sup> The aim was, on the one hand, to endorse the outcome of the Preliminary Consultations, namely the Helsinki Final Recommendations,<sup>14</sup> and, on the other hand, to pave the way for the second phase by allowing the foreign ministers to make known their governments' general guidelines on the content and conduct of this second phase.<sup>15</sup>

The main priority was that no one should seek to challenge the hard-won consensus on the final document of the preliminary consultations. No one did so, which will allow everyone to reopen the discussion in Geneva on the points that are of particular interest to them. Some delegations have already submitted written proposals for the second phase. The Warsaw Pact countries (excluding Romania) have submitted a set of texts covering all four sections of the agenda equally and which, from a formal point of view, appear to be a simple enlargement of the final document of the Preliminary Consultations.<sup>16</sup> In substance, the Soviets and their allies sought to regain some of the ground lost in Helsinki by adopting positions that they had still been defending at the start of the Consultations. This

11 Cf. files CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1987/78#671\* and CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1987/78#672\* (B.72.09.15.1).

12 Urho Kekkonen, [dodis.ch/P15249](https://dodis.ch/P15249).

13 For an update on the progress of work during the second phase of the CSCE in Geneva, cf. DDS, vol. 26, doc. 57, [dodis.ch/38848](https://dodis.ch/38848). For a general overview of the negotiation process, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/T1409](https://dodis.ch/T1409).

14 Cf. [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).

15 For details of the bilateral talks held during the Conference, cf. the minutes drawn up by Hans-Jörg Renk, [dodis.ch/38844](https://dodis.ch/38844).

16 For the various proposals, cf. [dodis.ch/77497](https://dodis.ch/77497).

tactical retreat is not surprising and is consistent with their generally static conception of the CSCE.

These proposals were responded to in a series of texts, mainly from the British, French, Italian, and West German delegations, which focused on various practical aspects of the free movement of persons and information: family reunification, facilities for journalists working abroad, the creation of a European magazine, etc.<sup>17</sup> In short, as might have been expected, the positions taken during the first phase of the CSCE confirmed the existence of two divergent concepts of détente, which clashed during the preliminary consultations and will undoubtedly clash even more vigorously during the Geneva negotiations. This divergence concerns not only the substance but also the form that the final outcome of the second phase should take. Some, led by the Eastern countries, want recommendations and declarations of general intent that are in no way binding. Others would undoubtedly be prepared to go a little further, although it is unclear how far.

### *III. Next steps: Switzerland's position*

Our approach to the second phase of the CSCE was outlined in the speech given by the Head of the Department in Helsinki (text attached to this report).<sup>18</sup> In essence, the Geneva negotiations should serve to deepen and make more concrete the possibilities offered by the agenda approved in Helsinki. It is clear that we cannot expect substantial progress in all the areas envisaged, if only because the CSCE agenda covers almost all aspects of relations between states. In our view, the aim should therefore be to seek practical and immediate results, which will necessarily be modest, in certain well-defined areas, while in the other areas the aim should be to lay the foundations for facilitating, where appropriate, the continuation of the dialogue beyond the Conference. It seems reasonable to want to assign both short-term and long-term objectives to the CSCE, because if we give up on the former in advance, we are simultaneously admitting that the Conference serves no purpose other than to illustrate a climate of détente.

Now that the principle of developing a method for the peaceful settlement of disputes has been included in the CSCE agenda, our delegation will have the task of defending a specifically Swiss proposal.<sup>19</sup> To this end, the Political Department has prepared a detailed draft convention consisting of 60 articles, which has already been distributed to all participating states so that they have time to examine it before September 18 and can begin discussing it on that date.<sup>20</sup> We will also ensure that our proposal is examined in an ad hoc working group. There are no particular changes to report regarding the chances of this draft being well received. The response to it in the speeches by the 34 foreign ministers in Helsinki was slightly more favourable than we had expected: nearly two-thirds of them re-

<sup>17</sup> Cf. [dodis.ch/77497](https://dodis.ch/77497).

<sup>18</sup> Speech by Federal Councillor Graber of 5 July 1973, [dodis.ch/38846](https://dodis.ch/38846). Cf. also the minutes of the Ambassadors' Conference of 29–31 August 1973, [dodis.ch/35117](https://dodis.ch/35117), pp. 38–62, and the presentation on the CSCE given there by Swiss Ambassador in Helsinki Champiche, [dodis.ch/35119](https://dodis.ch/35119).

<sup>19</sup> For the appointment of the Swiss Delegation for the second phase of the CSCE in Geneva, cf. DDS, vol. 26, doc. 28, [dodis.ch/38389](https://dodis.ch/38389), point 4.

<sup>20</sup> Draft Convention on a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of July 1973, [dodis.ch/75165](https://dodis.ch/75165).

ferred to it, several in terms that suggest strong support.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the initial impressions gathered since the draft convention was distributed seem to indicate that we were right to submit a detailed and comprehensive document in advance, accompanied by commentary, which should encourage more careful and serious consideration than a simple outline of our ideas would have done.

This project on the peaceful settlement of disputes remains our major initiative, to which the Swiss delegation must give priority. However, we will continue to monitor all issues relating to human contacts and the dissemination of information very closely, as our delegation did in Helsinki during the preliminary consultations. We do not plan to submit initiatives in these areas at the start of the second phase, but we reserve the right to do so during the negotiations, taking into account what other more directly concerned countries have already done. The same applies to other areas of cooperation: economic, cultural, and scientific. Over the past month, the Political Department has organised a series of consultations<sup>22</sup> with all relevant federal government departments to clarify the guidelines that will direct our delegation on the various items on the agenda and to determine in which areas and in what form new Swiss initiatives could be envisaged.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> For a summary of the main topics discussed by the foreign ministers, cf. [dodis.ch/75158](https://dodis.ch/75158).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. file CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1987/78#675\* (B.72.09.15.1).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. the minutes of the meeting of the FPD's CSCE working group held on 24 August 1973, [dodis.ch/77753](https://dodis.ch/77753). For all Swiss documents in this volume, cf. [dodis.ch/C2935](https://dodis.ch/C2935).

[dodis.ch/76989](https://dodis.ch/76989)

NATO

*Lecture given by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security  
Policy Kastl at the NATO Defense College in Rome<sup>1</sup>*

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE – MBFR

Extract

[Rome,] 19 September 1973

[...] <sup>2</sup>

In discussing: CSCE and MBFR, I will in each case sketch from where we have come again, what each side aims at in those negotiations and how the Alliance deals with these two subjects.

CSCE: the Conference has been a Soviet ambition since 1954; at that time the Soviet Union first proffered the concept of a pan-European security system, but it was not until 1966 that it formally proposed the convocation of a Conference and I quote “to discuss the question of ensuring security in Europe and organizing pan-European co-operation.” After the invasion of Czechoslovakia<sup>3</sup> and, in particular at the Budapest meeting of 17<sup>th</sup> March, 1969,<sup>4</sup> Soviet and Warsaw Pact proposals became more reasonable and business-like.

This has been our analysis of the possible Soviet motives for the move towards a conference. First, the Western acceptance of the status quo in the Soviet realm, including the recognition of borders and the division of Germany. Secondly, the acceptance of the role of the Soviet Union runs its empire and specifically of the doctrine of limited sovereignty regarding the satellite states, i.e. the Brezhnev doctrine.<sup>5</sup> Thirdly, creation of euphoria in our public opinions, thus jeopardising

1 NATO Archives (NA), NATO Defense College Fonds, Lecture Series, T00745-044-04 (K27529). *The original of this document is in English and has been publicly disclosed. This lecture was given at the NATO Defense College (NDC), [dodis.ch/R44049](https://dodis.ch/R44049), and was delivered on 19 September 1973 by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Jörg Kastl, [dodis.ch/P80335](https://dodis.ch/P80335), as the 43<sup>rd</sup> course. A short biography of the lecturer in the document has been omitted. For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76989](https://dodis.ch/76989). The Nato Defence College was established in 1951 by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Dwight David Eisenhower, [dodis.ch/P407](https://dodis.ch/P407), as a centralized college to supplement national military education across the Allies. The lecture was originally delivered orally and simultaneously recorded by an unidentified typist. The NDC lecture series was publicly disclosed in 2024 by the NATO Archives and includes typed lectures delivered to students by military and civilian personalities between 1951–1959 and 1971–1993. The College would host two 24-week courses each year beginning in January and September. These courses included visits to different allied and partner nations and an intense guest lecturing programme from military, political, and economic experts.*

2 For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76989](https://dodis.ch/76989).

3 On 20–21 August 1968, Czechoslovakia was invaded by Warsaw Pact Countries.

4 At this meeting, Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers declared to Europe their support for improved relations with the West and called for a European security conference, which would later become the CSCE.

5 The doctrine was established in 1968 to declare that any threat to the socialist rule in the Soviet Bloc was a collective threat. The name of this doctrine refers to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).



the maintenance of our Alliance defence efforts and, in parenthesis, this impression was borne out by the propaganda style approach the Soviets took towards the Conference. It almost seemed as if they were seeking a conference just for the sake of a conference. Fourthly, the creation of an alienation between North American and Western European allies, thus hitting at the very basis of our community. Fifthly, more influence on the European integration movement and activity in all possible fields and sixthly, of course, gains in technological know-how and easier money for the flagging Communist economies.

This broad analysis did its part to keep Allied enthusiasm within bounds. The Warsaw Pact schemes stood in contrast to our own aim to work for the solution of the issues dividing East and West and not to indulge in mere atmospherics. However, the Allies, after painful bilateral bickering and pressing their communist interlocutors, agreed finally to holding multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki from November last year onwards and the reasons for this decision were the following ones.

First the Soviet interest in the conference was successfully used for the sake of a satisfactory quadripartite agreement on Berlin<sup>6</sup> in which we all had a keen interest. Secondly, the Soviet obsession with this conference was further put to our advantage insofar as those Allies taking a direct interest in the promotion of talks on MBFR made plain to the other side that they would not go to Helsinki without a Soviet commitment to parallel talks on force reductions. This parallelism has not been one of substance, but only one in time and this parallelism in time has been imperfect insofar as MBFR talks started, as you will recall, only two months later in Vienna.<sup>7</sup> The same imperfection holds true for the present phase of the multilateral negotiations, the first and the second phases of CSCE will be over before MBFR negotiations begin on 30<sup>th</sup> October in Vienna.

There has been another reason for our accepting MPT,<sup>8</sup> as it was called in those beautiful abbreviations of NATO, with 13 neutral or non-aligned countries, we stood a fair chance of keeping the risks of a conference at a reasonable level.

Fourthly, the Warsaw Pact reluctantly yielded to our insistence in thorough and serious preparations. We said no conference is better than a failing one and we set ourselves to work to harmonise our individual and national positions within NATO. Allied governments aim broadly at the following results: first, of course, to make European security safer and not to diminish it. This they hope to ensure by seeing to it that the many lofty principles to which the Soviet Union and its allies have committed themselves in innumerable United Nations documents, including the United Nations Charter,<sup>9</sup> be adhered to in practice and not only in words. That in particular the renewed use of the Brezhnev doctrine be made at least slightly more difficult for the Soviet Union and that, finally, certain-military

6 Signed on 3 September 1971, by France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR to ease East-West tensions, as it ensured civil communications between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany.

7 Daily meetings of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) ad-hoc group in Vienna started on 30 January 1973 to discuss the allied position at the first MBFR meeting on 31 January 1973 and its follow-up meetings. These preliminary discussions were met with surprising conciliation from Warsaw Pact states, but looming difficulties on the question of participation in a conference.

8 Multi-lateral Preparatory Talks.

9 Signed 26 June 1945 with a primary purpose to maintain international peace and security.



measures, such as advance notification of military exercises or the exchange of manoeuvre observers, be established. Such measures, gentlemen, may not seem terribly impressive to you, the military, but they may slightly help to build some confidence and enhance stability in Europe.

You know that, in our view, the second aim, that of freer movement of people, ideas and information, has been at the heart of any successful conference as we conceive it. Not only governments and states, but also the individual citizen in our countries should benefit from the spreading détente in Europe.

The third aim follows a similar idea, also East–West cooperation in trade, science and so forth should produce concrete results for the individual and not only help the ailing Eastern economies.

Fourthly, it is our aim to obtain well-balanced results and not to seek agreement regardless of the content of these agreements.

Where do we stand today? Behind us lie the multilateral preparatory talks, the first phase of the conference, with the meeting of Foreign Ministers<sup>10</sup> who adopted, early in July in Helsinki, recommendations prepared by the preparatory talks, a meeting of the coordinating committee<sup>11</sup> organizing the work of the second phase of the conference and, only yesterday, the work of the working committees began. These committees will have to tackle twelve very specific subjects. I list them, just for the sake of illustration: first, principles; second, certain military measures; third, a peaceful settlement of international disputes (you will remember that this is a Swiss idea); fourth, trade; fifth, industrial cooperation; sixth, cooperation in the fields of science and technology; seventh, environment; eighth, further economic and social cooperation schemes; ninth, human contacts, repatriation of families, easing of the exit of citizens from their countries; tenth, promotion and exchange of information; eleventh, cultural exchanges, and twelfth, education.

An analysis, in the light of these events I have just mentioned, may seem to be justified and I look at the results first from the angle of a Soviet colleague of mine. First, the fact that the conference is finally taking place after such long procrastination on the side of reactionary Western forces constitutes a major diplomatic success for the forces standing for peace and progress. Secondly, the solidarity among the socialist delegation has prevailed despite diversionist attempts of our enemies to play off one brotherly nation against the other. Even the outspoken words of a Rumanian delegate<sup>12</sup> which, at the outset of the Helsinki talks in November, had encouraged some of the Western delegations could put to reason. Thirdly, the imperialist and misguided neutral delegations have failed to force upon us the revocation of what they maliciously labelled the Brezhnev doctrine. Fourthly, we have successfully withstood all attempts to destroy our morale and the Marxist conscience of our masters through the imposition of the concept of so-called freer movement of people, ideas and information. We made it quite plain to our interlocutors that we only admit more cultural exchanges within the limits of existing national legislation.

<sup>10</sup> 3–7 July 1973, finalized rules of procedure, agenda, and instructions of the conference working bodies adopted by 35 Foreign Ministers from Europe (except Albania), the US and Canada.

<sup>11</sup> Established to manage procedural matters related to phase two of the conference.

<sup>12</sup> Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs George Macovescu, [dodis.ch/P48063](http://dodis.ch/P48063).

Now I look at the results from my own angle as a NATO servant. First, fifteen sovereign nations<sup>13</sup> very keen about their sovereignty have, with the help of the members of the European Community<sup>14</sup> in an endeavour unique in diplomatic history I believe, worked out a common dossier. The dossier is impressive in size and in precision. It has been the fruit of more than four years of sometimes hard labours; it defines the problems of the proposals being put at the table, weighs its pros and cons, suggests negotiating tactics and offers concrete recommendations. The common studies have resulted in great mutual Allied understanding and harmony; there have not been sprung any surprises by anybody against anybody. The Allies at the big table, or round the big table, in Helsinki and now in Geneva, do not sing “con una voce,” but rather sing, each one harmoniously a polyphonically orchestrated theme. Secondly, our businesslike, serious and open-minded approach has won the support, unexpected for some, of the neutrals and non-allied countries on all important issues. Thirdly, the Warsaw Pact had to accept our approach which considers each problem on its own merits and which goes from the detail towards the more general. This has been in contrast to the Communist attempt to hurry us through towards a superficial and propagandist declaration of no substantial without any real negotiation on the detail. Now there is a new point. We have neither acquiesced with the Brezhnev doctrine nor have we accepted the Soviet thesis that the Conference should adopt a new kind of international law only applicable to Europe.

There are two other reasons for being reasonably satisfied – one being that our insistence on freer movement of people and information has not been given up, but has rather gained in momentum and importance as the result of recent developments in the Warsaw Pact.<sup>15</sup> I think of the process, on the one side, of ideological hardening, of the authoritarian regimes there, for example the conclusion of ideological agreements between the Communist Parties in Eastern Europe and, on the other hand, in particular of the appeals of the heroic Soviet or Czech dissidents lest we appease with their torturers. This increases the pressure from our public opinion on our authorities to stand firm and not to be lured off course. Last, not least, closely linked with the last observation, against all expectations, there has not been general euphoria spreading in Allied Chanceries or public opinion which the Soviet Union had tried to create so vigorously during the preparatory phase. On the contrary, there has been a certain sobering trend spreading in Europe and possibly as well in the North American Allied countries.

It may thus be said that the benefits both sides have drawn from the Conference so far have been more or less fairly balanced. But failure or success will not be judged by what has been achieved up till now, but by what is to come out from the second to the present phase of negotiations; for it is in Geneva now that the final texts of eventual declarations and resolutions will have to be hammered out

<sup>13</sup> Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, Greece, Turkey and West Germany.

<sup>14</sup> Predecessor of the European Union. Members include France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.

<sup>15</sup> Intra-alliance coalitions against the Soviet Union formed within Warsaw Pact meetings in the early 1970s.

by our negotiators. The multilateral preparatory talks have lasted more than six months only in order to lay the basis for the beginning of the real work. It may well require a little longer in order to achieve what we have set ourselves as an aim. Above all, it will require even more circumspection, patience and tenacity on the part of our colleagues on the spot to bring the Conference to a good end. I am sure they will do a good job, although I am less sure that the final result should have to be overrated.

*Now, MBFR:* The concept was born in 1967 when the report on the future tasks of the Alliance, the so-called Harmel Report noted, I quote “the Allies are studying disarmament and arms control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions.”<sup>16</sup> MBFR became NATO policy in June 1968 when, in the Reykjavik Declaration,<sup>17</sup> all the Foreign Ministers, except the French one, gave the signal to the other side to work towards talks on this subject. The signal, however, produced no response from the Warsaw Pact until May 1971 when the Party chief, Mr. Brezhnev, hinted at Soviet willingness to start negotiations at once on force reductions, foreign and indigenous. It then took almost two years of intensive Allied diplomacy to arrive at exploratory talks in Vienna by the end of January 1973. As I said before, it was above all due to the leverage offered by the Soviet obsession with the Conference that this kind of imperfect parallelism became effective.

What have been the motives for four of the fifteen NATO member states to seek negotiations on MBFR so tenaciously? First, it has been their desire to reach a more stable military balance in Central Europe at a lower level where hitherto the level of armed confrontation had been the highest. While maintaining undiminished security, they want to limit military capabilities which they regard as destabilising. Force reductions can also reduce the risks of miscalculation flowing from ambiguous military activity.

Secondly, there has also been suggested at times the argument that MBFR could help to save the tax-payer considerable money on military expenditures, or that MBFR could help to promote more freedom in the satellite countries through reduction of Soviet forces policing them. Under close examination, both these motives do not hold water; first of all it has become quite clear that, even after some reduction of forces, which will not go very much beyond a rather limited percentage of which I would not make any specific mention, we could not save much money; I would even say that the remaining forces will cost us a little bit more money because they would have to be more sophisticated and more modern. Secondly, the relatively small reduction of Soviet forces would not make any appreciable difference to the degree of subservience which we can notice nowadays in all the satellite countries; whether there are twenty-two Soviet divisions in East Germany or sixteen or eighteen, does not make too much difference.

<sup>16</sup> The former Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, [dodis.ch/P15124](https://dodis.ch/P15124), proposed at the 16 December 1966 ministerial meeting to establish a Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance to study the developments of political events and their effects on NATO. The Special group officially formed in 1967 and produced a report later that year – known informally as the Harmel Report, cf. [dodis.ch/77582](https://dodis.ch/77582) – that defined the future tasks of the Alliance, reasserted NATO’s basic principles, and introduced the notion of deterrence and détente.

<sup>17</sup> The meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers and state representatives participating in the NATO Defence Programme on 24–25 June 1968, which reaffirmed Allied motivations towards disarmament and arms control in the East.

But, thirdly, there has been an argument which has not been used in public, and for a very good reason, but which has carried increasing weight in the light of internal developments in some Allied countries. This argument suggests that, as long as the Western MBFR proposals are on the table, it is more difficult for Western parliaments to cut forces unilaterally. Even when and if serious negotiations start between members of the two opposing military systems, they are preferable to unilateral cuts, let us say by the United States alone, or by any European country, or preferable even to a military dialogue conclusively held and involving the United States and the Soviet Union alone.

What has been the result of the multilateral MBFR negotiations in Vienna? It would be an understatement if we neglected Soviet procrastination which our delegation have had to overcome over more than five months. There had, in addition, been some shortcomings which, although rather insignificant in nature, may have disappointed some observers. First, the designation of the talks agreed in Vienna does not include the word "balanced". However, this cannot be considered a substantive loss to the Western cause because to the Soviets the term "balanced" has always been something of a puzzle, worked into a mystery by the Allied policy makers who included it to ensure and assure both sides of equal treatment. The concept of balance is fully and adequately expressed in the Vienna final communiqué of 28<sup>th</sup> June [1973] by references to, I quote: "undiminished security for each party."

The second shortcoming regards the question of participation. Participants are divided into two categories, as you know, the direct ones with decision-making powers and the special participants who are allied to them. The two sides have agreed to disagree on the future status of Hungary<sup>18</sup> in the negotiations. The Soviet objective, right from the outset, has been to exclude Hungary from the negotiations entirely (and this, by the way, over the heads of the Hungarians themselves). The Allied objective had been to keep open the option of negotiating measures also covering Hungary; this option remains open. The Allies intend to raise the question anyhow of Hungary when appropriate during the negotiating phase.

Thirdly, the Allied delegations did not reach agreement with their Warsaw Pact interlocutors on an agenda; lacking the necessary time, they agreed, however, that all participants with decision-making power would be entitled to raise any topic relevant to the subject matter for negotiation and which they feel should be discussed and decided there.

Fourthly, in spite of the procrastination tactics and the shortcomings just mentioned, the Allied governments participating in the Vienna talks termed the talks themselves as broadly satisfactory. They said that negotiations would take place from 30<sup>th</sup> October onwards and the setting of a specific date for the opening had, indeed, been the major purpose of these talks. As an unbiased observer, may I remark that the date of 30<sup>th</sup> October has not been so much the making of our exploratory team in Vienna, but rather the result of the talks in June between Presi-

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<sup>18</sup> Suggested to be a tactical positioning tool for the Soviet Union according to a report by the Chairman of the Council, 1973.

dent Nixon<sup>19</sup> and Mr. Brezhnev. In addition, one might ask whether the setting of a date alone does already reveal much of the real Soviet intention to start at that time meaningful substantive negotiations proper. In any case, Vienna has served to set up some rules of procedure which will help to save some time during the negotiating phases, because they will apply to them as well and secondly they had served as a kind of “dry-run” for the negotiations and consultations among the Allies themselves. The Allies have developed methods for maintaining their cohesion through very full, thorough and timely consultation.

Now a short look at what might be the possible Soviet objectives in responding to the NATO pressure for MBFR negotiations. It can be assumed that they will stall for quite some time and at least as long as the Conference proper on European Security and Cooperation in Geneva; the second phase of which has not been concluded in a way which seems satisfactory to the Soviet Union. Secondly, we may assume that they will engage thereafter somewhat more seriously in some talks. Why? Because they want to create some kind of euphoria and of *détente* which they regard as so important and also because very probably they will look and aim at that element in our defence posture which they regard as superior to theirs, i.e. the nuclear element.

Whatever the Soviet motives for the forthcoming negotiations, we shall have to prepare ourselves most thoroughly and, I may add, quickly for this round. We can of course base our work on the intensive military and political dossier that NATO started to develop more than five years ago and we are indeed at present seriously engaged in bringing up to date the negotiating papers for Vienna. Not too much time is left, we shall have to finalise our view, first of all on secret or internal guidelines which had already been before us for quite some time, but in which you still find some important square brackets reflecting some Allies dissension then we will have to finalise our common negotiating approach which will contain substantive elements for eventual negotiating proposals to be put to the other side. The approach must cover such issues as the nature and the level of forces to be reduced, the ratio of reductions, the relation between possible phases of a gradual phased approach, some guidance on collateral constraints or on verification. Furthermore, there will have to be an orientation on the negotiating tactics, i.e. how the Allied negotiators will deal with the substantive elements, whether they are going to wait until the other side comes up with a proposal or whether they are to put their papers on the table relatively early in the discussions. Last but not least, there will be a chapter to revise and put more detail into the question of Allied consultative procedures.

General, Lady and Gentlemen, a very few remarks in conclusion. It can be said, I believe, that our negotiators on the spot will be aware of three major dangers. The first danger being that there is no room for hurrying through some kind of agreement which would not suffer substantively from shortcomings through superficiality or through exaggerated hurry.

On the other hand, there is a similar danger, i.e. to be too difficult in detail, not in terms of thoroughness but in terms of gaining as much time as possible for the

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19 United States President Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](https://dodis.ch/P13584).

maintenance of the status quo, as we have it in our defence posture today. This would be very dangerous insofar as it may work against our own interests, since there are strong forces who are in favour of cuts anyway – so a clear middle course will have to be steered by our governments.

Thirdly, there is the danger that you may be seeking an agreement along the same lines as in the case of the CSCE, an agreement which is sought regardless of its content; that you may feel satisfied just by some paragraphs on cuts or movement constraints and think that our security would be enhanced by this. This would be wrong again. I would conclude by saying that, in the many consultations I have had with most of the members of the delegations, I gained the impression that they are highly responsible and conscious of their responsibility, highly knowledgeable and, to a very great extent as well, sufficiently patient and it is patience which is required.<sup>20</sup>

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20 For all NATO documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2907](http://dodis.ch/C2907).

[dodis.ch/75712](https://dodis.ch/75712)

Austria

*Opening statement by the Head of the Austrian Delegation to the CSCE Liedermann<sup>1</sup>*

SUB-COMMISSION 8 (HUMAN CONTACTS)

[Geneva,] 27 September 1973

Mr Chairman<sup>2</sup>

Austria noted with great satisfaction that the final recommendations<sup>3</sup> of the Helsinki Consultations in the third agenda item also recognised humanitarian aspects as a means of contributing to the strengthening of peace and understanding between the peoples of the participating States, because, in our opinion, such a statement is in line with Article 1 of the UN Charter<sup>4</sup> and because there is a very clear *interaction* between political relations between states and the generous development of human contacts in all their forms.

Just as it is the primary task of the state to ensure the welfare of its citizens, *so too are human beings at the heart of the security needs of states* in the international community, which is why we must not overlook the role of human beings in our concept.

Above all, it seems to me that one of the great duties of a permanently *neutral* state is to never tire of emphasising the human side of politics.

If we want to promote and further develop the process of *détente*, we must also be able to come closer together on a human level and get to know each other better in order to gain more trust in each other, which is a prerequisite for peaceful coexistence and cooperation, which in turn is an essential element in ensuring security in Europe.

The interdependence of states and peoples, in which we live today as a consequence of developments in the natural sciences, especially technology, transport links and communications, has brought us closer together. We often hear

<sup>1</sup> Austrian State Archives/Archiv der Republik (AT-OeStA/AdR), BMAA/II-Pol, International 12, GZL 30.169/6a/73. Translated from German. This statement was transmitted by the Head of the Austrian Delegation to the CSCE in Geneva Helmut Liedermann, [dodis.ch/P51320](https://dodis.ch/P51320), on 28 September 1973 to the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and arrived in Vienna on 2 October 1973. The statement was forwarded to the heads of Sections II and IV for their information.

<sup>2</sup> On 27 September 1973, the Sub-Committee 8 of Committee III at the CSCE negotiations in Geneva was chaired by United States delegate Guy Coriden, [dodis.ch/P81731](https://dodis.ch/P81731), cf. Swiss Federal Archives CH-BAR# J2.95#1974/40#33\* (431).

<sup>3</sup> Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).

<sup>4</sup> The mentioned article reads: "The purposes of the United Nations are: [...] (3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion," *The Charter of the United Nations* of 26 June 1945, UN doc. UNCIO XV (1945).



it said that the world has become much smaller as a result of technological developments in recent decades. But has this really brought us closer together? Do we really understand each other better? In order to breathe more life into this technological convergence, which is already effective at this level, it is extremely important to develop human contacts at all levels, *especially on an individual basis*. How can we succeed in developing the process of building trust between states if we fail to promote contacts between the people who, taken together, make up the populations of those states, and to create more trust in this crucial human sphere in order to strengthen and promote the willingness to live together peacefully and to cooperate for the benefit of all peoples and states?

When I emphasise the importance of human contacts, I do so with a view to the principle mentioned at the outset that people are at the heart of our republic's politics.

We are *not* pursuing *any missionary aims* in this regard, but purely practical goals that are in line with our own interests and at the same time serve to ease tensions. Austria's geographical location and historical development mean that our people maintain many family and other personal relationships beyond our borders and therefore have a very concrete interest in creating better conditions for contacts between people in all their forms and for solving humanitarian problems.

It is therefore very important to us in Austria that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe achieves *concrete results as soon as possible* in the interests of promoting and further developing the process of détente in this area.

However, if we want to achieve such concrete results, we must also do very concrete work and deal in great detail with the specific aspects of the task at hand, as set out in the relevant parts of the final recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations.<sup>5</sup>

This is how we understand the task ahead of us, and we are prepared to work constructively in the interests of ensuring that our conference proceeds *swiftly*.<sup>6</sup>

5 Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).

6 For all the Austrian documents in this volume, cf. [dodis.ch/C2929](https://dodis.ch/C2929).

[dodis.ch/76977](https://dodis.ch/76977)

France

*Intervention by the Member of the French Delegation to the CSCE Chazelle,  
to Sub-Committee IX (general debate)<sup>1</sup>*

ON THE FLOW OF INFORMATION BETWEEN EUROPEAN STATES

[Geneva,] 5 October 1973

Mr Chairman<sup>2</sup>

As our introductory debate comes to a close and we prepare to begin detailed and tangible examination of the various points in our instructions, meaning measures whereby our objectives may be achieved, I would like to share a few reflections on all the statements we have heard so far with our sub-committee. In doing so, I do not hope to change anyone's ideas, or even the positions of any one of us. But these observations, inspired by the sole desire to facilitate efforts to reach points of agreement, may perhaps help to inform our genuine work and make it more fruitful.

Last week, we saw the clash, in very courteous but very clear terms, of two fundamentally different conceptions of information, which appear very difficult to reconcile. They are not the result of historic circumstances alone, but are rooted in principles, indeed in political principles that differ massively. On the one hand, we have heard that information – which is, as our Czechoslovak colleague<sup>3</sup> underlined, a “power” in itself – must be subject to political power, which alone is qualified before the social body it claims to embody to assess the usefulness or dangers that information bears. In response, we have heard, from the other side, that information, because it is by its very nature distinct from political power, because it belongs to the order of truth and not of convenience, cannot be other than independent and, subject to safeguards that must be as discreet as possible and concern morality, public order and the security of the nation, be fully free not only within each country, but across borders.

There is no need to clarify the choice made by France between these two visions of things, over the last century and a half during which the issue of information in society has truly begun to arise. As we prepared to start our work in Helsinki,

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archives of the French Foreign Ministry (FR-AMAE), 99SUP [C.S.C.E., 1973–1978], 16. Translated from French. The edited text most likely includes the author's handwritten corrections, for the facsimile, cf. [dodis.ch/76977](https://dodis.ch/76977). This statement was delivered by the member of the French Delegation to the CSCE Jacques Chazelle, [dodis.ch/P78511](https://dodis.ch/P78511), on 5 October 1973.

<sup>2</sup> On 5 October 1973, the Sub-Committee 9 of Committee III at the CSCE negotiations in Geneva was chaired by Cypriot delegate to the CSCE A. Georgiades, [dodis.ch/P81921](https://dodis.ch/P81921), cf. Swiss Federal Archives CH-BAR#J2.95#1974/40#36\* (432).

<sup>3</sup> Jaromír Sedlák, [dodis.ch/P81765](https://dodis.ch/P81765).

on 4 July, our Foreign Minister<sup>4</sup> was keen to underline the importance attached by the Government of the French Republic to “this idea of freedom”.

So we will spare no effort, throughout our debates, to contribute to ensuring that freedom reigns in our mutual relations and, singularly, in the field for which our sub-committee is responsible. On this point, moreover, we all agree, as that is indeed the aim, if words have meaning, of our instructions, and the aim that has been ratified by our ministers. The question – our only question – is how to achieve that aim, by achieving, by common agreement, substantial enough progress on this path for us not to feel, at the end of our work, that we have betrayed our mandate. For every one of us is well aware that if, in this area, our discussions arrive only at a failure or – and this boils down to the same thing – we only manage to agree on words, without reality changing at all, then the fate of the Conference as a whole would be compromised.

Yet we do not, it seems to me – and this the crux of what I wanted to say – have any chance to make progress if we do not, of course, show realism, as our Finnish colleague<sup>5</sup> advised us, but also clear-sightedness. What I mean is that we should first and foremost work to distinguish between what is possible and what is not yet possible, and that we will go all the further along the path of the possible – which is perhaps more promising than we think – if we are quick to identify its perimeter. But on this I must explain myself.

The presentation and discussion of ideas, systems and practices that we have just observed was no doubt inevitable. Tactically, it is good to recall your positions before opening dialogue, particularly such a difficult one on such a serious matter. Indeed, I believe that this was necessary and useful. We will now be able to see more clearly and better measure the boundaries within which we must hold our debate if it is to be successful. May I add that I was struck by the honesty, sometimes brutal honesty, yes, with which several of us have expressed their points of view? The less we seek to mask our positions behind great words, the better we will be able to identify the routes available between them. But it is clear to us all, I believe, that this presentation and discussion cannot, in itself, bring about anything.

By illustrating the depth of the divergences between our conceptions, it has, on the contrary, confirmed how vain it would be to hope for some compromise between them. It is important to recall that that is not the goal of our Conference. Not one of us, I imagine, has come here with the aim of bringing others around to their own manner of thinking and acting, in an area that is so fundamental to the very foundations of our States. The French delegation, in any case, does not hold any such illusion, which it would even consider dangerous. If I may quote our Minister once more, you will recall that he encouraged us, in the same speech in Helsinki, to “take into account the reality, in the Europe of 1973, while taking care not to challenge the political organisations of States.”

That is why, may I say, I struggle to comprehend the insistence with which certain delegations are seeking again to inscribe, in gilded letters, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs as we prepare all our work,

<sup>4</sup> French Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel Jobert, [dodis.ch/P47096](https://dodis.ch/P47096).

<sup>5</sup> Klaus Törnudd, [dodis.ch/P55557](https://dodis.ch/P55557).

just as in the past, on the base of tombs, we would write: “abandon hope, all ye who enter here”. They surely do not suggest that the various agreements we may no doubt arrive at subsequently may, when it comes to truly applying them, be challenged by everyone as they so wish and emptied of their substance in the name of higher principles. That would be to deny such agreements any value in advance, and I am sure that the delegations in question would be the first to reject such an interpretation. And I do not believe that they are refusing to come to any agreement that would not be compliant with their own laws, their own regulations and their own customs: that would mean denying any possibility of negotiation as, as our British colleague<sup>6</sup> has underlined, any negotiation involves mutual concessions and no substantial progress can be made, in the area in question, without changes in our customs, and no doubt in our regulations and, if necessary, in our laws. But if recalling these principles simply means, as I am personally convinced, that we in no way intend to allow such changes to be imposed on us against our will and that we will only accept changes that we have freely subscribed to, then that precaution is a natural one. However, while it is no doubt worth taking, it should not be taken with such vigour, which unnecessarily aggravates mutual mistrust. None of us, I am sure, imagines trampling underfoot in our Committee the principles that were so carefully drawn up in the first.

Now I will come back to what I was saying. While there is no question of seeking to change the conceptions each of us hold as regards information, the only way forward is that which is stated in the very title of our Conference. That means, in our area of work, stepping up and developing our cooperation. Within the limits rooted in our national differences, this cooperation must firstly seek to improve mutual knowledge, with freer and greater information for each people on the domestic and foreign policy, institutions, achievements and, even more so, perhaps, daily life, of the others. It is no accident that I am speaking here of peoples and not of leaders. Not only do the latter already have some experience of one another and the means to get to know each other better, but their *détente*, and then rapprochement, efforts are at risk of remaining fragile so long as ties of understanding are not forged between individuals, and so long as the sense of cultural and human community has not emerged between them. And it is indeed for these peoples, as several of our ministers underlined in Helsinki, that our Conference, if it is to be a success, must offer something new.

While limited, to begin, to the scope of mutual information, the area to cover in our efforts remains considerable. You need travel only a little in Europe to realise the scale of the points of ignorance and, therefore errors or mere points of indifference – which are almost as dangerous as points of incomprehension – that continue to weigh on relations between countries that are sometimes neighbours. I do not only have in mind those where a restrictive conception of information forms a barrier of silence to the outside world; I also have in mind those, countries, like mine, where the very notion of freedom, aggravated by the lack of sufficient available information, unduly reduces the attention given to part of this outside world.

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6 Peter Maxey, [dodis.ch/P81766](http://dodis.ch/P81766).

So we all have something to do, a lot to do, to improve things, and for everyone to be satisfied.

But above all, within these limits, the scope of our work appears markedly more feasible. By initially setting aside efforts to agree on measures which, given their general nature, could raise practically insoluble problems for some of us, we would begin, in what would already be a great step forward, by freeing up the flow of information on our countries and on their mutual relations, both between our countries and within them. As the aim is clear and should not, in terms of its principle, lead to any objections, discovering the ways and means of achieving it should be less difficult. Without wishing to speculate as to the next stages of our work, I believe they would gain from the problem being split into as many aspects as it takes to truly apprehend and address the true difficulties one after the other.

For example, and to keep to the letter of our instructions, we should distinguish in our successive examination of aspects between the issue of access to sources of information and the distribution of information. Concerning the first point, we must seek to address the obstacles faced, here and there, in collecting data that could inform foreign opinion as to the realities of a country's political, social, economic and cultural life, whether this data is available in the form of written documentation from administrations or from private institutions, or whether it must be collected verbally, from the mouths of official figures, from leaders of organisations and from citizens. We will, of course, stumble over the notion of confidentiality, which is understood differently by different parties, but on which we could at least compare our respective viewpoints. In particular, we will see how to improve the working conditions in our countries of those key informers, foreign journalists, concerning their freedom to move within our countries, to access truly relevant documents and to have useful conversations with the holders of information.

When it comes to distribution, our task will not only be to ensure that the material collected can fully, swiftly and easily reach the people and bodies responsible for its implementation, but also to seek to abolish or reduce the restrictions encountered, in a great many countries, by the distribution of foreign information. We will thus have to address the issue of distribution of the press and publications, and of the audience of radio and television broadcasts, and once again we will stumble over a major difficulty: censorship. Yet it is better to talk about it than to seek to ignore it, as we cannot reach an agreement if we have not first understood one another. While the divergences between us cannot all be overcome, setting and complying with explicit criteria would be a major step forward in itself.

One need only sketch out the discussions that await to realise how complex and difficult they will be, and the number of stumbling blocks we face, even when they are limited to the relatively modest aim that I set down earlier. They should no doubt escape the difficulties of principle that I mentioned earlier, as when it is dedicated to other countries, information cannot be suspected of undermining that in which it is distributed. However, we can all see the challenges that await us, concerning both the collection and the distribution of information.

Many States still, for the purposes of propaganda or ill-conceived security, seek to obscure from foreign curiosity whole swaths, if not the most part, of their

activities and the problems that they can lead to. Many, too, and often the same, are worried by the flow, within their own territories, of information concerning certain aspects of foreign realities, in fear of them providing fodder for criticism at home, emerging as a challenge or setting a bad example. We will have to insist unwaveringly to dissipate this two-fold fear, for that is the true barrier, rather than that of our regimes and our ideologies, which we should and which we can gradually eliminate between us. All our countries today have their strengths and their weaknesses. But they must all feel strong enough now to open themselves up so that we can talk of their weaknesses and here they speak of what gives the others their strength. It is, as we can see, a question of confidence – and first and foremost, self-confidence.

Yet this self-confidence can only develop alongside confidence in others, which must be met by the honesty of others. Our effort to boost and to enrich the flow of mutual information between our countries can only succeed if, on both sides, we accept the rules of the game and stick to them. By that I mean that it is not only, to speak the jargon of the information sector, issuers and receivers who will have to play along with greater tolerance, but also those who produce and distribute this information, who will have to hold themselves to greater discipline. We are here, for months, to seek to lay down or consolidate the basis for active and friendly co-operation between our countries. Such a prospect means that nobody must, at the same time, through information, seek to undermine the institutions and rules that other countries have established for themselves and which, while they may displease us, are a matter for their peoples alone. The duty of reserve is all the more important for neglecting it would swiftly annihilate any progress we have made.

I have just a few more words to say, and I'm a little ashamed to have spoken at such length. I have spoken of confidence, and of honesty. These two virtues are the cornerstone of everything, if we want things to change. Without them, nothing is possible; with them, we will soon be surprised by what has become possible. But if each country were to wait for the others to practice them before practicing them itself, any agreements we have managed to arrive at would, no doubt, remain ineffective during all that time. Confidence and honesty are, ultimately, the fruits of one another. For the process to begin, the example must first be set. That is, in any case, what we will strive to do, I am certain, as we begin our work.<sup>7</sup>

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7 For all the French documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2906](http://dodis.ch/C2906).

[dodis.ch/76898](https://dodis.ch/76898)

Poland

*Memorandum from the Department of Studies and Programming of the Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

THESES ON THE POSITION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS AT THE CSCE.

*[Warsaw, no earlier than 19 October 1973]*

1. In view of its historical experience, Poland attaches fundamental importance to ensuring the inviolability of European borders as the basis for establishing lasting peace and security in Europe and thus ushering in a new era in the history of the European continent. Therefore, of all the principles of inter-state relations discussed at the CSCE, the principle of the inviolability of borders is the most important for us.

2. The bilateral and quadripartite agreements concluded in 1970–1972, i.e. the agreements between the GFR and the USSR, the Polish People's Republic and the GDR, and the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, constitute a recognition of the political and territorial realities existing in Europe. The fundamental component of recognising the political and territorial realities is the recognition of existing borders as inviolable. Only on this basis was it possible to set Europe on the path of easing of tensions, cooperation and peaceful coexistence, and, i.e., to convene the first CSCE. A similar position was taken by most foreign ministers in their speeches during the first phase of the CSCE in Helsinki.

3. We consider all proposals for the formulation of the principle of the inviolability of borders at the CSCE in terms of their compliance with the above-mentioned agreements. The proposal made by the USSR during the first phase of the CSCE, which we supported, is fully in line with the concluded agreements.

4. We firmly reject any wording which is inconsistent with the agreements or that attempts to interpret the agreements in a manner contrary to their letter and spirit. We will never allow the final documents of the CSCE to undermine the significance of the bilateral agreements or to represent a step backwards compared to those agreements.

5. This group includes the proposals put forward by the GFR and France during the second phase of the CSCE.<sup>2</sup> They can be considered together, as the French

<sup>1</sup> Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (PL-AMSZ), DSiP 3/82, w. 2. This document has been translated from Polish by Anna Sadowska. This memorandum was established by Department of Studies and Programming of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on 19 October 1973 at the earliest.

<sup>2</sup> Phase II of the CSCE (expert negotiations in Geneva) lasted (with breaks) from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975.



proposal on the principle of the inviolability of borders does not differ greatly from the GFR proposal. Therefore, we cannot consider the French proposal to be a compromise, as its authors present it. Anyway, we believe that no compromise is possible on border issues: either you stand on the ground of the inviolability of the current borders in Europe, or you undermine the status of those borders. We would like to express our surprise that this proposal was put forward by France, whose position on border issues or the future of the German question has so far been similar to that of Poland (and expressed in bilateral documents).

6. The proposals of France and the GFR on border issues and, more broadly, on territorial issues are unacceptable to us for the following reasons:

(I) The proposals wrongly subordinate the principles of the inviolability of borders and respect for territorial integrity to the principle of the prohibition of the use of force. The prohibition of the use of force is an essential element of the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, but it is not the only one. This issue was clearly explained during the Helsinki MPT,<sup>3</sup> and the final recommendations of the MPT clearly state that all principles are equally important and equally inter-related. We are surprised that some Western countries are returning to this issue, departing from the recommendations of the MPT.

(II) By using the formula of the inviolability of borders “regardless of their legal status”, an attempt is being made to undermine the *de jure* recognition of existing borders as state borders. This is an attempt to include in a multilateral document view on the provisional rather than definitive nature of some borders in Europe. The adoption of a formulation indicating the existence of divergent opinions on the legal status of existing borders in Europe could be used as an anchor point for raising border issues in the future, which, in the light of the existing agreements, should be considered definitively closed.

In these agreements (in particular in the agreement between the Polish People’s Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany), the borders were defined as state borders. A state border is a recognised institution in international law, and agreements on borders enjoy special legal protection. This was confirmed in Article 62(2)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which rules out the possibility of invoking a fundamental change of circumstances as a basis for revoking a treaty establishing borders.

(III) Combining the principle of the inviolability of borders with the principle of self-determination of nations is not justified in any way. The principle of self-determination is an independent principle and is no more closely linked to the principle of the inviolability of borders than any other principle. In any case, the principle of self-determination of nations does not take precedence over the principle of the inviolability of borders.

(IV) Combining the principle of the inviolability of borders with so-called peaceful changes to borders in a manner consistent with international law and by way of agreement could be justified, were it not for the fact that it weakens the significance of the principle of the inviolability of borders. Even if some Western European countries apply this formula not to borders in Central Europe but to

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3 *Multilateral preparatory talks.*

Western European borders in the process of political integration, in its current Western formulation it objectively works against the recognition of political and territorial realities in Europe. Corrections and changes to the status of borders made in accordance with international law (also by the SC) are a separate matter which, strictly speaking, does not fall within the context of the principle of the inviolability of borders. These changes in any case must not undermine the security of other interested countries.

(V) In the French draft, as in the GFR draft, there is no mention of the inviolability of borders in the future or the renunciation of territorial claims. These formulas are included in the USSR draft and were also included in the GFR's bilateral agreements with the SC. The French proposal on the inviolability of borders, just like the GFR proposal, therefore represents a step backwards compared to agreements to date.

7. We consider our borders to be completely secure and regulated in terms of international law, which is why we do not raise the issue of any specific borders at the CSCE. We consider the principle of the inviolability of borders in general terms. We believe that it is equally important for all European countries. However, we cannot allow the wording adopted by the CSCE to be used by anyone – now or in the future – to question the final nature of European borders

#### *Commentary*

The above theses constitute material for bilateral talks at the CSCE. The EEC countries, including France, as evidenced by talks with it, are pushing for a formula at the CSCE on the possibility of peaceful border changes, not so much because they support the GFR's concepts of German unification (which is difficult to accuse of e.g. France), but because of their integrationist tendencies and fears that the CSCE might adopt a formula on borders that would constitute a theoretical obstacle to political integration.

The GFR is taking advantage of this situation by "adding" the formula on self-determination to the formula on peaceful border changes. As a result, the SC are opposed by the entire united bloc of the EEC Nine.

If it were possible to work out a formula rejecting the GFR's interpretation and not interfering with the integration doctrine, the unified bloc of Western states could be broken up.

Admittedly, the GFR's proposals may concern the border between the GFR and the GDR rather than the borders of the Polish People's Republic, but rejecting them is undoubtedly in the interest of the Polish People's Republic.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> For all Polish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2901](http://dodis.ch/C2901).

[dodis.ch/76982](https://dodis.ch/76982)

Israel

*Speech by the Israeli Ambassador in Bern, Levavi, before the First Committee of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Geneva<sup>1</sup>*

[THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF EUROPEAN AND  
MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY]

Geneva, 23 October 1973

I have the honour of submitting to your distinguished Committee a memorandum<sup>2</sup> of the Government of Israel on the problem of the security in Europe and in the Mediterranean region.

My government appreciates highly that its application to present its views on this subject has been received favourably and expresses its thanks to the president, the delegations and the executive secretary.

The government of Israel has taken note with great satisfaction of the recommendation number 15 of the Helsinki consultations to the effect that in considering questions relating to security in Europe, this Committee will bear in mind the broader context of world security and in particular the relationship which exists between security in Europe and in the Mediterranean area.

The memorandum in this connection, drafted on the instructions of my government, respects meticulously the decision arrived at in the course of the Helsinki consultations to exclude the subject of the Middle East.

We are aware however that other Mediterranean countries who have presented their views to this Committee, or intend to do so, referred in fact to Israel as having no legitimate right to exist.<sup>3</sup> We respect the high purpose of this Committee and shall abstain here from futile and destructive polemics of the kind that unhappily takes place recurrently at other international gatherings. The recent tragedy in itself,<sup>4</sup> the great losses of human life and the widespread destruction – which we so deeply deplore together with all men of good will – has demonstrated which side had recourse to acts of war in order to achieve its objectives,

<sup>1</sup> Israel State Archives (ISA), MFA 8088/5. *Original in English. This speech was given by the Israeli Ambassador in Bern Arye Levavi, [dodis.ch/P14779](https://dodis.ch/P14779). Levavi also spoke in the Second Committee on the same day. For the background to Israel's appearance at both Committees, and Yugoslavia's opposition to this appearance, cf. the circular by the Israeli Head of the Europe I Department Yaish, [dodis.ch/P51234](https://dodis.ch/P51234), to the Israeli embassies in Washington, Helsinki et. al., dated 26 September 1973, ISA, MFA5311/16.*

<sup>2</sup> For the memorandum, cf. ISA, MFA8088/5.

<sup>3</sup> Levavi's speech followed the appearances of the Algerian representative Hocine Djoudi, [dodis.ch/P68749](https://dodis.ch/P68749), on 9 October 1973, [dodis.ch/77499](https://dodis.ch/77499), and the Tunisian representative Salah Ladgham, [dodis.ch/P81568](https://dodis.ch/P81568), on 10 October 1973, [dodis.ch/77498](https://dodis.ch/77498).

<sup>4</sup> The Yom Kippur War, which broke out on 6 October 1973 with a joint Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israeli forces on the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.

which side refused negotiation as a means to resolve disputes and thus negated the principles, approved again at Helsinki, to abstain from the use of force and to settle conflicts by peaceful means only.

The repeatedly proclaimed intention of certain countries to destroy Israel, and their acts of aggression against her ever since her establishment, left Israel no alternative but to defend her existence with utmost determination.

However we have constantly emphasized that the absence of free, direct, normal peace negotiations between Israel and her neighbours lies at the heart of the deadlock in the Middle East. In responding positively to the call of the Security Council yesterday<sup>5</sup> the Government of Israel has expressed the hope that the bloodshed and hostility which have tormented the Middle East for so many years will be replaced by an era of peace and co-operation.

We fervently hope that the Conference for European Security and Co-operation will find constructive ways to convince all countries of the adjacent Mediterranean area that only peace and co-operation can ensure human progress throughout their region –to the benefit of the peoples residing there, as well as to the benefit of Europe and of peace throughout the world.

It remains important to consider very briefly the relevant framework of history.

The close bonds that link Israel, other Mediterranean countries and Europe reach deep into the past and account for many aspects of the spiritual heritage that has given the world vital and enduring impulses.

For many centuries, the history of the Mediterranean peoples has been intimately linked with that of Europe. Thinkers of the Jewish, Greek, Roman, Christian and Moslem civilisations, all born on the shores of the Mediterranean, have been engaged in fruitful confrontation and intercourse in the lands surrounding the Middle Sea and throughout Europe from the intellectual centers of Iberia to the furthest bounds of Russia. The spiritual impact of this encounter has created indissoluble affinities between the peoples of the Mediterranean and the continent of the North.

The conference on European Security and Cooperation cannot be impervious to the fact that the Mediterranean is the contact point and a historical bridge between Europe and the adjacent continents of Asia and Africa. It would appear that the development of fuller contacts and the pooling of men's resources, minds and toils, ought to be extended to the whole Mediterranean area on account of its organic link with Europe and because it is the most appropriate channel through which European values and achievements could radiate towards the two other great continents.

Let me emphasize that should the Conference wish to have some of the views expressed by Israel in the submitted document further elaborated, Israel will be most happy to respond. Israel herself would wish, with the agreement of the Conference, to refer again to some of the subjects on the agenda of the Conference should circumstances, or the progress of the work of the Conference, warrant it in her opinion.

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<sup>5</sup> On 22 October 1973 the UN Security Council adopted the joint US-Soviet sponsored Resolution 338, calling for a ceasefire between Israel and its neighbours and the opening of negotiations on a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

In conclusion I express the best wishes of my government for a successful outcome of the deliberations and efforts of your illustrious Committee. May it achieve a great and significant contribution to the cause of peace.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For all Israeli documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2908](https://dodis.ch/C2908).

[dodis.ch/77019](https://dodis.ch/77019)

Federal Republic of Germany

*The Political Director of the Federal Foreign Office, van Well, to State Secretary Frank*<sup>1</sup>

CSCE; HERE: SOVIET CRITICISM OF OUR WORDING REGARDING THE  
“INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS” • TALKS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL  
CHANCELLOR AND AMBASSADOR FALIN ON 24 OCTOBER 1973<sup>2</sup>

Confidential

Bonn, 13 November 1973

I. The memorandum on the talks reports that, based on his impressions gained in Moscow, Ambassador Falin outlined inter alia that not everything had been done to implement the important and far-reaching decisions taken in May (Brezhnev visit).<sup>3</sup> He went on to say that our bilateral relations were a model and a yardstick for many other states on whether progress was being made on détente. In many fields in which progress was possible, he described the situation as a standstill. He had the impression that technical agencies wanted to implement decisions taken between the leadership of the two countries according to their own interpretation.

By way of example, he cited inter alia:

The problem of the inviolability of frontiers was “off the table” after the agreement in the Moscow Treaty;<sup>4</sup> the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in Geneva had, however, included new wording proposals in their drafts.

Response by the Federal Chancellor: The “Geneva” process the Ambassador mentioned was not known to him. He would make inquiries.

II. The transcript attached as an annex elucidates the situation. In the opinion of the Political Directorate-General, the Soviet criticism is unfounded. The misunderstanding has obviously been resolved, as the Soviet side is no longer voicing the accusations made by Ambassador Falin on 24 October 1973.

<sup>1</sup> Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (DE-PA/AA), B 130, vol. 9073 (212) Restricted. File reference: 212-341.31-3251/73. Translated from German. This memorandum was written and signed by the Political Director of the Federal Foreign Office Günther van Well, [dodis.ch/P51500](https://dodis.ch/P51500), co-signed by Division 500, for the attention of the State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office Paul Frank, [dodis.ch/P46511](https://dodis.ch/P46511), and seen and approved by the latter on 20 November 1973. For the 5 annexes to the memorandum cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77019](https://dodis.ch/77019). This document was also published in German in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (AAPD) 1973, Munich 2004, doc. 375.

<sup>2</sup> For the memorandum of conversation between Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](https://dodis.ch/P15409) and Soviet Ambassador in Bonn Valentin Falin, [dodis.ch/P48479](https://dodis.ch/P48479), cf. AAPD 1973, doc. 334.

<sup>3</sup> General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543), visited the FRG from 18 to 22 May 1973, cf. AAPD 1975, doc. 145–152.

<sup>4</sup> Treaty concluded by the FRG and the Soviet Union on 12 August 1970 in which both parties committed to the principles of the non-use of force and the inviolability of frontiers.

Our delegation in Geneva tells us that this delegation had confirmed prior to the visit of the Federal Foreign Minister to Moscow that there were no difficulties at all between the two delegations and that the topic no longer played a significant role in Moscow. The Soviet side instead attached particular importance to the good cooperation between the two delegations in Geneva being praised in the statement on the Moscow visit.<sup>5</sup>

I propose bringing the attached transcript to the attention of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Minister.

*Memo on CSCE Declaration on Principles; here: Principle of the inviolability of frontiers*<sup>6</sup>

#### *I. Developments in Geneva consultations*

The discussion on the principle of the inviolability of frontiers in Geneva is being conducted primarily on the basis of the following documents:

##### *1. Helsinki Final Recommendations;*<sup>7</sup>

In accordance, a document is to be drawn up in Geneva precisely formulating the principles “with such clarifications and additions as may be deemed desirable” and “in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations”; in the list of ten principles, “inviolability of frontiers” comes directly after “refraining from the threat or use of force”.

*2. Soviet draft of a General Declaration on the principles of Security in Europe and on the Principles Guiding Relations between States in Europe (Annex 1).*<sup>8</sup> In this Declaration, the participating States solemnly declare that they will respect and apply the following principles without restriction:

“... the inviolability of frontiers, whereby the participating States consider the existing frontiers in Europe to be inviolable today and in the future, do not make territorial claims against one another and recognise that peace in this area can only be upheld if no-one attempts to challenge the inviolability of current frontiers.”

The Soviet Union concedes that this principle is connected to other principles in the catalogue, however, rejects subordinating this principle to the principle of refraining from the use of force. According to the Soviet Union, frontier changes are not completely excluded in the future, in the form of

- frontier changes based on a treaty between sovereign states;
- frontier changes through integration processes;
- frontier corrections, including negotiations on the demarcation of frontiers.

They are not, however, to be explicitly mentioned in the catalogue of principles in the CSCE Declaration because the Soviet Union considers these obvious; the principle of the inviolability of frontiers is not to be “restricted” in any way.

<sup>5</sup> For the statement of the Federal Foreign Office on the visit of Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, [dodis.ch/P15413](https://dodis.ch/P15413), to the USSR from 31 October to 3 November 1973, cf. *Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government*, Bonn 1973, pp. 1405 f.

<sup>6</sup> DE-PA/AA, B 130, vol. 9073 (212). Translated from German. This annex dates from 6 November 1973.

<sup>7</sup> *Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973*, cf. [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).

<sup>8</sup> For Annex 1 cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77019](https://dodis.ch/77019).



3. On 26 September, *we* presented an explanatory document on the principles of refraining from the use of force, the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity in Geneva (Annex 2).<sup>9</sup> Other allies also presented explanatory documents on other key principles. The tactics agreed in the Alliance and the Community were not to take up the wording of the principles requested by the Soviet Union based on its draft until a sufficient basis for drafting texts had been created after thorough discussion of the individual principles (inductive method). Our wording regarding the principle of the inviolability of frontiers reads:

“Every participating State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing international boundaries of another participating State or as a means of solving territorial disputes and issues concerning frontiers of States. The participating States consider their frontiers, as they exist today and regardless of the legal status they have in their view, to be inviolable. The participating States are of the opinion that their frontiers can only be changed in accordance with international law, using peaceful means and by means of an agreement which takes due account of the right to self-determination of peoples.”

The first sentence is based on the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States,<sup>10</sup> which is quoted as a source in the Helsinki Final Act.<sup>11</sup> The two subsequent sentences are identical to those in the French draft (see figure 4).

4. *French draft* of a declaration on principles (Annex 3).<sup>12</sup> This draft has been discussed at length in the Alliance and the Community. The French have largely taken account of the amendments we requested. In its definition of inviolability in number 3, the French draft refrains from making express reference to the non-use of force. In number 2, however, it prohibits the “threat and use of force ... to violate territorial integrity” which amounts to the same thing. The rest of the wording matches ours in terms of content, that is, the right to peaceful and consensual frontier changes is connected to the right of self-determination of peoples. This clarifies that frontiers *cannot be changed using violent means*.

5. *The Political Committee of the “Nine”* has just agreed in Copenhagen that when formulating international law principles on territorial issues our main goal is to uphold the possibility of peaceful frontier changes<sup>13</sup> (number 7 of the Political Committee report to the ministers RM (73) 20 of 13 November 1973).

## II. Our position regarding the principle of the inviolability of frontiers

1. The explanatory documents presented in Geneva, as well as our paper on the principles of refraining from the use of force, the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, are intended as a “position de départ”. They serve to examine

<sup>9</sup> For Annex 2 cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77019](http://dodis.ch/77019).

<sup>10</sup> Resolution No. 2625 of the United Nations General Assembly of 24 October 1970, UN doc. A/RES/2625(XXV).

<sup>11</sup> For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](http://dodis.ch/58821).

<sup>12</sup> For Annex 3 cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77019](http://dodis.ch/77019).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the document “Conference goals and Strategy of the Nine at the CSCE” of 13 November 1973, [dodis.ch/77021](http://dodis.ch/77021), that was supplemented to the “Blauer Dienst” (Blue Service) vol. 33 of 10 December 1973. The Blue Service, which was printed on blue paper, was a compilation of selected information from the headquarters of the Federal Foreign Office for the missions abroad.

the subject at a deeper level. In this discussion, our aim was to make plain our understanding of the nature of the inherent connection between the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and the non-use of force.

2. The discussions in Helsinki and Geneva have resulted in agreement that the principle of the inviolability of frontiers should be listed separately in the CSCE catalogue of principles alongside the prohibition of the use of force as laid down in international law. This agreement does not, however, imply acceptance of the Soviet thinking that the principle of the inviolability of frontiers is independent from the prohibition of the use of force in terms of content or that it is even some kind of overarching principle. We want to uphold the connection between the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and the prohibition of the use of force and other principles under international law, as expressed in the introductory sentence of Article 3 of the Treaty of Moscow. We need to do so in order to protect our policy on Germany as outlined in the Letter on German Unity of 12 August 1970.<sup>14</sup> At the same time we also need to do this with a view to the “European option”. With regard to the creation of a European Union, all EC countries absolutely insist that peaceful and consensual frontier changes have to remain possible and that the catalogue of principles must be absolutely clear here.

Although it is notable that the Soviet Union only addresses frontier changes and not in parallel the elimination of frontiers, the focus ultimately is not so much on the subordination of inviolability to the non-use of force that the Soviet Union accuses us of which is allegedly in contradiction of the Moscow Treaty (Annex 4)<sup>15</sup> but on the endeavours of the Soviet Union to ensure the wording does not include “peaceful change”. However, it meets with the collective resistance of the West and of most non-aligned countries, which like for example Spain have unresolved frontier issues that they want to resolve peacefully.

3. Recently we have not re-introduced our wording in Geneva, wording which is supported by many countries, including the United States and Canada, and have ourselves voiced our support for the document presented by France. Nevertheless, we should not withdraw our paper until wording is agreed with which we are absolutely content. We thus allow ourselves the option of potentially coming back to our paper if, for example, the French vote in favour of wording that we cannot accept. As a country which proposed wording, we are in the “inner circle” when the drafting begins. We also need to ensure we can continue to interpret the Moscow Treaty as we have been doing thus far in case the principle of the inviolability of frontiers ends up being worded ambiguously. However, this option may vanish if we were to withdraw our proposals before knowing the final outcome.

This will not result in a bilateral controversy with the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> In the Letter on German Unity presented in the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the occasion of the signing of the Moscow Treaty on 12 August 1970, the Federal Government underscored that “this Treaty does not stand in contradiction to the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work toward a state of peace in Europe, in which the German people regain their unity in free self-determination”.

<sup>15</sup> For Annex 4 cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77019](http://dodis.ch/77019).

<sup>16</sup> For all documents of the FRG in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2909](http://dodis.ch/C2909).

[dodis.ch/77137](https://dodis.ch/77137)

Türkiye

*The Head of the Turkish Delegation to the CSCE Benler to the Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

[SECOND TERM OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION IN EUROPE]

Secret

Geneva, 29 November 1973

1. Second Term of the CSCE aims to define each of the topics on the agenda in a specific manner. In these circumstances, the work has the characteristics of preparations for transition to drafting. In this type of work, the details come to the fore in a way that makes summarizing difficult. Furthermore, it is natural that a comprehensive analysis of the Conference's main aspects of world politics, both in general and with regard to Türkiye, cannot be undertaken by such a summary. For this reason, I would ask that the summary presented below be evaluated with this note.
2. General observations: In the work carried out so far during the Second Term, the main trends observed from the outset regarding the preparatory stage of the Conference continue. Although the objectives of both sides are different, one is the Central European issue through the East German issue at the Conference, while the other is the Soviet Union's effort to establish itself as a partner for cooperation on the basis of clearly defined principles; this can also be defined as establishing the principles for the next phase of détente. It means avoiding initiatives that would undermine the Eastern system even in the long term and open up a breach in the system. At every point they put forward, the principle of the supremacy of the State comes first, according to their ideology, while the West bases its proposals on people and human relations. This will lead the West to act in a manner that keeps all "options" open regarding the Central European issue particularly with the pressure from West Germany and as a means to a position to encourage the development of human relations. The impact of these two entirely distinct approaches to the Conference concept is reflected in the results of the work as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Turkish Diplomatic Archives (TDA), TDA-K0000503-G0004108-89365. Translated from Turkish. This cipher telegram No. 333 established by the President of the Turkish Delegation of the Second Term of CSCE Özdemir Benler, [dodis.ch/P81319](https://dodis.ch/P81319), and signed by the Turkish Permanent Representative to the UN Office in Geneva Coşkun Kırca, [dodis.ch/P51104](https://dodis.ch/P51104), was sent from the Turkish permanent representation in Geneva to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 29 November 1973. It refers to cipher telegram number 177. It can be asserted that this telegram was drafted in order to narrate the security concerns that arose in the Second Term. This correspondence has been printed in 15 copies.

- a) Conflicts arise from time to time. However, the desire to maintain moderation prevails on both sides.
  - b) During the drafting process, the most extreme views are defended in order to secure the greatest margin for bargaining.
  - c) Whatever the main issue of the conference may be, it is becoming increasingly clear as the work progresses that the resulting outcomes will affect every European country in different ways and to varying degrees.
3. When war broke out in the Middle East, the question momentarily arose as to whether the Conference would be affected by this. In particular, the smaller countries of the East cautiously searched this possibility. However, this did not last long. Keeping the two matters separate quickly became prominent.
  4. Another observation concerns the situation of the Nines. The Nines have established their presence in economic matters. In addition, they are systematically conducting consultations among themselves on political issues. There are even indications that they wish to use the Conference as a catalyst to institutionalize political consultation among themselves. These consultations have led to the development of strong ties with NATO over time. The French have also recently begun to attend NATO meetings regularly. It is difficult to say whether this is a coincidence: however, the French interest emerged during with developments arising from the Middle East war.
  5. Generally, the neutral countries tend to side with the West. This situation can be explained by the similarity of systems. Yugoslavia's position is somewhat different: this difference stems partly from its aim of acting as a spokesperson for the Third World, but also to some extent from its different system.
  6. The Eastern Bloc is in complete solidarity. The Soviet Union acts as its spokesperson. Romania, however, is trying to remain separate as much as possible, and the West is trying to drive it in that direction.
  7. The status of the work according to the agenda is as follows: The work the Conference is being carried out by the Three Main Commissions established in accordance with the three items on the agenda, the Sub-Commissions attached to them, and the Coordination Commission responsible for organizing all the work. Now, Working Group on Results of the Conference, which is under the fourth item, will be added to these as a new one.
  8. The majority of the work at this stage focused on determining the working method. As mentioned above, the reason was that the two sides had completely different expectations of the outcome of the Conference. The East brought a Draft Declaration for each Commission in line with its own approach and requested a method that would allow for immediate transition to drafting. The West initially advocated a method of examining and discussing, then drafting. The compromise reached was close to the West-

ern model. Now, until the mid-December break, efforts are being made to finalize matters through an exchange of views and mutual clarification. Drafting preparations will commence after the holiday.

9. Türkiye's position within the Conference:

First Commission: This commission is responsible for the political aspects of security in the broadest sense. It will prepare a document setting out a Declaration of Principles and confidence-building measures (such as the mutual notification of maneuvers). In addition, it will examine the principle of refraining from resorting to force or the threat of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

We are adjusting our behaviour and actions according to the following points:

- a) Working to ensure that the principles to be included in the declaration are defined in a way that will not undermine our security in general, but rather have a positive impact. For example, East's involvement in alliances or other issues through institutionalized consultations or its proposals regarding the Pan European Security System are always objected.
- b) Ensuring that no expression in the declaration undermines any "option" necessary for us to pursue the Cyprus issue. The principle of respect for commitments is an example of this.
- c) Exhibiting a positive stance on the peaceful resolution of disputes (arbitration). Considering the Compulsory Arbitration within this stance, but with a realistic view, as a problem for the future.
- d) Evaluating confidence-building measures within the context of Türkiye's own specific security matters.

10. The Second Commission covers a wide range of issues, from trade to environmental concerns. The East opposes the discriminatory application of tariffs and non-tariff barriers against its exports and believes that all economic relations should be conducted in a manner consistent with the requirements of its own State's trade and centralized command planning system.

Within the Conference, we are generally acting in a manner that ensures Türkiye's interests are positively affected by the increasing volume of trade between the advanced industrialized countries of the West and the communist countries. In terms of the requirements of our developing economy, we have focused carefully on the following points:

- a) We have persuaded our allies to accept a view that will eliminate the disadvantages of regional cooperation in the field of environmental issues, both in terms of security and economics.
- b) We have prepared a document on migrant workers that highlights the importance and key aspects of the issue for the economies of developed European countries and labour-receiving countries, and that will prevent the issue from being exploited by the East.

- c) We are endeavoring to ensure that the Conference adopts a decision that will prevent discriminatory treatment of the Developed Countries of Europe in the implementation of measures taken in favour of developing countries.

11. Third Commission:

It carries out work aimed at cooperation in the areas of human relations, culture, information and education. The West, with its systems that prioritize human freedom, aims to base the anticipated cooperation between East and West in this area on the concept of human relations. Behind this aim lies, on the one hand, the desire to maintain and develop ties between the two Germanies through this channel and, on the other hand, the view that a breach can be opened in the communist bloc through the establishment of liberal principles. The East in turn confronts this concept with the "State," basing cooperation on the principles of "non-interference in internal affairs" and "sovereignty."

There is no long-term issue from Türkiye's perspective. In Turkish society, there is a unanimous desire to establish a system that prioritizes human freedom. However, the fact that we have some short-term issues is guiding our Committee's approach in this scope.<sup>2</sup>

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2 For all the Turkish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2919](https://dodis.ch/C2919).

[dodis.ch/77052](https://dodis.ch/77052)

Canada

*The Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE Shenstone to the Department of External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

## CSCE: GENERAL SITUATION

*Extract* • Confidential

Geneva, 5 December 1973

This telegram surveys overall situation at CSCE on eve of NAC Ministerial Meeting and forthcoming pause in Geneva deliberations from December 15.

[...] <sup>2</sup>

2. Two and a half months of discussion in committees and subcommittees have been non-polemical and mildly informative but have brought little progress towards consensus on key issues; and of course there has been no agreement on even a small fragment of final text. In most working bodies, reluctance of East to envisage that final documents should deal with problems in concrete and detailed terms has handicapped efforts to institute useful dialogue on specific points of difference since each side is thinking on a different scale. However, discussion phase has clarified significant elements of each side's basic desiderata particularly as far as WPO is concerned; this is somewhat less true of Western objectives which are fairly clear in broad outline but have not yet been precisely defined in certain respects even behind scenes. Structure of final documents and nature of follow-up are two most obvious lacunae in Western position despite effort in recent paper by Nine to deal with them. Situation represents partial contrast to Helsinki where West entered negotiations with almost complete statement of what it wanted to achieve, in form of package of draft mandates. Neutrals too have so far been less decisive in their approach in most fields than they were in Helsinki although on many matters of substance they are basically friendly to West.

3. After long weeks of slow-motion skirmishing this autumn, battle (for so it is seen here) will be joined as soon as drafting begins in all or most of CSCE working bodies not long after conference reconvenes in New Year. No one has any clear idea how drafting task will be tackled; probably for some weeks there will be a good deal of floundering, with complex and passionate procedural arguments masking substantive disputes (a lively CSCE tradition), but eventually adequate working methods will develop, probably combining present formal subcommittee structure with more flexible unofficial arrangements. No delegation seriously ex-

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9091, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 42. *This telegram No. CSCE217 signed by the Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE Michael Shenstone, [dodis.ch/P81291](https://dodis.ch/P81291), was addressed to the Canadian Department of External Affairs. For the complete list of addressees, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77052](https://dodis.ch/77052).*

<sup>2</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77052](https://dodis.ch/77052).



pects completion of agreement till at least Easter; and many, including Canadian delegation and at least some WPO reps, estimate that task will probably take until about mid-May, with most of major issues being settled almost simultaneously near end of process. However, degree of commitment to completion of CSCE among most participants is such that there is little detectable disposition here to doubt likelihood of eventually achieving agreement. Refusal of third phase is of course an option which West must clearly keep open for bargaining purposes, but it is envisaged seriously by very few, e.g., Dutch (quite gladly) and Finns (quite sadly). This general mood is factor we shall have to reckon with in determining our own tactics during crucial phases of bargaining process.

4. A striking fact testifying to momentum of conference is extent to which convulsions of Mideast war, nuclear alerts and energy crisis have so far left CSCE unaffected in its stately onward progress apart from fact that Swiss oil shortage has lowered temperature in conference building and further numbed debate. Delegations now display slightly more polite interest in contributions by non-participating Mediterranean states but few delegations are genuinely willing to shift balance of this basically East–West conference southward.

5. Following survey of state of play in main working bodies will demonstrate difficulty of estimating how fast events will move after Xmas or precisely what bargains will emerge.

#### *Basket I*

6. Subcommittee 1 on principles guiding relations between states [...] <sup>3</sup> During discussion USSR and WPO (minus Romania) have supported Soviet declaration and its sparse definitions but have received practically no support from Romania, neutrals and NATO who have insisted on inclusion of essential details concerning each principle. It has not been possible to contest fact embodied in Helsinki recommendations that there will be separate listing of principles of non-use of force, inviolability and territorial integrity. Outside of WPO, however, there is no support for wording these three principles in way which could lead to interpretation that peaceful changes in frontiers are excluded. Although it is still difficult to predict precise course of events, it seems likely that when Soviet text is rejected USSR will press for minimal definition of “respect for inviolability of frontiers” which WPO can interpret one way and neutrals and NATO another way. Touchy issue of rights of national minorities (raised recently in Committee 1 by Yugoslavs) may be included in principle on human rights.

7. Special Working Body (SWB) has reached impasse over Swiss proposed system for peaceful settlement of disputes. Swiss, other neutrals and NATO insist that in order to be improvement on existing systems, new system must provide for compulsory jurisdiction in advance of particular future disputes; WPO rejects this and says any system must embody free choice of parties. They have so far refused to budge on Canadian compromise formula (backed by Swiss) for selecting for compulsory jurisdiction a few specific subjects, perhaps linked with CSCE results. We wonder if Swiss will hold to compulsory jurisdiction indefinitely; if

3 For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77052](http://dodis.ch/77052).

not, West may have problems. Other topics before SWB are (a) basically meaningless Soviet draft on application of principles, which has virtually no non-WPO support; (b) Romanian draft on implementation of non-use of force. Call in latter for future drafting (e.g., by follow-up body) of European non-use of force treaty is regarded by NATO countries as one of most dangerous ideas floating at conference since, although Romanians claim proposal is aimed at USSR, Soviets might try to use treaty to score points they fail to achieve at CSCE on inviolability and territorial integrity. Hope is that a few innocuous details from Romanian text may be selected for incorporation in final documents.

8. In Subcommittee 2, discussion of military confidence-building measures has been marked by (a) divergent positions on notification of manoeuvres, WPO being ultra conservative; (b) only few problems regarding exchange of observers as all delegations agree on fundamentals, i.e., purely voluntary, reciprocal conditions, bilateral initiatives; (c) limited debate on notification of movements because neither Soviet nor USA delegations in favour and NATO tactic is to conceal divergent positions among 15 by discussing manoeuvres and movements as single concept. Some other CBMs, e.g., Spanish exchange of visits and Swedish budget disclosure, receiving cautious encouragement but prospects uncertain. Debate on other military measures is strongly pushed by neutrals and has focused on MBFR info link, principle of undiminished security for all European states not merely MBFR participants, and indivisibility of political and military détente (meaning need for realistic advances in both areas). CSCE results in military area will clearly be minimal but some acceptable means should be found of at least appearing to meet some neutral concerns in this area.

#### *Basket II*

[...] <sup>4</sup>

#### *Basket III*

14. Problems here as expected seem more intractable than elsewhere, and differences are particularly acute on issue mentioned above in paragraph 2, i.e., extent to which final results should contain provisions couched in concrete and specific terms. In various subcommittees Soviet delegation recently put cards on table concerning final form of results of work in this basket. They said that as directed by Helsinki paragraph 43<sup>5</sup> there should be one final document encompassing all results of negotiations (in contrast to Western inclination towards numerous loosely associated texts); it should be of average length in terms of precedents (meaning quite short, like Helsinki text); it should be precise and intelligible to man in street and phrased in respectable terms (meaning non-controversial and without anti-curtain overtones); and it should be headed by preamble reiterating elements of paragraphs 42–44, i.e., aims stated therein and principles of relations between states, with particular emphasis on sovereignty, non-interference and respect for laws and customs. In prolonged and difficult Committee III debates,

<sup>4</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77052](http://dodis.ch/77052).

<sup>5</sup> This reference and the following one refer to the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](http://dodis.ch/77496).

West including Canada has strenuously resisted idea of such a preamble because of its restrictive connotations but Soviets keep insisting this is price for acceptance of detailed measures in subcommittees. Meanwhile, long overdue work is starting among Nine (with strong encouragement from Canada and others) to draft texts embodying general objectives or principles of freer movement of people and dissemination of info to introduce specific Western measures.

15. In Subcommittee 8 (human contacts) WPO and Western positions remain far apart; it is still almost impossible to see shape of any final common ground in conference document form. Essentially WPO have shown no sign of accepting anything more than statement of good intent in human contacts area, well hedged by respect for restrictive principles (see above), to be followed up by bilateral agreements. Their idea of negotiating fat appears to be concessions to return to Helsinki texts but certainly not to go beyond them. They have almost completely avoided trying to come to terms with detailed and concrete multilateral proposals with political and moral binding force put forward by Western delegations, although they seem slightly more resigned to eventual paper concessions in family problems than in equally important general travel area. Fact that except for Canadian proposal on reunification of families there are still no major final proposals from Western delegations on table has probably made WPO, who are treating human contacts as inconvenient drafting exercise, even less willing to engage in any real discussion. Therefore even second round of discussion based on French-inspired catalogue has not been particularly productive. Drafting phase will be severe test of Western determination.

16. Info (Subcommittee 9) seems as sensitive for WPO as human contacts, or more so. Here they appear to be thinking in terms of (a) statement such as that in Helsinki mandate advocating greater (but not free) dissemination of info, and (b) elaboration of a few simple concrete measures towards this aim, but not of type which would result in circulation of info beyond control of authorities. Where concessions will be hardest to obtain are precisely where they would be most useful: i.e., improved circulation of printed info, guaranteed unhindered access to direct broadcasts, and better conditions for journalists in contacting unofficial sources, travel, etc. Unless West adopts very tough stance during drafting, there is risk of securing only marginal improvements (like magazine or Irish proposal on oral info), prefaced by statement urging only relatively greater flow of info, to which it will be difficult to pin WPO countries in future.

[...]<sup>6</sup>

19. In summary, we see long and difficult drafting phase ahead. Final outcome will almost certainly constitute, on balance, something that can be depicted as modest advance on present situation in Europe in terms of Canadian objectives but every inch of real progress beyond minimal level will be hard-fought and will require stubborn and united efforts of allies combined with as much influential neutral support as can be rallied. We cannot yet estimate chances of such progress being attained.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77052](http://dodis.ch/77052).

<sup>7</sup> For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).

[dodis.ch/76899](https://dodis.ch/76899)

Poland

*Memorandum from the Department of Studies and Programming  
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

ASSESSMENT OF THE CSCE IN GENEVA AND THE DISARMAMENT  
NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA

*Extract* • Secret

Warsaw, 23 January 1974

*I. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.*

1. The work to date of the second phase of the CSCE in Geneva (18 September–14 December 1973) was filled by a general debate on three items on the agenda (security, economic cooperation, cooperation on humanitarian matters and others). The fourth item – the institutional consequences of the Conference – was only touched upon fragmentarily. A total of 214 documents were formally registered, however, if procedural documents are excluded and double registration in committees and subcommittees is taken into account, approximately 180 drafts of final documents were submitted. Committees I and II also adopted the views of six non-European Mediterranean countries on security and economic cooperation issues (Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, Egypt, Morocco and Syria).<sup>2</sup>

2. There are chances of beginning the preliminary editorial work at the turn of January/February this year (some subcommittees have already taken the relevant decisions), but the possibility must still be taken into account of additional documents being submitted by EEC countries, especially concerning items II and III of the agenda – which may delay editing the documents.

3. The resumption of the second phase of the CSCE took place in a context of waning interest on the part of many participating states. This is due to a variety of factors. One should consider processes within NATO and the EEC, as well as the desire of many medium-sized and small countries to demonstrate their role in developing and taking decisions of the Conference, especially in view of the role played in this area by the USSR and the USA. The decline in interest in the Conference is also due to the realisation of the fact that many of the socialist states' goals which were once fundamental to it have already been taken care of through bilateral negotiations (borders, normalisation), while others are the subject of oth-

<sup>1</sup> Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (PL-AMSZ), z. 26, w. 31. t. 301. This document has been translated from Polish by Anna Sadowska. This memorandum was established by the Department of Studies and Programming of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 23 January 1974. The document was also published in Polish in *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne* (PISM) 1974, doc. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 60, [dodis.ch/76982](https://dodis.ch/76982).

er negotiations, and it is not realistic for the CC<sup>3</sup> to push through concessions from the USSR and other SC<sup>4</sup> in relation to point III.

4. The fundamental pursuit of the SC at the present time is

- working towards maximum acceleration of the editorial work;
- ensuring the fastest possible transition to Phase III and conducting it at the highest level;
- thereby granting the highest possible rank to the CSCE's fundamental political document, the General Declaration, signed by the participating states,
- ensuring that this document contains an appropriate formulation of the principles of the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity,
- ensuring in the document re point III of the agenda the broadest possible – under the current conditions – scope of the development of cultural, informational and inter-personal cooperation, while effectively guaranteeing that these will not serve the interests of anti-communist forces and that they will be implemented with full respect for the sovereignty of states, non-interference in their internal affairs as well as their laws and customs.

5. Capitalist states, both NATO (including the EEC) and neutral

- combat the so-called doctrine of “limited sovereignty”,
- oppose the assumption in the Conference documents of commitments to renounce territorial claims for the present and the future, as well as others opposing the possibility of peaceful border changes in the future, arguing mainly with the vision of political integration of the “Nine”<sup>5</sup> and acting against any freezing of European borders by the Conference,
- put forward maximalist demands regarding the formulation of the principle of respect for human rights with the intention of using it when pushing through the so-called freer circulation of persons, ideas and information and when limiting the principle of non-interference in internal affairs,
- they wish to avoid accepting commitments to granting MFNT<sup>6</sup> and removing all discriminatory barriers to economic cooperation, and they strive to obtain maximum facilitation in this area in order to “penetrate” the economic life of socialist countries,
- a new element is the CC's growing interest in the issues of raw materials and energy and the possibilities of solving this problem jointly, with the participation of the SC,
- they continue their offensive for maximum facilitation of the so-called “freer circulation of persons, ideas and information”.

6. The delegations of socialist countries, conducting coordinated activities in all working bodies of the Conference, managed to push through a relatively fast pace and orderly manner of work during the phase of presenting the positions. This was not hindered by Romania's differing position on certain security issues.

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3 *Capitalist countries.*

4 *Socialist countries.*

5 *This refers to the countries of the European Economic Community.*

6 *Most favoured nation clause.*

As a result of consultations with the head of the Polish delegation in Moscow, it was agreed that this course of action would be fully continued. The socialist countries would continue to act together as a united and solid force, refraining from individual initiatives, as, according to the Soviet comrades, this could inspire in NATO hope for the possibility of diversifying and outplaying them separately.

7. Internal coordination of the activities of the capitalist countries' delegations was particularly evident within the EEC, less so in NATO, while maintaining a significant degree of nuance in the positions of individual countries.

8. The institutional consequences of the Conference and the level of its third phase still remain in limbo. Capitalist states are using both of these elements to exert pressure on the issues of the so-called "freer circulation of persons, ideas and information".

#### *Conclusions:*

It is essential to maintain the current level of activity of the Polish foreign service in relation to the CSCE.

We will continue to participate in the efforts of socialist states to bring the Conference to a conclusion as efficiently and quickly as possible, and not only to achieve at it our political goals, but also to ensure the continuation of a pan-European political dialogue on security and cooperation through the establishment of permanent consultation mechanisms (Consultative Committee or other formula). To this end, the Polish People's Republic's diplomatic missions in the participating states have received appropriate instructions.

In order to extend our current influence on our Western partners, it is necessary to continue to use high-level political talks to present our position, as well as to activate interparliamentary and social channels for this purpose (in cooperation with the Social Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe).

It is of particular importance to:

- 1) continue our argumentation on the principle of the inviolability of borders,
- 2) justify the need to hold the third phase of the Conference at the highest level in order to ensure the appropriate rank of its results,
- 3) initiate thinking about further steps after the Conference in order to maintain the momentum of the processes of easing of tensions and cooperation in Europe and to create an infrastructure for peaceful coexistence based on a system of commitments by states to work together for peace and cooperation.

The current stage of work at the Conference in Geneva allows us to assume that the third phase will take place in Helsinki in June or July this year at the level of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party or the Prime Minister.<sup>7</sup>

This justifies the need to commence preparatory work, including substantive and organisational tasks.

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<sup>7</sup> The third phase of the CSCE took place from 31 July to 1 August 1975 in Helsinki (at the level of heads of states and governments).

It is proposed that:

- 1) The Research Department and the Administrative Department, in cooperation with the Human Resources Department and the Minister's Office, be tasked with preparing a detailed plan for the organisational arrangements of the Conference, including:
  - the composition of the support team (experts and technical support – communications, security) with a defined scope of tasks,
  - a list of material and investment needs, securing hotels and transport at the Embassy in Helsinki,
  - a schedule of preparatory work for technical teams, the scope of preparatory work for the Embassy and a list of necessary temporary staff reinforcements for the facility.
- 2) Instruct the Studies Department, to – in cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party – proceed with:
  - developing the substantive position of our delegation during the general debate, including the preparation of an appropriate text for the Head's speech,
  - preparing a plan for our activities in bilateral meetings with European delegations,
  - developing a comprehensive plan for our activities after the Conference.
- 3) The Department of Information and Cultural Cooperation, in cooperation with the Department of Studies, should develop a plan for the propaganda and information coverage of the CSCE.

[...] <sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The section concerning the Vienna disarmament negotiations has been omitted. For the complete document, cf. PL-AMSZ, z. 26, w. 31. t. 301. For all Polish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [do-dis.ch/C2901](https://dis.ch/C2901).



[dodis.ch/76991](https://dodis.ch/76991)

Federal Republic of Germany

*The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Brandt to the General Secretary  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Brezhnev<sup>1</sup>*

[THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS, AS WELL AS HUMANITARIAN  
COOPERATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE]

Confidential

Bonn, 7 February 1974

Thank you very much for your letter, in which you address several issues relating to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.<sup>2</sup> On numerous occasions, we have had the opportunity to discuss, and somewhat align our views on, these matters. This has also benefited cooperation between our delegations.

I continue to believe that the Conference marks an important waypoint along the path to a state of affairs in which increased cooperation will bring enhanced security and stability. I consider the Conference's prospects to be favourable. That said, it is an ambitious attempt – one that stands to positively or negatively impact further developments in Europe.

We both agree on how significant these questions are, also for the future of bilateral relations between a good number of countries. I believe, as you do, that we should do everything in our power to bring the Conference to a timely and successful conclusion. I hope that no participant in the Conference wishes to see it delayed; I myself do not have any information that would bear out this impression.

You mention two issues in particular: The inviolability of frontiers, as well as humanitarian cooperation and cultural exchange. I share your view that these are key issues in the negotiations.

Let me assure you that, as concerns the frontier issue, the Federal Government can accept any text that aligns with our Moscow Treaty of 12 August 1970.<sup>3</sup> Since,

1 Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (DE-PA/AA), B 130, vol. 10126 (212). Translated from German. This letter by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](https://dodis.ch/P15409), to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543), was forwarded on 7 February 1974 by Desk Officer in the Federal Chancellery Heinz Dröge, [dodis.ch/P53523](https://dodis.ch/P53523), to the Head of the State Secretaries' Office Peter Schönfeld, [dodis.ch/P81442](https://dodis.ch/P81442), requesting it be delivered immediately to the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Moscow: "The Chancellor attaches great importance to the letter being delivered by Ambassador [Ulrich] Sahn [[dodis.ch/P81440](https://dodis.ch/P81440)] at the highest possible level, yet without any risk of delay. Priority should be given to timely delivery." Note by Schönfeld on 8 February 1974: "Telegram sent on 7/2, at night", cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76991](https://dodis.ch/76991). This document was also published in German in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (AAPD) 1974, doc. 37.

2 For the German translation of the undated letter from the General Secretary of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543), to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](https://dodis.ch/P15409), cf. [dodis.ch/76991](https://dodis.ch/76991).

3 Treaty concluded by the FRG and the Soviet Union in which both parties committed to the principles of the non-use of force and the inviolability of frontiers.

in this connection, Foreign Minister Gromyko has made it clear in an agreed form that the principle of inviolability of frontiers does not affect states' sovereign right to change frontiers through peaceful means,<sup>4</sup> there should be no problem with providing a similar clarification at the Geneva Conference, as well, in such a way that takes into account the multilateral nature of the outcome of the Conference. Here, I would also like to refer to the discussions that took place between our negotiators, which at the time led to the respective statement being issued by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

Neither are we seeking controversy on the topic of cooperation in the humanitarian sphere or regarding cultural exchange. We have no intention whatsoever of interfering with the internal structures of the participating States. The outcome of the Conference should satisfy the growing desire for greater cooperation, as well as help develop flexible procedures. The enhanced cooperation that we are seeking should benefit everyone, not merely one side. The Conference aims to create a state of affairs that justifies expanding these contacts.

I can understand your concern that there are plenty of people who enjoy engaging in hollow talk and are looking for meaningless tasks. In addition, I am worried there are those who take with one hand the same thing they give with the other. I am looking for a way to reach an agreement that will preclude any suspicion that the newly created possibilities for exchange and cooperation can be restricted again at anyone's whim. After all, the purpose of this great step forward must be to reach a state of affairs that will engender further steps of détente in Europe.

I have instructed our delegation to pursue constructive efforts in this regard.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> On 29 July 1970, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](https://dodis.ch/P489), commented as follows during a meeting in Moscow with Foreign Minister of the FRG Walter Scheel, [dodis.ch/P15413](https://dodis.ch/P15413): "Here is something to allay your concerns: When two states voluntarily decide to unite or to adjust their frontiers, as we ourselves have done – repeatedly, in fact – with Norway, Afghanistan and Poland, or when states choose, for example, to do away with their common frontiers and to unite, as has occurred in Syria and Egypt, then we would not have thought to criticise this, because this is an expression of sovereignty and belongs to the inalienable rights of states and peoples. Anyone who poses questions in this regard is seeing problems where there are none." Cf. AAPD 1970, doc. 340. The Federal Government published this statement by Gromyko in a memorandum issued in connection with the ratification procedure in December 1971, cf. *Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government* 1971, pp. 2014–2017.

<sup>5</sup> For all documents of the FRG in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2909](https://dodis.ch/C2909).

[dodis.ch/77129](https://dodis.ch/77129)

Türkiye

*The Turkish Permanent Mission to the International Organisations in Geneva to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

[THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS]

Secret/Very urgent

Geneva, 29 March 1974

1. Despite the fact that the drafting work on the principle of the inviolability of borders of the Eastern Bloc, considered the most important issue or key point of the Conference, has been ongoing for two weeks and no official text has yet emerged, the negotiations have generally proceeded more smoothly than expected. The reason for this may be the fact that the Westerners agreed to conduct the negotiations based on the texts put forward by the Soviets as a “compromise formula”, rather than insisting on their own texts.<sup>2</sup>
2. The first point that drew the Soviets’ objection in Western texts was the direct link established between the inviolability of borders and the concept of the use of force. This issue can be considered resolved, with the contribution of our Delegation, by adding the words “seizure (and/or) usurpation”, which indirectly encompass the concepts of law, illegality and use of force, into the sentences relating to the land claims of the Soviets. (The participating States will therefore refrain from any demand or act aimed at seizure (and/or) usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State). Although some delegates, such as Canada, may return to their link positions on other occasions, the likelihood of their views being accepted is very low for the reason stated in the first paragraph.
3. The second point of opposition is the phrase in the French text referring to the special status of certain borders, which has been worded in such a way that it could be interpreted either way (irrespective of the legal status which in their opinion they possess). The Westerners did not support this statement, which appears in brackets in the unofficial text, strongly

<sup>1</sup> Turkish Diplomatic Archives (TDA), TDA-K0000503-G0004109-125336. Translated from Turkish. This cipher telegram No. 161, referring to cipher telegram No. 113, was written by the Head of the Turkish Delegation to the CSCE in Geneva, Özdemir Benler, [dodis.ch/P81319](https://dodis.ch/P81319), signed by the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Turkish Mission to the United Nations Office in Geneva (Osman) Reşat Arım, [dodis.ch/P53697](https://dodis.ch/P53697), and addressed to the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara, the Turkish Delegation to NATO in Brussels and the Turkish Embassy in Bern. 15 copies of the correspondence have been printed.

<sup>2</sup> It can be deduced that this telegram was composed in order to accentuate the principle of inviolability of borders regarding the Soviet threat.

enough. In fact, the French Representative,<sup>3</sup> referring to this situation in a private conversation, stated, "I suppose I won't be the one to fight this battle." This phrase is also unlikely to be accepted.

4. As expected, the point to which the Easterners objected the most was the statement that borders could be changed through peaceful means, by agreement, and in accordance with the principle of "self-determination". All these Delegations have unequivocally stated that any reference to border changes, even remotely, in the principle of the inviolability of borders is unacceptable, but that it might be possible to include a provision stating that changes could be made in accordance with another principle, namely the law of nations. The Western Delegations were aware that the Easterners would not accept these statements here either, and that at most, it would not be possible to go beyond providing a text to prevent peaceful changes. Since the concept of violation also contains the concepts of coercion and illegality, they are of the opinion that placing the word "violation" at the beginning essentially implies peaceful change. (As is well known, given our national interests, we did not support the mention of a change based on "self-determination" during the works in NATO, but we stated that we could not directly oppose the text solely for the sake of solidarity.) Meanwhile, as an interim formula, the Spanish and Swiss Delegations (believed to have been proposed at the request of the Soviets) put forward an interim proposal.<sup>4</sup> This proposal envisaged finalizing the first draft of the principle, but transferring the section concerning peaceful amendment, for which the location would be determined at a later date, to a separate document. Our delegate, after consulting with the German, French and American Delegations and seeing that there was a consensus, stated at the meeting that this proposal could be useful in preventing an impasse, and the French and American Delegates expressed their support for this statement. At this first meeting, some Neutrals, including Cyprus, also expressed their support for the proposal. Subsequently, during our consultations under the NATO administration, it was observed that the Dutch, Belgian, British and Canadian Delegations objected on the grounds that it would be inappropriate to give the impression that this statement, which could be used to secure concessions from the Easterners on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Basket and reliability measures, had been abandoned at this stage. Given that the Greek Delegate<sup>5</sup> who agrees with the aforementioned Delegates had little to do with making concessions on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Basket or military issues, it is assumed that their motives are different. According to the explanation later provided by the West German Delegate,<sup>6</sup> the same issue was also discussed during the Scheel-Kissinger talks, and an agreement was reached on a formula similar to this one. (A footnote to be inserted indicating that the location of this sentence will be determined later).

3 Jacques Andréani, [dodis.ch/P51175](https://dodis.ch/P51175).

4 Not located.

5 Dimitri Velissaropoulos, [dodis.ch/P63969](https://dodis.ch/P63969).

6 Guido Brunner, [dodis.ch/P48500](https://dodis.ch/P48500).

5. The views of our Allies who oppose the proposal are undoubtedly reasonable when considered separately from the course of the negotiations. However, as we mentioned above, we believe that the tactical laxity in the manner of conducting the negotiations up to this point, and even the statements made in private conversations suggesting that an appropriate solution could be found for this statement, have given sufficient clues to the Easterners working with large delegations here. On this matter, the West German Delegation, with whom we frequently communicate, expressed that there is no need to insist on including the phrase which is not in the Moscow Agreement into this principle, that the Soviets' consent to its placement elsewhere would be an achievement in itself, and that the Soviet Delegation, who was afraid of having to accept statements that would remain in the records of the Moscow Agreement, should not be pressed further, otherwise their stance throughout the Conference could harden. Our impression is that the Germans are not at all pleased that this issue, which directly concerns them, has been turned into a document for East-West bargaining. At this stage of developments, the 9s also seem to share the Germans' view.
6. As for the wording of the first sentence of the principle, it will be drafted as we prefer, namely: "The participating States regard an inviolable all one another's frontiers – Les États participants regardent mutuellement leurs frontières comme inviolables". In these sentences, there still seems to be an ambiguity that could be interpreted as implying that the expression "one another's frontiers" refers to shared borders. However, no intervention has been made because other formulas would have had greater drawbacks, proposing them at this stage would have complicated the negotiations, and finally, the expression had been used in previous discussions to mean "all the boundaries of all participants". One issue that has come up, as we mentioned in our previous telegram, is that the Yugoslavs wish to add the expression "...as well as all frontiers in Europe." The Yugoslavian representative<sup>7</sup> explains this by stating that joining the Conference requires the inclusion of Albania's land and sea borders within the scope of the principle. My Greek colleague links this to some of their existing disputes with Yugoslavia and Albania and does not want it, but does not directly oppose it. Westerners generally dislike it too. The British in particular argue that explicitly mentioning the European borders could mean de jure recognition of the Baltic borders.
7. As the final sentence of the principle, there are two texts, one from the Hungarian Delegation and the other from the Soviet Delegation: "Le respect rigoureux maintenant et à l'avenir par les États participants de l'inviolabilité des frontières est une condition fondamentale au maintien de la paix dans la région." – "Strict respect now and in the future by participating States for the inviolability of borders is a fundamental condition for maintaining peace in the region." (By the Hungarian Delegation)

7 Dura Ninčić, [dodis.ch/P51342](http://dodis.ch/P51342).

“Ils considèrent que tout attentat contre les frontières existantes serait une menace contre la paix, une violation de la paix.” – “They consider that any attack on existing borders would be a threat to peace, a violation of peace.” The Easterners’ “declamatory” proposals, which do not actually introduce anything new, aim to give the principle a more distinguished place than others. The Hungarian proposal is unsuitable because it explicitly advocates this idea and opposes the concept of connection. The Soviet text is problematic because it is unclear what is meant by “any attack” and because it is of such a nature as to end the old debates on the requirement to define “violation”. We are considering rejecting both texts, but accepting them, if necessary, with a statement that includes the concept of “violation” and the elements of “illegality and use of force”.<sup>8</sup>

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8 For all the Turkish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2919](https://dodis.ch/C2919).

[dodis.ch/76978](https://dodis.ch/76978)

France

*The French Ambassador in Bonn, Sauvagnargues, to Minister of Foreign Affairs Jobert*<sup>1</sup>

#### CSCE AND GERMAN AFFAIRS

Bonn, 28 April 1974

As the drafting work in Geneva enters a decisive phase, I believe it useful to have another look at the relationship between the CSCE and German affairs, as illustrated by the issue of reservations in relation to previous agreements and treaties and the quadripartite rights and responsibilities.

In general terms, the problem in this respect in Geneva is identical to that which arose under "Ostpolitik": that of reconciling normalization of the situation of Germany and of Europe, on the one hand, and the upholding, on the other, of a special status giving the Four Powers oversight and possibilities of intervening in German affairs.

From 1969 to 1972, throughout "Ostpolitik", we were exposed to two successive risks in the latter regard. The first was that of seeing the German question being a practically exclusive matter for the two States in Germany. We avoided it, firstly, through reservations expressed when concluding the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, in order to stop them being used against us. Then, in the Berlin agreement, we created an intricately linked set of contractual arrangements which has not only maintained, but enhanced the responsibility of the Four Powers in an area of importance for Germany and For Europe.

The other lay with the international community. The United Nations membership of the two States in Germany could have resulted, by the effects of law or of the GDR becoming a State like another, in limiting if not erasing our rights and our responsibilities. This was addressed through the reservation in the form of the quadripartite declaration of 9 November 1972, which was accepted by the two States and the international organisation and which consolidates all the new and existing *de jure* and *de facto* privileges we enjoy concerning Berlin and Germany, which are exorbitant from the perspective of classical international law.

All in all, during this phase of normalization in Germany, we have avoided to the extent possible both the Germanization and the internationalization of the German question. At the same time, thanks to the necessary cooperation of the

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archives of the French Foreign Ministry (FR-AMAE), 178QO [Europe, Allemagne, République fédérale d'Allemagne, 1974–1978], 2125. Translated from French. This encrypted telegram No. 1844 was sent by the Ambassador of France in Bonn Jean Sauvagnargues, [dodis.ch/P42740](https://dodis.ch/P42740), on 28 April 1974 and received by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel Jobert, [dodis.ch/P47096](https://dodis.ch/P47096), on 29 April 1974 at 11.15 a.m. Sauvagnargues was Holder of the Agrégation in Germany and a "ministre plénipotentiaire" of "hors classe" level. A month after sending this telegram, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new President of the French Republic Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, [dodis.ch/P13791](https://dodis.ch/P13791).



Four Powers and the two Germanies that the Berlin agreement required, we have given the former a living right and concrete grounds for intervention. The importance of this result becomes clear when you remember that in 1961 and 1962, the United States were considering the internationalization of access routes to the old capital, and that at the beginning of the Berlin talks they were still inclined to entrust to the Germans alone the task of agreeing on the arrangements for traffic on these same routes.

The risk emerging now in Geneva is that of a dilution – at European level this time – of the specific situation of Germany, and, therefore, of our position in this region. That was no doubt one of the fundamental aims of the USSR, for which the next stage in normalization launched in Helsinki and continued in Geneva was to lead to an arrangement concluded in lieu of an undesirable or impossible peace treaty concerning Germany.

Of course, in the last two years or so, the agenda of the CSCE has broadened. Security is no longer one single subject, and cooperation problems account for two baskets of work. But progress in these two fields is slow and difficult, and is primarily being made on the first dimension, the only one, moreover, that the Soviets have the intention of signing. Germany is not its subject. However, it must be recognised that, notwithstanding the assurances that Yugoslavia and Romania wanted, faced with the USSR, and above all if the fact that military issues are more or less absent from the talks in Geneva is taken into account, that the ulterior motives of many, if not all of the participants often appear to be focused on the major political security problem that persists in Europe: that of the status and the evolution of Germany – or the Germanies.

The problem can be apprehended from two angles.

The first is primarily legal. If we are not careful, the CSCE will place above quadripartism a sediment of texts that may mitigate or even erase it, as both the Federal and the Democratic Republics will, for the first time, have the same standing as the Four Powers, signing a common document of such scope. This risk must be avoided, thanks to a satisfactory reservation in relation to prior treaties and agreements inserted into the very documents of the CSCE. This reserve must be worded so as to cover agreements “concerning” the two Germanies – to which the latter are not “parties”.

In this respect, I noted during recent talks in Bonn on this subject with members of our delegation to Geneva, that the Germans have agreed that the passage in question of the declaration on principles (paragraph 10) expresses reservations, not only concerning prior agreements and treaties to which the participating States have signed up to, but also those to which they are committed. Such a wording seems to me to be acceptable if it must, as it safeguards the quadripartite agreement and declaration and everything covered by the latter, but it is the absolute minimum.

The second aspect is more political. The very existence of a body of rules applicable to Europe and to all European States, in addition to the United States, another quadripartite power – regardless of the precautions taken to mitigate its binding nature – may seem to empower this Europe to meddle in German affairs. This risk would of course be heightened, should the conference be followed by

further steps or even lead to the creation of a more or less permanent body. In the most favourable scenario, with a good clause expressing reservations in relation to prior agreements and treaties, we will have to prove, when difficulties emerge concerning Germany, that this is the prerogative of the Four Powers and, if applicable, the two German States. In the less favourable scenario, we will be at risk of interferences that could only complicate the exercise of our right of oversight of German affairs.

To cover ourselves in this respect also, the ideal solution would of course be a reservation concerning the quadripartite rights and responsibilities in general, worded in light of the outcomes of Geneva and outside of those outcomes. We have expressed two “objections” as to the CSCE as a whole. The first was in response to Finland’s invitation in autumn 1972 and had the primary effect of protecting us from the consequences that could have arisen at that time, from the fact that the GDR, with which neither the three allies, nor the Federal Republic, had established relations at that point, participated alongside us in the preparatory work. The second was made orally by our delegation, on behalf of the three Western powers alone, at the start of the talks in Geneva. Neither seems to me to have the significance that a reservation expressed in due form by the Four Powers, during the adoption of the final text or texts of the CSCE, would have.

The task would no doubt be tricky. On the Russian side, their reluctance would no doubt be even greater than that shown by Mr Gromyko in June 1972 as to the idea of a quadripartite declaration. And we perhaps now have fewer means of pressure over them than at a time when the GDR was waiting to be recognised by the three Western powers and sought, moreover, United Nations admittance. The Americans, meanwhile, may be tempted to reach the end of the work in Geneva with as few difficulties and, above all, clashes as possible. That said, if they have not forged relations with the GDR by then, they may still have some interest in a reservation. Lastly, the Germans, while they say they see no problem with a repetition of the content of the quadripartite declaration, may be less in need of such a precaution as in the past, tempted as they seem to be by the prospect of humanitarian facilities on top of what “Ostpolitik” has brought them.

The British, meanwhile, have just informed us in the quadripartite group that they had come, both in London and here, to the conclusion that a general objection appeared necessary to them. The Embassy of the United States considers that the problem as a whole should be examined by the Bonn group.

The matter does indeed seem to me to need detailed study as quickly as possible.

I would appreciate instructions from the Ministry.<sup>2</sup>

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2 For all the French documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2906](http://dodis.ch/C2906).

[dodis.ch/76983](https://dodis.ch/76983)

Israel

*The Director of the Europe I Department Yaish to the Assistant Director-General  
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Meroz<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE – AN ITALIAN PROPOSAL FOR A DECLARATION  
ON THE MEDITERRANEAN

Classified

Jerusalem, 9 May 1974

*[Complements]* my memorandum no. 2704 of 28.4.74<sup>2</sup>

A. An inquiry at the State Department raised the following points:

1. The Americans think the declaration is “very complicated.” They would prefer a limited paragraph to appear in the final document, which would be content with expressing the connection between the CSCE and the Mediterranean region. A special declaration inflates the issue and could become a specific item on the Conference agenda.
2. The declaration contradicts the Phase I decision of the CSCE in Helsinki to exclude the Middle East from the CSCE framework.
3. The Americans want to reduce the areas of contact between the CSCE and the conflict in the Middle East as much as possible. A declaration such as that proposed by the Italians would broaden the scope. If “follow-up institutions” for the CSCE are established, the declaration could serve as a pretext for holding discussions on the Middle East issue.
4. The Americans believe that the Soviet Union’s position on the proposed declaration will be negative. The Americans also understand that “the Arabs” have reservations about the declaration and that it has received lukewarm support from the 9.<sup>3</sup>

B. It therefore turns out – as was not clear before – that the American opposition is directly related to the Middle East issue.

C. It is clear that we must take into account the American reservations, especially since our basic position has always been that discussion of the Middle East issue in the CSCE should be prevented. At the same time, we cannot deny our statements in the CSCE itself about the connection between European security and the Mediterranean.

<sup>1</sup> Israel State Archives (ISA), MFA8530/2. Translated from Hebrew. This letter No. 2747 was signed by Nissim Yaish, [dodis.ch/P51234](https://dodis.ch/P51234) and addressed to the Assistant Director-General for Europe of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yohanan Meroz, [dodis.ch/P51231](https://dodis.ch/P51231).

<sup>2</sup> For Yaish’s memorandum No. 2704 of 28 April 1974, cf. ISA, MFA8530/1.

<sup>3</sup> The nine members of the European Economic Community: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom.

D. The Italian chargé<sup>4</sup> contacted me yesterday on instructions from Rome and asked for our position on their proposal. He added that it was urgent because they had heard that another Mediterranean country was preparing to submit a proposal on the same subject (The hint was: a country unfriendly to Israel).

In light of the above, I suggest that we respond to the Italians roughly in the following general terms:

1. As we declared in our appearances before the CSCE, Israel willingly accepted the Conference's recommendation that, in its discussions on security and cooperation in Europe, it would take into account the existing connection between the above and the Mediterranean region. In principle, Israel therefore regards the mention of the subject in the final document positively.
2. However, Israel wishes to note that in Helsinki it was explicitly decided not to address or discuss the issue of the Middle East at the Conference and in its committees. Israel has noticed that despite the above decision, all five Arab countries that appeared before the CSCE<sup>5</sup> raised the issue of the conflict in the Middle East in an explicit and controversial manner and in extreme language that is offensive to Israel. Israel also noted with regret that no country, including Italy, had found it necessary to call the above speakers to order, or to ask them to remove from their statements and memoranda the sections referring to an issue that had been explicitly removed from the conference's agenda.
3. This being so, Israel fears that those sections in the declaration that refer, in the form of direct or indirect implications, to tensions in the Middle East will serve as a pretext for the Arabs to renew and establish their previous demands for a discussion of the conflict at the current Conference or even in frameworks that may be decided upon later in the Conference.
4. Without entering into a discussion of the details of the wording of the Italian proposal, Israel requests that its concerns be taken into account in order to prevent a move that could lead, with a high degree of probability, to developments that would undermine the justified and wise decision made in Helsinki not to discuss Middle East affairs within the framework of the CSCE.
5. I propose to inform the Americans of our position and our response to the Italians.

At this point, I would not suggest embarking on a campaign against the Italian initiative, as American opposition is enough to clip its wings.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Refers to the Italian chargé d'affaires in Tel Aviv. Not identified.

<sup>5</sup> Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Syria.

<sup>6</sup> For all Israeli documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2908](http://dodis.ch/C2908).

[dodis.ch/38858](https://dodis.ch/38858)

Switzerland

*Meeting of the Federal Council Delegation for Foreign Affairs of 5 June 1974<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE

Bern, 5 June 1974

With the decisive phase of the CSCE negotiations in Geneva approaching, the exchange of views within the Federal Council Delegation is intended to prepare the options to be taken and the instructions to be given to the Swiss delegation.

Following on from the successive reports presented to the Federal Council on the progress of the second phase of the CSCE, a report dated May 28 (see Annex 1)<sup>2</sup> serves as the basis for discussion. Additional information may be added on four points:

1. On the *SPSD*, the Swiss document relating to the procedure was submitted and accepted as a basis for discussion with favourable comments.<sup>3</sup> The Soviets nevertheless remain hostile to the inclusion of the term “mandatory” in the provisions of the document (section 2).<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, they believe that the *SPSD* should not be the only topic of discussion in the follow-up to the CSCE. While we have no objection to this last point, we must remain firm on the issue of mandatory compliance. Its exclusion from the provisions is unacceptable to us. The Soviets, keen to avoid giving us a flat refusal, want a compromise, but it is difficult to imagine what form that could take.

2. *Basket III*: The Soviets caused surprise by dusting off an international convention on the press and radio, dating from September 23, 1936, which is still in force and has been ratified by Switzerland, among others.<sup>5</sup> The convention pro-

1 Swiss Federal Archives CH CH-BAR#E2814#1993/210#1\* (1). Translated from French. These minutes were drawn up by the Deputy Head of Political Division I of the Federal Political Department (FPD) Claudio Caratsch, [dodis.ch/P15359](https://dodis.ch/P15359), and by Pierre-Yves Simonin, [dodis.ch/P15417](https://dodis.ch/P15417), Secretary to the Head of the FPD, Federal Councillor Pierre Graber, [dodis.ch/P4171](https://dodis.ch/P4171). In addition to those mentioned, the meeting was attended by the Head of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Federal Councillor Ernst Brugger, [dodis.ch/P31389](https://dodis.ch/P31389), the Head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police Kurt Furgler, [dodis.ch/P12150](https://dodis.ch/P12150), the Secretary-General of the FPD Ernesto Thalmann, [dodis.ch/P997](https://dodis.ch/P997), the Legal Advisor to the FPD and Head of the Swiss Delegation to the CSCE in Geneva Rudolf Bindschedler, [dodis.ch/P1396](https://dodis.ch/P1396), the Head of Political Division I Charles Müller, [dodis.ch/P1258](https://dodis.ch/P1258), and the Head of the Political Secretariat François de Ziegler, [dodis.ch/P2755](https://dodis.ch/P2755).

2 Report of the Swiss Delegation to the CSCE in Geneva, [dodis.ch/75188](https://dodis.ch/75188). Cf. also the report dated 8 April 1974, [dodis.ch/38860](https://dodis.ch/38860), and the memorandum by Deputy Head of Division Caratsch, dated 20 May 1974, [dodis.ch/75182](https://dodis.ch/75182).

3 Proposal from the Swiss Delegation to the CSCE of 18 September 1973, cf. [dodis.ch/78313](https://dodis.ch/78313). For the discussion, cf. the telegrams Nos. 2, 5 and 15 from the Swiss Delegation to the CSCE in Geneva to the Political Directorate dated 24 and 31 January and 28 February 1974, CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1987/78#680\* (B.72.09.15.1).

4 Cf. DDS, vol. 26, doc. 57, [dodis.ch/38848](https://dodis.ch/38848), point 2. I. b).

5 International Convention concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, signed at Geneva, 23 September 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS), Vol. 186 (1938), pp. 301–317.

vides for restrictions on press freedom but also includes a clause on compulsory jurisdiction.

3. *Conference schedule*: The Nine Ministers will meet on June 10 and 11, followed shortly thereafter by NATO ministers. We must await the outcome of these two consultations.<sup>6</sup> The danger for the neutral and non-aligned countries (NN) – Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Finland/Yugoslavia, Malta, and Cyprus – of being excluded from bloc-to-bloc negotiations is not insignificant. Under these circumstances, the question arises as to whether the NN countries as such should consult with each other at a level to be determined; in this form, the Astroem proposal could be acceptable, with a view to breaking the deadlock at the Conference.<sup>7</sup>

4. The negotiations are undoubtedly in crisis. What can be done to resolve this? The alternatives appear to be as follows:

- either suspend the Conference for three months or longer and resume the second phase in the autumn or later;
- or proceed with a “package deal”<sup>8</sup> in the coming weeks and agree on the uncontested issues. This would be a simple reissue of the Helsinki “blue book.”<sup>9</sup> This approach would open the door to the third phase, the results of which would be purely psychological, with no real significance.

The discussion focuses successively on the various baskets dealt with by the CSCE.

#### *I. Security (Basket I)*

The salient points for us are:

1. The SPSP, whose fate is closely linked to the acceptance or rejection of its binding nature (even if limited to the procedure). If we do not obtain a satisfactory response on this point, we will be forced to conclude that the entire project has failed.

The feeling is that, even in view of Swiss domestic policy, it would be appropriate to frankly acknowledge the possibility of the SPSP's failure. Furthermore, the French position on this subject may come as a surprise, given that since 1919 it has always been committed to the peaceful and binding settlement of disputes. It was only in December 1973 that it made a 180° turn in Geneva for reasons that are well known.<sup>10</sup> It also denounced Article 36 of the ICJ Statute.<sup>11</sup> This is still its position, though it is likely that it will change in the long term.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. the memorandum by the Deputy Head of the FPD's Political Service East Karl Fritschi, [dodis.ch/P16389](https://dodis.ch/P16389), dated 25 June 1974, [dodis.ch/75185](https://dodis.ch/75185).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. the report by Deputy Head of Service Fritschi on the talks between Federal Councillor Graber with the Secretary-General of the Swedish Foreign Ministry Sverker Åström, [dodis.ch/P16730](https://dodis.ch/P16730), on 29 May 1974, [dodis.ch/53905](https://dodis.ch/53905).

<sup>8</sup> English in the original. For the “package deal” involving the Neutral and Non-Aligned countries, cf. the report by the Head of Delegation Bindschedler, dated 26 July 1974, [dodis.ch/38861](https://dodis.ch/38861). Cf. also the minutes of the Ambassadors' Conference of 4–6 September 1974, [dodis.ch/35118](https://dodis.ch/35118), pp. 21–25, and the presentation on the CSCE given there by Ambassador Bindschedler, [dodis.ch/35120](https://dodis.ch/35120).

<sup>9</sup> English in the original. I.e. the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).

<sup>10</sup> For the dispute between Australia, New Zealand and France before the International Court of Justice concerning French nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean, cf. [dodis.ch/75166](https://dodis.ch/75166) and Bindschedler's note of 12 November 1974, file CH-BAR#E2814#1993/210#1\* (1).

<sup>11</sup> Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), 33 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) 993.



2. *Military measures*, which are so benign as to seem laughable; nevertheless, discussion has stalled, revealing the unpleasant atmosphere prevailing at the Conference. On this point, the views of the two superpowers coincide; they have the means to block everything by preventing consensus, but this is also true of the Nine or the NN. For the time being, we are at an impasse; military measures are not of considerable importance at the CSCE. If it proves difficult to present such modest results to the Swiss public, we could nevertheless emphasise the connection with the conferences on disarmament measures, which are also stalling.<sup>12</sup> The monitoring of decisions taken in the military field would be the responsibility of a special body, whose functions would also have to be agreed upon.

It is clear, moreover, from the links with the Vienna negotiations (MFR) that the superpowers are hostile to discussing real military issues within the CSCE. Some countries believe that they can address these issues under the guise of the CSCE follow-up, but this seems unlikely to be feasible.

## *II. Economic cooperation (Basket II)*

In this regard, there is reason to fear that the principles established in this basket will not withstand confrontation with reality; at the slightest sign of trouble on the world economic scene, they are likely to be abandoned. There is undoubtedly a risk of disappointment, but we must accept some formulas that may seem “literary.” Moreover, these principles will be applied bilaterally. The most difficult issue – that of the most-favoured-nation clause – remains open.

## *III. Human contacts, information (Basket III)*

We must emphasise the importance of these issues, to which Parliament and public opinion are particularly sensitive.<sup>13</sup> Our delegation, for its part, has never harboured any illusions in this regard. It has taken a pragmatic stance from the outset (very little progress is still progress), rejecting the naive “all or nothing” approach. Yet in this basket too, things are at a standstill. There is still, however, a glimmer of hope. Tactically, the Eastern Bloc could make concessions when the time comes, i.e., at the very end of the Geneva phase. Unfortunately, the opportunity to negotiate the inviolability of borders has been missed, especially by the Nine. The meagre Soviet concessions on the dissemination of written information can be considered provisionally accepted after first reading. There is therefore room for hope. These issues will undoubtedly become more topical again when the follow-up to the CSCE is discussed.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. DDS, vol. 26, doc. 79, [dodis.ch/38884](http://dodis.ch/38884).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the Federal Council's response to the petition from the Swiss Radical Youth of 17 November 1973, minutes No. 624 of 24 April 1974, [dodis.ch/77738](http://dodis.ch/77738); the minutes of the meeting of the National Council's Foreign Affairs Committee of 25 April 1974, [dodis.ch/77736](http://dodis.ch/77736), pp. 9–16 and of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council of States held on 27 May 1974, [dodis.ch/77737](http://dodis.ch/77737), pp. 2–10.



*IV. Next steps*

The Eastern countries hope to conclude as quickly as possible. On the Western side, the decision is linked to the upcoming meetings of the Nine and NATO.<sup>14</sup> In these circumstances, the neutral countries will either have to wait for the blocs to make their decisions or take the initiative themselves.

Some opinions refer to the current political situation, in which only governments can take decisions. A certain degree of polarisation is therefore inevitable. It is best to wait until that moment. A Swedish-style initiative would have no chance of success, nor would an initiative by the NNs. Switzerland must, as in the past, avoid the formation of an NN bloc. We are the only ones defending a clear position: let us therefore retain as much autonomy as possible. The CSCE gives the NNs an opportunity to demonstrate their political existence and make their voices heard. However, in order to maintain this undeniable advantage, should we form a bloc with the other neutral and non-aligned countries? Maintaining an autonomous position seems preferable.

Others believe, however, that it is not in fact a question of forming a new bloc, but rather of recognising that the NN have common interests (which is reflected in a certain division of labour in Geneva) and that, so far, their cohesion is more evident than that of the Nine. It is always easier to work together than to work in a scattered manner. Faced with the options offered by the Nine, NATO, and the Eastern Bloc, a position will have to be taken. The idea of a meeting of the NN countries could be taken up again after the EC and NATO meetings. It could be at the level of heads of delegation or senior officials from the foreign ministries. It would in fact be the public emergence of something that already exists. Consultation between the NN would serve two purposes:

1. a new attempt to assert our interests;
2. the demonstration of a position independent of the blocs, acting on a psychological level.

It remains to be seen whether the NNs could really offer anything concrete to break the deadlock at the Conference and justify the proposed operation. The assumption is that what the NNs could offer would correspond to the objectives of the West, while having a better chance of being accepted by the Eastern countries.

With regard to the recent Swedish initiative, it appears that Vienna wishes to align its position with that of Switzerland; at the same time, the specific content of the proposals has been viewed rather negatively there. The Austrian reaction and also Mr. Kreisky's attitude in Moscow show that Austria, like Switzerland, does not intend to terminate the CSCE whatever the cost.<sup>15</sup>

It is not necessary to make an immediate decision on the above-mentioned issues. Mr. Bindschedler is authorised to sound out the other delegations in Geneva.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. [dodis.ch/75185](https://dodis.ch/75185).

<sup>15</sup> On the visit of Austrian Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, [dodis.ch/P2507](https://dodis.ch/P2507), in Moscow, cf. the letter of Swiss Ambassador in Moscow René Fässler, [dodis.ch/P1142](https://dodis.ch/P1142), to the FPD, dated 7 June 1974, [dodis.ch/75195](https://dodis.ch/75195). For the Austrian position, cf. also QdD 30, doc. 72, [dodis.ch/75715](https://dodis.ch/75715), and the minutes of the talks between Austrian Foreign Minister Rudolf Kirchschläger, [dodis.ch/P15488](https://dodis.ch/P15488), and Federal Councillor Graber on 3 May 1974, [dodis.ch/40545](https://dodis.ch/40545), pp. 7–9.

The situation should be reviewed after the Nine and NATO have taken a position and after the possible outcome of the meeting between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev in Moscow.<sup>16</sup>

#### *V. Migrant labour*

Discussions are still ongoing regarding the position to be taken on Turkish proposal II/H/1518 (see Annex 2) on economic cooperation and establishing principles on the economic and social aspects of migrant labour.<sup>17</sup> Points 2, 4, and 9 of the draft, which appear to be acceptable to all other CSCE participants, may be problematic in terms of Swiss domestic policy. It would be dangerous to give the Swiss public the impression that the Federal Council is no longer autonomous in defining its policy on foreign labour.<sup>18</sup>

The text of the proposal may still be softened in line with the guidelines agreed upon by the three departments concerned:

1. Ensure that no proposals exceeding Turkey's requests are introduced and avoid adding any undesirable clarifications to the text;
2. Endeavour to include the *reservation on demographic structure* in the draft resolution;
3. Endeavour to also include in the text the *reservation on national legislation*, as already discussed with the head of the Turkish delegation;<sup>19</sup>
4. endeavour to replace the notion of "Mediterranean countries" with a general concept;
5. refrain from amending the paragraphs in detail, as the general reservations render such amendments unnecessary.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> United States President Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](https://dodis.ch/P13584), was in the USSR from 27 June until 3 July 1974 visiting the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543). Cf. the letters of Ambassador Fässler of 8 and 9 July 1974, [dodis.ch/75167](https://dodis.ch/75167) and [dodis.ch/75194](https://dodis.ch/75194), as well as Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, Volume XV, doc. 186–198.

<sup>17</sup> For the proposal submitted by the Turkish Delegation to the CSCE on 14 March 1974, cf. [dodis.ch/75237](https://dodis.ch/75237). Cf. also DDS, vol. 26, doc. 57, [dodis.ch/38848](https://dodis.ch/38848), point II. a); the minutes of the meeting of a working group on the economic and social aspects of migrant labour of 13 May 1974, [dodis.ch/38856](https://dodis.ch/38856), and the memorandum by Jérôme Lugon, [dodis.ch/P41695](https://dodis.ch/P41695), of the Swiss Delegation to the CSCE, dated 4 November 1974, [dodis.ch/38857](https://dodis.ch/38857).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. the memorandum from the Deputy Head of Political Division I Caratsch, and the Secretary to the Head of the FPD Simonin, dated 22 May 1974, [dodis.ch/38402](https://dodis.ch/38402).

<sup>19</sup> Ali Hikmet Alp, [dodis.ch/P51182](https://dodis.ch/P51182).

<sup>20</sup> For all Swiss documents in this volume, cf. [dodis.ch/C2935](https://dodis.ch/C2935).

[dodis.ch/77133](https://dodis.ch/77133)

Türkiye

*The Turkish Permanent Representative to the International Organisations in Geneva,  
Kırca, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

[CSCE]

Secret/Very Urgent

Geneva, 28 June 1974

1. Work on the Conference is currently focused on finding solutions to the causes of slowdowns on the Third Basket.

Economic affairs are progressing at the necessary pace. In the declaration of principles, the initial drafting of principle “non-intervention in internal affairs” is nearing completion. The matter of military measures is at an impasse.

2. The major obstacle in the Third Basket is the matter of “family reunions”. One of the main concerns here is the issue of providing the “taking one’s savings abroad” option to the person planning to leave the country. In the field of information, the creation of the “possibility of openness to foreign broadcasting” continues to be the main obstacle – mutual resistance on these issues brings progress to a standstill.

3. The Representative of the Soviet Union<sup>2</sup> announced at a special meeting that they were ready to move forward on certain aspects – as, in their own words, a sign of goodwill. For example, they stated that they could consider more moderate formulas regarding exit taxes in terms of “family reunions”, and “subscription” in the field of information. Regarding confidence-building measures, they stated that they could extend the announcement area to 100 kilometres along the borders and increase the announcement period to 10 days.

The significance of these matters, said to have been made to reflect a conciliatory mindset, is quite small within the context of conflict issues:

Therefore, naturally, it didn’t help create a basis for reaching an agreement.

4. Meanwhile, another attempt was made: The Finns proposed a solution to address the East’s desire to link all of its involvement within the Third Basket to both the principles and the “laws and customs.” They proposed adding the phrase “ensuring compliance with the laws” to the end of the definition of the principle

<sup>1</sup> Turkish Diplomatic Archives (TDA), TDA-K0000418-G0003548-195161. Translated from Turkish. This Cipher telegram No. 281 was established by the President of the Turkish Delegation of the Second Term of CSCE Özdemiş Benler, [dodis.ch/P81319](https://dodis.ch/P81319) and transmitted to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Turkish Permanent Representative to the UN Office in Geneva Coşkun Kırca, [dodis.ch/P51104](https://dodis.ch/P51104), on 28 June 1974 at 9:45 a.m. It was decrypted on 30 June 1974 at 10:35 a.m. and registered the same day at 1:50 p.m. Copies were also sent to the Turkish Delegation to NATO and to the Turkish Embassy in Bern. 15 copies of this cipher telegram, regarding negotiations on the third basket of the CSCE were printed. It can be deduced that this telegram was written to clarify the negotiation of the parties on the subject of the family reunification.

<sup>2</sup> Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Kovalev, [dodis.ch/P45912](https://dodis.ch/P45912).

of “non-intervention in internal affairs”. Thus, at least on the surface, the aim was to find a way of compromise in terms of the restrictions that the East wanted to impose, by incorporating them into principles.

5. Information and thoughts were also presented regarding the Finnish proposal’s appearance in terms of the principles. I will address here some matters that, I believe, go beyond the scope of the said framework.

During our NATO meeting, the US Representative<sup>3</sup> focused on whether the Finnish idea could be a solution – using a cautious language. Even though it was cautious, this behaviour may be considered, firstly, within the framework of Americans’ understanding regarding the Meeting, and then, of the matters relevant to the Third Basket. The Americans are acting on the view that it is unrealistic to solve, using the Third Basket method, the issue of closed regimes of the East. This understanding is perhaps consistent with their understanding regarding the outcomes they expect at the Conference.

From the perspective of the 9s, within the European framework, increasing the “Contact” relationships carries particular value with regards to softening the closed regimes, while not going so far as to wear them down. They believe that long-standing contacts will be in the best interests of Europe.

These two approaches stem from the following detail, which suggests that the US views the issues from a global perspective: Europe is the most important issue for the US – but it is only one of them. It is not a matter of underestimating the political benefits of increasing contacts with the East.

I addressed here, regarding the US behaviour, my impression about their desire to reflect this behaviour, albeit cautiously this time, on the course of the Conference. It would be valuable for us to gain insight into this topic, which we touched upon here, during the recent high-level NATO meetings.

6. The Finns will have carried out their abovementioned initiative under the influence of Moscow. The 9s think it is too early for such an attempt. Regarding the matters relevant to the Third Basket, it does not seem to have adopted a view that attempting to satisfy the Soviets in this manner would be futile. The Finns’ suggestion of this idea without consulting them probably played a part in this as well. The East on the other hand resists moving beyond the principle of “non-intervention in internal affairs”, unless the Finns’ suggestion is given shape.

7. At yesterday’s NATO meeting, the American Representative explored once again the possibility of finding a compromise around the Finnish opinion. The 9s’ reaction was, again, as I have stated above. As I mentioned above, the difference of opinion stems from the reflection of two different understandings in the Conference negotiations.

8. In fact, provided that it is subject to, for example, the obligations arising from the law of nations, the Finnish opinion indeed seems like a way to reach common ground. However, at the current stage of the negotiations, we also think that it’s too early to attempt this.

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3 Albert W. Sherer, [dodis.ch/P81733](https://dodis.ch/P81733).

9. While the Finnish attempt was progressing this way, a pragmatic approach was sought to clear the obstacles in the matters of “family reunions” and “openness to broadcasting”. To this end, special contacts were called.

10. I have mentioned here that one of the major concerns regarding the family reunions was the matter of “taking one’s savings abroad”. The Soviet Union in particular firmly opposes this. During our consultations with those within the 15s, when the grounds were deemed suitable, we suggested searching for a formula based on the principle of preserving the rights of a person leaving a country over the property and money they leave behind. Now, this principle is being discussed in the aforementioned specific issue while seeking a path to reconciliation with the East. I do not know whether or not the Soviets will accept this formula. When we proposed this idea of reconciliation during the NATO consultations, we aimed both for reconciliation and for our people abroad to reserve all rights they may leave behind if they return to homeland.

11. I have mentioned above that the East’s position on military matters shows, so far, no sign of compromise. The manoeuvre unit is corps. The announcement must only be made to the relevant countries. The area must be 100 km long along the borders; the duration of the announcement must be 10 days. This is the brief summary of the stance of the East. There is no change in this.<sup>4</sup>

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4 For all the Turkish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2919](http://dodis.ch/C2919).

[dodis.ch/75748](https://dodis.ch/75748)

Italy

*The Head of Office III of the Directorate-General for Political Affairs Ferraris  
to the Deputy Director-General Gardini<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE: IMPORTANCE OF CERTAIN ISSUES STILL UNRESOLVED  
IN THE FIRST COMMISSION

Rome, 20 July 1974

1. In the First Commission – with particular regard to the First Subcommission (declaration on principles) and to the Special Working Body (implementation mechanism) – there are some outstanding problems of considerable significance, on which it appears necessary to draw attention once again, insofar as they also involve Italian interests, whether direct or indirect.

2. *Inviolability of frontiers.* On April 5, as is known, the statement of the third principle of the Helsinki Decalogue concerning the inviolability of frontiers was recorded, by virtue of a complex compromise of substance and procedure. With regard to this recording, there is still a specific reservation presented, albeit belatedly, by the delegation of the FRG. Formally, therefore, acceptance of the text is not yet definitive.

After the West had finally agreed at Helsinki to the Soviet insistence on innovating international law (that is, to attribute entirely new legal value to a concept certainly shared by all, but on a purely political and contingent level), the wording obtained appears overall rather favourable: with terms partly ambiguous, not all corresponding to Soviet desiderata, inviolability is linked to the renunciation of the use of force (this is due in large part to the action of the Italian delegation, which at the same time sought to facilitate a solution, as acknowledged both by the USSR and by the Western delegations). Nevertheless, the East now seeks to validate – and the West generally reacts passively – its inaccurate interpretation, namely it aims to give a central and unconditional value to the inviolability of frontiers, presenting it once again as immutability and inalterability of frontiers, of the political and territorial status quo, of the division of Europe, while passing completely in silence over the connection with the renunciation of the use of force.

<sup>1</sup> Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Historical Diplomatic Archives (IT-ASDMAE), DGAP, Uff. XIII (ex III), CSCE, b. 84, fasc. Appunti d'ufficio CSCE, 1974. *Translated from Italian. This memorandum No. 053/452 was established by Deputy Head of Delegation to the CSCE Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, [dodis.ch/P48092](https://dodis.ch/P48092), and addressed to the Deputy Director-General for Political Affairs Walter Gardini, [dodis.ch/P54619](https://dodis.ch/P54619), who has seen this document.*



3. *Clause on the peaceful change of frontiers.* According to the Western conception, such a clause was to qualify the inviolability of frontiers in conjunction with the enunciation of the new principle desired by the USSR. By virtue of the aforementioned compromise of April 5, a formula on the peaceful change of frontiers was recorded, leaving for the moment undecided its placement in the Decalogue of principles. After lengthy discussions among the Nine, it was concluded, in adherence to an Italian legal thesis and with only the generic (and provisional) reservation of Ireland, that the clause should be inserted in the principle of territorial integrity. This was due to evident logical connections of subject matter and because in this way the absolute character of inviolability, understood in the Soviet sense, found a precise limit in the lawfulness of changes within a territorial context. On the Italian and Western side, the aim was thus to leave clearly open the European option, in addition of course to supporting the FRG in the option of German reunification.

The Bonn Group instead (we had objected to its specific competence, but it does not appear that our Representations followed up on Ministerial Telegram no. 2004/C of May 13, 1974) reached different conclusions, communicated in detail by Kissinger<sup>2</sup> to the Soviets in the Moscow talks, while the Nine were informed only on July 11. The Four Powers responsible for Germany and the FRG (on the initiative, it seems, mainly of the Americans) would therefore have agreed that the clause in question should be placed under the principle of sovereign equality.

Such rapid adherence to a Soviet position seems to us reprehensible. The text of the clause, further weakened and inserted under sovereign equality, is limited to affirming the obvious, namely that a State has the faculty, by virtue of its sovereign rights, to dissolve itself or to change its frontiers or to donate its territory or part of it. It thus highlights even more that the normal condition is that of inviolability, whose political and legal value of immutability becomes even more evident. Linked instead to territorial integrity, the clause in question retained its effectiveness: dissolved in the broad channel of sovereignty, moreover with statements indicating its subsidiary or secondary character compared to other far more important sovereign rights, it does not reflect the requirements of the political prospects of European unification. It could even be added that it is doubtful whether the clause thus conceived could serve the purposes of German reunification: in the new context, in fact, the clause implies that the right to change the territorial order is subordinated to the perfect climate of sovereignty on the part of the States concerned, which, in the case of the two German States, could give rise to divergences due to the existence of quadripartite rights limiting the full exercise of sovereignty.

In conclusion, the decision of the Bonn Group seems to have rendered vain the tenacious Italian action at Helsinki and Geneva (conducted with very little help from the other Westerners, except too late, when they finally became convinced of the soundness of our arguments). Such Italian action aimed at preventing the Declaration of Principles from affecting the prospects of European unification and at preventing the USSR from obtaining a right of political and legal evaluation

2 US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846).



over unification itself. Not by chance, moreover, the Soviets recently told Minister Sauvagnargues<sup>3</sup> that they could not accept the inclusion of the clause in question under territorial integrity because this would have “cast a shadow on the clarity of inviolability.” The Soviets had seen exactly the danger and succeeded in evading it. The principle of inviolability will therefore emerge from the CSCE as certain and absolute, thanks also to the interpretation that the Soviets will tenaciously repeat, thus introducing into Europe a new legal principle hitherto unknown in general international law. Will Europe thus have its own special and different law and different limitations from the rest of the globe?

It should finally be noted that the highly dubious decision reached by the Bonn Group, outside the rules of Community and Atlantic consultation, probably reflects the views of Secretary of State Kissinger, who at Ottawa had already clearly indicated that the American interest in eventually supporting the clause on peaceful change was limited to understanding German needs, without any hint of comprehension of European needs.

4. For considerations not very different, the Bonn Group now requests, again through American and German channels, support for the inclusion in the body of the declaration of a *clause on Berlin and Germany* intended to safeguard the principle of quadripartite responsibilities.

While not denying the importance of such confirmation, nor the appropriateness of avoiding language that might prejudice such rights, it is our view that safeguard declarations (or “disclaimers”) by the delegations concerned could equally achieve the purpose. What must be avoided is that, in order to obtain the desired effect, a formula be introduced into the declaration of principles that would amount to a multilateral confirmation of all existing treaties. This, however, is the approach of the French draft declaration on principles, which sets forth the following formula: “The participating States note that the present Declaration cannot prejudice treaties and bilateral and multilateral agreements previously signed by the participating States. They further note that nothing in the present Declaration can be interpreted against any provision of the Charter of the United Nations.” With regard to this formula, which is found almost verbatim in the Soviet draft, our delegation from the outset entered a formal reservation within the Nine and in the Conference during the general debate. And this for two concerns:

a) The ratification of all existing treaties would amount to a *multilateral confirmation of the Brezhnev doctrine*, that is, of the singularity of law and of relations among Eastern countries founded on politically unequal treaties. In this way, every other more vague formula that is being laboriously sought to be introduced into the Conference texts to contest such doctrine would be emptied of content, and the essential objective of the West in matters of security would be betrayed: the reaffirmation of principles of international law universally recognised and the necessity of their application regardless of relations among States. Although this is an objective which, for reasons of general evaluation, seems to have lost much

3 French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Sauvagnargues, [dodis.ch/P42740](http://dodis.ch/P42740).

of its value in the eyes of the Americans, the possibility of its abandonment should be the result of a considered decision, also in light of the psychological effects this could produce both in Western and neutral public opinion, and in certain circles of that of the Eastern countries;

b) The explicit reference to the multilateral treaties in force, and in particular to "all the provisions" of the Charter of the United Nations, would serve the purpose all too clearly pursued by the USSR at the CSCE of scoring a point against those States, among them Italy, which rightly consider Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter to be obsolete. These articles, contemplating a power of armed intervention by the founding States of the UN against the "ex-enemy States" independently of a decision of the Security Council, imply a discrimination and an implicit limitation of the sovereignty of certain countries which we consider devoid of any valid foundation from the moment when, with the signing of the Peace Treaty and admission to the UN, the consequences of the conflict were formally liquidated.

On points a) and b) above, our position cannot coincide, for obvious reasons, with that of the United States, Great Britain, and France, nor with that of the FRG, whose disorderly and contradictory negotiating conduct is the result of complex internal and external constraints. These are issues in relation to which the specificity of our positions must also be assessed, positions that find support, more than among our major allies, among countries such as Romania, Canada, and some of the neutral and non-aligned.

5. Italian legal doctrine and political practice have always led to emphasizing the importance of strengthening instruments for the *peaceful settlement of disputes* and extending compulsory procedures of arbitration and conciliation. Due to the strong opposition of the Eastern countries (and of some Western ones), the Swiss project in this direction did not succeed in Geneva and was substantially abandoned by the very proposing delegation, which replaced it with a draft resolution of a procedural nature for the further examination of the project following the Conference. The Eastern countries, and with them France, however, request that even from this resolution of referral any mention of the advisability of directing future work towards the search for formulas contemplating compulsory jurisdiction be excluded.

Some important Western countries (including the United States and the FRG) seem willing to accept any solution. Other delegations (including Canada, Great Britain, Italy) maintain the view that without the element of compulsory jurisdiction, a generic procedural decision of referral would amount to a total lack of progress or even a regression compared to the current situation in Europe regarding dispute settlement, and would be reduced to a gesture of distrust towards the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

Thus arises the choice between acquiescence to a substantially negative solution, capable only of saving appearances by giving the impression that the CSCE has in some way implemented the Helsinki Recommendations on this point, and, on the other hand, the reaffirmation that a pure and simple acknowledgment of the impossibility of achieving concrete results is preferable to the acceptance of a

commitment for the future to elaborate a system even less perfected and therefore less effective than the existing one.

6. On these points it would be advisable to reach conclusions suitable to reflect Italian interests, even beyond the requirements of the CSCE.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For all Italian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2915](https://dodis.ch/C2915).

[dodis.ch/75715](https://dodis.ch/75715)

Austria

*Conversation between Secretary-General of the Austrian Foreign Ministry Haymerle  
and Soviet Ambassador-at-Large Zorin on 21 August 1974 in Vienna<sup>1</sup>*

EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE CSCE

Extract

Vienna, 22 August 1974

[...]<sup>2</sup>

*Ambassador Zorin:* does not wish to go into detail, as the Soviet delegation is in constant contact with the Austrian delegation in Geneva.

He wanted to address two issues:

1) In the Soviet assessment, it is quite possible to complete the second and third stages “within a few months”.

In recent months, especially in the period immediately before the summer break, it had been possible to resolve a number of contentious issues, including the principle of the inviolability of borders and the passage on peaceful border changes, as well as the formulation of a complex agreement on agenda item III, which also paved the way for further solutions. The majority of the texts on agenda item II were also already available, even if certain contentious issues remained unresolved. With regard to agenda item IV, there were signs that a number of states were taking a more positive stance.<sup>3</sup>

In any case, most of the points of contention had already been resolved, and it must be clear that a solution could not be found for everything at this stage; something had to be left for the future. Sometimes it seemed that certain states loved the conference so much that they wanted to drag it out indefinitely in some form or another.

1 Austrian State Archives/Archiv der Republik (AT-OeStA/AdR), BMAA/II-Pol, Zl. 800/887-6a/74. Translated from German. This file was processed by Austrian Foreign Ministry (BMAA) Department II/2 Legation Secretary Walter Siegl, [dodis.ch/P51319](https://dodis.ch/P51319), and signed on 22 August 1974. The file was available to Department III/7 Legation Secretary Christian Zeileissen, [dodis.ch/P52037](https://dodis.ch/P52037), and a copy was forwarded to the Austrian Delegation to the CSCE on 3 September 1974. The detailed exchange between Secretary-General of the BMAA Heinrich Haymerle, [dodis.ch/P41627](https://dodis.ch/P41627), and Soviet Ambassador-at-Large Valerian Zorin, [dodis.ch/P11993](https://dodis.ch/P11993), focused on the UN, but the CSCE was also discussed for about an hour. A separate transcript was filed on this aspect. In its summary, the BMAA emphasised that „Zorin’s remarks could lead to the conclusion that only Austria – and not the Soviet Union as well – were interested in confidence-building measures. Concerning information [about military exercises] that would be conveyed solely to those neighbour states that belong to the same military alliance, [such information] would be of very limited interest for them.” For the summary, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/75715](https://dodis.ch/75715).

2 For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/75715](https://dodis.ch/75715).

3 Agenda items had been defined in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, i.e. I: Questions Relating to Security in Europe, II: Co-Operation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment, III: Co-Operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, IV: Follow-up to the Conference, cf. [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).

The results available made it seem appropriate to plan for the third phase to be convened at the highest level. This did not mean that every country was obliged to send its head of state. Secretary-General Haymerle interjected that this also depended on the respective constitutions; Zorin nodded in agreement.

Zorin concluded by saying that Austria was participating very actively in the work in Geneva and expressed the hope that Austria would contribute to bringing the conference to a conclusion "soon".

2) He then turned to the "confidence-building measures," in which Austria, he said, was developing a special activity.

The Soviet Union did not want Austria to get the impression that pressure on the Soviet Union could be used to get it to go further than was possible. The Soviet Union was no less interested in matters of national security than other states.

As the entire post-war policy shows, the Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, the far-reaching proposals put forward by some states – including Austria – cannot be described as realistic. Zorin said he could understand that individual NATO states were interested in placing the Soviet Union under military control. However, he found Austria's position in this regard incomprehensible. "Why does Austria need information about all military manoeuvres held throughout the European [*part of the*] Soviet Union? Austria has managed without this information until now."

Zorin then addressed specific issues relating to confidence-building measures, in particular the announcement of military manoeuvres:

Scale: In the Soviet Union, the proposal by the West (including the neutral countries) is laughed at; a regulation requiring the announcement of manoeuvres at division level would mean a continuous flow of information, as manoeuvres are constantly taking place within a division. Such communications could therefore only create a distorted picture and would arouse mistrust instead of trust.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, proposes such information at army level, as such manoeuvres are of a special and not a routine nature.

Addressees: The Soviet proposal to notify neighbours in the case of national manoeuvres is entirely sufficient. Zorin listed the following neighbours: Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, as well as Finland, Norway and Turkey. In the case of international manoeuvres, information could be provided to all CSCE states.

Notice period: The Soviet Union offered 10 days. If the West demanded 60 days, it was perhaps to engage in espionage.

Zorin summed up that the Soviet Union saw no basis for the Western proposals on any of these issues, as each state had a special responsibility in matters of national security.

It must also be recognised that, given the current state of international relations, it is not possible to go any further. Austria must proceed "sensibly" and not allow itself to be influenced "emotionally". Later, there may be more to be done on these issues, which concern a completely new area of international agreements.

4 Zorin omitted Soviet military interventions and invasions in Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968.

If some Western states – not Austria – assume that the Soviet Union absolutely wants to end the conference and must therefore meet maximum demands, this is an illusion. Small states need the CSCE more than the Soviet Union.

As Zorin concludes, he has addressed this aspect in a particularly open manner, as Austria is by no means taking a passive stance here.

*Secretary-General Haymerle:* We know that the Soviet Union does not need the CSCE – just as Austria does not need it, since we too have lived without the CSCE until now. But we want to arrive at a new, more secure form of coexistence. Every country raises the issues that are important to it at the CSCE.

Austria's concern is that the CSCE should lay the foundations for a process of détente that cannot be reversed.

So much for the basics.

Haymerle then addresses some of Zorin's general questions, but emphasises that he does not wish to comment on technical aspects here.

1) Zorin's remarks suggest that only Austria – and not the Soviet Union – is interested in confidence-building measures. Information in this context that only concerns neighbours belonging to the same military alliance can only be of very limited interest.

2) The basic idea behind confidence-building is not "control" or espionage, but the hope that such measures will create trust – as the word suggests – which will lead to a lasting deepening of the détente process.

3) There is a connection between political and military détente, which is reflected in the idea of confidence-building measures. This is the purpose of Austria's efforts, but it is also actively involved in all other issues at the conference. For Austria, which is located in the middle of Europe and is practically disarmed,<sup>5</sup> the issue of confidence-building is understandably of particular and great importance. It is therefore also important that the negotiations in Geneva go hand in hand with those in Vienna.

Austria is in favour of developing forward-looking principles for issues on which no concrete arrangements are yet possible. In this regard, Austria put forward ideas before the summer recess that envisage the implementation of confidence-building measures in two phases; these ideas have aroused interest in both pact systems. There has not yet been a formal response from the Soviet Union.

Haymerle refers to the CSCE passage in the communiqué following Chancellor's<sup>6</sup> state visit to Moscow and mentions that the Chancellor also had a lengthy private discussion with Prime Minister Kosygin.<sup>7</sup>

Austria would, of course, be in favour of the final phase taking place at the highest level. However, the Federal Chancellor had said that this was on one condition: it must be a success. Only then would people appreciate the significance of a summit meeting; otherwise, it would mean a devaluation of the work of the

<sup>5</sup> While reflecting the small size of Austria's defence budget, armed forces and weapons arsenal, this statement was in contradiction of the Neutrality Law of 1955 stipulating Austria's will to defend its neutrality with all available means, cf. *Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich* No. 211 of 4 November 1955, p. 1151.

<sup>6</sup> Austrian Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, [dodis.ch/P2507](https://dodis.ch/P2507). Kreisky's visit to the USSR took place from 28 May until 1 June 1974. For the Soviet-Austrian Communiqué, cf. [dodis.ch/75195](https://dodis.ch/75195).

<sup>7</sup> Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, [dodis.ch/P15549](https://dodis.ch/P15549).

leading statesmen. Some concrete results had been achieved before the summer break. With regard to agenda item I, one of the Soviet Union's main concerns had already been satisfactorily addressed earlier (Zorin nods in agreement). If there were still contentious issues with regard to agenda item II, the conference would certainly not fail because of them (Zorin nods in agreement again).

Austria has particular concerns regarding item III. Austria has no intention of undermining or questioning the social order of other states. We are living in a time of transition, and if we want to lay the foundations for further détente, we have to slowly move towards bringing the people of different states into closer contact with one another. We do not want to demand anything impossible here; we want the same thing as with the confidence-building measures – a long-term goal and concrete results where this is already possible today. A number of principles would have to be worked out that would slowly and automatically lead to a genuine cooperation between the European states. (Zorin reveals his reservations by laughing.)

*Zorin:* thanks him for explaining the Austrian position and addresses the issue of confidence-building measures.

We must proceed step by step. This does not contradict Austria's ideas about parallel political and military détente.

It is a question of degree – what is possible today and what is not yet possible.

*Haymerle:* It is true that this is a question of degree, but Austria already wants to establish certain principles today, as the Austrian delegation explained to the Soviet representative in the relevant working body in Geneva shortly before the summer break.

*Zorin:* confirmed that Ambassador Mendelevich<sup>8</sup> had told him about these statements, which he (Mendelevich) was “considering”. However, as Mendelevich had added, the new Austrian approach did not differ significantly from the previous proposal and was therefore not realistic in all respects. Mendelevich would, however, consider the idea of two phases.

If we want to establish certain principles now, we must bear in mind that everyone understands these principles in their own way; we cannot determine today what is not yet clear.

*Haymerle:* The term “principles” is perhaps misleading; it would be better to speak of “perspectives”. Austria does not want the conference to simply decide that the essential issues should be settled later. Things must be steered in the right direction.

*Zorin:* Some countries give the impression that they want to go beyond the Helsinki mandate. Significant steps have been taken since then, but “appetite comes with eating”.

Zorin urges Austria “not to rush things” and not to try to achieve too much at this stage. That could only damage trust.

*Haymerle:* For the time being, trust has undoubtedly not been lost. Difficulties in overcoming different negotiating positions are part and parcel of any conference.

8 Soviet Ambassador-at-large Lev Mendelevich, [dodis.ch/P54642](https://dodis.ch/P54642).



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*Zorin:* There is a minimum and a maximum of what is possible.

*Haymerle:* Let us strive to turn the minimum of what is possible into the maximum of what is possible.

*Zorin:* concludes by saying that this has been a very useful exchange of views.<sup>9</sup>

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9 For all the Austrian documents in this volume, cf. [dodis.ch/C2929](https://dodis.ch/C2929).

[dodis.ch/76949](https://dodis.ch/76949)

United States

*Conversation of President Ford with Secretary of State and National Security Advisor  
Kissinger in Washington<sup>1</sup>*

[CSCE]

Extract • Secret/Nodis

Washington, 28 August 1974

[...]<sup>2</sup>Kissinger: [...] Let me spend five minutes on CSCE.<sup>3</sup>

The original proposal by the Soviet Union in the early 1960's excluded the United States. Its purpose was to present a substitute for a peace treaty and to create the mood that NATO was no longer necessary. We originally opposed it but gradually changed because all the European leaders pleaded for it and Brandt<sup>4</sup> cut the ground out from under us by recognizing East Germany. Brandt is a good example of a flashy guy with no substance behind it.

Your tactical problem with the CSCE Summit is the Europeans say they don't want a Summit but if you oppose it, they will come out for it and drag you into it. So you have got to stay a half step ahead. But with the Soviets, don't commit yourself so the Soviets can use it against us with the Europeans.<sup>5</sup>

1 Ford Library (US-GRFPL), National Security Advisor, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, [Box 5](#). This memorandum of conversation was written by US Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, [dodis.ch/P57408](#), who participated in the conversation between United States President Gerald Ford, [dodis.ch/P47012](#), and his National Security Advisor to the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](#). The meeting took place at 9:00 a.m. in the White House Oval Office. It was published in: *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, *European Security*, [doc. 243](#). On 9 August 1974, US Vice President Gerald Ford was sworn in as President after Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](#), resigned the office that day.

2 For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76949](#).

3 On 15 August 1974, Kissinger told President Ford that the United States “never wanted” CSCE, but “went along with the Europeans. It includes some basic principles, something on human contacts, no change of frontiers, and what they call ‘confidence-building measures.’ The Soviet Union wants it as a substitute for a peace treaty. They more or less have that. The big hang-up is on freedom of movement. It is meaningless – it is just a grandstand play to the left. We are going along with it.” cf. [dodis.ch/77185](#).

4 The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](#).

5 During his 15 August 1974 briefing of President Ford, cf. [dodis.ch/77185](#), Kissinger noted: “What you will face is whether to conclude it at the summit level or foreign minister level. My guess is the Europeans will decide on a summit. We have positioned with the Soviet Union, so we look like we are ahead of the Europeans.” In response to a question from the President about the timetable, Kissinger said: “Maybe next March. The Soviet Union wants it this year, but that is not possible. If you meet Brezhnev [General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](#)] in December, they won't want it before that. There are no decisions to make now. When you meet Gromyko [Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](#)] the end of September you should give him the impression we are trying to be helpful. There is no implementation in the treaty.”.

The document has four major parts, including the statement of principles, then the three baskets. One is conference<sup>6</sup>-building (military) measures, economic matters, and human contacts.

The document is meaningless. The big issue is the question of the inviolability of frontiers as against peaceful change – where the peaceful change will be. Now the big issue is peaceful contacts. The Europeans are trying to work on the Communist parties so they are pushing this. The Communists have gone along with much of it. We have asked the Europeans to put down all their demands in writing so we can put it to the Soviets, and they don't want to.

We are now at Stage II. The Soviets want to have a Summit before the end of the year. I think it would be better in the Spring.

The President: I think it is mandatory to come after the first of the year.

Kissinger: I think you have to make the trip through Europe first. I would go to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary. We haven't been invited there, but there is some merit in the Soviets seeing a welcome in even a loyal satellite – no President has ever been there [Hungary].<sup>7</sup>

[...] <sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The word "conference" is in error; the phrase should read "confidence-building".

<sup>7</sup> Square brackets in the original.

<sup>8</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76949](https://dodis.ch/76949). For all documents of the United States in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2904](https://dodis.ch/C2904).

[dodis.ch/77053](https://dodis.ch/77053)

Canada

*The Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE Delworth to the Department of External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*CSCE: QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW DURING XMAS-NEW YEAR BREAK:  
III: PRESENTATION

Confidential

Geneva, 20 December 1974

Throughout current phase of conference, we have put heavy emphasis on human contacts issues and this seems to have been reflected in what we see of public assessment of conference's meaning for Canada. In general, this emphasis has been well and wisely placed for number of reasons, not least of which is fact that much of new ground being cut by CSCE is to be found in human contacts area. As we move towards concluding stages of second phase, I wonder however whether it might not be worthwhile to broaden the outlines of our analysis and presentation of CSCE, and to set human contacts issues in context of totality of conference problems and achievements. I am not suggesting that we dilute or play down significance of family reunification text, for example, and its potential usefulness in future dealings with Eastern Europeans. Rather my point is that there is more to CSCE from Canada's point of view than Basket III even though our main public emphasis has been put on some of the issues there. In broadest terms, CSCE has provided invaluable forum in which Canada can express its European-ness and has provided opportunity to diversify our foreign policy outlook by engaging us in issues and areas of interest and activity which are of vital relevance to European countries even if they do not always impinge directly on Canada. Substantive involvement in these issues, as well as being seen to be associated with the totality of European concerns (which is what conference reflects) is in my view at least as important as specific advances we have been successful in promoting on human interest questions. If we are to continue being accepted as a full participating member of world of Europe, it would be in our interest now, as we move towards home stretch, to diversify our analyses and our expressions of interest in conference to encompass totality of issues under negotiation, simply because many of them are of vital importance to our European friends.

2. Question of "the principles" is a case in point. While we have played active and constructive negotiating role and made real contribution in this area, we may have overlooked fact that these questions probably mean more to some confer-

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9092, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 49. This telegram No. CSCE947 signed by the Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE, Thomas Delworth, [dodis.ch/P51338](https://dodis.ch/P51338), was sent to the Canadian Department of External Affairs on 20 December 1974. For the complete list of the addressees, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77053](https://dodis.ch/77053).

ence participants than other aspects of conference. It was in this area that Soviet Union had staked out its primary objectives and it is precisely here that Western negotiators have deprived Russians of satisfaction they have sought in promoting CSCE. It is probably true that the principles affect Canada in a much less vital way than they relate to FRG concerns, for instance. But in general terms, human rights principle for example will be useful to have in background in future dealings with Soviets and their friends. Europeans feel this rather strongly. Furthermore, in the totality of the principles text, there will be nothing at variance with "peaceful change," and there will even be a sentence on peaceful change of frontiers. This means in effect that Soviet objective of freezing status quo will have been neutralized. All things considered, I believe that we might amplify a little our expressed interest in these questions by developing some of these implicit themes.

3. Subject of CBMs is treated in separate message dealing with possible modification of approach. Suffice it to say that conference on security and cooperation cannot end up with minimal or meaningless text on military matters (notwithstanding fact that these questions at CSCE are essentially political but cast in military terms). I am becoming increasingly concerned that Soviets and Eastern Europeans may believe they have sensed that the allies have lost earlier interest in these concepts and that at the last minute we and neutrals will be forced by negotiating deadlines to accept meaningless provisions. Such an outcome would be in interests of no one in West. It is therefore open question whether some form of interest might be expressed and repeated in public in the coming months as signal to Eastern Europeans.

4. No one ever anticipated that CSCE would provide forum for significant negotiations on such matters as tariffs or trade policy problems and possibly for this reason Basket II has not received attention it deserves. (Another reason is possibly that in this area Canadian interests on occasion have, in contrast to Basket III, been in direct opposition to those of the Nine.) Nonetheless, useful texts have been registered including recognition of the role individual firms and enterprises in economic relations. The conference is also expected to approve a text by which the participating states will pledge to endeavour to develop their trade relations on as broad a multilateral basis as possible. Interesting too is interpretation of many aspects of Basket II as further steps in direction of breaking down barriers to freer movement of people (business contacts) and ideas (texts on economic info in several subcommittees). I think that this theme might well be played up since it is logical extension of emphasis heretofore on human contacts.

5. Although possibly sensitive from federal-provincial relations point of view, education and culture components of Basket III have likewise registered useful provisions and ideas. These are far from academic or peripheral questions for many of the Europeans and the French, here as elsewhere, are treating culture as one of their highest priorities. Similarly, provisions relating to work of journalists when agreed will be of direct relevance and interest even though actual number of Canadian journalists involved will probably be small and certainly much smaller than those of most European countries.

6. Conference follow-up does not yet lend itself to same suggested treatment, although it would be useful to present for public consideration the thought that

Canada expects that progress in relations with Eastern Europe will not stop with termination of conference at probable summit, that processes begun in Helsinki and Geneva must continue to move forward substituting a dynamic process for a static definition of "good relations," and that we expect useful results across a broad range of questions of mutual interest.

7. In short, my view is that, as we begin to think of (undoubted) Helsinki summit and to prepare for it, especially in the light of the probable senior involvements and the public interest this will develop, we might take steps to broaden and balance our presentation, using a slightly wider angle lens, to bring a number of other issues into sharper Canadian focus.<sup>2</sup>

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2 For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).

[dodis.ch/77054](https://dodis.ch/77054)

Canada

*The Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE Delworth to the Department of External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

## CSCE: GENERAL ASSESSMENT

Confidential

Geneva, 21 December 1974

Most satisfying observation I can make on eve of Xmas break is that after much effort the promise of Western achievement contained in the Helsinki Final Recommendations is being realized at CSCE Stage II.<sup>2</sup> Process of multilateral negotiation has been operating in new fields, towards the promotion of the freer flow of people and ideas across frontiers; detailed and concrete texts sought by West in such areas are coming together. Although transformed and indeed seriously flawed by the negotiating process – and whether or not they ever serve as precise manuals for Eastern European bureaucracies which is exceedingly doubtful – these texts taken as a whole constitute an impressive political achievement for West and for concept which we and the great majority of our allies have of détente.

2. Greatest single achievement to date, or indeed likely, in field of human contacts at conference is family reunification text. Western persistence in negotiation over many months coupled with undoubted recognition by Soviets and GDR of its importance to public opinion of Western and prominent neutral states unquestionably led to this satisfactory result. Texts on marriage and travel are admittedly less good but these too are, we suspect, beyond what East expected to give and, when taken with statement of principle of freer movement of people and with concepts of access in detailed texts on culture and education, make useful basis for further Western effort. Where Western achievement has not been so great is in field of freer flow of info. This is area in which *[illegible]*<sup>3</sup> recognized that it is indeed “probing the outer limits of détente”; Soviets have quite correctly calculated that in return for concessions in more publicly important area of human contacts they would be required to give less in potentially much more influential and explosive realm of freer flow of info.

3. In field of economic, scientific and technological cooperation, there is by now very large assemblage of completed texts. While many of these are bland in context of economic negotiation, they would seem, taken as a whole, to be mod-

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs Fonds (RG25), vol. 9092, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 49. *This telegram No. CSCE972 signed by the Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE Thomas Delworth, [dodis.ch/P51338](https://dodis.ch/P51338), was sent to the Canadian Department of External Affairs. For the complete list of the addressees, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77054](https://dodis.ch/77054).*

<sup>2</sup> *Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).*

<sup>3</sup> WZ OEJFGUHV O in the original. For the facsimile, cf. [dodis.ch/77054](https://dodis.ch/77054).



erately useful from Western point of view; in some respects they could prove to be of considerable importance. East has neither sought nor obtained important commercial nor technological advantage at CSCE, leaving this for bilateral deals with major Western states or other more specific multilateral fora. On other hand, West has achieved good number of texts aimed at promoting freer contact between individual scientists and businessmen, better business conditions, etc., all with a distinctly freer movement of people flavour. Key problems such as MFN stubbornly remain to be solved but all indications are that result will not be unsatisfactory from Western point of view.

4. If Western patience in negotiating in human contacts has at last resulted in relatively sudden pre-Xmas (1974) completion or near-completion of texts, same approach has produced much more steady build-up of useful text in declaration on principles. With eight of ten principles now completed (seven registered and the eighth on the verge of registration), there still remains a number of difficult issues – peaceful change of frontiers, the inter-relationship of the principles and a means of safeguarding quadripartite rights in Berlin in the principle on fulfilment of obligations under international law – which will probably require considerable negotiating time. Although some allies are concerned that work in this area is lagging as a result of more dramatic moves in human contacts, we have been advocating continuation of careful and measured approach. It was this approach on Western side, with some considerable help from neutrals, which added satisfactorily full text of principle on human rights to growing decalogue.

5. There is of course significant area where progress is not being made, on CBMs. Adamant refusal of Soviets to enter into real negotiation is causing increasing consternation among Western and neutral delegations who are of firm view that military aspects of building security must be treated in serious way at CSCE. Danger of arriving at eleventh-hour cul de sac has led number of Western delegations to call for a rethinking of approach to CBMs early in New Year; our suggestions have been set out in separate message. Other area where positions remain far apart and almost no progress has been made is on the follow-up to the conference. Although West has quite rightly maintained that need for measures of organizational nature to follow conference could only be gauged on basis of conference results and has usefully gained time to this end, fact is that results are now being produced and Western position will have to move after Xmas. Value of continuing multilateral negotiating process in areas concerning freer flow of people, info and ideas and of continuing to involve USSR and its Eastern European allies in this process is perhaps more evident now. We have suggested rethinking of reserved Canadian position and expect that other Western delegations too may now be looking more seriously at positive aspects of follow-up prior to concerted analysis of Western position after Xmas.

6. Most marked feature of past session has been change of pace. From very static and discouraging beginning in early autumn, conference moved into gear with indication by Soviets some weeks ago of series of concessions in key human contacts area. In retrospect, this move seems almost certainly to have been designed to prepare way for Brezhnev meetings with Ford and Giscard although it may also be result of increased firmness, publicly announced in conference, of USA

position. After Rambouillet summit, events have moved even faster; while it is possible that considerable progress now being achieved is simply traditional end of term acceleration, it seems more likely that Stage II of the conference is indeed moving towards completion, perhaps by late spring. Completion of third stage at highest level before meeting of European communist parties mid-year seems to be immediate Soviet goal. In broader perspective, it is probable that Soviets have at last recognized that conference will have to produce results across board of Final Recommendations<sup>4</sup> and are moving to cut off a long negotiating process which had turned out to be rather different from the one they expected, of their envisaged pan-European security conference.

7. Acceleration of progress and of concessions this undeniably requires from Western side is causing predictable strains among allies. Particular FRG concerns in principles area, and French, USA, British concern for safeguarding of quadripartite rights in Berlin (apparently “settled” between French and Soviets at Rambouillet) are not easy for other allies to deal with. Greatest strain of all however has been caused by Rambouillet summit itself; whatever French may argue after fact about continuity in allied approach to completion of second stage and holding of third, operative impression throughout conference is of a “deal” – or possibly a series of deals. This impression has been reinforced by growing tendency of French to negotiate human contacts and cultural issues directly with Soviets and then to exert pressure on rest of Nine and 15 and neutrals to fall into line. Some have speculated this is not unrelated to French wish to complete much of sensitive, important negotiating before Irish take over presidency of Nine at New Year. Whatever the motive, this tactic backfired rather spectacularly in last hours of conference when several allies refused to bow to heavy French pressure and accept French-Soviet text on intro to human contacts and MAC.<sup>5</sup> Undoubtedly some such effort at some point is required and French as long time leader of Western side at conference are in best position to make it and to respond to present Soviet concessions. This fact, however much recognized, does not make process easy one with regard to alliance solidarity so remarkably consistent and productive in conference to date. Our emphasis on necessity to preserve this solidarity and on a measured careful approach to obtain satisfactory results, when taken with similar attitudes on part of most of our other allies, will hopefully help to counter-balance undoubted need to “move” in conference.

8. As footnote I would add the obvious. Whether tied to the Vladivostok communique formula or the “*bonnes prémisses*” of Rambouillet, pass has been effectively sold by West on meeting at third stage at highest level. It has been clear for some time that this bargaining counter fell in a political domain outside conference negotiations so that its abrupt loss is not unexpected and should not seriously upset Western position in remainder of second stage negotiations. In any case in light of recent progress in conference, and from vantage point of Xmas break, it is our expectation that such a meeting will be warranted on basis of fairly satisfactory results.<sup>6</sup>

4 Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](http://dodis.ch/77496).

5 Mutually acceptable conditions.

6 For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).

[dodis.ch/75750](https://dodis.ch/75750)

Italy

*The Head of the Italian Permanent Mission to the International Organisations  
in Geneva, Farace, to Minister of Foreign Affairs Rumor<sup>1</sup>*

[ITALY'S STRATEGIC ROLE IN CSCE TALKS]

Geneva, 7 January 1975

Minister Ferraris<sup>2</sup> and my other collaborators, who have with such prestige represented the Italian delegation in the individual Committees and Subcommittees of the CSCE, have submitted or will submit to Your Excellency their considerations on the period of the Conference which concluded at Christmas. As for myself, just as I have done in the past after each negotiating pause, I would like to set down on paper some general impressions, indicating, if possible, the future prospects, the problems which still require some reflection, and the sectors in which we are in a position to offer our further contribution to the development of the negotiation.

1. The optimism I had expressed at the end of the summer session was not misplaced. From the resumption in September – and especially in the last few weeks – the Conference has proceeded at a much faster pace than before. It was we, the Italian delegation, who perceived the first signs of some thaw in the Soviet positions during an informal working meeting we had in early October with the leading members of the USSR delegation. We then realised – and reported it to our Community colleagues – that something had changed; and that it was perhaps legitimate to begin to hope that our effort at objectivity and realism, in dealing with issues on which we were aware of Moscow's sensitivities, might meet with some response – even if not a true parallelism – in a greater effort by our Eastern interlocutors to take into account some of our basic requirements.

The results achieved, though not sensational, have been encouraging; and it must be our hope that the changed climate, apparently established before Christmas, will be confirmed in the imminent resumption of work. The unknown factor lies, as is evident, in the attitude of the USSR in relation also to the possible destabilization (whatever its cause) at the summit of the Soviet leadership, of which so much is spoken these days. Personally, I am not pessimistic because I have the

<sup>1</sup> Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Historical Diplomatic Archives (IT-ASDMAE), DGAP, Uff. XIII (ex III), CSCE, b. 149, fasc. CSCE. Parte generale, 1975. *Translated from Italian. This report No. 037 was signed by the Head of the Italian Permanent Mission to the International Organisations in Geneva Alessandro Farace, [dodis.ch/P51335](https://dodis.ch/P51335), and addressed to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mariano Rumor, [dodis.ch/P15297](https://dodis.ch/P15297), who has seen the document.*

<sup>2</sup> The Deputy Head of the Italian Delegation to the CSCE Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, [dodis.ch/P48092](https://dodis.ch/P48092).

impression that there is an interest, above all on the part of the Eastern countries, to conclude this negotiating chapter as soon as possible, if only because its prolongation would highlight even more certain negative aspects of communist society. After all, at the Kremlin – as perhaps elsewhere – the struggle is a struggle for power and ideas have only an instrumental character.

If this favourable forecast is confirmed, we could expect to complete within two months or a little more the first draft of the documents relating to the “mandates” contained in the three main chapters of the Helsinki Recommendations. Of course, this does not mean that all problems will have been resolved. But a good step will by then have been taken, and we will be in a position to address the other problems on whose solution the overall negotiation depends, and with it the possibility that at the beginning of the summer the third and concluding phase of the Conference may be held. Of these problems, which require reflection and impose some decisions, I take the liberty of briefly informing Your Excellency.

2. The first concerns the type of document or documents that the Conference will adopt and the issues connected thereto, on which the Helsinki Blue Book<sup>3</sup> offers no guidance. In it, it is stated that “drafts of declarations, recommendations, resolutions or any other final document will be elaborated by consensus” (paragraph 8), and elsewhere reference is made to “decisions” of the Conference, referring to the content and not to the form. The subject was addressed at the time in the general debate and often reappears in formal or informal discussions, but has never been concretely examined.

We know for certain that the Soviets aim for a single final document to emerge from the Conference; the Western delegations, on the other hand, favour a multiplicity of documents, interpreting the Helsinki Recommendations more precisely. But apart from this, it is not yet clear whether the Final Act<sup>4</sup> will consist of a text reproducing all the decisions agreed upon in the Conference, or whether there will be a brief introductory document – on which the signatures of the representatives of the participating States will be affixed – and the individual decisions will appear as annexes to that Act. The choice of one or the other solution is not merely formal. It affects the value that the final document of the CSCE will assume in the eyes of the various Governments. Nor should certain constitutional requirements be overlooked in this context.

As far as we are concerned, I think we have no reason to be rigid in supporting the multiplicity of documents unless our Community “partners” insist on it (the French have been among the firmest supporters of the thesis of multiplicity, and I do not know whether at the Fontainebleau meeting they renounced asserting their reasons on this point as well). In any case, as of today, the problem seems less important to me, since what we feared in the single document for the “third basket” was that it would turn into a most general instrument and therefore unsuitable to correspond to our demands in the field of human relations. Judging by the texts agreed upon so far, it seems to me that this danger has been overcome. Experience dispels certain misgivings.

3 *I.e. the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973*, [dodis.ch/77496](http://dodis.ch/77496).

4 *For the Final Act in all CSCE languages*, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](http://dodis.ch/58821).

Where, however, I believe we should not yield is in maintaining that all the decisions of the Conference have equal value. It is undeniable that each of them has its own nature and therefore different scope in terms of the obligations deriving from it, but all must indiscriminately receive the same identical treatment. On the Soviet side, however, there has been an attempt, since Helsinki, to confer upon the decisions on “principles” a priority and primordial value compared to the other commitments that will emerge from the Conference. We have not lent ourselves to this game, and we must continue to defend ourselves against it, since it aims to reduce the scope and consequences of the other understandings reached or to be reached in the CSCE, and particularly to deprive of weight and value, both politically and morally and psychologically, that cooperation in the delicate sector covered by the “third basket” which represents for the West the counterpart to the demands upheld by Moscow for the “first basket”: cooperation, moreover, which constitutes what is substantially new in the construction of détente as both means and result of a better understanding not only among States, but also among individuals. It is to this aspect of détente that Your Excellency rightly referred in Your interventions as President of the Council when You indicated that our efforts should be committed to achieving a “qualitative leap” in East/West relations.

Connected to the problem of the type of document is that of the declarations that might be necessary at the time of signing the Acts or the Final Act, in the event that there were some ambiguities in the agreed texts. This eventuality should not be overlooked by us, for a twofold interest: one purely national, the other Community.

As to the first, it is a matter of confirming, at the appropriate time and place, that as far as we are concerned, we consider Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter of the United Nations to have lapsed. Everything suggests that not only the USSR but also the other three guarantor powers do not intend to renounce their powers over Berlin and Germany as a whole. It will therefore be difficult to avoid some formula, in the tenth principle or elsewhere, that aims implicitly to reconfirm the validity of the two articles cited. It will therefore be necessary – at the time when the texts are finalized – to assess whether the assurances given to us by our allies, to the effect that the matter does not concern Italy, are sufficient to safeguard our position, or whether it would be advisable for us to state it in a declaration, whatever value such a declaration may have.

As regards Community interests, it has always seemed to the Italian delegation – and I mentioned it when then Foreign Minister Moro<sup>5</sup> came to Geneva – that if the relevant texts of the “declaration of principles” did not sufficiently safeguard our full freedom to carry forward, to its ultimate consequences, the process of European integration, it would be necessary to reaffirm collegially or unilaterally such freedom. I believe it would be advisable to examine this eventuality from now on, perhaps taking the initiative to consult our Community “partners” to establish which of them are willing to follow us on this path and the most appropriate form for an ad hoc declaration, whose responsibility could fall upon Italy if, as

<sup>5</sup> Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, [dodis.ch/P13878](https://dodis.ch/P13878), served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 7 July 1973 to 23 November 1974.

is probable, the signing of the Final Act of the Conference were to take place during the semester in which our country holds the presidency of the Community.

3. Once the first reading is completed, it will be necessary to put all the documents in order. This is not an easy task, given that the texts, even those officially recorded, still reflect, through the device of square brackets, the contrasting positions of the individual parties on substantive points. In the best of cases, some brackets represent merely bargaining tools in a subtle negotiating game.

Putting the texts in order therefore means seeking compromises: first within each document, and secondarily through a complex process of "give and take" between document and document, both within each "basket" and between "basket" and "basket." Final "packages" can already be foreseen for certain delicate subjects of the Conference, such as the C.B.M. (currently completely blocked) or the "most-favoured-nation" clause (in the commercial sector).

In this true work of experts at a high operational level, I believe the Italian delegation has an important contribution to make. Our action is not hindered by the danger of compromising national requirements, unlike what happens for other countries, even in the West, such as Germany (obsessed with the problem of German unification) or Great Britain (tormented by the Irish crisis and the dispute over Gibraltar), to mention only a few cases. Our preconditions are solely of a moral nature, thus resting on a "philosophy" widely accepted, at least in outward manifestations: to safeguard the great principles of universally recognised international law from undesirable regional distortions and to ensure an openness in human relations such as to reduce elements of mistrust and therefore of insecurity in inter-European relations. Starting from this privileged situation, I am convinced that the greater conceptual agility of our delegation, its spirit of imagination and initiative, its marked negotiating sensitivity, place us in a particularly favourable position for the search for those compromise solutions necessary to translate provisional texts into definitive ones. This conviction is reinforced by the fact that our delegation has succeeded, through its consistency and objectivity, in securing a position of particular respect not only among the allies, but also among the neutrals and the Eastern countries.

4. The third point concerns the "follow-up" to the Conference. At the CSCE the debate on this subject is still at an initial stage because it is hindered by two preliminary conditions. The first is dictated by the Helsinki Recommendations (paragraph 53), which subordinate the "follow-up" to the progress achieved in the Conference; the second is linked to the position taken by the Western countries, opposed to any follow-up that implies a form of institutionalization.

Closer reflection leads me to believe that the condition set by the Helsinki Recommendations may have had a tactical value, but in light of experience should not be taken literally. It is indeed likely that the fewer the results of the Conference, the greater the interest, even for the West, in establishing a procedure to monitor the implementation of the decisions taken and above all to improve them. In any case, this condition now seems to me to be overcome: we cannot in fact deny that some progress has been made in the work at Geneva and that (un-

less the Conference were to fail for entirely different reasons) the balance, even if not exceptional in scope, would still, in many respects, be positive.

The second condition reflects the position of the Nine, shared in part by the Fifteen and opposed not only by the Eastern countries but also by the neutral countries, who for understandable reasons desire an institutionalization and politicization of the "follow-up."

The restrictive position of the Community countries seeks justification in the concern to avoid the creation of a "droit de regard" of the Soviet Union over the West. The argument has never entirely convinced me. Apart from the fact that control would operate in both directions and that, as regards the Soviet world, the "follow-up" would have precisely that restraining and stimulating force which is at the basis of our interest in the Helsinki "mandates," the "droit de regard" would become dangerous for the West only in relation to events of great scope (for example German unification or the process of European unification) which in any case would involve a far broader international problem than that linked to the institutionalization or not of the CSCE "follow-up."

In any case, the Danish text on "follow-up" – which contemplates only technical follow-up, albeit in various forms, and provides for a new CSCE meeting at a fixed time, even if distant – is certainly unsatisfactory for Moscow and for the neutral countries. The latter now rely on a Finnish compromise text, in reality closer in its inspiration to the text of the Eastern countries than to the Western one. On the eve of the Christmas recess, the British delegation presented us with certain proposals that improve the Danish document. These proposals, in my judgment, are interesting, but could also be improved. In my report last September, I suggested that it should be we ourselves who revive the discussion on "follow-up." The time today is even more ripe for us to move in this direction, if Your Excellency agrees in considering that it is possible for us to adopt on this subject a more flexible attitude, taking into account the fact that, for the purposes of détente, the long debate in the CSCE represents a starting point and not an end point.

5. In concluding this report – which I have sought to make as concise as possible – I would like to express the hope that the Italian delegation will maintain, also in the next phase of the Conference, the position which has so far inspired it: a position objectively open to the course of history, firm in defending the fundamental demands corresponding to our conception of democracy and international cooperation, a position of close collaboration with our Community and Atlantic "partners" and at the same time inspired by realism in assessing the limits of defending our interests in light of an equally balanced evaluation of the limits of the needs of others; which seems to me to be imperative in order to bring to a successful conclusion a negotiation involving no fewer than 35 countries, of different political alignments and diverse ideological systems, and which bases its decisions exclusively on "consensus."

To continue to carry out our tasks in light of these premises and along these lines, I must ask Your Excellency – in my capacity as Head of the Italian delegation to the CSCE – to do everything possible so that, independently of other service requirements (which, in my modest view, are secondary if one is convinced, as I



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am, that the Conference can complete its work within the span of a few months), the personnel of the Italian delegation be maintained in the same number and at the same level of competence, preferably without substitutions taking place, so as to ensure that our contribution, in the hopefully decisive phase, may be, as in the past, determinant.<sup>6</sup>

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6 For all Italian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2915](https://dodis.ch/C2915).

[dodis.ch/76984](https://dodis.ch/76984)

France

*Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

FRG AND CSCE

Paris, 21 January 1975

The Federal Republic of Germany plays a vital role in the CSCE, a conference desired by the USSR, with the primary aim of establishing the territorial status quo on our continent, and more specifically in central Europe.

It is therefore unsurprising that the West Germans, both within the Government and in the opposition, are keeping a close eye on the progress of the work that began in September 1973 in Geneva. This focus is mainly on certain points of the draft declaration concerning the principles guiding relations between participating States, but also on delicate matters such as human contacts and the outcome of the Conference.

*1 – Peaceful change of frontiers.*

When, on 5 April last, the definition of the key principle for the Soviets which is that of the inviolability of frontiers was agreed on, the Conference also recorded a sentence, partly of French origin, relating to the possibility of changing frontiers, but solely in accordance with international law, by agreement and by peaceful means.<sup>2</sup> However, the place for this sentence was not specified, mainly on account of German-Soviet antagonism.

As Bonn succeeded in getting Washington onside, the United States suggested a new formulation, reusing the same elements, in a positive form this time, for this “floating sentence”, the outcome of which must be, according to Moscow, respectful of the principle of sovereign equality. Following unclear autumn discussions, the Soviets informed the Germans that they did not intend to notify the definition agreed on, irrespective of its place. This firm attitude was recently confirmed to our Ambassador in Moscow.<sup>3</sup>

Our position is to say that we will support any proposal that would garner approval from both parties; but, if we must take into account the interests and most importantly the susceptibility of our neighbours, we will undoubtedly be unable to go very far in continuing the support given up until now to the so-called “American” formulation.

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archives of the French Foreign Ministry (FR-AMAE) 178QO [Europe, Germany, Federal Republic of Germany, 1974–1978], 1998. *Translated from French. This memorandum was written by the Political Affairs Directorate of the Foreign Ministry.*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 61, [dodis.ch/77019](https://dodis.ch/77019).

<sup>3</sup> Jacques Vimont, [dodis.ch/P81250](https://dodis.ch/P81250).

## 2 – *Reservations of quadripartite rights*<sup>4</sup>

After lengthy negotiations conducted in Bonn with the United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, we were able to obtain approval from the latter, then from the USSR, of a formulation that would guarantee quadripartite rights over Berlin and Germany as a whole.

## 3 – *Equal value of principles and connections between them.*

This is a concept to which the Germans, like ourselves, are very committed. But the Soviets, who seek to ensure that the inviolability of frontiers takes precedence over the other principles, solely wish to acknowledge equality in the application of these principles, which are all, in their eyes, “of paramount importance”. It seems easier to agree on a formulation that would, without formally mentioning a link between the principles, categorically refused by Moscow, say that “every principle must be interpreted with regard to the others”.

## 4 – *Human contacts*

The Germans are very committed to proper definitions of the subjects contained in this part of the agenda. They appear to be satisfied with the texts registered before Christmas on family reunification and marriage between nationals of different countries. However, they reproached us for seeking, in liaison with the Soviets, the update of an introductory text for all of these proposals, whereas the discussions had stalled for many weeks. We do not believe it is possible to achieve a more satisfactory draft on such a sensitive topic for the Kremlin.

## 5 – *Outcomes of the Conference.*

Having long shown themselves to be in support of a certain political institutionalization after the CSCE, the Germans have come considerably closer to our point of view. This new attitude seems to have coincided with the arrival of Chancellor Schmidt.<sup>5</sup>

It might prove advisable to seek confirmation that the Federal Republic is indeed in favour of an interim period of a sufficiently long duration; alone, a decision of this nature will allow for a suitable evaluation of the implementation of the decisions of the CSCE before examining what interest we might find, both at the national level and in terms of the growth of the community, in pursuing unilateral dialogue between the 35.

Such a convergence of views would be especially desirable as the United Kingdom has just informed us of opinions that, without taking position in favour of the creation of a permanent body, tend to render this fundamental concept of a trial interim period devoid of all substance.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. QdD 30, doc. 67, [dodis.ch/76978](http://dodis.ch/76978).

<sup>5</sup> Helmut Schmidt, [dodis.ch/P15416](http://dodis.ch/P15416), succeeded Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](http://dodis.ch/P15409), as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany on 16 May 1974.

*6 – Level of the third phase.*

Without making any public statement, the Germans do not reject the idea of concluding the CSCE with a summit meeting. This is what was indicated by Chancellor Schmidt to Gromyko<sup>6</sup> during the latter's visit to Bonn last September.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](https://dodis.ch/P489).

<sup>7</sup> For all French documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2903](https://dodis.ch/C2903).

[dodis.ch/77013](https://dodis.ch/77013)

Federal Republic of Germany

*The Political Director of the Federal Foreign Office van Well to the FRG Embassy  
in Moscow<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES; HERE: "PEACEFUL CHANGE" •  
TELEGRAM 239 FROM THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW  
OF 21 JANUARY 1975<sup>2</sup>

Confidential

Bonn, 28 January 1975

I. Since 5 April 1974, the East–West discussion concerning wording on "peaceful change" (p. c.) acceptable to everyone has proceeded as follows:

1) On 5 April 1974, participating States provisionally registered a text on the principle of the inviolability of frontiers. At the same time, wording on p. c. was provisionally registered on a separate sheet of paper, based on the West's proposed wording for Principle III "Inviolability of frontiers" that had been put forward by France in Geneva on 19 October 1973.<sup>3</sup> The wording provisionally registered on 5 April reads: "The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed only in accordance with international law through peaceful means and by agreement."<sup>4</sup>

Agreement was not reached on the placement of wording on p. c. in Principle III "Inviolability of frontiers" due to the resistance of the W[arsaw] P[act] states. The final position remained undecided for the time being. The conference journal contains an entry by the chairman of Subcommittee A (Decalogue) to the effect that a generally acceptable positioning of the wording on p. c. "in one of the principles" would be decided at a later point.

We made our definitive agreement to the registration of the principle on the "inviolability of frontiers" contingent upon five conditions. Thus, we will only consent to registration if agreement is reached on the following questions:

- the principle in which the wording on p. c. is included,

<sup>1</sup> Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (DE-PA/AA), B 130, vol. 10200 (212), File reference 212-341.31-132/75. Translated from German. This Telegram No. 359 was written by member of the CSCE desk of the Federal Foreign Office Werner Pieck, [dodis.ch/P81436](https://dodis.ch/P81436), signed by its Political Director Günther van Well, [dodis.ch/P51500](https://dodis.ch/P51500), and seen by the Deputy Head of the CSCE desk, Jürgen Gehl, [dodis.ch/P81438](https://dodis.ch/P81438), on 28 January 1975, who noted: "Draft also signed by [legal] division 500". It was delivered to the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in Moscow on 30 January 1975. This document was also published in German in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (AAPD) 1975, Munich 2006, doc. 18.

<sup>2</sup> The Ambassador of the FRG in Moscow, Ulrich Sahn, [dodis.ch/P81440](https://dodis.ch/P81440), reported on a conversation with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Zemskov, [dodis.ch/P58028](https://dodis.ch/P58028), on 20 January 1975 in which, among other things, the inclusion of West Berlin in the CSCE was discussed, cf. AAPD 1975, doc. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Corrected from "19 October 1974".

<sup>4</sup> English in the original.

- the precise wording on p. c. in this new context,
- the precise wording of the principle on the self-determination of peoples,
- wording which highlights the link among the principles and
- German wording of these principles satisfactory to us (for a summarised outline see Ortex No. 35 of 8 April 1974).<sup>5</sup>

2) During Nixon's visit to Moscow in June 1974,<sup>6</sup> US Secretary of State Kissinger proposed the following wording for inclusion in Principle I ("Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty") to the Soviet side:

"In accordance with international law the participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement."<sup>7</sup>

Gromyko agreed to consider it.

Further information:

Although Kissinger's wording includes the three elements "in accordance with international law", "peaceful means" and "agreement" in the order we desire, the details were not coordinated with us. In particular, it does not contain "and nothing in the present declaration shall affect this right".<sup>8</sup> We considered this addition to be desirable if the statement on p. c. is included in Principle I (Sovereign equality) and not in Principle III (Inviolability of frontiers), and certainly if it is incorporated into Principle IV (Territorial integrity). Inclusion outside the sphere of territorial principles can easily give rise to the impression that any statement on p. c. is an empty phrase of a too general nature which would attain a negative connotation for the European sphere if specifically stated in Principle III. As the Kissinger wording does not contain the additional phrase mentioned here, the inclusion of a statement on the equal weight and interconnected interpretation of the individual principles is especially important, as is envisaged in a satisfactory manner in No. 11 of the French draft principles. The Federal Minister explained this at length to Secretary of State Kissinger during their talks in Miesbach on 6 July 1974.<sup>9</sup> Kissinger assured us of his support on this.

3) The US delegation officially put forward the wording (see No. 2 above) for inclusion in Principle I (Sovereignty) in Geneva on 25 July 1974.

4) Gromyko presented the Federal Minister with the following wording in the Soviet mission in New York on 26 September 1974:<sup>10</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Circular instructions by the Head of the Foreign Information Desk of the Federal Foreign Office Gerhard Dohms, [dodis.ch/P81443](https://dodis.ch/P81443), of 8 April 1974, [dodis.ch/77016](https://dodis.ch/77016).

<sup>6</sup> United States President Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](https://dodis.ch/P13584), was in the USSR from 27 June until 3 July 1974 accompanied by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846). Cf. AAPD 1974, doc. 195 and doc. 197–200 and Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, Volume XV, doc. 186–198.

<sup>7</sup> English in the original.

<sup>8</sup> On 30 April 1974, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, [dodis.ch/P15413](https://dodis.ch/P15413), recommended the following wording in a letter to Secretary of State Kissinger: "In accordance with international law, the sovereignty of the participating states shall include the right to change their frontiers by peaceful means and by means of agreement, and nothing in the present declaration shall affect this right." Cf. AAPD 1974, doc. 138.

<sup>9</sup> For the conversation between Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, [dodis.ch/P15414](https://dodis.ch/P15414), and Secretary of State Kissinger cf. AAPD 1974, doc. 202.

<sup>10</sup> For the conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](https://dodis.ch/P489), and Foreign Minister Genscher cf. AAPD 1974, doc. 277.

“The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, only through peaceful means and by agreement.”<sup>11</sup>

At the suggestion of the Federal Minister, Gromyko agreed that talks on a universally acceptable wording of the reference to p. c. should be continued in Geneva. He said that the Soviet side believed that the matter had already been settled. But it had realised that it was still undecided, after all. He stated that he would therefore like to submit the amended wording of the American proposal to us for consideration.

5) The Soviets later told the American side that it was withdrawing the wording quoted in No. 4 above because of a “typing error” (statement by a member of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Vorontsov,<sup>12</sup> to the State Department on 27 September 1974).

6) Vorontsov submitted the following “concrete” wording to the State Department on 27 September 1974:

“The participating states consider that their frontiers can change only in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.”<sup>13</sup>

7) Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev<sup>14</sup> (head of the CSCE delegation) proposed the following wording to Ambassador Brunner<sup>15</sup> in Geneva on 23 October 1974:

“The participating states consider that their frontiers can only be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.”<sup>16</sup>

Kovalev stated that the American wording (see No. 2 above) was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. He went on to say that, politically, it downright encouraged frontier changes. Kovalev did not say anything about placement in the Declaration on Principles.

With this wording, the Soviet Union returned with insignificant changes (“in accordance with international law” is in commas, “only” is placed further forward) to the wording of 5 April 1974, on condition that this text should not be incorporated into Principle III.

Further information:

We still regard the insertion of p. c. in the principle concerning the inviolability of frontiers as the best solution. If we cannot attain this, we could agree to including p. c. in one of the other principles if

- the message on p. c. were to be formulated positively (omission of “only”. This is intended to avoid the impression that the wording on p. c. is a general statement which, in concrete terms, is restricted by the principle of inviolability of frontiers to such an extent that, in practice, it only covers frontier corrections),

11 *English in the original.*

12 *Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington Yuli Vorontsov, [dodis.ch/P53731](https://dodis.ch/P53731).*

13 *English in the original. The words “can change” were underlined. There was a handwritten comment: “be changed”.*

14 *Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Kovalev, [dodis.ch/P45912](https://dodis.ch/P45912).*

15 *Head of the Planning Staff at the Foreign Office of the FRG and Head of the Delegation to the CSCE in Geneva Guido Brunner, [dodis.ch/P48500](https://dodis.ch/P48500).*

16 *English in the original.*



- the phrase “in accordance with international law” is worded in such a way that compliance with international law cannot be interpreted as a prerequisite for peaceful and consensual frontier change and
- in the Declaration on Principles, a statement on the equality and interconnected interpretation of the principles is included (in order to establish a link between the principle of inviolability of frontiers and the wording on p. c. inserted in another principle).

8) We have accepted the Americans’ willingness to discuss bilaterally with the Soviet Union wording on p. c. that protects our interests. In mid-January 1975, the State Department proposed the following wording to the Soviet Embassy, which we had envisaged as the preferred alternative to the Kissinger wording we continued to regard as optimal (see No. 2 above):

“The participating states consider in accordance with international law that their frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.”<sup>17</sup>

There has yet to be a reaction from the Soviet side.

## II. To sum up:

1) On 5 April 1974, all CSCE participating States approved the inclusion of a statement on the continued admissibility of peaceful and consensual frontier changes in the Declaration on Principles:

2) Two questions, among other things, remain unresolved:

a) The positioning of the reference to p. c.

The conference journal contains an entry by the chairman of Subcommittee A (Decalogue), which was not contested, stating that the wording on p. c. be included “in one of the principles”. This means it is still possible to accommodate p. c. in Principle III (Inviolability of frontiers).

b) Modification of the wording

Since October 1974, the Soviet side has claimed that we were trying to change something that had already been agreed in Geneva. It is thus ignoring the fact that the majority of the CSCE participating States do not share this view and also that we submitted a five-point reservation on 5 April 1974. The Soviet side’s arguments do not align with its conduct after 5 April 1974. For by responding to new wording proposals and submitting its own draft amendments on p. c., it implicitly acknowledged that it was admissible to modify the wording of 5 April 1974.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> English in the original.

<sup>18</sup> For all documents of the FRG in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2909](https://dodis.ch/C2909).

[dodis.ch/75752](http://dodis.ch/75752)

Italy

*The Deputy Director-General for Cultural, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Ferraris  
to the Director-General for Political Affairs Ducci<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE

Rome, 6 March 1975

1. The announcement, by the German side to the Political Committee of the Nine in Brussels on 3 March and by the American side in the Atlantic framework in Geneva on 5 March, of an understanding reached between the United States and the USSR on the clause of the peaceful change of frontiers places the Atlantic allies and the Community partners before a fait accompli on an essential point of the entire CSCE.

2. It should be noted that, in their contacts with the Soviets (and in the solution chosen), the Americans acted without prior consultation, even of a general nature (except perhaps with the Germans), and without having any mandate or assignment. Until the other day the allies insisted on maintaining their support for the American formula of 26 July (thus still the Ministers of the Nine on 13 February in Dublin), itself at the time chosen without consultation, while the Americans were negotiating other formulas with the Soviets.

From this angle the consideration that imposes itself is that the Europeans, precisely on a point considered fundamental for the interests of European political unification, have seen the solution dictated by the autonomous will of the two superpowers without their knowledge. Unfortunately, the Americans have always considered that the question was of exclusive German interest, and the Germans, in the uncertainty and contradictions of their conduct, have supported this thesis, with the result that in the agreed solution the Americans thought only of taking into account the desiderata, moreover considerable, of the Germans. The Italian insistence on drawing attention to the European function of the problem was never truly supported by the Community partners.

3. The European Community thus once again emerges sacrificed on the altar of the Soviet-American understanding not only in the procedures, but also in the

<sup>1</sup> Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Historical Diplomatic Archives (IT-ASDMAE), DGAP, Uff. XIII (ex III), CSCE, b. 149, fasc. CSCE. Parte generale, 1975. Translated from Italian. This memorandum No. 108/V/55 was signed by the Deputy Head of the Italian Delegation to the CSCE Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, [dodis.ch/P48092](http://dodis.ch/P48092), and addressed to the Director-General of Political Affairs Roberto Ducci, [dodis.ch/P48086](http://dodis.ch/P48086). It was then transmitted by the Coordinator of Offices I, V, and VI within the Directorate-General for Political Affairs Umberto La Rocca, [dodis.ch/P81424](http://dodis.ch/P81424), to the Permanent Mission to the International Organisations in Geneva, by *Telespresso* No. 053/136, dated 11 March 1975.

substance of the proposed solution, now destined to prevail. This for the following reasons:

a) the Germans, in urging the Americans to advance the formula of 26 July, had justified it by the need to have a text better than that of 5 April: this did not occur with the abandonment of that text;

b) on our part, instead, it was considered advisable to remain faithful to the formula of 5 April, but on condition of insisting rather on its exact and appropriate placement (if not under the inviolability of frontiers, at least under territorial integrity); the Community partners, and in particular the FRG, had repudiated the first understanding in this sense only to take it up again recently, but too late, with the result that we now have the formula of 5 April under the principle of sovereign equality;

c) this result coincides fully with the Soviet approach, so much so that one wonders why it was necessary to wait so long, with so many proclamations of intransigence (in particular, at least in appearance, by the FRG) only to then accede, without compensation, to the Soviet desiderata;

d) the transformation from negative to positive of the clause is a non-existent acquisition, both because in the Russian text the clause was already positive, and because such an adaptation was always necessary on the lexical level if the clause was to be placed under a principle other than the inviolability of frontiers.

4. From what was said in Geneva by the Americans it appears that the understanding with the Soviets also extends to the specific way of inserting the clause into the body of the principle of sovereign equality and to the timing of the operation. In this regard it is observed:

a) it is intended to insert the clause in the last part of the principle, that is, where the rights (or rather faculties) of States to conduct their relations as they see fit are indicated, and not among the true and proper rights of sovereignty. In this way the inconveniences of the connection with sovereign equality (that is, the affirmation of the absolute character of inviolability, of which peaceful change is an exception) are aggravated: peaceful change is not a right on a par with the other traditional rights connected with sovereignty, but an obvious faculty. It is the difference that exists for an individual between the constitutional right of freedom of assembly and association and the faculty of choosing one's own friends. This interpretation, which the Soviets sought and obtained, is aggravated by the introductory verb ("they consider"), that is, by a verb that underlines the subjective and relative character of this clause;

b) as for the timing, the commitment with which the Americans would like to formalize at 35 the understanding reached between two will cause the understanding to lose any negotiating value. After the final summit has been accepted, as well as the principal objective of the USSR (the formal sanction of the inviolability of frontiers and the division of Europe into two), the possibilities of obtaining something either on the treatment of journalists or on military measures are entirely illusory. If moreover the establishment of a working group on the third phase were to be approved in whole or in part, as the neutrals propose in their

blindness (false in the case of the Swedes), the West will have lost all its politically effective negotiating instruments.

5. It can be concluded that the patient Soviet waiting has finally prevailed over Western tenacity. The Soviets end up obtaining confirmation of the political status quo; they will obtain the sanction of the permanent division of Europe with the proclamation for the first time by 35 countries of different social systems of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence; they will succeed in reducing to nothing the references to contacts between individuals (and indeed, taking advantage of the situation, they are reopening the points already agreed upon in order to exclude such references).

Western Europe therefore, in the logic of the theses affirmed by Kissinger<sup>2</sup> last June, will emerge from the CSCE defeated in its aspirations by the joint will of the Soviets and Americans. The theses we have supported with such consistency have not prevailed before the two superpowers and the passivity and lack of political unity<sup>3</sup> of the Community and Atlantic countries. The CSCE will reveal itself as an important but failed attempt in its potential for evolution towards different relations in Europe. The undeniable acquisitions on individual points will not be able to compensate for this political failure.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846).

<sup>3</sup> Handwritten modification in the original: *unione deleted and emended by hand to visione*.

<sup>4</sup> For all Italian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2915](https://dodis.ch/C2915).

[dodis.ch/77042](http://dodis.ch/77042)

European Community

*Declaration of Heads of Government during Dublin Council on CSCE<sup>1</sup>*

MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN COUNCIL IN DUBLIN ON  
10 AND 11 MARCH 1975 • SUMMARY OF DECISIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

*[Dublin, 11 March 1975 at the earliest]*

*VII. Declaration on the CSCE<sup>2</sup>*

The Heads of Government reaffirmed the determination of the Nine<sup>3</sup> to pursue and further develop their policy of détente and cooperation in Europe.

They expressed the hope that this policy would contribute to the continuous strengthening of understanding and confidence among peoples. This objective should in particular be reflected in the development of relations between States and peoples in which due importance should be given to individuals.

In this context, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as the implementation of its decisions, is called upon to play an important role.

The Heads of Government welcomed the constructive role that, thanks to their concerted diplomacy and to the common positions they adopted, the Nine have been able to play in the conduct of this Conference, which is closely linked to the interests of the European Community.

The Heads of Government examined the progress of the work currently under way in Geneva; they noted that substantial progress had been achieved, but also that important issues still remained to be resolved.

They declared themselves in favour of completing this work as rapidly as possible. To this end, they intend to continue and intensify their efforts to seek, in an open and constructive spirit, positive solutions to the questions still under discussion or outstanding.

The Heads of Government hope that all participating States will make – just as they themselves are determined to do – all necessary efforts to obtain balanced and satisfactory results on all the subjects on the agenda. This would make it possible to envisage concluding the Conference in the near future and at the highest level.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), CM2/1975-727(1). Translated from French. This Declaration was extracted from doc R/807/75 and consists of the Summary of decisions and conclusions of the inaugural meeting of the European Council in Dublin on 10 and 11 March 1975 and was made up of the heads of State or government of the European Economic Community.

<sup>2</sup> The Helsinki Final Act, signed on August 1, 1975, by 35 nations, concluded the CSCE to reduce Cold War tensions cf. [dodis.ch/58821](http://dodis.ch/58821). It established 10 principles (the “Decalogue”) guiding relations, covering territorial integrity, human rights, and economic cooperation. It led to the modern Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

<sup>3</sup> The “Nine” refers to the nine members of the European Community as of 1975.

<sup>4</sup> For all European Community’s documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2912](http://dodis.ch/C2912).

[dodis.ch/76990](https://dodis.ch/76990)

NATO

*Lecture by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Kastl  
at the NATO Defense College in Rome<sup>1</sup>*

THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE AND  
ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION

[Rome,] 13 March 1975

I feel greatly flattered, General,<sup>2</sup> that you bear with another of my lectures on the two four-letter negotiations, CSCE and MBFR. You are terribly spoilt by the brilliance and thought provoking lectures you hear almost every morning; Mr. van Campen<sup>3</sup> and the outstanding Dean of the NATO Diplomatic Corps, M. de Staerke,<sup>4</sup> probably had an easier task than I will have to inform you of the background and the current state of these two negotiations, but I'll try. As I told General Wolff before, I deeply regret his departure, I think there is only one comfort probably for him, the fact that from July onwards he will not have to listen again to the same lecture I had already read out previously. And now lady and gentlemen, I would like first of all to give you a very short introduction on the state of East–West relations against which background I will then come to the detailed description of the two negotiations. When we compare the state of East–West relations today as compared to the situation 20 years ago, much has of course changed. Whilst 20 years ago no one would have hesitated to describe relations with the East as frankly hostile, today there are encouraging elements of cooperation. But the relationship is still uneasy and uncertain. The Communists' ideological dislike of the West and our distaste for much of what the Communists do and say, there seems to be no fundamental change in the respective feelings. There still is a rivalry between East and West under pinned, as you know better than I, by a growing Communist endeavour to expand Soviet world power mil-

<sup>1</sup> NATO Archives (NA), NATO Defense College Fonds, Lecture Series, T00745-049-05 (K28627). The original of this document is in English and has been publicly disclosed. The lecture was given at the NATO Defense College (NDC), [dodis.ch/R44049](https://dodis.ch/R44049), and was delivered on 13 March 1975 by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Jörg Kastl, [dodis.ch/P80335](https://dodis.ch/P80335), as the 46<sup>th</sup> course. The NDC was established in 1951 by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe Dwight David Eisenhower, [dodis.ch/P407](https://dodis.ch/P407), as a centralized college to supplement national military education across the Allies. The lecture was originally delivered verbally and simultaneously recorded by an unidentified typist. The NDC lecture series was publicly disclosed in 2024 by the NATO Archives and includes typed lectures delivered to students by military and civilian personalities between 1951–1959 and 1971–1993. The College would host two 24-week courses each year beginning in January and September. These courses included visits to different allied and partner nations and an intense guest lecturing programme from military, political, and economic experts.

<sup>2</sup> Commandant of the NDC, Danish Lieutenant General Eigil Wolff, [dodis.ch/P81391](https://dodis.ch/P81391).

<sup>3</sup> Dutch Directeur du Cabinet of the NATO Secretary-General Paul Van Campen, [dodis.ch/P81433](https://dodis.ch/P81433).

<sup>4</sup> Belgian Dean of the NATO Diplomatic Corps André de Staerke, [dodis.ch/P49608](https://dodis.ch/P49608).

itarily and there is always the danger in particular circumstances of this contradiction and antagonism developing into confrontation. But, the dangers of overt hostility are very clear today to all parties and there is in consequence a mutual acceptance and even some common effort to work towards some kind of common agreement. I would say (with Professor Kissinger)<sup>5</sup> this relationship is one of collusion and of collision. Now we hear a lot about détente of course but then the term détente tells us more about our own feelings towards East–West relationships at one particular time than about that relationship itself. When East–West relations appear to be going well we feel very confident, we are more relaxed, we have the feeling of détente. When there appears to be a setback, a confrontation in the Middle East or the breakdown of a trade agreement, we are concerned, we are less relaxed, there is less feeling of détente. Now what are the factors really governing this uneasy and uncertain relationship between East and West?

The Western countries of course have two basic aims: to create a more stable, strategic environment and to keep under control situations which might lead to dangers, confrontations and secondly, in the longer term by a process of contacts and exchanges, discussion and negotiations, to reduce step by step the barrier between East and West and to bring about the evolution of a more normal, a more sound and more natural situation particularly in Europe. Of course (we can be a little bit less sure of the Soviet aims), but judging from their behaviour they would certainly seem to include the following objectives: first of all, and I would regard this as the highest and over-riding objective, avoidance of a confrontation with the West of a kind which could lead to an escalation into a totally destructive conflict. Secondly, and very close to the first objective, the bringing about of a situation in Western Europe which would guarantee a calmer Western front at a time when the Soviets are very concerned, over the shorter and longer term, by their Chinese neighbours. So this is to a certain extent a defensive objective but, subject to these two considerations I mentioned before, there is a third objective which I would not like to under-rate: that is the jockeying for positions for the expansion of Soviet world power interests. Now taking into account these aims, how are we setting about the general conduct of our negotiations?

Where people differ but, for very good reasons as in this case the horror of the possibility of nuclear war, do their best to avoid open conflict, it is usually wise for them to do two things: first, to make quite clear what is absolutely not negotiable and to demonstrate that they have both the means and the will to hold on to that and defend it against any attack or pressures. And secondly, to look at the respective positions and see if there are any possible meeting points or areas of agreement. This is exactly what we have done in conducting our negotiations. We've made quite plain what is not negotiable: our security, our freedom, our unwillingness to prejudice the eventual future of Europe as a whole or to renounce our ultimate goal of real progress towards a sounder and more normal situation in Europe. We've shown through our defensive, military arrangements, our will and our capacity and determination to defend these values. And finally we have of course engaged the Soviet Union and its allies, into these negotiations which I'm

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5 US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846).



now coming to. On what areas, lady and gentlemen? First, so long as the Soviet Union is convinced that the West is not going to weaken and to allow a situation to arise in which it can be subjected to political pressure under threat of military force. Then there is a possibility of negotiating for a more strategic situation at a lower level of forces. That is exactly the field for SALT and for MBFR. And secondly there are possible, more limited agreements with regard to the political situation in Europe. The Soviet aim of consolidating the status quo in Europe is of course diametrically opposed our concept. On the other hand, a policy of status quo requires the bringing of some respectability to that status quo. The Soviet Union has therefore seen some advantage in trying to negotiate agreements governing relations between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe which in its eyes will provide the desired respectability. For their part, allied countries who rule out absolutely any thought of seeking to change this status quo by force, also see advantage in the negotiation of agreements, though they see them not as consolidating and giving respectability to that status quo but as a further means towards an eventual increase in contacts and exchanges and as a step towards normality.

Now I set MBFR in this strategic field, CSCE in the political field. Let me start with CSCE. These very extended and painstaking negotiations have a little bit escaped into the background of public opinion and I can only be very grateful for this fact because it has helped us to avoid public pressures bearing upon our negotiators. On the other hand this conference in which 35 nations, all the Europeans except Albania, are taking part plus Canada and the United States, is a serious matter; or it may at least become something serious. The CSCE is a Soviet baby as you know and a baby which has been kindled and nursed from 1955 onwards and which got an enormous push in the back in 1969 after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and we had the feeling that the Soviets in particular pursued the following aims with this, as they called it, Pan-European Conference. First, in the absence of a Peace Treaty after World War II they desired to have a solemnly consecrated territorial and political status quo in Europe. Secondly, they desired to provide the impetus for a collective security system in Europe that would weaken the defence readiness of NATO and, in the longer term, would render superfluous and obsolete the United States military presence in Europe. Thirdly, they attempted to extend Soviet political influence in Western Europe and to inhibit the process of European integration. You will understand that the first reactions of Western statesmen have therefore been rather cool. We wanted first the Russians to show that they not only meant *détente* in words but also in practice. Some evidence came about. It came about in 1972 with the first SALT Agreement,<sup>6</sup> then there was the Four Power Agreement on Berlin<sup>7</sup> one year before and there was the Basic Agreement<sup>8</sup> between the two German States by the end of '72. Last but not least, there was an incomplete, imperfect, and only limited parallelism in time between

6 Signed 26 May 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union for the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and ease international tensions between the East and West.

7 Signed by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States on 3 September 1971 to open access and communications between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic in respects to Berlin.

8 Signed on 21 December 1972, the agreement acknowledged each state's sovereignty for the first time.

CSCE and MBFR. At the outset, when we started considering the two negotiations there was a majority of views in NATO, mainly Europeans, who thought: we can well consider MBFR taking place without CSCE but we cannot consider CSCE taking place without MBFR. So after a short relatively effective trip, by Dr. Kissinger to Moscow in September '72, this imperfect parallelism was established and we got assurances that shortly after the beginning of the CSCE talks there would also be a beginning of talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

In the light of these events, we then decided to take up actively the security conference idea, first of all insisting that the United States and Canada should be part of this jamboree. This was accepted. Then secondly we said this should not only be a public affairs show with a lot of waltzing, dining and wining à la Viennoise of 1815, but should be a serious affair in which we should look into what we are going to discuss. So there were first, from November '72 onwards, multi-lateral preparatory talks in Helsinki to examine whether an agenda for a full-scale conference could be agreed upon. We did not only want to talk of the principles governing relations between states which may have otherwise confused public opinion and our own governments. We wanted as well some subject matters discussed of our own liking. It has been our aim, as defined collectively in our Foreign Ministers' communiqués, to determine whether it would be possible to have a serious discussion about issues of concern to both sides and whether a conference could produce satisfactory results leading to practical improvements in East-West relations. Now these multi-lateral preparatory talks went on until June 1973 and they culminated in the first phase of CSCE at the level of Foreign Ministers in July in Helsinki. They agreed on the agenda, which was much more balanced than the original Soviet dish offered to us and the second phase, the working phase, the present phase of the conference started then in September '73 and I am sorry to say for our colleagues in Geneva, is still going on.

It's not very funny. There are as you know several baskets into which they are looking for fine printed texts with commas and iotas in the right place, the first basket being questions of security including principles governing relations between states including confidence-building measures, the second basket concerning economics, scientific, technological and environmental cooperation and the third one dealing with a freer flow of information, ideas and people. The Russians originally had only thought it wise to talk of cultural cooperation, meaning by that increased number of exchanges between La Scala and the Bolshoi. The fourth basket had been tabled by the other side as a possible follow-up to the conference. Now in the first basket the Soviets had pursued and anticipated their aim of developing a test, declaring that the existing frontiers in Europe were immutable. The West insisted on its side that essentially the principle which is involved is the non-use of force and that is the inviolability and not the immutability of frontiers that must be affirmed in this context. We have insisted on keeping open for the future the possibility of peaceful frontier changes, keeping in mind both the situation in Germany as well as that in Western Europe. One of the main Soviet aims as we had already foreseen was to bring about a form of confirmation by all the European countries, including the United States and Canada, of the Treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and its Eastern partners, the Soviet

Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia and the GDR, thus attempting to supersede and water down the reservations and *modus vivendi* elements in these Treaties. This has been resisted. Furthermore, the Western powers mainly responsible for Berlin and Germany as a whole – France, the United Kingdom and the United States – had to see to it that their power and leading political position be not undermined by any kind of eventual text. At any rate they could not accept any kind of law applicable only to Europe. Under the same heading the Swiss had put forward a proposal for the submission of international disputes to an arbitration machinery, but the Soviets' reaction had been lukewarm. There is a third item mainly supported and pushed forward by the non-aligned and the neutrals: this is the confidence-building measures providing for the advance notification of exercises, possibly military movements and the exchange of manoeuvre observers, but here again the Soviets' reaction has been cool.

In the second basket the Soviets initially tried hard to get some advantageous text on the "most favoured nations" clause and some commitments on easier credits and so forth, but as soon as they saw that this constant insisting on Western concessions might manoeuvre them into a position of being demanders, who would have to pay a price for it in another currency, they withdrew a little bit and showed less interest in this matter.

The third agenda item, freer movement, is by far in our view the most important one. We cannot speak of a better environment in Europe only by establishing perhaps better machineries for consultation between governments in East and West; this we have already in ample quantity but what we need in addition is a better atmosphere and environment from which the individual citizens of our countries can derive benefit. We see greater freedom of contact as a natural component to lessening international tensions and we are very strongly backed by our public opinions. There are different reasons for this public pressure which you can only work on. There is for example the case of Germany with divided families, a divided nation with very painful results for individuals. There is the case of let's say Canada where there are strong Eastern European minorities who can bring or help lose votes if their ideas and hopes are not fulfilled. And there is another element which has come forth over the last 2 years or so and that I would call the "Solshenitsyn syndrome."<sup>9</sup> More and more people in our countries and even in circles which have never been blamed for being cold warriors, started putting the question of what all this détente policy really was bringing about if in the Soviet Union the lunatic asylums<sup>10</sup> were still a form of silencing a highly respectable minority and therefore even public opinion, intellectual and left-wing public opinion, pressed us for some improvement in East-West contacts and the lifting, be it even by an inch or so, of the intellectual and the political Iron Curtain.

The fourth item as I said of Soviet-Communist origin is the follow-up to the conference. The Russians right from the beginning had not made any secret of the fact that what they really were aiming at was a sort of regional security council for Europe, of a Pan-European nature, which could transform the political and even

9 Russian author and dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, [dodis.ch/P47624](https://dodis.ch/P47624).

10 Psychiatry was weaponized by the Soviet Union to shut down political opposition by diagnosing dissent as a mental disorder.

the military and the social scenery; therefore we have been relatively cautious, since the introduction of such consultative machinery would have enabled the Soviets to cast a longer shadow over the rest of Europe. We therefore said that a follow-up could be considered only after a satisfactory outcome of the conference and this is still our position, but the current thinking foresees the possibility of letting certain limited technical bodies go on working on specific problems, for example on basket 2, on-trade and East–West technical cooperation, which could be taken care of by the ECE, the European Committee of Economic Affairs, a sub-regional organisation of the United Nations sitting in Geneva, or the Regional Conference of UNESCO which could take care of some cultural cooperation.

We thought that after a relatively extended period of let's say 1 ½ or 2 years, the Soviets would have had an opportunity to prove that they were willing to live up to the text they would sign with us and then we could see whether a new fresh conference would be worthwhile. Now lady and gentlemen, how have we, the Allies, done in Helsinki and in Geneva? For the last 6 years it has been my dubious privilege to chair the Senior Political Committees,<sup>11</sup> meetings and endeavours on preparing dossiers for CSCE and, as we will see later, for MBFR. I think this has been a rather unique achievement in diplomatic history that nations of such a differing background, with so widely differing interests, have been able to put their minds together and to work out business-like, reasonable and logical position-papers which even found support among the neutrals and the non-aligned and, in spite of the ups and downs and constant efforts on the part of our Communist interlocutors to drive wedges between our colleagues, they have I think sung their chorale in a polyphonous but harmonious way. Of course we had to be very careful to steer our course away from two dangers, two extremes: we didn't want to drag our feet or to sabotage the conference, in which case we would have lost our public support and the support of the neutrals and it would not really have paid off; on the other hand of course we did not want to rush the conference into any kind of unforeseeable and uncontrollable final result. We are now in March, the day before yesterday the heads of Government of the Nine,<sup>12</sup> who since 1972 have greatly helped NATO to promote new and common positions, have issued in Dublin a statement saying that the progress made thus far has been encouraging and that there is good reason, if all people cooperate fully (in parenthesis, as well the countries of the Warsaw Pact), to have a third phase relatively soon and at the highest level.

Now, on the basis of what has this statement been made? As far as basket 1 is concerned, out of the 10 principles<sup>13</sup> foreseen the most difficult teeth have been drawn, the issue over immutability or inviolability has been solved by the United States and the Russians in a dialogue which has been pursued on the initiative of all NATO countries, we still have to finalise the 4 Power Clause, *reservatio mentalis*, then we will have to put together all this in a statement saying that all these

11 *Forum for the exchange of views between allied members regarding political affairs.*

12 *France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, FRG, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg.*

13 1. Sovereign equality 2. Refraining from the threat or use of force 3. Inviolability of frontiers 4. Territorial integrity of States 5. Peaceful settlement of disputes 6. Non-intervention in internal affairs 7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief 8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples 9. Cooperation among States 10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

principles are equal and we will have to hedge off any attempts to have sneaked in into this catalogue references which could be interpreted in such a way that we may appear as having accepted the Brezhnev doctrine, which we of course do not. But as regards the list of principles a second item, more important I think at the moment and more topical, is confidence-building measures where the Russians have not yet budged. We are not, between you and me, greatly helped by the fact that some of our Allies are less confident about confidence building measures than others and keep rather silent in Council,<sup>14</sup> but I think this lack of warmth and of enthusiasm for the advance notification of military movements is being made up and good by the enthusiasm shown by the neutrals.

The second basket doesn't constitute a problem. The third basket represents already I think a laudable although not earth-shattering achievement in the framework of the reunification of families, repatriation the facilitation of exits and so forth. We have made considerable progress, we must still see to it that in the preamble the Russians be prevented from more or less paralysing and disqualifying what they have granted in the operational part of the resolution.

Now a last word on the statement of the Nine Heads of Government in Dublin. I think they have done nothing worse or nothing better than some of the outstanding Western statesmen have said before: M. Giscard d'Estaing, President Nixon, President Ford, Chancellor Brandt, Prime Minister Wilson<sup>15</sup> have already said some time ago, partly even years ago, that a summit conference would be acceptable and desirable. I think this is fine but the summit conference of course requires a very careful look at our public opinions insofar as we might leave the impression that by the very fact of their gathering and signing any kind of resolution and shaking hands, the world has turned much better forever. The world will not turn much better unless we work for it daily and there is a second point which is of course very important and that is the Russians will have to show, in the wake of the third phase, that they really mean what they have signed and thirdly, there has been as I said before a relatively qualified parallelism between MBFR and CSCE. Where do we stand on MBFR? We have not made any glorious progress yet on MBFR. That means we will have to show quite clearly to the Russians as well as to our public opinions, and this probably will have to be done in Helsinki at the third phase, that détente or normalisation of East-West relations in the longer term cannot be envisaged without doing away with the military disparities which still prevail in Central Europe. So in order to see the situation change substantially, we must insist on progress on MBFR.

Now gentlemen, MBFR. You know the negotiations have been in progress in Vienna for almost a year and a half. The initiative has been a Western one dating back to the Harmel Report<sup>16</sup> and the Reykjavik Signal<sup>17</sup> in '67 and '68 and the Rus-

<sup>14</sup> *Meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).*

<sup>15</sup> French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, [dodis.ch/P13791](https://dodis.ch/P13791), United States President Richard Nixon, [dodis.ch/P13584](https://dodis.ch/P13584), and Gerald Ford, [dodis.ch/P47012](https://dodis.ch/P47012), Chancellor of the FRG Willy Brandt, [dodis.ch/P15409](https://dodis.ch/P15409), and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, [dodis.ch/P13688](https://dodis.ch/P13688).

<sup>16</sup> *Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance of 13 December 1967*, [dodis.ch/77582](https://dodis.ch/77582), written by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, [dodis.ch/P15124](https://dodis.ch/P15124).

<sup>17</sup> *The final communique of the NAC Ministerial Session on 24–25 June 1968, which adopted the declaration on mutual force reductions.*

sians have been rather hard-eared reacting to it and I said before, it was only our insistence on a date for MBFR which then opened up for them the possibility of cashing in the CSCE. What are our basic aims to provide for undiminished security at a lower level of forces? And secondly, to correct the imbalance of ground forces and main battle tanks in Central Europe? Here is a short list of figures: there are about 925 000 men on the Eastern Front, to NATO's 777 000, a disparity of almost 150 000 men. The East has about 15 000 main battle tanks in active units to our 6000: a disparity of about 9000. Of our total of 770 000 men, about 193 000 belong to the United States Forces; of the Warsaw Pact total of 925 000 men, some 460 000 are Soviet. All these data have been given to the Soviets in late 1974. They have of course been subjected to seasonal changes of course, but no fundamental changes. We have in vain, I may add, invited the Warsaw Pact to turn up with their figures which they have hitherto consistently refused.

Now who are the participants in these negotiations? First of all, on the Eastern side, all members of the Warsaw Pact: on our side 12 of the 15 NATO nations except Iceland (no armed forces), France (doubts right from the outset) and Portugal because of its geographical location. But at least Portugal is represented by an observer in Vienna. There are two categories of participants: the direct or the decision-making participants who have forces and/or territories in the area of reduction (the definition of which I will explain in a moment) i.e. the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and Benelux, the Netherlands Belgium and Luxembourg. The remainder have a special status, they are the flank countries, they may not intervene directly in the decisions but may speak on matters of their direct concern: Norway, Denmark, Turkey and Greece and Italy. In the area of reductions, there is a fundamental agreement. On the Western side the Federal Republic of Germany and Benelux, on the other side Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR. There is as you know no agreement on Hungary; we had added that at the last moment before we started negotiations. I must say between you and me, almost more out of fun than of military necessity because we thought it may enrich a little bit our negotiating package. The Generals were not terribly keen on it. The Russians came up immediately and said: alright, if you include Hungary we of course insist on Italy, which made us think a little bit; this thinking process lasted for about 6 months. Very educating process I must say. The Americans rather impatient to get some results over night bore out with us and showed enormous courtesy towards our haggling. Out of these first 6 months came out an agreement to disagree: we say we still insist on Hungary; we reserve ourselves the right to come back to it at least in the context of some circumventive provisions, and the other side said: if you do so we couldn't care less and then we would insist on Italy. I don't think we have lost anything as long as we keep Hungary in mind when we talk of some accessory measures, there we must of course include Hungary as well because of the possible build-up of forces withdrawn from Czechoslovakia to Hungary or possibly pressures from Hungary to some flank countries. The second advantage of this haggling period was that we have learnt to live together and we have now I think produced the right spirit for cooperation.

The forces excluded from the negotiations are the naval and amphibious forces, and there is no intention to include para-military units. What has been our

basic proposal made at the beginning of the negotiations? We aim at a common ceiling of approximately 700 000 men on each side for overall ground forces in the area of reductions to be achieved in a 2-phase negotiation. The first phase include only the U.S. and the Soviet Union: specifically the Soviet Union should withdraw a 5 division tank army consisting of 68 000 soldiers and 1700 main battle tanks; in exchange the United States would withdraw 29 000 men. In the second phase non-U.S., non-Soviet Union forces would be addressed with a view to completing the movement towards the common ceiling of 700 000 men. Secondly, we said this may look a little bit queer to you because the figures are asymmetrical, but the situation in which we negotiate is very asymmetrical as well, there is at least the geographical disparity: whilst the U.S. forces would be withdrawn at least 5000 kilometres away, the Soviet force would only go back by about 650 kilometres from the centre of the area of reduction. And secondly there is the preponderance of Soviet tanks which I just mentioned. Then we said, last but not least, there should be associated measures which I just mentioned in the context of Hungary which should be an integral part of this arrangement, such as stabilising measures, verification measures. What has been the Eastern proposal made at the beginning of the negotiations? That the two sides reduce first by equal amounts and then by equal percentages, that means in '75 the direct participants make a symbolic reduction of 20 000 men on each side, followed in '76 by 5% reduction on each side and in '77 by 10% reduction on each side. That the existing correlation of forces, that is of course the existing imbalance in the favour of the Warsaw Pact, be contractualised in an international agreement. That air and nuclear forces be included, that we negotiate thirdly the reduction of forces of all direct participants right from the outset including (and that has been the Communists' main aim) the Bundeswehr, the German Armed Forces. The Eastern proposal of course does not provide for a common ceiling but they are very interested in setting national sub-ceilings which would open them the way for some interference in the internal arrangements or rearrangements of our Armed Forces in the future, which could become a little bit awkward in the case of a movement towards closer military cooperation in Western Europe. Our reaction to this Eastern proposal was: we cannot agree to the contractualisation of the existing imbalance; this would mean a formal acquiescence that the Communists have a permanent right to have more forces in their part than we do. Then secondly the more the forces in the area are reduced by equal numbers the more the imbalance would grow. Thirdly, nuclear weapons should not be addressed because the nuclear balance cannot be discussed without taking into account the forces outside Central Europe and we should concentrate our negotiations which are already so complex, on Central Europe alone. Air Forces we said should be excluded because it doesn't make great sense because of the high mobility of air forces and the proximity of Soviet airports close to the reduction area. The introduction of air nuclear elements would add new layers of complexity to what is already immensely difficult and we must proceed by stages, starting with the most important and the most embarrassing problem in Europe, that is the presence of the Soviet and the U.S. forces. The issue of the reduction of European forces is far more complex and the indigenous forces constitute a much larger proportion of NATO forces than is the case in the War-



saw Pact (about 75% of NATO forces are non-U.S. and only about half of the Warsaw Pact forces are non-Soviet), and therefore the reduction of indigenous forces would affect NATO's security more critically than that of the Warsaw Pact. And then we said we cannot accept national ceilings for the reasons I just expressed.

Now what have been the developments, lady and gentlemen, since the outset of the negotiations? We have had many many informal and some plenary meetings, we have explained our respective positions in detail and have carefully probed each other's positions and intentions. Last October, roughly on the first anniversary of the talks, the East made what it said was a new proposal: it called for an overall reduction in 1975 of 20 000 men on each side, of which half would be taken by the United States and the USSR and the other half by the remaining direct participants. The East suggested that the United States and Soviet reductions could be taken in the first six months of 1975 and the reduction by the remaining direct participants in the second half of 1975. They said this was a concession to our phase concept. We told our Red friends that we saw virtually no difference in their so-called new proposal: the size of the reductions and the proportions were the same and the nuclear and air component would be kept and there would be no compensation for the disparities. In February '75 a couple of weeks ago, the Communists proposed certain purely procedural modifications to their existing proposals to which I could perhaps refer later in the questions and answers period, but there are no changes of substance whatsoever. Last year during the phase 1 and phase 2 reductions, we even suggested that we should freeze our forces so as not to compensate for the U.S. reductions. The East has not definitely responded to this proposal but has made the suggestion that one should have a freeze right from the outset before the reductions take place. We said definitely no, because such a freeze right from the outset would freeze the very disparities which we are trying to overcome; secondly, the main business of the negotiations is not to have a freeze but to have reductions. It could only be acceptable in connection with reductions and furthermore it seems a little bit absurd that we talk of freezing of forces the size of which is unknown to us since the East have not provided us with data we can control. So we see no fundamental change in the position of either side, we are still looking for common ground, we will of course in the not too distant future look again at our own positions and see where we can perhaps rearrange some aspects of these. I think, speaking very personally, that there is one non-negotiable element in them and that is definitely the common ceiling. We cannot abandon this idea because it would indeed lift and tilt the ground on which we stand and that is we must, through these negotiations, achieve a reduction of the confrontation but with undiminished security, and possibly with a consideration of the strategic and military disparities. What is the outlook? I am sure that we will not make any major progress before the end of the CSCE, whether this is to be welcomed or not I can't tell, I think personally, that if we had played the parallelism a little bit differently we could probably have made a little progress because the Soviets are so terribly keen, particularly Mr. Brezhnev,<sup>18</sup> to have a CSCE as quickly as possible because he has set up a whole schedule for a

18 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](http://dodis.ch/P15543).

European Communist Conference<sup>19</sup> and for a new Party Congress<sup>20</sup> and so forth, so he is personally involved; but the wisdom of governments is ungaugeable and I would not like to quarrel with our highly respectable statesmen. But perhaps after the wrapping-up of the CSCE, if our statesmen make it quite plain that détente in the long run is inconceivable without the correction of the existing and continuing disparities, then we may perhaps make some steps forward. Last remark, in spite of the lack of progress, we have kept our ranks very close, we have learned our lessons from the first quarrels, we have a very dense and smoothly functioning machinery, first of all the Council of course; then we have the Senior Political Committee consisting of the Cabinet Councils of the 15 nations, then we have the MBFR Working Group which is working very closely under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee<sup>21</sup> and then we have the “ad hoc” group in Vienna<sup>22</sup> consisting of the Western delegations which meet daily and where there is no bi-lateral or multi-lateral exchange of information between East and West that is not very carefully analysed and gauged by all people concerned. I think if we maintain our military posture and don’t continue making force cuts only dependent on progress in MBFR, we can hope for some reasonable and satisfactory outcome. Secondly of course we will have to keep as closely together in political terms as we have learnt to live over the last 1 ½ years.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> 29–30 June 1976, East Berlin. 29 participating European countries.

<sup>20</sup> 25<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, 24 February–5 March 1976.

<sup>21</sup> The Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee US Lieutenant General Richard Shaefer, [dodis.ch/P81608](https://dodis.ch/P81608).

<sup>22</sup> Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions “ad-hoc” group, established January 1973.

<sup>23</sup> For all NATO documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2907](https://dodis.ch/C2907).

[dodis.ch/76738](https://dodis.ch/76738)

Portugal

*The Portuguese Ambassador in Helsinki, Nunes de Freitas, to Minister  
of Foreign Affairs Melo Antunes<sup>1</sup>*

[COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITIES IN PORTUGAL]

Encrypted

Helsinki, 9 April 1975

Rumours are circulating in diplomatic circles in this country that some NATO member states have asked the Soviet government to cease Communist Party activities in Portugal, adding that otherwise they will not sign the final text of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Eastern European colleagues who spoke to me about this matter condemned this kind of pressure.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal (PL-DAR), PT/AHD/S16A1P1/PEA/1/1975/88082. Translated from Portuguese. This encrypted telegram No. 59 signed by the Portuguese Ambassador in Helsinki, Armando Nunes de Freitas, [dodis.ch/P81213](https://dodis.ch/P81213), was sent from the Portuguese Embassy in Helsinki to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Major Ernesto Augusto de Melo Antunes, [dodis.ch/P52050](https://dodis.ch/P52050), who received it on 9 April 1975 at 12:00 p.m. in Lisbon. It reports pressure being exerted by NATO countries on the Soviet government not to support the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). It was written on the eve of the first free elections with universal suffrage held in Portugal (elections for the Constituent Assembly), which were to take place on the first anniversary of the 25 April 1974 revolution. International pressure to prevent the USSR from encouraging the PCP to impose a Soviet-style dictatorship of the proletariat in Portugal was exerted in various chancelleries by NATO countries and others, with one of the main stages being the CSCE meeting in Helsinki. The author of the telegram, Armando Nunes de Freitas has spent almost his entire career under the dictatorship. However, it was after the fall of the latter that he was first accredited with ambassadorial credentials. When he arrived in Helsinki, Portugal had already established diplomatic relations to Eastern European countries like Romania, the USSR, Yugoslavia, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (all between June and July 1974). The Minister of Foreign Affairs to whom the telegram is addressed is Major Ernesto Augusto de Melo Antunes, who was one of the political strategists of the April 25 revolution and the main ideologue of the Armed Forces Movement, having participated in several provisional governments.

<sup>2</sup> For all Portuguese documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2897](https://dodis.ch/C2897).

[dodis.ch/76761](https://dodis.ch/76761)

Portugal

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director-General of Political Affairs Cabral and the Head of the Atlantic Pact Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nuno de Lorena<sup>1</sup>*

ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Extract

Lisbon, 19 April 1975

[...] <sup>2</sup>*Part II. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase in Geneva*[...] <sup>3</sup>*Commission III (Cooperation in the Humanitarian Field and Others)*[...] <sup>4</sup>

39. It is within the framework of Commission III that new issues with strong ideological overtones are introduced into the realm of multilateral negotiations. Indeed, never before had an International Conference addressed the freer movement of people and ideas across Europe between Western and socialist countries.

40. Contrary to the initial Soviet expectation that the CSCE would be a brief and symbolic meeting to give a multilateral blessing to the “status quo,” Western countries intend to include Basket II on the Agenda of the MPT [Multilateral Preparatory Talks] Conference in Helsinki.

41. Thus, the mandate of Commission III, due to the problems it raises regarding human contacts and information, constitutes one of the most difficult aspects of the Geneva negotiations, since, being one of the basic objectives of the West, it now interferes with the very structure of socialist countries where, alongside some more moderate currents, others still defend the maintenance of ideological and social barriers.

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archive and Library of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal (PL-DAR), PT/AHD/ S16A1P1/PEA/1-1975/88082, Translated from Portuguese. These notes signed by Minister Plenipotentiary and Deputy Director-General of Political Affairs of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sérgio Aires Trindade Sacadura Cabral, [dodis.ch/P81214](https://dodis.ch/P81214), and by the Portuguese Head of the Atlantic Pact Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nuno Maria da Cunha e Távora Silveira e Lorena, [dodis.ch/P81216](https://dodis.ch/P81216), mention the essential aspects of the Geneva's first and second phase of the CSCE (1973–1975), including the Soviet and Western objectives and the Portuguese perspective.

<sup>2</sup> We publish here an extract of Part 2 (pp. 6–22) and Parts 3 and 4 (pp. 23–28). For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76761](https://dodis.ch/76761).

<sup>3</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76761](https://dodis.ch/76761).

<sup>4</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76761](https://dodis.ch/76761).

42. In this context, the question of the “preamble” to the texts of the Third Commission arose: the socialist countries wanted it to be restrictive, invoking the principles of non-interference and respect for domestic law, which would subsequently allow the authorities of those states to prevent the application of decisions taken within the framework of the Third Commission. Obviously, the Western countries opposed this.

43. The “preamble question” was only resolved through a general compromise (“package deal”)<sup>5</sup> that included a final proposal acceptable to the West, since it referred to the Principles only in general terms, and two texts to be inserted into Principles 1 and 10, which established the right of participating States to choose and develop their respective political, economic and cultural systems and to determine their laws and regulations, but in accordance with international law and the final documents of the CSCE.

[...] <sup>6</sup>

*Part III. Soviet and Western Objectives at the Conference. The Portuguese Position*

64. Having described, albeit very briefly, the nature and results of the work of the various committees and subcommittees, it is now important to provide a more complete overview of the Conference, outlining the objectives pursued in Geneva by the Soviet and Western parties.

65. Fundamentally, the USSR aims to achieve, within the CSCE, the enshrinement of the status quo resulting from the Second World War in Eastern Europe, the establishment (albeit in the long term) of a collective security system in Europe, and the strengthening of its position through a “droit de regard” in all European affairs.

66. More specifically, the USSR would have in mind: a) Western recognition of the existing borders on the continent, particularly those of the GDR and the territories acquired by the Soviets as a result of the 1939–45 war (namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, part of Finland, Poland and Romania, i.e. a total of 500 000 km<sup>2</sup> with over 23 million inhabitants; b) Western acceptance of the political status quo in Central and Eastern Europe, which would imply tacit recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence in the Warsaw Pact countries; c) rapprochement with the West on terms more favourable to the preservation of the Soviet political, economic and social system and an increase in its political influence in Western Europe; d) the creation of a climate of détente likely to lead to a gradual weakening of the West’s determination to maintain appropriate defence mechanisms; e) the weakening of the transatlantic link, particularly in view of the gradual withdrawal of American forces; f) the weakening the Atlantic Alliance, calling into question the belief in its usefulness, pressing for the abolition of blocs and advocating a new security system; broader access to Western financial, scientific and technological resources; h) to influence political leaders in Western countries, primarily with a view to preventing progress in their economic and political integration, by insisting on the idea of cooperation at European level.

<sup>5</sup> English in the original. For the “package deal” cf. QdD 30, doc. 69, [dodis.ch/38858](https://dodis.ch/38858).

<sup>6</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76761](https://dodis.ch/76761).

67. For their part, Western countries want the CSCE to play a key role in reducing tensions by achieving concrete results in relations between the two blocs in the political, economic and security fields.

68. More specifically, the Western countries want: a) the CSCE not to serve to perpetuate the division in Europe, but rather to contribute to reconciliation and cooperation, initiating a process aimed at reducing existing barriers; b) the creation of an atmosphere of trust by promoting freer movement of people, information and ideas; the definition of principles governing relations between participating States and the adoption of measures (including military measures) aimed at strengthening trust and stability in order to reduce the dangers of military confrontation; c) that the “Brezhnev doctrine” of limited sovereignty be challenged by insisting on the application of the principles governing relations between participants, regardless of their respective political, economic and social systems.

69. Regarding the Portuguese position, arguments were invoked from the outset pointing out the drawbacks of our presence in the CSCE, fundamentally related to aspects, now outdated, of our country’s foreign policy.<sup>7</sup> But not only that. Arguments were also put forward to highlight the advantages of this presence, namely the possibility of Portugal having an active voice in continental affairs, not distancing itself from Europe and keeping all doors open, contributing to the formulation of a European policy, strengthening contacts with Eastern European countries and taking advantage of the benefits that might result from a permanent body that could eventually emerge from the conference as part of the “follow-up”.

70. In the course of the negotiations, the Portuguese position has been, as mentioned above, the following: a) in Commission I,<sup>8</sup> a general alignment with the Allied position regarding principles, support for the Swiss project of peaceful dispute resolution, and, with respect to the CBM opposition to the notification of air and naval manoeuvres and the notification of movements, and support for the notification, on a voluntary basis, of land manoeuvres with forces smaller than a Division or equivalent; in Commission II,<sup>9</sup> a very discreet attitude, given the difficulties we have had in ensuring an effective presence in that Commission. However, we particularly supported the reference to developing European countries; in Commission III,<sup>10</sup> a position of balance and conciliation, the only one that, in the face of the divergences between the two camps, seems able to safeguard solidarity with the Atlantic allies while still establishing good ties with the socialist countries, particularly with Romania;<sup>11</sup> on point IV (follow-up), where there are also marked divergences, we adopted an intermediate position based on the Danish ideas supplemented by the British memorandum of January 30<sup>th</sup>, thus favouring a certain institutionalization of the “follow-up”. Our position is set out in the instructions recently sent

<sup>7</sup> For the Portuguese position towards the CSCE in the final stage of the dictatorship, cf. QdD 30, doc 27, [dodis.ch/76736](http://dodis.ch/76736) and QdD 30, doc. 36, [dodis.ch/76737](http://dodis.ch/76737).

<sup>8</sup> On security.

<sup>9</sup> On cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment.

<sup>10</sup> On cooperation in the humanitarian field and others.

<sup>11</sup> Romania was the first East European country with which Portugal established diplomatic relations immediately after the 25 April 1974 revolution.



to Delse [*Portuguese Delegation to CSCE*] by telegram No. 48 of the 18<sup>th</sup> of this month, a copy of which is attached for better clarification.<sup>12</sup>

*Part IV. Final Considerations*

71. From what has been said above, it follows that the CSCE has already achieved appreciable results, although important points of the Helsinki Agenda, regarding which there are still disagreements among the participants in the Conference, must still be discussed at the negotiating table.

72. Thus, Commission I still needs to resolve the issue of the peaceful alteration of borders as well as the safeguarding of the rights of the four Powers with respect to Germany. Agreement must also be reached on the wording of the preamble to the “Declaration of Principles”, including the question of its equivalence. Furthermore, no agreement has yet been reached on confidence-building measures (CBMs).

73. In Committee II, where the atmosphere has been less tense from a political point of view, given that many of the issues discussed there are being negotiated within the GATT or through direct negotiations, there are matters that require agreement. This is the case with reciprocity and most-favoured-nation treatment.

74. In Committee III, discussions are continuing on issues relating to journalists’ working conditions, travel and certain aspects of the cultural sector.

75. As for the “Follow-up,” the crux of the matter is currently being negotiated.

76. The Conference therefore marks the beginning of the process of thawing relations between East and West, and for this reason its limitations—which cannot be overcome at this stage—must be viewed realistically. It is understood that, with regard to issues being addressed for the first time at the multilateral level (such as those in Basket III), it is not possible, for the time being, to reach definitive solutions.

77. On the other hand, the scope and significance of the results achieved depend not so much on the signing (albeit at the highest level) of the CSCE’s final documents, but rather on how the Conference’s recommendations—the implementation of which is primarily the responsibility of the participating States—are put into practice. Furthermore, to assess the CSCE’s results in their proper perspective, it is important to bear in mind that they must be viewed within the broader context of East–West relations, which includes other ongoing negotiations.

78. Western countries do not expect the CSCE to bring about a sudden, radical change in the European landscape. They believe that it should have a dynamic, far-reaching effect, and thus do not accept the permanent entrenchment of the “status quo” in Europe.

79. The valid criterion for assessing the CSCE will therefore be the extent to which it effectively contributes to East–West cooperation and to overcoming the division of Europe into blocs.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> For the telegram No. 48 from the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Head of the Portuguese Delegation (Delse) in Geneva, dated 18 April 1975, cf. [dodis.ch/78103](http://dodis.ch/78103).

<sup>13</sup> For all Portuguese documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2897](http://dodis.ch/C2897).



[dodis.ch/77057](https://dodis.ch/77057)

Canada

*The Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE Delworth to the Department of External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE: GENERAL COMMENTS ON APPROACHING THE NATO SUMMIT

Confidential

Geneva, 14 May 1975

As you know, we have been troubled for some time by some references in press and diplomatic circles to interpretation of CSCE which ascribes to Soviet Union greater degree of satisfaction of objectives than we believe to be the case.

2. If one thinks back on what Soviets had in mind in first promoting this conference in mid-sixties, and what West has been able to do in expanding mandate and in conducting detailed negotiations on that mandate, one cannot avoid being struck by major extent to which Soviets have been forced to modify and adapt their original objectives. More than that, if one reads the text as it has emerged from negotiations – and in particular the text of the principles where, to give only one example, inviolability of frontiers accounts for only two paragraphs while eight are devoted to human rights – one cannot escape feeling that for Russians this conference has been not a relative success but a significant substantive failure. Where they sought an endorsement of the status quo and an acceptance of the concept of immutability, they have been conceded only an absurd formula on the inviolability of frontiers and some other forms of words that go no further than existing UN formulations. Far from muting and discouraging the process of change, CSCE text in general contains nothing which is at variance with this process and indeed a good many formulations which hallow it as an aspect of relations between states. As argued in a number of preceding messages, I believe that the totality of CSCE text – even if sometimes lumpy and elephantine in expression – is encouragingly positive and tilted in our direction, which helps to account for current Soviet urgency in bringing this painful negotiation to a rapid conclusion.

3. This is not to say that Soviets themselves will accept this reading and that they will try to bury and forget CSCE text. Far from it. They have invested too much in this conference to pretend that it never happened even though they do not much like it. There can be little doubt that conclusion of CSCE will be presented as dawn of new era and that through process of contorted logic some of results will be portrayed as Soviet triumph. The problem they are going to face is to make this a convincing presentation based on actual CSCE text in its broad totality.

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archive Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9093, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 53. This telegram No. CSCE1258 was signed by the Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE Thomas Delworth, [dodis.ch/P51338](https://dodis.ch/P51338), and sent to the Canadian Department of External Affairs. For the complete list of the addressees, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77057](https://dodis.ch/77057).

They will attempt to argue for example that inviolability of frontiers (the phrase rather than the principle) means an acceptance of the status quo (the principle states in fact that frontiers will not be “assaulted”) and that this is a grand new idea in international relations (it is in fact simply a deduction from the principle of non-use of force but in this form the principle is not uniformly enticing to the Soviet Union). More than that, they will attempt to develop follow-up and the Swiss proposal into opportunities for having another run at the broader political objectives they did not achieve at CSCE.

4. It is precisely because Soviet script can almost be written in advance that we should be very careful now about appearing to concede validity of Soviet contentions by expressing too solemnly our concerns about propaganda potential for USSR in the principles. Instead we should be analysing amongst ourselves the scope of Soviet failure at CSCE and making sure this is understood fully by press and public so that Soviet policymakers in the pre- and post-Helsinki summit period harbour no illusions as to problems they are going to face in trying to sell West a European security pig-in-a-poke based on a propagandistic presentation of CSCE text rather than a careful reading of it. Finally, Western analysis of what Soviets have and have not achieved in CSCE might induce an attitude not of complacency but of rather more self-confidence than they ritualistically exhibit when considering the prospect of continued multilateral negotiating contact with Soviet Union and its friends. For West, process has been difficult and boring almost beyond words but it has been moderately successful in terms of workman-like results achieved.<sup>2</sup>

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2 For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).

[dodis.ch/76938](https://dodis.ch/76938)

Ireland

*Report from the Department of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*19<sup>TH</sup> EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MINISTERIAL MEETING ON EUROPEAN  
POLITICAL COOPERATION<sup>2</sup>*Extract • Confidential*

Dublin, 26 May 1975

*I**Item 1: CSCE**(a) General Discussion*

The Ministers had before them to orient their discussion a Presidency report prepared by the Sous-comité in Geneva which gave a brief evaluation of the present situation at the Conference.

*Presidency* (FitzGerald) suggested that the Ministers have a general discussion of the problems which remain to be resolved and to what extent the Soviet desire to hold Stage III in July might encourage an earlier solution to those problems. In the light of this discussion, the Ministers might be able to see more clearly the prospects for a conclusion to the Conference before the Summer break. *Presidency* added that the Ministers might wish to consider the question of issuing a press statement after the meeting.

*Denmark* (Andersen)<sup>3</sup> felt that the most important remaining issues were CBM's<sup>4</sup> and the texts on Journalists. If these were resolved Stage III could be held in July but he was not hopeful about this. In regard to the Follow-up, *Denmark* was anxious that the Neutrals' support for the Danish proposal should be ensured and that the Nine should take account of their conditions for accepting the Danish proposal.

*Netherlands* (den Uyl)<sup>5</sup> said that the Nine must be careful not to commit themselves to any time limits for the end of the Conference to which they might be held by the East. They felt that some very important points remained to be settled but that if the U.S.S.R. adopted a positive attitude Stage III could be held in July. They

<sup>1</sup> National Archives of Ireland (IR-NA) DFA 2007/111/841. *Ireland held the rotating Presidency of the European Council from January to July 1975.*

<sup>2</sup> *The Irish Delegation was led by Foreign Minister Garret FitzGerald, [dodis.ch/P50840](https://dodis.ch/P50840), accompanied by, among others, Parliamentary Secretary John Kelly, [dodis.ch/P68748](https://dodis.ch/P68748), the Secretary-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs Paul Keating, [dodis.ch/P73432](https://dodis.ch/P73432), the Permanent Representative to the EC Brendan Dillon, [dodis.ch/P81351](https://dodis.ch/P81351), Head of the EC Division Éamonn Gallagher, [dodis.ch/P81352](https://dodis.ch/P81352) and the Political Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs Noel Dorr, [dodis.ch/P58807](https://dodis.ch/P58807). For a list of all members of the Irish Delegation, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76938](https://dodis.ch/76938).*

<sup>3</sup> *Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Knud Børge Andersen, [dodis.ch/P49020](https://dodis.ch/P49020).*

<sup>4</sup> *Confidence Building Measures.*

<sup>5</sup> *Dutch Prime Minister Joop den Uyl, [dodis.ch/P50261](https://dodis.ch/P50261).*

stressed, however, that as there was no evidence of this positive attitude on the part of the U.S.S.R., the Nine should not create the impression they were ready to accept July as the date for Stage III. On Follow-up, *Netherlands* said that while they could appreciate the importance of the Neutrals' support for the Danish proposal, the Neutrals also would have to compromise their demands, particularly in regard to the length of the interim period, for which 18 months was very short. *Netherlands* reiterated their concern that the Nine should ensure the concordance of the different language versions of the texts.

*U.K. (Hattersley)*<sup>6</sup> agreed that some important points had not been settled, notably CBM's, Basket III, Follow-up and the equality of the Principles. He said that the U.S.S.R. had a vested interest in concluding the Conference at summit level before the Summer and that the Nine should use this as a form of pressure to obtain concessions from the East. He suggested that the Nine tactics should be to indicate that they had no objection to continuing the Conference over the Summer and that if the U.S.S.R. wanted to finish in July, they would have to make concessions to the West.

*France (Sauvagnargues)*<sup>7</sup> agreed with *U.K.* concerning the tactics the Nine should adopt. He said that while the Nine should think in terms of concluding the Conference in July, they should not say so openly while important points remained unresolved. In regard to outstanding problems, CBM's were not as important for France as for other countries. On Follow-up, *France* felt that the creation of a permanent organisation would undoubtedly be a victory for the U.S.S.R., and that the Neutrals could not be accommodated to that extent. He recalled that the Danish proposal, when it was tabled in 1974, had envisaged an interim period of three years before the meeting of Senior Officials in 1977. Now the interim period would be only two years. He warned his colleagues against the political dangers involved in the setting up of a permanent political body.

*Italy (Rumor)*<sup>8</sup> agreed that as the Nine had never set a date for Stage III they could exploit the Soviet desire to finish in July to their advantage. He said that the institutionalisation of the Follow-up was not acceptable and that Italy doubted whether the Nine would derive any substantial satisfaction from Basket III.

*FRG (Genscher)*<sup>9</sup> agreed with *France* about the danger inherent in a permanent Follow-up machinery but felt that three years was unnecessarily long before the meeting of Senior Officials. *FRG* considered that the Nine had conceded as much as they could and that they should now signal to the U.S.S.R. that the Conference could finish soon only if real concessions were made by the East.

In regard to CBM's, *FRG* felt that the question of area was most important and that the Finnish proposal that notifications be given within a radius of 300 km of borders was a good one.

*Belgium (Van Elslande)*<sup>10</sup> felt that the Nine should not create the impression that they were prepared to set up a pan-European security system. He said that while

6 *British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Roy Hattersley*, [dodis.ch/P50902](https://dodis.ch/P50902).

7 *French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues*, [dodis.ch/P42740](https://dodis.ch/P42740).

8 *Italian Foreign Minister Mariano Rumor*, [dodis.ch/P15297](https://dodis.ch/P15297).

9 *Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Hans-Dietrich Genscher*, [dodis.ch/P15414](https://dodis.ch/P15414).

10 *Belgian Foreign Minister Renaat Van Elslande*, [dodis.ch/P47039](https://dodis.ch/P47039).

they were anxious to finish the Conference as soon as possible there would have to be satisfactory solutions to the problems of CBM's, Basket II and Basket III. On Follow-up, *Belgium* said that there could be no question of creating an institutionalised machinery and that an adequate length of time should pass before the meeting of Senior Officials. *Belgium* wondered if it would be wise to hold Stage III at the highest level if satisfactory results were not achieved in Geneva.

*Luxembourg* (Thorn)<sup>11</sup> agreed that pressure should be brought to bear on the U.S.S.R. to make concession in the negotiations and that there should be no permanent Follow-up body.

*b) Press Statement*

The Ministers then considered the draft press statement which they had before them. They agreed that the tone of the statement should indicate to the Russians that their desire for the conclusion of the Conference in July could be satisfied only if they made concessions in Geneva.

*U.K.* made the point that if the Nine gave no incentive to the U.S.S.R. to make concessions, the East might abandon all hope of finishing the Conference by the end of July and become even more intransigent than they were at present. *FRG*, supported by *Luxembourg* and *Netherlands*, said that the statement should clearly indicate that Stage III in July was conditional on Soviet cooperation in the negotiations. This was agreed.

*Belgium* was opposed to any reference to a specific date in the statement, arguing that the Nine had never set a date for Stage III before and that if they did so now, they might be constrained to end the Conference by that date. The *Presidency* pointed out to *Belgium* that to omit the reference to July would destroy the whole point of the press statement which was to bring pressure to bear on the Russians to make concessions by offering them the prospect of holding Stage III at a time they would like i.e. July. *Belgium* was adamant, however, and the impasse was finally resolved by omitting the reference to Stage III altogether.

*c) Community Participation in Stage III*

*Commission* (Ortoli)<sup>12</sup> said that it will be necessary to ensure that the Community competence is fully respected in the signature of the Final Act.<sup>13</sup> To this end he proposed that the President-in-Office should sign the Final Act in his double capacity, as national representative and as President of the Communities. He also proposed that the President-in-Office should make an oral declaration at Stage III, along the lines of that made at Stage I in Helsinki by Danish Foreign Minister Andersen. This declaration would interpret the phrase "Participating States" to mean the Community in these areas where the Community held competence. This was agreed by the Ministers.

[...]<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Luxembourgish Prime Minister Gaston Thorn*, [dodis.ch/P15471](http://dodis.ch/P15471).

<sup>12</sup> *President of the European Commission François-Xavier Ortoli*, [dodis.ch/P15433](http://dodis.ch/P15433).

<sup>13</sup> *For the Final Act in all CSCE languages*, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](http://dodis.ch/58821).

<sup>14</sup> *For the items discussed*, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76938](http://dodis.ch/76938). *For all Irish documents in this volume*, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2903](http://dodis.ch/C2903).

[dodis.ch/77015](https://dodis.ch/77015)

Federal Republic of Germany

*Speaking Notes of Federal Foreign Minister Genscher for the cabinet meeting  
on 9 July 1975<sup>1</sup>*

[CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATING PHASE OF THE CSCE IN GENEVA]

[Bonn, no later than 9 July 1975]

The negotiating phase of the CSCE in Geneva is coming to an end. The vast majority of the subject matter for negotiation has been covered, and agreements have been reached. Some questions are still unresolved; but even here fairly concrete outlines of the envisaged solutions can be discerned.

Under these circumstances, a speedy conclusion to the negotiations and the setting of the date for the third phase in Helsinki can be expected, although it is not yet possible to predict a precise timetable for this. It therefore seems justified to have the cabinet discuss the CSCE again at this point. So far, it has been discussed chiefly on two occasions: in May 1972, when we adopted the guidelines for the German delegation,<sup>2</sup> and in October 1974, when we dealt with the major interpellation by the CDU/CSU.<sup>3</sup>

The details of the outcome of negotiations and the timetable will come later.

There are two questions that the cabinet will have to consider:

- Can we support the results that have been reached, and under what conditions can we accept solutions to the issues still to be resolved?
- How should we prepare for the public presentation of the results and specifically for their discussion in the Committee on Foreign Affairs and in parliament as a whole?

I assume that the treatment of the issue in the media is well known. It is not uncritical and demonstrates a certain weariness. Even though, realistically speaking, the Conference was not expected to achieve major breakthroughs, there is now a tendency to attach less importance to these events than they deserve. Here,

<sup>1</sup> Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (DE-PA/AA), B 28-ZA/111659. Translated from German. This is the final version of the *Speaking Notes of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher*, [dodis.ch/P15414](https://dodis.ch/P15414), including handwritten alterations to the text by the Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to the CSCE in Geneva, Klaus Blech, [dodis.ch/P51339](https://dodis.ch/P51339). For the 119<sup>th</sup> cabinet meeting cf. *die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung* vol. 28, [dodis.ch/77492](https://dodis.ch/77492).

<sup>2</sup> For the *Guidelines of the Government of the FRG for the CSCE of 18 May 1972*, cf. QdD 30, doc. 18, [dodis.ch/77012](https://dodis.ch/77012).

<sup>3</sup> For the major interpellation from the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union parliamentary group, [dodis.ch/R26841](https://dodis.ch/R26841), of 8 July 1974 regarding the CSCE, cf. [dodis.ch/77493](https://dodis.ch/77493). The Federal Government responded to this interpellation of the opposition in writing on 10 October 1974, [dodis.ch/77494](https://dodis.ch/77494), and it was debated in the Bundestag on 17 October 1974, cf. *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. Stenographische Berichte*, Bonn 1974, S. 8326–8420, [dodis.ch/77670](https://dodis.ch/77670).



the opposition finds an attitude it can exploit for its own ends. At the moment, its stance is fundamentally negative for a number of reasons that in part have very little to do with the Conference itself and its results. Whether individual efforts to obtain a more differentiated perspective will have any impact is currently unclear. These efforts stem from the view that the concrete results of the negotiations, even in the form in which they are already visible, represent progress and improvements compared to what went before and to the status quo. They are attempting to distance themselves from the blanket criticism that the Conference was originally a Soviet project, the realisation of which in principle has to involve making concessions to the Soviet Union that cannot be balanced out and which therefore definitely constitutes a political disadvantage for the West and for the Federal Republic of Germany in particular.

In fact, an assessment of the Conference and its results will not be possible without examining how it came about.

It is no doubt correct that the East has been toying with the idea of a European security conference since the early 1950s, but without even touching on the aspect of contacts and cooperation in the course of these considerations.

It is no doubt also correct that this idea was originally driven by the goal of maximising the benefits of such a conference for the East: The legitimisation of the territorial and power-political status quo created by the Second World War as being basically unchangeable, and with it also a final settlement of the German question on Eastern terms within the pan-European area; the separation of the United States and Canada from the European continent; the creation of Western requirements for dissolving the military alliances.

The last point in particular played a prominent role in Bucharest in 1966.

Efforts of this nature on the Eastern side did at least go hand in hand with the willingness to work towards reducing the tensions in cooperation with the West within an initially extremely restricted framework.

On the other hand, the West, too, had a genuine interest in reducing these tensions and therefore in a situation in which it could use the Soviet willingness to do this, as limited as it may initially have been, for its own benefit.

That is the background to the Harmel Report,<sup>4</sup> which was adopted by the Conference of NATO Foreign Ministers on 14 December 1967 and which assigns two main functions to the Alliance: As well as the goal of maintaining military strength and political solidarity among the partners, it was also tasked with pursuing “the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved”.

The way in which the Alliance has embraced the idea of a security conference should be regarded against this backdrop.

- Firstly, a conference like this could seem to be an appropriate direct instrument for promoting détente if its approach was closely tailored to our understanding of détente: détente as *modus vivendi*, i.e. not a perpetuation of the status quo but rather remaining open to the possibilities offered by new

<sup>4</sup> Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance of 13 December 1967, [dodis.ch/77582](https://dodis.ch/77582), written by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, [dodis.ch/P15124](https://dodis.ch/P15124).



developments; in line with our interests, not only on the German question but also in the European process; no separation of North America from Europe; maintaining military security; incorporating the fields of cooperation and human contacts, without which in a free society the impact of détente would not be noticeable and therefore implausible.

- Secondly, the Alliance used the willingness to hold a conference like this to achieve progress in other important areas of East–West relations. It is against this backdrop that the NATO Foreign Ministers, at their meeting in Rome on 26 and 27 May 1970, announced the willingness of the West to enter into preparatory multilateral negotiations on a CSCE if progress were made in the following negotiations:
  - between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR,
  - between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and Poland,
  - between the Four Powers on Berlin,
  - between the United States and the Soviet Union on SAL[T].

An additional declaration by NATO concerned the opening of MBFR negotiations.<sup>5</sup>

As early as 22 June 1970, the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact accepted the participation of the United States and Canada at the Conference. Here, they considered the question of foreign troops stationed in Europe, a sign that the East was willing also to play a role in the context of MBFR. Brezhnev's speech in Tbilisi in spring 1972 confirmed this.<sup>6</sup>

The years that passed between these steps and the start of the CSCE talks in Helsinki saw the entry into force of the Eastern Treaties, the Berlin Agreement,<sup>7</sup> the Basic Treaty with the GDR<sup>8</sup> and the SALT I Agreement between the United States and the USSR. It was possible to coincide the beginning of MBFR talks in Vienna very closely with CSCE.

The first phase of CSCE in Helsinki gave the subsequent Geneva negotiations a mandate, the content of which did justice to the West's demands, i.e. the Western understanding of détente.

The requirements that we imposed on ourselves and on the other side based on fundamental, politically strategic and tactical considerations were thus fulfilled.

An essential point must be made here: The coherence of the [Atlantic] Alliance, which already proved itself in the preliminary phase and formed the starting

<sup>5</sup> For NATO's Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions of 26/27 May 1970 cf. [dodis.ch/77762](https://dodis.ch/77762).

<sup>6</sup> General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543), held his speech in Tbilisi on 14 May 1971.

<sup>7</sup> Agreement concluded by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France on 3 September 1971 which reiterated the common responsibility of the Four Powers regarding Berlin as a whole, safeguarded civilian traffic between the FRG and West Berlin, confirmed the right of the government in Bonn to represent West Berlin in matters of foreign policy and made it easier for West Berliners to travel to East Berlin. Cf. United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), vol. 880, pp. 116–148.

<sup>8</sup> In the Treaty of 21 December 1972 concerning the basis of relations between the FRG and the German Democratic Republic both states committed themselves to the principles of the non-use of force, the inviolability of frontiers and to the development of good neighbourly relations. However, they agreed to further disagree on the "German question".

point, also proved to be reliable during the rest of the process in Geneva. This is complemented by the cooperation, which could almost be described as even closer, between the nine Western Europeans which have emerged as and which continue to form the nucleus of the Western group in Geneva.

We could even go so far as to describe the necessity to cooperate as closely as possible within the framework of this Conference and to shoulder the main burden of the West there as a particularly effective integrating factor in the political cooperation of the Nine. It has shown not only that a coordinated approach is possible on the part of the West, but that the ongoing coordination among the Nine has also strengthened their cooperation as a whole. I do not exclude the possibility that this joint work within the framework of the Conference could serve as a starting point for establishing greater harmonisation than we have experienced to date in other areas of *Ostpolitik*, too. The work of Western European integration has evidently been anything but hampered by the negotiations in Helsinki. This is one of the Conference's most remarkable results, irrespective of what it has produced in terms of papers.

The East, in turn, has in no way proved to be as monolithic and therefore as influential as the structure of the Socialist camp initially appeared to suggest. Here, the stance of Romania was particularly remarkable, even though the need of this country to play a special role at all costs was not and is not always beneficial to achieving such results.

It is also important to mention the basically positive role of the neutral parties. After all, through the CSCE all European countries (with the sole exception of Albania) have been included in the dialogue on détente, which otherwise could easily have become a dialogue between blocs or even between the superpowers. It emerged that where purely foreign policy interests (which in these cases are dictated by neutrality or non-alignment) are not the only thing that matters, but where the focus is rather on fundamental values with regard to the way in which a society in freedom should be organised, there was widespread consensus and also a balance of interests between Western and neutral countries which had an operational impact. This has proved to be extremely advantageous particularly in the area of cooperation and contacts.

Results like this from the Conference and views like this that it has imparted should not be disregarded when it comes to assessing its impact.

After the end of the Conference we will have to conduct an in-depth analysis of those aspects in particular that we cannot deal with individually here today.

Instead, our discussion today will focus on the actual results of the Conference. Against this backdrop, I want to consider two questions:

- 1) Have we been able to realise the ideas with which we embarked on the CSCE?
- 2) What are the global impacts of the Conference, and what opportunities and risks do they harbour?

Regarding the first question: Have we been able to realise our ideas?

Three general aspects were important for us:

- We had to counter any attempt to use the Conference to establish a regional form of international law for Europe, under which any change to the status quo would have been impermissible. Specifically, that meant that the Conference should not put any obstacles in the way of the declared goals of our policy, which we had clearly set down in the Letter[s] on German Unity.<sup>9</sup> Neither should Berlin's interests be diminished. Last but not least, none of the results of the Conference should be able to give the Soviet Union the opportunity to interfere in relations between the countries of the West, whether within the Alliance or above all within the framework of the Western European integration processes.
- From a positive perspective, the aim was to take a step along the path towards a lasting détente. However, this détente will only become permanent when the currently still-dominant pattern of a friend-foe relationship between the East and the West is dismantled by means of greater free movement, a more free flow of information and last but not least economic cooperation (which we must conceive as something not only between states but also between free individuals and organisations). This process is not least dependent on what is going on in the minds of people upon whom Eastern propaganda is still imposing a manipulated view of the world. It seemed essential to us that the achievements made at each step of the détente process be of concrete and direct benefit to the people. If this were not the case, it would be difficult to take further steps and provide plausible reasons for why they were necessary.
- Our goal had to be to show clearly that political and military security are inextricably linked, even though the negotiations in Geneva certainly could not focus on all, or even the most central problems relating to military security. Specifically, this meant leaving no doubt that the following concept would be unacceptable to us: a concept that recognised the existence of a political security problem facing the whole of Europe that needed to be resolved jointly but that implied that the military security problems concerned only the area where East and West were directly face to face, i.e. Central Europe. We had to underscore that the geographical restriction of the MBFR talks in Vienna to a so-called reduction area was a pragmatic exception to a principle that applies to Europe as a whole.
- Finally, we had to ensure that the Conference did not create an institutionalised mechanism that could be abused by the East to control events in Europe. This does not mean that we opposed the continuation of the multilateral détente efforts after the end of the Conference.

We have been able to achieve a considerable proportion of these ideas, although not everything as we would have wished. That is only to be expected at a conference with 35 participants where every decision requires the approval of all parties.

<sup>9</sup> In the letter on German Unity presented in the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the occasion of the signing of the Moscow Treaty on 12 August 1970, the Federal Government underscored that "this Treaty does not stand in contradiction to the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work toward a state of peace in Europe, in which the German people regain their unity in free self-determination".

One thing is certain: The CSCE did not become a conference about Germany and Berlin. We have been able to eliminate or at least minimise the threats to our Germany policy that individual provisions in the set of principles could have harboured – I am thinking in particular of the principles of inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity. We will have an explicit statement to the effect that the participating States, in accordance with international law, can change their borders peacefully and by mutual agreement. The right to self-determination is anchored in the set of principles, as is the principle of human rights and fundamental freedoms. We will be protected from static and restricting principles, such as the inviolability of frontiers, being distorted and used against us by the existence of a statement on the equality of all principles. Under this statement, the interpretation of each of these principles will have to take account of the others, making it impossible for the points that matter to us to be undermined by others when those others are overemphasised and attempts made to attach greater importance to them. In this context particularly, it is vital that the results of the Conference are set down not in an international treaty but in a declaration of political intent. They therefore do not create new international law, neither do they affect the existing legal situation. The texts also contain a statement on that last point.

Our ideas regarding cooperation and contacts, information and culture have undoubtedly not been realised to an extent that could be considered ideal. However, in this area particularly, it must be taken into account that the aim was to achieve results incorporating all systems. What has been achieved should not be measured against what we would ideally wish for but against what is actually possible. Compromises were unavoidable. The important point is that in making them, we have not betrayed our fundamental beliefs. If what is envisaged in Basket III on the issues of human contacts, information, culture and education is realised, even if only in part, then Europe's reality will have changed for the better. I do not deny that the commitments made by individual governments on this issue first have to be put into practice through appropriate national measures. I am also under no illusions that the Eastern European governments, if they feel that it is necessary, will look for ways and means to evade unpleasant obligations. And nonetheless, these obligations set a standard against which states will have to allow themselves to be measured. Anyone who does not implement these Conference decisions will call into question the result of the Conference as a whole.

Regarding the military aspects: Everything indicates that on the issue of confidence-building measures we will be successful. The Soviet Union – and it has a crucial role to play here – is assuming responsibilities in this area in a way that reaches remarkably deep into its territory, something that would have been barely conceivable just a few years ago. What has been agreed here is not only of substantial and psychological importance in connection with the security of our continent, but is also likely to have a positive impact on the Conference climate in Vienna.

Finally, regarding the impacts of the Conference: We will not have an institutionalised core of a European security system, something we would not have wanted. Neither have we allowed ourselves to be placed on an automatic path that would inevitably bring us to that point, in an initially harmless form. Instead,

the continuation of the multilateral dialogue on détente will take place very pragmatically in a way that will allow us to keep our options open. We will be able to make the specific forms that this dialogue could potentially take in the future dependent on the prevailing political situation, which we will, of course, evaluate separately, not least in light of the concrete implementation of the substantive decisions of the Conference.

Regarding the second question: What are the global impacts of the Conference?

The CSCE has neither changed the power structures in the world nor, most importantly, has it shifted the balance of power within Europe. It gives the European countries a chance – though currently it is no more than a chance – to establish greater security, a greater degree of trust, more contacts and closer cooperation. However, it does not exclude the possibility of adhering to political stances that are brimming with conflict potential. We will not subscribe to the illusion that the East and particularly the Soviet Union have dispensed with long-term political goals. They will merely want to pursue them under different conditions and, if they abide by the Conference results, that is what they will have to do. The planned Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe<sup>10</sup> and the 28<sup>th</sup> Party Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union<sup>11</sup> scheduled for February next year will provide us with insights on what strategy is being pursued here.

If nothing else, we will initially be able to assume that although the Soviet Union and its allies may be pursuing their goals with a different understanding of the Conference results, they will at least be striving to comply with them formally. Herein lies our chance; our starting positions are not unfavourable.

Within the Alliance and among the Nine, we have been working together for some time to ensure that the interpretation we have to consider to be the right one and the one that is in line with our interests has an impact – whether within our countries' public sphere, on the global stage, or in dealings with other Conference participants.

I am sure that here, too, the coherent approach of the West will prevail. That is the only way for us to ensure that the energy available to us is used to the best effect to implement the results of the Conference.

In conclusion, I propose that you give your support to the conference results available so far.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> *The Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe took place in East Berlin on 29/30 June 1976.*

<sup>11</sup> *It is meant the 25<sup>th</sup> Party Conference that took place in Moscow from 24 February to 5 March 1976.*

<sup>12</sup> *For all documents of the FRG in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2909](http://dodis.ch/C2909).*

[dodis.ch/77059](https://dodis.ch/77059)

Canada

*The Canadian Ambassador in Moscow, Ford, to the Department of External Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

#### CSCE EVALUATION: THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

Confidential

Moscow, 9 July 1975

From this vantage point, I would question view expressed by CSCE delegation in two reference telegrams that CSCE has been essentially a failure for Soviet Union. While West has come out as well or better than could be expected and Russians have failed to attain many of their specific objectives and conceded a good deal more than they had originally bargained for, CSCE on balance still appears to be qualified success for USSR, which does not mean that results are unsatisfactory for West. I should emphasize that in this telegram I am addressing myself only to problem of Western evaluation of significance of CSCE conclusion, and not to very different question of public presentation of CSCE results.

2. A major problem in assessing CSCE results is that its significance must be viewed at two different levels: the first, which is more immediate and short term, though it can extend to longer term, relates to the broad political impact of CSCE conclusion and to way it will be interpreted in both Eastern and Western countries and in world at large. At that level, notwithstanding Western achievements in obtaining balanced texts on principles, and securing important concessions from Russians on CBMs and in Basket III, overall impact of conference is bound to enhance status of USSR and of Brezhnev's<sup>2</sup> détente policies, and to add element of consolidation to territorial status quo in Europe including division of Germany. This is a fact irrespective of precise wording of CSCE texts. Conference was promoted by USSR and after very long and difficult negotiations it will have been successfully concluded at spectacular and historic summit where Brezhnev will be very much in spotlight.

3. Russians will of course present results as definitive endorsement of World War II results and of territorial status quo in Europe. They are already hard at work in plugging this line. West can do a good deal to counter excessive Soviet claims and to ensure that results are viewed in their proper perspective, and without euphoria (e.g., as step in long and difficult process including other key area, e.g., SALT, MBFR, bilateral relations whose significance will depend on effective

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9093, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 56. This telegram No. MCW2708 signed by Canadian Ambassador in Moscow Robert Ford, [dodis.ch/P41708](https://dodis.ch/P41708), was addressed to the Canadian Department of External Affairs on 9 July 1975. Ford refers to other documents, including CSCE1258 from 14 May 1975, QdD 30, doc. 84, [dodis.ch/77057](https://dodis.ch/77057). For the other referred documents, as well as for the complete list of addressees, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77059](https://dodis.ch/77059).

<sup>2</sup> General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

implementation). But at broad political level CSCE is still bound to be viewed widely as significant success for USSR though perhaps also as a successful exercise for both sides.

4. With CSCE out of way, and no institutional follow-up, Russians will be free to turn their attention to other areas including Far East communist party relations and Soviet-American relations, including SALT. European agenda will not be exhausted, with focus shifting to MBFR, but they will have some flexibility and time to determine best course for them and to ponder desirability at some later stage of a new initiative towards some kind of all-European security system with disarmament campaign meanwhile serving to maintain momentum and to encourage mood of military relaxation in West.

5. There is also second level for assessing CSCE results, namely impact over time of CSCE texts themselves. It is in this longer term perspective that results appear much less satisfactory for Russians and more favourable to West. Viewing results in this context, I would not quarrel with the analysis of CSCE delegation. Many of specific Soviet objectives have indeed been thwarted – they have failed to get kind of endorsement they wanted on inviolability of frontiers, subscribed to language on peaceful change and national self-determination which may in fact weaken their position on territorial status quo and Brezhnev doctrine, and accepted general undertakings on human contacts and flow of info which West can seek to use to good effect in years ahead in expanding exchanges with USSR and Eastern European countries. Latter may as a result feel a little freer to develop their relations with West, though conference has also served to bring about greater degree of multilateral coordination (and Soviet control) among WPO countries.

6. While implementation will be key issue for West, it is clear from speeches of Soviet leaders, notably Brezhnev, and from Soviet press articles, that Russians have no intention to be bound by CSCE texts which they regard as entirely subject to principle of non-interference and to their own interpretation of the requirements of their internal laws and regulations. Progress in implementation is thus likely to be slow and to take place essentially in framework of bilateral agreements and programs. While balance sheet on CSCE texts is satisfactory for West, and probably best that could have been hoped for, potential benefits are longer term and assessment of their real value must await test of time.

7. In sum, having in mind broad political impact of CSCE and significance of CSCE texts themselves, our tentative conclusions from Moscow vantage point may be stated as follows:

- 1) Conclusion of conference substantially enhances prestige of USSR and position of Brezhnev.

- 2) It entails some further political consolidation of European status quo.

- 3) It will free USSR from restraints imposed by conference and more fundamentally for some time from concern with defence of its interests in Europe, and enable it to concentrate on other areas, notably Far East and relations among communist parties. In particular one of main political aims of USSR will have been achieved by establishing at least appearance of stability in its relations with Europe thus permitting it to devote greater energy and attention to problem of Sino-Soviet relations.



4) Conference will appear as vindication of détente and will make it more difficult for West to maintain its military posture. It will increase pressure on West for concessions in MBFR. Russians will also be under pressure, but West has more difficult position to uphold, the more so because of differences in Western camp on substance of what negotiations should accomplish.

5) Conference has witnessed a high degree of cooperation and unity among Western countries and induced greater cohesion rather than divisiveness. This is a definite plus though it may be difficult to maintain in future notably in MBFR.

6) Russians have made important concessions in texts and this could serve to expand scope of East–West cooperation and exchanges. It has also potential to generate conflict in future, as Russians are unlikely to move quickly to implement CSCE provisions in Basket III especially.

7) CSCE results will lack essential element of balance for West if they are not complemented by meaningful commitments to limit or reduce defense expenditures and size of military forces.<sup>3</sup>

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3 For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).

[dodis.ch/76939](http://dodis.ch/76939)

Ireland

*Memorandum from the Department of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBERS  
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, BRUSSELS, 16–17 JULY 1975.  
POLITICAL COOPERATION ISSUES

*Extract**[Dublin, no later than 16 July 1975]*[...]<sup>2</sup>*(A) Agenda Items Political Cooperation framework**(i) CSCE**(a) Background*

1. The 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe opened in Helsinki at Foreign Minister level in July 1973. The second stage (negotiation of detailed texts) began shortly thereafter at official level in Geneva and is now drawing to a close. If one or two remaining contentious issues can be solved this week, the third and final stage (formal signing and speeches) should take place at Head of Government level in Helsinki over the three day period 30 July to 1 August.
2. The Nine have been particularly active at the Conference. During our Presidency Ireland had the heavy task of speaking for the Nine, chairing all Nine coordination meetings and coordinating Nine positions at the Conference and in the various Committees.

*(b) Issue which will be before Nine Heads of Government meeting*

3. The Nine Heads of Government at their meeting in Brussels are unlikely to discuss details of the negotiations. They may however consider issuing a statement or declaration “situating” the results of the Conference for public opinion in their countries. The successful conclusion of such a Conference has for many years been an aim of the Soviet Union. Some of our partners (particularly those with large Communist parties at home) are concerned that the Soviet Union will now “play up” the result as a success for its policies and make it a major theme for a Conference of European Communist parties later this year. Some of the Nine feel it important therefore to make clear their own view of the Conference by way of a declaration or

<sup>1</sup> National Archives of Ireland (IR-NA), DT 2005/145/701. *This summary note of the meeting of Heads of Government in Brussels on 16 and 17 July 1975 was prepared by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs.*

<sup>2</sup> For the introduction of this memorandum, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76939](http://dodis.ch/76939).

statement from the present meeting. (Something may also be done in other frameworks such as NATO).

4. France and Italy are already circulating separate texts for such a Nine declaration. These texts welcome the conclusion of the Conference as a step in the process of detente while making it clear that differences of outlook as well as different social and political systems still persist in Europe. They also try to suggest that the Nine do not see the Conference decisions as a new system of international law for Europe or indeed as having binding legal force. It is probable that the work of drafting a suitable text – if Heads of Government should decide to issue one – will go on at official level while the meeting of Heads of Government is in progress.

(c) *Suggested Irish position*

5. The Nine have worked very closely together at the CSCE but they differ somewhat in their view of the results. No one of course sees it as an unqualified success and the differences are largely a matter of emphases. Some tend however to see the Conference as a useful, if limited, step towards detente and hope to see the East–West “dialogue” resume fairly soon; while others stress the limited nature of what has been achieved and the extent to which the conclusion of the Conference meets Soviet aims.
6. Our assessment of the Conference could perhaps be that it is moderately satisfactory. We would not over-estimate its results but we might not wish to be too closely associated with purely NATO concerns. If the Taoiseach<sup>3</sup> wishes to speak he might perhaps indicate a position on the following general lines:
  - (1) We are pleased that the Conference, which has been a long drawn out affair with a life of its own, appears to be coming to an end.
  - (2) We do not overestimate what has been achieved.
  - (3) Nevertheless we think that some useful things have been achieved. In particular, we regard it as moderately important that an explicit link has now been established internationally between detente in the purely political sense and the humanitarian, human contact and information issues of the 3<sup>rd</sup> “basket”.
  - (4) Of course much will now depend on how the engagements entered into are carried out. The prospect that the “dialogue” begun at the Conference may be resumed after an interval for assessment should provide a useful incentive to the Eastern European side to carry out these engagements.
  - (5) We realise of course that the Soviet Union may now seek to depict the conclusion of the Conference as a success for Soviet policies. Something of this kind is only to be expected at this stage.

3 Taoiseach (Irish “Prime Minister”) Liam Cosgrave, [dodis.ch/P15295](http://dodis.ch/P15295).

- (6) Public opinion in Ireland has not been greatly concerned about the CSCE – at least not to anything like the same extent as public opinion in some other member States.<sup>4</sup>
- (7) We agree that it could be useful to issue a statement or declaration from our present meeting which would “situate” the results for public opinion generally in Western Europe. Indeed it would seem odd – if we are to go together to Helsinki in two weeks time to sign documents of the Conference – that we should say nothing to the public about it from this meeting.
- (8) It is quite possible to strike a moderately positive note and at the same time ensure that public opinion in each of our countries is given a clear and realistic assessment of the results of the Conference; is not deceived into feeling that the security of the West has been ensured by detente; and the limited and conditional character of what has been achieved there.
- (9) A most important feature of the Conference for us has been the extent to which the Nine as such have coordinated their positions, affirmed their identity and acted together on the issues which arose. We hope that this unity of outlook will be maintained.
- (10) We feel it would be desirable to coordinate our positions on our respective statements at Helsinki at the final stage of the Conference. This could best be done by agreeing that each of us will draw on elements in whatever declaration we may agree on here today.

[...] <sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> This point (6) is crossed out in the original by an unidentified hand, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76939](http://dodis.ch/76939).

<sup>5</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76939](http://dodis.ch/76939). For all Irish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2903](http://dodis.ch/C2903).

[dodis.ch/76985](http://dodis.ch/76985)

France

*Memorandum from the Political Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

PROSPECTS FOR THE DÉTENTE POLICY AFTER THE FINAL PHASE  
OF THE CSCE

Paris, 18 July 1975

The CSCE was born of the détente. The idea of a Conference of European countries, floated as early as in 1954 by the USSR, only took shape with the end of the Cold War. It arrived at the same time as other measures of rapprochement, like the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, the start of the SALT and the MBFRs, which was no accident: it was the result of an unspoken link between them.

The CSCE is an important step in this process, but it will only be possible to assess its results subsequently. In the meantime, we must be wary of the ulterior motives and ambiguities it involves, and which are in large part linked to the different interpretations that arise from the very notion of Détente.

*1) The CSCE is an important step on the path of détente.*

The fact that it took place at all is an exploit in itself: the meeting of 35 Heads of State representing Europe as a whole, plus the United States and Canada, but without Albania, is an event of considerable significance. Such vast gatherings had never before been seen outside of United Nations forums.

Everyone came away more or less satisfied. It is generally considered that the main gain for the Eastern countries, and first and foremost the Soviet Union, was the principle of the inviolability of frontiers, enshrining in their eyes the political and territorial status quo in Europe. In return, the Westerners obtained the approval of a whole “basket” of measures concerning contacts between people, information, culture and education, within which individual and collective freedoms have ample room to apply. That conception is not wrong, but the reality is not so simple. The principle of the inviolability of frontiers is not the pure and simple consecration of the status quo, for several reasons. The CSCE’s Final Act<sup>2</sup> is not a treaty and does not contain legal obligations, but rather mere political and moral declarations of intent. We took great care to ensure this point of view prevailed. Moreover, we took many steps to ensure safeguards: a clause on peaceful

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archives of the French Foreign Ministry (FR-AMAE), 178QO [Europe, Allemagne, République fédérale d’Allemagne, 1974–1978], 2063. *Translated from French. In the absence of a Special Assistant for the CSCE following the appointment in January 1975 of Jacques Andréani [dodis.ch/P51175](http://dodis.ch/P51175), as chargé d’affaires for Europe, this memorandum No. 167 was written by the Political Affairs director François de Laboulaye himself, [dodis.ch/P51503](http://dodis.ch/P51503).*

<sup>2</sup> For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](http://dodis.ch/58821).

change of frontiers, clause on equal application and inter-relation of principles, reservation concerning allied rights in Berlin.

The Westerners, meanwhile, only gained the clauses in the third “basket” in exchange for those on the non-intervention in internal affairs of States, which limits their scope. However, they did manage to introduce certain principles of importance to them into the first basket, such as the self-determination of peoples and respect for human rights. For their part, the Soviets won a prestige prize with the holding of the final phase at “summit” level. They also won agreement that further meetings would be held to follow on from the CSCE, but not that these “outcomes” would take an institutional or regular form; and their own position varied on this point, so we cannot draw very clear conclusions.

All in all, satisfaction appears universal. Even the neutral and non-aligned States and the small powers underlined their interest in the rule of “consensus”, which guarantees their independence, and the holding of further gatherings to “build confidence”. It therefore seems that, in this case, confrontation has for the first time made way for broad cooperation, and the spirit of the “Cold War” for a new atmosphere of détente.

*2) The CSCE can only be judged on its results.*

As the CSCE produces no legal obligations, its conclusion can only be considered as a step forward, and not an end. It is not a result in itself. Only after a rather long “interim period”, the principle of which we worked to have accepted, will it be possible to judge if the parties have behaved in accordance with the declarations of intent they signed up to.

This point is all the more important given that these decisions hide a lot of ulterior motives and differences of interpretation. For example, it is widely admitted that the CSCE was a negotiation between independent and sovereign States, and that is stated in paragraph 65 of the Helsinki Final Recommendations.<sup>3</sup> But what is negotiation between States? For the Westerners, the expression above all means that these are not talks “between blocs” as are seen in other international forums. The Soviets have a more restrictive reading, whereby only Governments are committed to the texts of the Conference and not people or individuals (although they did have to make some concessions on this point).

Similarly, the Soviets consider that only States and not groups of States, like the European Community, the cohesion of which was however clearly expressed during the negotiations, are bound by the texts. Another question is whether the texts apply to certain territories, like Berlin, that are not clearly attached to a State. The Federal Republic of Germany, fearing the USSR’s interpretations, had a “Berlin clause” included in the texts.

Another controversial expression is that of “irreversible détente”. We were at great pains to exclude it from the CSCE’s texts, but we can be sure that the Eastern countries will re-introduce it in their commentaries. In their eyes, it means that the CSCE is the completion of a process, that of political détente, in which the status quo is enshrined definitively, stability is ensured, and we can move on to the

3 Cf. the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](http://dodis.ch/77496).

next phase: military détente. In their view, that would involve regional arms reduction, the dissolution of military alliances and the establishment of a collective security system in Europe, which appears to be their ultimate goal. The creation of a permanent body (what we would call the “institutional outcome”) would in this respect play an important role, and that is why the Soviets are so interested in it.

### 3) *The ambiguities of détente.*

We can see here the importance of vocabulary and the need for precise language. Another ambiguous expression is that of “peaceful coexistence”, which of course does not appear in the CSCE’s texts; we can, however, expect Soviet propaganda to use it abundantly. This is the very heart of the notion of détente.

For the Eastern countries, peaceful co-existence excludes armed conflict, but not the “ideological struggle”, which is even an essential aspect of it. This means exploiting the weaknesses and divisions of the adversaries by all means short of war, with the final goal of overturning Western democracy.

An extension of this expression is “peaceful coexistence between States with different social regimes”. The expression means that the use of force is excluded from relations between blocks, but not within the communist system in which a different notion of “proletarian internationalism” prevails; it is a sort of justification of the Brezhnev Doctrine. This conception is obviously unacceptable, not only for us, but also for certain Eastern States and above all Romania, which is indeed counting on the CSCE and its “outcome” to free itself from this servitude.

### *Conclusion*

We can only welcome the fact that the pan-European conference took place, that everyone broadly came away satisfied and that a step forward was made in the détente process. But it would be premature to go further and to make an evaluation of the results, which it will only be possible to judge based on practice and after the rather long interim period.

In the meantime, and from now on, the interpretation of the texts and their presentation to the public will be of prime importance. We will have to be wary of the versions that the USSR and the Eastern countries will no doubt give for propaganda purposes. They are expected to seek to push the idea that the texts, and particularly the principle of the inviolability of frontiers, are binding and have practically legal significance. They will seek to discourage public opinion and undermine the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. And, when the time comes, they will resume their demand for an “institutional outcome”, with the goal of moving towards a collective security system. Moreover, we can be sure that they will seek to reintroduce the notions of “irreversible détente” and “peaceful coexistence”, if not into the texts themselves, at least into their interpretation thereof. To shield ourselves from these dangers, concertation between Westerners and particularly between members of the Community, some of which do not appear fully aware of the traps of the language, will be of great importance.<sup>4</sup>

4 For all French documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2903](http://dodis.ch/C2903).



[dodis.ch/77196](https://dodis.ch/77196)

Israel

*Circular by the Director of the Europe I Department Yaish<sup>1</sup>*

## THE CSCE AND ISRAEL

Classified

Jerusalem, 18 July 1975

Please find attached the chapter on the Mediterranean,<sup>2</sup> which was approved by the working group established for this purpose and which, after approval by the coordinating committee, will appear in the final document of the CSCE.

The document notes “with appreciation” the concerns expressed by the non-member Mediterranean countries (Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Syria) at the conference, and that in its compilation, proposals and documents submitted by them were taken into account.

Analysis of the document proves that we have generally succeeded in the goals we set for ourselves in relation to the CSCE.

A. Despite the activities and initiatives of Austria, Malta, Yugoslavia, and Cyprus, the CSCE did not assume any role in the conflict in the Middle East, and the issue was not mentioned at all in the final document.

B. The attacks on Israel and the Arab view that we were responsible for the lack of stability and peace in the Mediterranean did not find any expression in the document.

C. On the political-security level, the principles that we also advocated in the documents we submitted were mentioned:

1. That the security of Europe is linked to the security of the Mediterranean basin.
2. That there can be no détente in Europe without détente in the Mediterranean.
3. That increasing cooperation and security in Europe should serve as an example and encourage similar processes in the Mediterranean region.

<sup>1</sup> Israel State Archives (ISA), MFA8088/5. Translated from Hebrew. This circular No. 749 was signed by the Director of the Europe I Department Nissim Yaish, [dodis.ch/P51234](https://dodis.ch/P51234), and addressed to the Israeli Ambassador in Washington Simcha Dinitz, [dodis.ch/P81366](https://dodis.ch/P81366), as well as to the heads of 15 other embassies and diplomatic representations. Copies were sent to the Director-General, Avraham Kidron, [dodis.ch/P51230](https://dodis.ch/P51230), the Assistant Director-General Ephraim Evron, [dodis.ch/P52907](https://dodis.ch/P52907), four Deputy Directors-General and several heads of department in the Foreign Ministry. For the complete list of addressees, cf. the facsimile in Hebrew, [dodis.ch/77196](https://dodis.ch/77196). This document complements Yaish's circular No. 720 dated 29 June 1975, cf. ISA, MFA6821/7. Part of the Final Act was attached to this letter, and is omitted here. For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](https://dodis.ch/58821).

<sup>2</sup> The document mentioned can be found in ISA, MFA8088/5. For the complete document of the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](https://dodis.ch/58821).

D. It is possible that mentioning the CSCE's intention to contribute to peace, security, and *justice* (our emphasis) in the region is to some extent a response to an Arab demand in its familiar form.

E. The chapter on cooperation in the areas of economy, industry, science and the environment is formulated positively but it is doubtful whether it has any practical value.

1. Malta managed to insert into the document a final clause of political significance in the spirit of the proposal it submitted in May of this year. But in fact, the elements that were unacceptable to us were removed from the original proposal and the following proposals *were not approved*:

- To apply the document to the Persian Gulf states as well
- To establish a “supervisory group” that would stimulate and encourage progress... towards political understanding and joint action. (!)
- To demand that the USSR and the USA gradually reduce their forces in the Mediterranean Sea in parallel with progress in creating a partnership between the countries of the region...

2. On the other hand, the part of the Maltese proposal that was accepted speaks of the participation of *all* the states of the Mediterranean basin in the recommended processes. By doing so, Malta opened the door to those Arab countries that have not so far expressed a desire to participate in the CSCE (Libya, Lebanon, Jordan and perhaps Iraq and Sudan). It also talks about continuing the dialogue in order to define additional common goals, encourage progress and initiatives and exchange views on the attainment of the above purposes. It is clear that these general remarks are a substitute for the original Maltese proposal to establish a “supervisory group” and institutionalize intervention in the affairs of the region.

3. From following the course of the discussions, it can be concluded that neither the Eastern bloc nor the West are interested in “encouraging and monitoring the efforts.” However, experience shows that Malta has a special talent for stirring up problems in connection with the Mediterranean issue, and we cannot tell when and in what framework it may demand the application of the fine principles contained in the document.<sup>3</sup>

3 For all Israeli documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2908](http://dodis.ch/C2908).

[dodis.ch/77060](https://dodis.ch/77060)

Canada

*Secretary of State for External Affairs MacEachen to the Cabinet*<sup>1</sup>

## CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

*Extract • Confidential*

[Ottawa,] 21 July 1975

[...] <sup>2</sup>*Background*

The background to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has been given at length in a previous memorandum to Cabinet on this subject dated June 13, 1973 (attached).<sup>3</sup> Although the initial proposal for the Conference originated with the Soviet Union, the outcome of the negotiations in Geneva has clearly not met the expectations of the Soviets. The Western states have succeeded in largely neutralizing the effects of a series of Soviet initiatives and have obtained acceptance of useful texts in areas of concern to the West, such as economic matters, science and technology, environment, human contacts, information, culture and education.

*Objectives*

2. Canada undertook its participation in the CSCE on the basis of the following general guidelines as outlined in the earlier memorandum and approved by Cabinet:

- a) to promote trade and financial relations with Western Europe and to the extent possible with Eastern Europe in the interest not only of Canada's own economic growth but also of maintaining a stable and prosperous international community;
- b) to foster cooperation with like-minded countries in Europe and to encourage freer exchanges with countries with different political and social systems in the interest of a more stable international order, greater social justice and improved environment;
- c) to expand scientific, technological and cultural relations on the basis of mutual benefit with the countries of both Western and Eastern Europe in the interest of quality of life in Canada;

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Privy Council Office fonds (RG2), vol. 6469, cabinet document 478-75, pt. 1. This memorandum signed by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen, [dodis.ch/P53713](https://dodis.ch/P53713), was sent to the Canadian Cabinet on 21 July 1975.

<sup>2</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77060](https://dodis.ch/77060).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. [dodis.ch/77081](https://dodis.ch/77081).

- d) to contribute to the security of Europe and to the lessening of tensions there in the interest of maintaining global peace and hence Canadian security; and
- e) in general, to seek concrete forms of mutually beneficial cooperation with these relatively developed countries for the purpose of diversifying Canada's external relations, reducing our vulnerability to and dependence on the USA and thus strengthening our independence, unity and identity.

In addition, Canada had a number of specific concerns that were also spelled out in the Recommendations section of that submission. The general guidelines have been met, as will be clear from the following analysis of the results of the Conference. In addition, most of Canada's specific concerns have been dealt with satisfactorily and mention of them will be made below in the review of the achievements of the Conference.

#### *Results of CSCE*

3. There are two recurring motifs that characterize the CSCE texts and that mark Western success in the face of Soviet intractability. The first is directly related to one of the main Soviet aims in calling for the Conference in the first place. From the beginning, the Soviet Union approached the CSCE as a vehicle for freezing and legitimizing the status quo in Europe, both the territorial status quo (the post-World War II boundaries) and the political status quo (the East-West division of Europe). This desire to render the European situation immutable has not been fulfilled, and instead the idea of change, of dynamic and evolving relationships rather than fixed and static ones, runs through the CSCE text as a whole like a continuing theme. This theme is particularly important in the section of the final texts dealing with the principles governing the relations between states. There the principles on inviolability of frontiers and on territorial integrity are explicitly balanced by a sentence on peaceful change – “the participating States consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement”. It is safe to assume that whatever scope and tempo of evolution the Soviet Union might be prepared to countenance in its own society and in its own way of doing things abroad, they would have preferred not to have enshrined this concept of change in a multilateral text. They finally accepted the concept only as the result of pressure from all sides which made it clear that this was one of the prices of a successful Conference.

4. The second aspect of major interest to the West is the repeated reference in the CSCE texts to contacts between private individuals and groups, as well as to those between governments and their agencies or institutions. This emphasis reflected the Western objective of encouraging freer interchange of people and ideas. The formulations on access and contacts occur in the Basket II texts on economic and environmental matters and constitute the main theme of Basket III (human contacts, information, culture and education). For the first time the Eastern European governments have agreed that such areas as human contacts and the freer flow of information are legitimate subjects for multilateral negotiation and agreement. This is of added interest because by patient persistence the West has

been able to persuade the Communist governments to accept the idea of voluntary modification of their practices. While the many texts dealing with contacts (like the rest of the Conference document) are not legally binding, a clear moral and political commitment has been undertaken by the Soviets and their allies in this very sensitive field. As in other facets of the CSCE texts, so in connection with increased contacts, a chart for future action has been laid out, in terms not just of general principles but also of specific measures.

*The Final Conference Document*

*Basket I – Principles*

5. It was recommended in the Memorandum of June 13, 1973 that Canada support the non-use of force in international disputes and avoid acceptance of any formulation which would recognize present European frontiers. This course was followed in Geneva and, as mentioned above, it proved possible to avoid the formalization of the status quo in Europe, to rule out the use of force in changing the status quo but to provide for the possibility of peaceful change. Despite the efforts of the Warsaw Pact countries to have established a special European body of international law adapted to their purposes in Eastern Europe, the declaration of the ten principles governing relations between states makes it clear that participating states are merely reaffirming doctrines to which they have already subscribed at the United Nations, and which are based on U.N. Charter “principles and purposes”.

*Basket I – Military Confidence-Building Measures*

6. Certain modest “confidence-building measures” have been agreed to at the CSCE. The principal one provides for the advance notification of major military manoeuvres. As recommended in the Memorandum of June 13, Canada has supported the development of texts in this field. Participating states have also agreed to invite, on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, other participating states to send observers to attend major military manoeuvres and to promote exchange visits of military delegations. The question of advance notification of movements as well as manoeuvres was studied but it proved impossible to reach agreement on any specific measures. The most that could be agreed was recognition in the final document that prior notification of movements would contribute to confidence-building, and thus participating states may do so at their own discretion. While these measures lie within the military field and are expressed in military terms, they are in fact political in nature; they do not in any way curtail military activities or add much to military intelligence. They may however contribute to greater political understanding by reducing the attitudes of secrecy that usually surround military matters. The West had hoped at the outset of the Conference to have much more substantial results in this area than in the event proved possible, but the call to all states henceforth to make some contribution to increasing mutual confidence is in itself a worthwhile if limited step in the process of furthering détente.

*Basket II – Economic Relations, Science and Technology, the Environment*

7. The economic aspects of the Conference have presented some problems because many of the subjects raised are more properly dealt with in other multilateral forums such as GATT, or in bilateral negotiations. Some important advances have, however, been made while, in accordance with the recommendations of the Memorandum to Cabinet of June 13, the Canadian interests in such matters as Most-Favoured-Nation status have been protected (specifically the agreed text does not contain any commitment to grant or exchange MFN treatment). In the area of commercial exchanges provisions have been agreed to which should lead to the facilitation of business contacts between East and West as well as to a significant increase in the interchange of business information (e.g., production and trade statistics, marketing information, information on national planning procedures). The texts on industrial cooperation also emphasize the importance of increased contacts and information exchange while stating that such cooperation is “motivated by economic considerations” rather than for political ends. Moving to the other aspects of Basket II, provisions directed towards facilitating direct and individual contacts between scientists and technologists have been achieved and maintained despite considerable opposition from the East. In the relatively new field of environmental cooperation, a Canadian proposal resulted in the adoption of a text aimed at “promoting the progressive development, codification and implementation of international law...” in this area.

*Basket III – Human Contacts and Information*

8. The texts that have emerged from these two sub-committees are obviously less ambitious and more qualified than the West had, for negotiating purposes, originally demanded. The Canadian concern has been to encourage the progressive reduction of barriers to freer movement of ideas and people, with an emphasis on individual initiative rather than government control. Despite the inevitable compromises resulting from difficult negotiations, the agreed texts on human contacts and information constitute a breakthrough, since it is the first occasion when the Soviet Union has allowed such matters to be discussed and agreed on multilaterally. The very fact that these texts will make up a very significant proportion of the final document will tend to undermine the Eastern argument that such questions as family reunification are of secondary importance and are attendant on politico-military developments. Of special interest to Canadians are the Canadian-sponsored text on family reunification and the text on the working conditions of journalists.

*Basket III – Culture and Education*

9. The West has succeeded in obtaining not only specific provisions for more direct contacts in these two fields between persons and between institutions, but also broader declarations of intent relating to access to, and dissemination of, information in culture and education. An innovative text on the subject of cultural diversity has been included as a result of a Canadian initiative. Taken together, the culture and education texts will be a useful instrument in the development of wider relations with Eastern European countries.

*Basket IV – Follow-up to the Conference*

10. This has been one of the most vexed questions at the CSCE, not least among our own allies. A decision on the modalities of follow-up was among the last taken at Geneva. The outcome was an agreement to hold a review meeting late in 1977, preceded by several lower level technical and preparatory meetings. This goes a fair way toward providing for a meaningful and thorough follow-up to the Conference, something which Canada has consistently favoured as part of our policy of drawing closer to Europe in the interests of diversifying Canada's external relations.

[...] <sup>4</sup>

*Public Relations Considerations*

14. Canadian policy towards the CSCE, particularly with respect to peaceful change and freedom of movement, reflects the concerns of interested sectors of the Canadian public. This policy was comprehensively set out by the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Banff '74 International Conference on Slavic Studies on September 6, 1974. <sup>5</sup> [...] <sup>6</sup>

15. [...] <sup>7</sup> It can be expected that some Canadians may voice disappointment that greater concessions were not obtained from the Warsaw Pact countries, especially in relation to Basket III items. In reply to such criticism, the point to be stressed is that the final document does not signal the achievement of détente, but rather establishes a solid and realistic basis for future steps in the process of furthering détente. CSCE was the first time that many issues, traditionally considered to be internal matters of states, were discussed multilaterally, and as such represents a notable departure from past practice.

*Conclusions*

16. The Canadian contribution to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe can be counted a success. Canadian interests were served and Canadian objectives largely met. Going beyond the expectations of many, a document has emerged from the Conference that can truly be said to meet the criterion long set by the Western participants, Canada among them – it contains balanced and substantial results.

*Recommendations*

17. It is recommended that the Prime Minister <sup>8</sup> be empowered to signify Canada's acceptance of the final document negotiated at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe by affixing his signature to it at Stage III of the Conference, to be held at Helsinki from July 30–August 1<sup>st</sup>, 1975. [...] <sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77060](http://dodis.ch/77060).

<sup>5</sup> Allan J. MacEachen, "Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe at a Decisive Stage," *Statements and Speeches*, No. 74/10.

<sup>6</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77060](http://dodis.ch/77060).

<sup>7</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77060](http://dodis.ch/77060).

<sup>8</sup> Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, [dodis.ch/P43403](http://dodis.ch/P43403).

<sup>9</sup> For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77060](http://dodis.ch/77060). For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).



[dodis.ch/76956](https://dodis.ch/76956)

United States

*National Security Advisor Kissinger to President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

## CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE)

Secret

[Washington, circa 22 July 1975]

*I. Purpose*

The *United States*, *Canada* and 33 European states will participate in the third and concluding summit phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. You and each of the other political heads of state or government will sign the CSCE's final act, and each leader will address the Conference.<sup>2</sup>

Through your presence at the Conference, you will demonstrate that the United States retains a vital interest in Europe, and that the security of the United States is tied through our participation in the Atlantic Alliance, to the stability of the European continent.

Your address to the Conference is scheduled for the morning of August 1, 1975. (Speaking order for the 35 participants was drawn by lot: Prime Minister Wilson<sup>3</sup> is first, General Secretary Brezhnev<sup>4</sup> 13<sup>th</sup> and you are 26<sup>th</sup>.) *Your speech, which will command worldwide attention, and your bilateral meetings during the conference will provide you with the very valuable opportunity to place the CSCE results in correct perspective.*

*Your purpose will be to:*

- evaluate the results of CSCE by stating that its declarations are not legally binding but, instead, represent political and moral commitments to lessen East–West tensions and increase contacts and cooperation;
- stress that while CSCE is a step forward, it is not the culmination of the process of detente, that large standing armies still oppose each other and that major differences between East and West remain to be resolved;

<sup>1</sup> Ford Library (US-GRFPL), National Security Advisor Trip Briefing Books and Cables of President Ford, 1974–1976, Box 13, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe, General (15). *This undated memorandum has been sent circa on 22 July 1975, from US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846), to United States President Gerald Ford, [dodis.ch/P47012](https://dodis.ch/P47012). Member of the National Security Council Staff Denis Clift, [dodis.ch/P81383](https://dodis.ch/P81383), sent the memorandum to Kissinger for his signature under a July 22 covering memorandum. A stamped notation on the first page reads: "The President has seen." It is a Briefing from Kissinger on the CSCE summit-level Conference that would take place from 30 July to 1 August 1975 at Finlandia Hall, Helsinki, Finland. This document is printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, *European Security*, [doc. 323](https://dodis.ch/doc/323).*

<sup>2</sup> For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](https://dodis.ch/58821).

<sup>3</sup> British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, [dodis.ch/P13688](https://dodis.ch/P13688).

<sup>4</sup> General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

- urge concrete implementation of the promises contained in the declarations, noting the importance the United States attaches to the humanitarian provisions and stating that Europe's military security problems still must be dealt with in MBFR and that SALT II must still be concluded.

## II. *Background, Participants and Press Arrangements*

A. *Background:* The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is the product of a long-standing Soviet proposal first raised in 1954 and resurrected in the aftermath of the Czech invasion in 1968. The Western governments recognized the proposal for what it was—a vehicle by which the Soviet Union hoped first to freeze the political map of Europe and then to extend its political influence westward. *The strong Soviet interest in the Conference led the West to exploit it in three ways:*

- *to gain Soviet concessions in East–West political issues.* The successful conclusion of the Berlin agreement in 1971, the agreement between East and West Germany, and the initiation of MBFR talks all were to some degree related to the linkage established by the West between progress on these political questions and the West's gradual acceptance of a CSCE.
- *to allow governments of Western Europe, both neutrals and members of NATO, to participate in the détente process.* Western governments were thus able to respond to a strongly held public feeling that relations between East and West were changing, that the process should be encouraged and that the management of the process should not be left to the US and USSR alone.
- *to introduce into the CSCE, as a condition for its successful conclusion, the issue of human rights – the so-called “freer movement” questions.*

The United States has participated in the CSCE with restraint, wishing neither to block the efforts of its Allies nor to have the CSCE seen as a source of contention between the US and the Soviet Union. Our objectives have been to maintain Alliance cohesion; to insist that the CSCE's declarations are political, not legal; and to seek such possibilities of easing tension between East and West as might be possible.

After two years of difficult negotiation, a CSCE balance sheet shows that:

- *the Soviets have achieved a CSCE.* It will be concluded at the summit, in a historically unique event. The final declarations will give the Soviets some basis to claim that Europe's frontiers have been confirmed along their present configurations, and that the political consequences of World War II have been digested and are universally accepted.
- *the CSCE results are not wholly what the Soviets wanted.* The documents are not legally binding. The statement of principles, even if the Soviets seek to lend it the color of law, by its language falls short of supporting the Soviet objective of freezing Europe's political configuration. Peaceful change of borders is allowed; the right to self determination is stated in sweeping terms. Our rights in Berlin have been preserved. *The Soviets did not get agreement to a post-CSCE European security arrangement designed to undermine NATO.*
- *beyond that, the philosophy which permeates most of the CSCE's declarations is that of the West's open societies.* The thrust implicit in the declarations is to-

ward greater human rights, the freer movement of peoples and wider access to information. In response, Warsaw Pact members have tightened internal discipline.

*Final judgment on the results of CSCE will depend*

- *initially on which side is able most persuasively to propagate its version of the CSCE and its version of future European security. The solemnity of the occasion will favor the Soviet Union, as will the simplicity of the Soviet message – that peace has arrived. The West has a more complex story to tell: that CSCE achievements are modest, that the proof of the CSCE's success lies in the future, and that a strong Allied defense posture is a precondition for security and future detente.*

*The Conference Documents. CSCE work has covered four major substantive areas, known as "baskets," concerning: political and military questions; economic, scientific and technological cooperation; cooperation in strengthening human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational relations; and post-conference follow-up arrangements.*

#### *Basket 1*

Under the first agenda item, conference negotiators have produced a declaration of the following ten principles of interstate relations:

- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.
- Refraining from the threat or use of force.
- Inviolability of frontiers.
- Territorial integrity of states.
- Peaceful settlement of disputes.
- Non-intervention in internal affairs.
- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
- Cooperation among states.
- Fulfillment in good faith of international obligations.

The Soviets were especially anxious to gain Western acceptance of an unambiguous principle on inviolability of frontiers by force. Western participants made absolutely clear, however, that their agreement to this precept would in no sense constitute formal recognition of existing European frontiers or imply that present borders are immutable. The Federal Republic of Germany, with the firm support of its NATO Allies, insisted on a reference in the Declaration of Principles to the possibility of effecting border changes by peaceful means. The United States took an active role in negotiation of this key text on peaceful border changes, which is included in the principle of sovereign equality.

Also under agenda item 1, CSCE participants have negotiated limited military security measures designed to strengthen mutual trust and confidence. Specific texts were produced on two modest but significant "confidence-building measures": prior notification of military maneuvers, and exchange of observers at those maneuvers.

*Basket 2*

Under agenda item 2, the Geneva talks have produced a series of declarations or resolutions concerned with economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation. These declarations should help broaden East–West industrial cooperation, reduce barriers to trade, increase scientific exchanges, and cooperation in the environment.

*Basket 3*

The third agenda item – Basket 3 – deals with increased human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational relations. This item was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the United States, our Allies, and the neutral states. Here we have negotiated especially sensitive issues for both East and West, partly because they deal with “ideological coexistence,” which has always been anathema to Moscow. At Geneva, agreement was reached on basket 3 texts dealing with such issues as: family reunification, family visits, marriages between nationals of different states, the right to travel, access to printed, as well as broadcast, information, improved working conditions for journalists, and stepped up cultural and educational cooperation.

*Basket 4*

Under the fourth agenda item, the conference produced a text on post-CSCE “follow-up” arrangements. The debate here turned on the degree of institutionalization and continuity to be accorded post-conference activities. The final compromise text provides for unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions designed to carry forward the work of the conference and monitor the implementation of agreed texts. A meeting of experts will be convened in the first half of 1977 to prepare for a gathering of senior officials, later the same year, to review results of CSCE and plan for possible additional meetings in the future.

*The CSCE Signing Ceremony.* The concluding ceremony at which the CSCE Final Document will be signed will take place immediately after the last plenary session at approximately 5:00 p.m. August 1, on the stage of Finlandia Hall. The 35 heads of state or government will be seated around a horseshoe-shaped table in French alphabetical order. *You will sit between FRG Chancellor Schmidt and Austrian President Kirchschräger,<sup>5</sup> and will be third to sign.* The participants will each sign once after the last item of the CSCE document.

B. *Participants:* The principal CSCE participants are listed alphabetically by country at Tab A.<sup>6</sup>

C. *Press Arrangements:* The CSCE summit will receive full press coverage.

<sup>5</sup> Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt, [dodis.ch/P15416](https://dodis.ch/P15416), and Austrian President Rudolf Kirchschräger, [dodis.ch/P15488](https://dodis.ch/P15488).

<sup>6</sup> For the attachment, cf. US-GRFPL, National Security Advisor Trip Briefing Books and Cables of President Ford, 1974–1976, Box 13, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe, General (15).

### III. *Talking Points*

1. The current working draft of your address to the CSCE summit is at Tab B.<sup>7</sup> The text is being cleared with Paul Theis.<sup>8</sup>

2. Talking points for your bilateral meetings during the course of the summit are being staffed in separate memoranda.

The accompanying Department of State briefing books<sup>9</sup> contain:

- additional CSCE background.
- biographic sketches of the CSCE participants.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Attached but not printed. For the final text of President Ford's August 1 address at the CSCE summit, cf. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford, 1975, Book II. Washington, DC 1977, pp. 1074–1081.*

<sup>8</sup> *US Executive Secretary at the Office of the President of the United States, Paul Theis, [dodis.ch/P81499](https://dodis.ch/P81499).*

<sup>9</sup> *Not attached. Papers from President Ford's briefing books for his trip are in the US-GRFPL, National Security Advisor, Presidential Trip Files, Box 10, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe, Briefing Book.*

<sup>10</sup> *For the annexes mentioned, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76956](https://dodis.ch/76956). On 8 August 1975, President Ford briefed his Cabinet on his European trip, noting: "Then we went to Helsinki. There has been criticism of the meeting. But it bolstered the West and gave a greater sense of independence to the Eastern European countries. The meeting was a definite plus. The borders were settled by treaty, most of them 30 years ago. The agreement – the Final Act – specifies self-determination and peaceful change of the borders." Kissinger also offered the Cabinet his thoughts on the conference: "CSCE was never an element of US foreign policy. We never pushed it and stayed a half step behind our allies all through the process. But we didn't want to break with our allies or confront the Soviets on it. The complaints we are seeing show the moral collapse of the academic community. They are bitching now about the borders we did nothing to change when we had a nuclear monopoly. Indeed, they beat Dulles about the head for his position. As the President said, the borders were legally established long ago. All the new things in the document are in our favor – peaceful change, human contacts, maneuver notification. At the Conference, it was the President who dominated the Conference and it was the West which was on the offensive. It was not Brezhnev who took a triumphal tour through Eastern Europe – it was the President. And even if every spectator was paid – which I don't believe – the leadership in those countries felt strongly enough about demonstrating their independence to put out so much money. Our relations now with our allies are better than ever since the early Marshall Plan days. Our relations with the Soviets – we didn't have the impression this group was on the upswing. Anyone observing from another planet would not have thought Communism was the wave of the future." Cf. US-GRFPL, National Security Advisor, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, [Box 14](#), memorandum of conversation, August 8, 1975). For all documents of the United States in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2904](https://dodis.ch/C2904).*

[dodis.ch/76940](https://dodis.ch/76940)

Ireland

*Memorandum from the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

APPROVAL OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION IN EUROPE AND ITS SIGNATURE BY THE TAOISEACH<sup>2</sup>

*Extract*

Dublin, 24 July 1975

[...] <sup>3</sup>

*Introduction*

1. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in which Ireland has participated together with 32 other European States and the United States and Canada, opened in Helsinki in July 1973. Its second stage commenced in Geneva in September 1973 and resulted in protracted drafting negotiations which were completed on Monday 21 July 1975.
2. The Final Act of the Conference, embodying a wide-ranging compendium of documents, is due to be signed in Helsinki on 1 August. It has been agreed by the Participating States that this stage should be at the highest level. Accordingly the present memorandum requests the Government to approve the signature of the Final Act of the Conference by the Taoiseach on behalf of Ireland.
3. The scope of the Final Act is wide, covering *inter alia* political relations between the participating States, military aspects of security and economic matters, humanitarian questions (including human contacts, information, culture and education). The texts agreed are annexed hereto.<sup>4</sup>
4. The Final Act is of a politically and morally, but not juridically, binding character. It is therefore not an international treaty or agreement under Article 29 of the Constitution<sup>5</sup> nor under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. The latter fact is made clear in a draft letter from the Finnish government to the Secretary-General of the UN which has been agreed.

<sup>1</sup> National Archives of Ireland (IR-NA), DT 2005/151/317. *This memorandum for the Irish Government was sent by the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Garret FitzGerald, [dodis.ch/P50840](https://dodis.ch/P50840). It was approved by the Government at its meeting on 25 July 1975 cf. the file IR-NA, TSCH 2/2/34 (GC 14/241).*

<sup>2</sup> Taoiseach (Irish "Prime Minister") Liam Cosgrave, [dodis.ch/P15295](https://dodis.ch/P15295).

<sup>3</sup> The initial two pages of this document are a brief summary of its contents and have been omitted. For the complete version, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76940](https://dodis.ch/76940).

<sup>4</sup> The annexes mentioned, not present in the facsimile, refer to the Helsinki Final Act, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](https://dodis.ch/58821).

<sup>5</sup> Bunreacht na hÉireann, the 1937 Constitution of Ireland which came into force in 1938.

*Background and Scope of the Conference*

5. Thirty five States took part in the CSCE. With the exception of Albania, all of the States of Europe, together with the United States and Canada were represented at the negotiations.
6. The initial proposal to convene the CSCE was made by the Warsaw Pact States who in 1966 proposed the convening of a Conference whose aim would be the strengthening of European security and the furthering of co-operation among all the States of Europe. Most Western countries at first were cautious about taking part in such a Conference and dubious about the aims which prompted the Warsaw Pact to propose it. It was considered that an important Soviet aim was to use the Conference to obtain formal recognition and acceptance of the political *status quo* in Europe as a whole thus consolidating Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and inhibiting the process of integration in Western Europe.
7. Subsequently, however, the political climate in Europe improved. A number of agreements between East and West helped to encourage a more favourable attitude on the part of the West to the proposed Conference. These included treaties made by the Federal Republic of Germany with Poland and the USSR in 1970 normalising their political relations, the Four Power accord on Berlin ratified in June 1972, the conclusion of agreements on increased contact and freedom of movement between the citizens of East and West Germany and the signature in December of 1972 of the Basic Treaty regularising relations between the two. Relations between East and West in the military sphere also improved. The United States and the Soviet Union successfully concluded the first phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) at Geneva, and the Soviet Union in September 1972 agreed to begin exploratory talks in Vienna between NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliances on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (MBFR). These developments combined to make the idea of a full scale Conference on Security and Cooperation more attractive.
8. Multilateral preparatory talks were held and by June 1973, agreement was reached on the agenda, date and participants for the Conference, its structure and costs. A memorandum on these matters was submitted to the Government on 15 June 1973. It was also agreed that the Conference would take place in three stages: the first stage at Foreign Minister level took place in Helsinki in July 1973. The second stage at expert level began in Geneva in September 1973, and the final third stage will take place in Helsinki from 30 to 1 August.
9. A feature of the lengthy negotiations in Stages I and II has been the close coordination of negotiations by the Nine member States of the Community in the framework of European Political Cooperation.



10. The work of the Conference was carried on in three main committees which dealt respectively with the first three chapters of the agenda. These chapters became colloquially known as the First, Second and Third "Baskets". *Committee I* dealt with political and security matters, *Committee II* dealt with economic matters and *Committee III* with humanitarian, cultural and educational questions.

In addition a fourth chapter of the agenda was concerned with Follow-Up to the Conference.

The work carried out in each of these three committees was interrelated, although the Eastern side attached more importance to the items in the First and Second Baskets and endeavoured to diminish the importance of those in the Third.

11. In practice *Committee I* was engaged on the elaboration of a catalogue of Principles, ten in all, which should guide relations between States. At first the USSR had sought to establish a selective catalogue of Principles which would have had the effect of creating a special regional code of law for Europe and in which a distinct Principle of frontier inviolability would have a primary place. The Nine and other Western States however wanted a more complete list of Principles based strictly on the UN. Charter and on other U.N. codifying documents so as to include the principles of human rights and self-determination of peoples. This position was in effect accepted. The ten principles elaborated by the Conference are as follows:

1. sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
2. refraining from the threat or use of force;
3. inviolability of frontiers;
4. territorial integrity of States;
5. peaceful settlement of disputes;
6. non-intervention in internal affairs;
7. respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;
8. equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
9. cooperation among States;
10. fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

12. The security chapter of the agenda also included certain limited proposals in the military sphere designed to give practical expression to detente. These are referred to as "confidence building measures" (CBM's). In the main, these relate to the prior notification of major military manoeuvres and the exchange of observers at manoeuvres. There is no question, however, of the Conference entering into the military sphere generally. The Irish Defence Forces are not affected by the commitments in regard to manoeuvres.

13. Committee II dealt with economic questions under the following main chapters:
  - Commercial exchanges
  - Industrial cooperation and projects of common interest
  - Science and technology
  - Environment
  - Cooperation in other areas (e.g. transport, tourism, migrant labour).
14. Although both East and West have much to gain from increased economic cooperation and trade, the fundamental differences between the Market and State Trading economies give rise to certain difficulties which the Conference had to endeavour to resolve. These related principally to the two questions of Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Reciprocity. The East wanted to secure from the West the grant of unconditional Most Favoured Nation Treatment – whereby the West would agree to extend to the East automatically and without quantitative restrictions in regard to imports, the benefit of any reduction or abolition of customs duties or charges granted to other countries. The Western countries generally and the Community in particular could not concede this demand. As regards Reciprocity the Community was anxious that the countries participating in the CSCE should subscribe to the idea that trade between countries with different economic systems should be developed on the basis of reciprocity ensuring an overall equivalence of advantages and obligations designed to achieve in negotiations with State trading countries a balance of concessions in either direction which would take account of the differences in the Eastern and Western economic and social systems between countries with different economic systems should be developed on the basis ensuring the overall equivalence of advantages and obligations and thus achieving in trade negotiations with State trading countries, a balance of concessions in either direction which would take account of the differences in the Eastern and Western Economic and Social Systems.
15. Useful texts were negotiated in regard to business contacts on cooperation in the industrial, scientific and technological fields, in regard to the environment, and on cooperation in transport matters, tourism training of personnel etc.
16. The work of *Committee III* (the “Third Basket”) concerned humanitarian and cultural questions which embrace such matters as freer movement of persons and wider dissemination of information and increased cultural exchanges. It was in these areas that Western hopes for the worthwhile results from the Conference had lain. The aim of the West was to ensure that in exchange for the commitments which the USSR had sought in the elaboration of principles of inviolability of frontiers etc. some significant concessions should be exacted from the East in regard to individual lib-

erties such as an easing of the restrictions imposed on travel by citizens of the Eastern countries, facilitation of the reuniting of families and wider dissemination of broadcast, filmed and printed information. In fact useful texts have been established in these fields, including for example improvement in the working conditions for journalists, and satisfactory commitments in regard to measures of cooperation in the sphere of culture and education were also negotiated.

17. The discussions on *Follow-Up* were concerned not only with the implementation of the undertakings arrived at but also the continuation of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference. The Nine and the West generally were concerned principally with the first aspect. The East on the other hand favoured the idea of permanent institutions of some kind. This was also attractive to some neutral countries. The Nine were firmly opposed to any such institutionalisation which apart from duplicating the U.N. in certain respects might give the USSR opportunities of interfering in the development of the Community and of the political integration of the Nine.
18. Agreement was reached on the holding of a review conference after two years which could recommend further such meetings, meetings of expert groups, or the holding of a new Conference. Consensus would however be necessary for any such recommendations. Much of the implementation measures are envisaged as taking place in the framework of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe or in UNESCO.
19. The question of a Mediterranean dimension to the Conference has been a contentious issue. A number of Mediterranean countries have pressed for extensive references to the non-participating countries of the Mediterranean basin in the documents of the Conference. Agreement was reached on a special document on the Mediterranean which goes some way to meet those wishes and, in order to obtain the consent of Malta who had put forward far-reaching proposals extending to the military field, contains a reference to the reduction of military forces, which is in fact outside the scope of the Conference.

*Evaluation of the results of the Conference*

20. We and our partners in the Nine have considered it particularly important that the results of the Conference should not be limited to a statement of principles but that they should also involve concrete measures aimed at improving contacts and cooperation in the economic and humanitarian field, both on the level of States and of individuals. The general pattern of results corresponds to this objective. The texts of the Conference for the most part relate to specific measures and areas of cooperation.
21. In regard to the Principles, the objective of the Nine was to avoid anything which might amount to a specific code of conduct for Europe, in particular any departure from existing principles accepted in the framework of the United Nations. It was particularly important to avoid any suggestion that

the Conference represented a freezing of the existing political and territorial status quo in Europe.

22. The principles as they have been drafted do not contain any innovation in relation to the principles of international behaviour as they have been defined in the framework of the United Nations and their subordination to the UN system is clearly established.
23. The recognition in the sovereignty principle that States have the right to change their frontiers by peaceful means and by agreement ensures that the declaration does not contain any implications of *immutability* of frontiers. They include a number of principles which reflect concepts which we have traditionally stressed for example the self-determination of peoples and the importance of human rights as a factor in the relationship among States.
24. The inclusion of concrete measures in the texts of the Conference was for the most part unwanted by the East. The texts on these subjects result from closely-negotiated and difficult compromises and, inevitably, their precision and degree of commitment often fall short of the standards we would desire. Nevertheless, these texts are valuable. Taken as a whole they help to situate the multilateral process on the concrete and practical level, where we would wish it, rather than on that of abstract principle.
25. In the economic chapter the recognition of the importance of reciprocity in relation to the different areas of economic cooperation constitutes an important advance. There are also valuable texts on the improvement of economic information and business contacts, on industrial cooperation, on the environment etc. It is significant that the role of private enterprise and individuals is recognised.
26. The texts on human contacts, information, culture and education are of particular importance. The CSCE has enabled certain delicate subjects, heretofore taboo, to be discussed internationally in a manner free from ideological recrimination. The texts which emerged reflect the difficulty of such negotiations. Nevertheless, they establish the validity and importance of these topics as an item on the agenda of inter-state relations. If applied in good faith they will involve improvements in the administrative practice of States in relation to key humanitarian areas and of access of individuals to information and culture. Furthermore, the texts establish guidelines for the future which are generally positive from our point of view.
27. The text on confidence-building measures, which results from a difficult compromise with the Soviet Union is considered useful by our partners in that it helps to underline the complementary relationship between military and political aspects of security. The main provision, that of the prior notification of manoeuvres of 25 000 troops or over, should contribute to forestalling the use of such manoeuvres as a means of political pressure in sensitive areas as Europe.

28. In general the fact that 35 States were able to agree on guidelines for some aspects of security and cooperation can be considered an important departure in the relationship between the participating States. The fact that these negotiations were on a basis of equality and consensus has been of value from the point of view of the neutrals whose role has been generally positive and, perhaps also of the smaller countries in Eastern Europe. The scope of the agenda and the absence of ideological confrontation can be considered a step forward in East–West relations.
29. From the point of view of Nine solidarity, the experience of the Conference has been a satisfactory one. The Conference strengthened the cohesion of the Nine, whose role, including that of the Community in the Second Basket, has been a key one, and recognised as such by the Participating States.

*Aspects of particular concern to Ireland*

30. An important concern of the Irish delegation was to avoid in the *declaration of principles* any language implying that the present frontiers in Europe are immutable or which might otherwise give rise to constitutional difficulties for us.
31. Because of the importance of peaceful change of frontiers for the German question as well as for the concept of eventual European union, our position on this question was shared by our partners of the Nine and supported by the U.S.
32. The texts of the principles as they have been agreed are acceptable to us from this point of view. On Western insistence the principle of the inviolability of frontiers has been drafted so as to refer essentially to the violent infringement of State frontiers. To avoid any suggestion of immutability, the following sentence has been inserted in the principle of sovereign equality:  
“(the participating States) consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement”.
33. The texts of the other principles which might have had constitutional implications, such as *territorial integrity* or *non-intervention in internal affairs* are sufficiently general in scope not to create difficulties for us. The Declaration as a whole does not contain any innovation on existing principles recognised in the framework of the United Nations. All the participating States agree that these principles are to be seen only as a statement of political intent and that they do not have any legal force.
34. The Minister for Foreign Affairs recommends that the Final Act of the CSCE be approved and be signed on behalf of Ireland by the Taoiseach.<sup>6</sup>
35. The Final Act is not of a juridically binding character and the State is accordingly not bound to any commitments financial or otherwise. The

6 For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](http://dodis.ch/58821).

Departments directly concerned and the Attorney General<sup>7</sup> have been kept informed of the course of the negotiations or consulted where necessary. A copy of the Memorandum has been sent to all Departments.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Declan Costello, [dodis.ch/P73370](https://dodis.ch/P73370).

<sup>8</sup> For all Irish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2903](https://dodis.ch/C2903).

[dodis.ch/77061](https://dodis.ch/77061)

Canada

*The Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE Delworth to the Department  
of External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE: STAGE III HELSINKI: BRIEFING FOR PM'S PARTY

Confidential

Geneva, 24 July 1975

Assume that general brief on Canadian objectives and participation in conference is under preparation at HQ. Hope it might include following points:

(A) Full participation in conference must be seen as visible manifestation of interest in diversifying and intensifying broad range of contacts with all European countries; from Canada's point of view CSCE not solely and simply an East/West exercise.

(B) Canadian interest in follow-up arrangements reflects continuing Canadian interest in belonging to a European forum in addition to NATO, as the only context in which direct dialogue with neutrals and Eastern Europeans can take place.

(C) Our approach to conference as a whole has been outward-looking and non-exclusive; we have wished to avoid impression of European self-preoccupation and have seen whole conference in "world dimension" recognizing it as essential that it be seen in UN context. We have felt that European problems or problems within world of Europe are important and must be dealt with on their own terms; but they must not be allowed to obscure or minimize existence of equally pressing problems elsewhere.

(D) Unlike some participants who took selective interests in work of conference, Canadian interest was spread right across board, with particular activities highlighted here and there such as sponsorship of family reunification text in human contacts, cultural diversity text in culture and a contribution to the environment text in the economic area. In general terms, it would be no exaggeration to say that Canada carried at least its full share of negotiating burden of Western side in connection with problems where our interest was shared Western one rather than specifically Canadian one. Canadian delegation was active in area of the principles and ended up as chairman of informal negotiating group through final stages of negotiations. In questions relating to military security, Canadian delegation was chairman of NATO caucus group and sponsored number of informal proposals throughout course of negotiations. We took full and active interest in economic area, recognizing that facilitation of "access and contacts" amongst

<sup>1</sup> Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs fonds (RG25), vol. 9093, file 20-4-CSCE, pt. 58. This telegram No. YTCC1540 signed by the Head of the Canadian Delegation to the CSCE Thomas Delworth, [dodis.ch/P51338](https://dodis.ch/P51338), was sent to the Canadian Department of External Affairs on 24 July 1975. For the complete list of the addressees, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/77061](https://dodis.ch/77061).



businessmen and in other related contexts could have beneficial effect on East/West relations and that this form of expansion of range of dialogue might be easier for East to accept than the sometimes more dramatic provisions in human contacts area. We feel that there is much ground to be explored and built upon in future in these economic texts. At same time this area proved sensitive to us since on some issues it highlighted differences of policy between ourselves and our European allies in the Nine. Finally, Basket III, pioneering area of conference, was of particular interest and occupied two members of Canadian delegation full time. Thus our interests and our contributions were varied.

(E) Canadian participation in negotiations has probably provided further confirmation to Europeans of our essential connections with and interest in world of Europe; this should tend to lessen any tendency to regard Canada simply as a North American adjunct to NATO with little understanding of or involvement in, say, cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe. In other words, our stake in European affairs has been broadened visibly to include more than the established NATO basis. Essentially passive posture adopted by USA throughout most of conference has resulted in Canada, with a more active and positively defined policy, showing up in a much more European way, and on a good many issues, e.g., last summer's "identification of priorities" exercise, differences in approach between Canada and USA have put Canada firmly into European camp, thus strengthening our visible identification with them.<sup>2</sup>

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2 For all Canadian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2913](http://dodis.ch/C2913).

[dodis.ch/76776](https://dodis.ch/76776)

United Kingdom

*The British Permanent Representative to the International Organisations in Geneva,  
Hildyard, to Foreign Secretary Callaghan<sup>1</sup>*

## CSCE: THE CONCLUSION OF STAGE II

Extract • Confidential

Geneva, 25 July 1975

[...]<sup>2</sup>

As I reported in my telegram No. 594 of 21 July, Stage II of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was concluded in the early hours of the morning of that day, after 22 months of extremely tough negotiations.

2. In his despatch of 29 July, 1974, which he called "The Long Haul" my predecessor<sup>3</sup> set out the background to the Conference, the different interests in play, and the tactics and procedures which had developed. I do not propose in this despatch to describe these again in any detail. Nor to analyse either the lengthy and tortuous course of the negotiations, which I hope has been sufficiently covered in telegrams and letters, or the conclusions set out in the 115 pages of Declarations, Resolutions and Recommendations which are contained in what will no doubt come to be known as the Green Book, to distinguish it from the Blue Book<sup>4</sup> of the Helsinki Recommendations which constituted the mandate for Stage II. (A summary of the various sectors is attached at Annex I.)<sup>5</sup> The results of Stage II, and their implications for all the participants, are now being subjected to careful and detailed studies which will form a separate and voluminous series. I shall confine myself to trying to highlight what seem to me to be the most important or interesting aspects of the Conference, and to offering some comments on the objectives, methods and reactions of the main delegations and groups.

1 National Archives (GB) FCO/41/1769. This despatch was signed by the British Permanent Representative to the Office of the UN and other International Organisations at Geneva, Ambassador David Hildyard, [dodis.ch/P81171](https://dodis.ch/P81171), and sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs James Callaghan, [dodis.ch/P15454](https://dodis.ch/P15454). Copies went to the British Representatives in all participating States and to the British Permanent Representatives to NATO, to the European Communities, to the UN and to the Council of Europe.

2 The introductory summary of the document's content has been omitted. For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76776](https://dodis.ch/76776).

3 Thomas Elliott, [dodis.ch/P81172](https://dodis.ch/P81172).

4 I.e. the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 8 June 1973, [dodis.ch/77496](https://dodis.ch/77496).

5 The annex has been omitted. For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76776](https://dodis.ch/76776).

*Eastern objectives and policies*

3. For many years the Soviet Union had wanted the West formally to accept, in Mr Gromyko's<sup>6</sup> words, "the political and territorial realities" resulting from the Second World War, and at the same time to subscribe to East-West détente in the limited sense which the Russians conceived of it. The Helsinki preparatory talks showed that the price of the West's agreement would be the broadening of the concept of détente to include a gradual liberalisation of contacts between people and in the fields of information and ideas. The Soviet Union was clearly anxious to limit this price as much as possible when the concrete details came to be worked out during Stage II.

4. The Soviet delegation was large (almost 100), very active and well briefed, and quick to use any bargaining weapon or to exploit any opening whether in bilateral or multilateral relations. I attach at Annex II<sup>7</sup> some notes on their personalities and tactics together with those of other main delegations, which may be of some interest in the context of future discussions. The Soviet delegation's difficulty was that in the Conference as a whole they were the demandeurs, and that after negotiating extremely toughly for a long period they were put by the Soviet leadership under a time pressure which became intense in the latter stages. Strategically they would have done better to have shown more flexibility much earlier, rather than stand firm for so long only to have to make very substantial concessions towards the end in order to ensure that Stage III could be held at the end of July. Tactically also the rigidity of their system created problems for them; they wasted a good deal of time and bargaining strength on points which realistically they could not hope to obtain, or which were of only secondary importance, apparently because they had high-level instructions, issued some time ago in very different circumstances, which were very difficult for them to change.

5. The Soviet leadership have achieved political, though not legal, recognition of the status quo; the results of the Conference are not legally binding. Also a summit meeting in July from which they will try to extract every possible propaganda advantage. No doubt Mr Brezhnev<sup>8</sup> needed this badly for his own time-table. I believe, however, that they have paid quite a high price, particularly in Basket III. It may be that they intend to take advantage of all the escape clauses which they succeeded in having included, and to pay little more than lip-service to the agreements reached. In this case they will, if the West remains determined, come under great and increasing pressure in the years to come, and may be put almost permanently on the defensive. Alternatively they may calculate that movement in the direction of greater liberalisation is inevitable, and that the conclusions of the Conference will still permit them to control the rate of evolution in order to ensure that it constitutes no serious threat in the foreseeable future. This is the official line of the professional diplomats in the Soviet delegation. Speculations in these fields are more for Her Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow<sup>9</sup> than for the delegation in Geneva, but it is clear that the Conference took a very different course from that

6 Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](http://dodis.ch/P489).

7 The annex has been omitted. For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76776](http://dodis.ch/76776).

8 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](http://dodis.ch/P15543).

9 British Ambassador in Moscow Terence Garvey, [dodis.ch/P37436](http://dodis.ch/P37436).

which the Soviet Union had originally expected, and that the Soviet authorities were thankful when at last they could extricate themselves from it.

*Co-ordination among the Warsaw Pact States*

6. The Warsaw Pact delegations co-ordinated as a group in the same way as did those of the Nine and Fifteen (NATO). I have already reported on various occasions about the divergencies within the Warsaw Pact. The Romanian delegation, who were both able and highly articulate, pursued very much their own policies and interests, to the great irritation of the Russians (and of the West in Basket III), until near the end of the negotiations. They then became far more moderate and co-operative over a wide range of issues on which they had previously been very tough; apparently as the result of Soviet pressure and Romania's growing economic difficulties. Even so the Romanians obtained a satisfactory document on the non-use of force which they regard as strengthening still further their hand against the Russians.

7. The other Warsaw Pact members all toed the line obediently, at least on major issues. Several times the Russians negotiated away points which one or other considered of great importance without informing let alone consulting them. This was particularly the case with the East Germans (Peaceful Change of Frontiers, Irreversibility of Détente, etc.) who may, however, have played up to the West Germans their resentment at the way in which they had been treated. On a few occasions one or more of the East Europeans differed from the Russians on a not very significant issue, almost always in the direction of greater inflexibility, and on minor matters such as the Easter break (which the Russians none the less made into a major political question) several were prepared to come out publicly against them. At this stage the conclusion can only be that the Russians can still crack the whip on any matter of importance and do not hesitate to do so. The Conference together with its follow-up, however, and above all the consensus rule, should gradually have an influence on relationships. And even if the Russians themselves only pay lip-service to the results in Basket III, they will find it very difficult to oppose movement towards greater liberalisation in any other Warsaw Pact country which is prepared to allow it.

*Western objectives and policies*

8. The main Western interests were on the one hand to avoid any commitments which could imply eventual acceptance of a pan-European security system or condonation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, or which could prejudice the reunification of Germany, the development of the European Communities, or the complicated position in Berlin; on the other to reduce to the maximum extent possible the barriers of suspicion and mistrust between East and West (paragraph 3 above). Their view on the latter issue was well summarised by President Kekkonen<sup>10</sup> at the opening of Stage I when he described security as a matter of opening gates rather than erecting fences. Certain US journalists like to talk in terms of winners and losers in the protracted negotiations, but in practice it was clear from the early

10 Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, [dodis.ch/P15249](http://dodis.ch/P15249).

stages that the result would be a series of compromises. The West protected its position in the political sector, with the references in the Principles to Self-Determination and to the possibility of Peaceful Change balancing that to the Inviolability of Frontiers to which the Russians attach such importance. And the references to Human Rights together with the conclusions of Basket III have ensured that these questions are now accepted as legitimate matters for international concern; a whole series of agreements have been reached and commitments, even if very often qualified, accepted.

9. It is difficult to assess from Geneva the importance of the Confidence Building Measures for which the UK delegation in particular worked so hard. Their value was always political, in reducing the huge barriers of secrecy within which the Russians, and above all the Soviet State, have always operated. I believe the Soviet negotiators when they say that although the commitment is on a voluntary basis, it will not be possible for the Soviet Union not to comply with it. There are indeed many pointers to Soviet desire to complement political with military détente in due course in order to reduce their crippling armaments bill. The results of the Conference could be a very useful first step, and an encouragement to progress in the talks in Vienna.

10. Nor is it easy to evaluate here the result of the second (Economic) Basket. The conclusions on Business Contacts and Facilities and on Economic and Commercial Information should be useful. The great battles on Most-Favoured-Nation treatment and Reciprocity ended in a draw but slightly to the advantage of the West. Possibly the most important result of all was the de facto recognition of the European Economic Community by the Warsaw Pact countries (see also paragraph 12 below).

11. The Conference could only be a stage in the process of détente, and a great deal will depend on the way in which the implementation of its results can be assessed and reviewed; thus on the continuing cohesion and determination of the West. Nevertheless, starting from the premise that the West had no practical alternative to the recognition of the status quo and that the *Ost-Verträge* had already taken a large step in this direction, I believe that we can conclude that a satisfactory price was extracted for this recognition, while the potentially awkward consequences were avoided.

#### *Co-ordination among the Nine and the Fifteen (NATO)*

12. Co-ordination among the Nine was both one of the major successes of the Conference, and a major contribution to the achievement of satisfactory results. Some heads of delegation of the Nine while intelligent and good negotiators in their own right, could be extraordinarily verbose and finicky. Both the French and the Germans in their different ways caused complications. So on a much lesser scale did at times the Dutch (see also Annex II).<sup>11</sup> Co-ordination consequently absorbed an immense amount of time which many delegations hoped to devote to other work. Nevertheless the repeated failures of those who tried to go it alone, and the effectiveness of the Nine when acting together, must, I believe, have had

<sup>11</sup> The annex has been omitted. For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76776](http://dodis.ch/76776).

their effect, including on many, although alas not all, of the French. There was a general feeling that the success of our co-ordination had given a considerable filip to the development of political co-operation in the future. At the same time the European Commission considered that it had emerged with increased status and influence vis-à-vis the State trading countries.

13. Co-ordination among the Fifteen NATO members was very good on the whole although there were moments when the Nine took so long to reach a common position that they appeared to be giving the others far too little time for adequate consideration and consultations. There were also moments when the Scandinavians felt that they had special interests, e.g. where Finland was concerned. Fortunately the Cyprus question caused very little trouble within the Alliance or indeed within the Conference at large; even the last-minute flurries over the Confidence Building Measures and representation at Stage III did not hold us up long.

14. The United States deserve a special mention. Dr Kissinger<sup>12</sup> had given instructions that the US delegation should keep in line with the Nine, indeed "half a step behind" if this were logically possible. On certain issues the US negotiated directly and effectively with the Soviet Union, e.g. at the behest of the Federal Republic of Germany over Peaceful Change of Frontiers. On others their influence and support was extremely helpful, for instance over the package deal in Basket III, and in particular on Working Conditions for Journalists. As against this Dr Kissinger's discussions on Confidence Building Measures were widely considered unhelpful, and may indeed have led to the West obtaining rather less than they could have expected on Prior Notification of Military Manoeuvres. In most sectors, however, the Americans were faithful but lack-lustre allies, determined not to allow themselves to be inveigled by the Russians into Super Power negotiations which could have been very unpopular with all the other Europeans.

#### *Neutral and non-aligned objectives and policies*

15. The neutral and non-aligned delegations stood together on many issues as the best way to ensure that their interests were taken into account. They had, of course, only a certain amount in common. They all felt to some extent out in the cold outside the main military alliances, and welcomed a conference in which they could participate as equals. They all attached crucial importance to the consensus rule. They all wanted definite arrangements for continuing the multilateral dialogue, and indeed most would have liked to see some form of institutionalisation. On this as on many questions the Romanians behaved more as a non-aligned country than as a member of the Warsaw Pact. On other issues some of the neutrals, particularly the Swedes and the Swiss, were clearly Western in outlook. And in Basket III the Russians said quite rightly that there were no neutrals. Unfortunately at times personalities counted more than policies with usually unhelpful results. In general, however, both neutrals and non-aligned were of considerable assistance to the West, and it remained a cardinal point of Western policy to ensure close and continued consultations with them.

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12 US Secretary of State Henri Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846).



*Malta and the Mediterranean States*

16. I shall not recount again in this despatch Malta's efforts to extend the scope of the Conference to include the non-participating Mediterranean States, and her success in extracting general agreement at the last moment, both to the continuation and amplification of the dialogue with these States, and to the inclusion in the document on the Mediterranean of a reference to lessening tension and to reducing armed forces in the region. This operation was certainly important as an illustration of the use or misuse which can be made of the consensus rule. It remains to be seen how successful it will prove in practice. Also, what effect Malta's behaviour will have on the other participating States and their attitude to future meetings.

*The follow-up to the Conference*

17. After a battle in the corridors it was decided that both the preparatory meeting and the meeting of the representatives of Foreign Ministers in 1977 should take place in Belgrade rather than in Helsinki as the Russians wished, or one meeting in each capital as was suggested at one time. Politically this could be a very interesting and important time for Yugoslavia. If there is to be a satisfactory review of the implementation of the results of the Conference, preparatory work will have to be well co-ordinated and begun in good time. Consideration is now being given both by delegations and in capitals to the most effective procedures.

*The UK contribution*

18. I have left until last the contribution which the UK delegation was able to make. In recent years at least we have been apt to be more modest than other countries about our achievements. There is no doubt, however, that particularly in the later phases of the Conference, the delegation played a considerable role in almost every sector.

19. We played a major role in the drafting of the Final Act proper.<sup>13</sup> In Basket I we were tough on Principles but ready with helpful suggestions and compromises, while on Confidence Building Measures we had the leading part throughout. In Basket II (Economic) we were prominent in paving the way for agreement, and were specially thanked by the representatives of the European Commission for the support and assistance which we had given them. In Basket IV (Follow-up) we also helped considerably towards the achievement of a compromise solution. It was in Basket III, however, that we made the biggest impact with our initiative for a package deal which led to a breakthrough after many months of impasse. Our concept of exploiting the time pressure on the Russians to confront them with a choice between making rapid and substantial concessions, but with an assurance that these represented the outer limit of the commitments which they would be called on to accept, or indefinite delay with no assurance that better terms would eventually be forthcoming, proved highly successful, and had a significant influence on the negotiations in all other sectors.

<sup>13</sup> For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](http://dodis.ch/58821).



20. One should not exaggerate the part which any Western delegation could play either in achieving results or in speeding up the work of the Conference. As I have emphasised in paragraph 12 above, by far the most important factors were the unity and determination of the Nine and the Fifteen. Nevertheless I am sure that the relatively satisfactory results of the Conference, and the fact that it was terminated in time for Stage III to take place in July, were due at least as much to us as to any other Western participant. I should like to pay warm tribute to all who participated in the work of the delegation in the course of the three long years since the early days at Dipoli, and particularly to the skill, imagination and endurance of those who formed part of it during the last gruelling months.<sup>14</sup>

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**14** For full details of British involvement in the CSCE, cf. Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO): Series III, vol. II: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975. For all British documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2898](http://dodis.ch/C2898).

[dodis.ch/38867](https://dodis.ch/38867)

Switzerland

*Speech by President of the Confederation Graber at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki*<sup>1</sup>

[CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE]

Helsinki, 30 July 1975

Allow me first to express my sincere gratitude to our Finnish hosts for their warm welcome. I would like to tell them how pleased I am to be here once again. The affinity between Switzerland and Finland is deeply rooted. It makes us particularly receptive to the spirit of this country, which, like the music of Sibelius, is marked by unostentatious grandeur and serenity.

Switzerland, located at the crossroads of three cultures that have earned the old continent its universal renown, *has always been vibrant with European life*. Throughout its seven centuries of history, it has shared in its splendours and tribulations.

As I stated from this same podium two years ago,<sup>2</sup> my country's *neutrality* has never been an excuse for a policy of empty chairs, indifference, or isolationism. On the contrary, it has dictated a concern for solidarity and the ambition to be ready, at all times and within its means, to serve the international community.

Having itself had the historic opportunity to overcome the antagonisms of race, language, and religion that caused conflict among its neighbours, Switzerland viewed their conflicts as fratricidal struggles. It ardently desired their reconciliation. It welcomes their cooperation today. But its interest has not been limited to this immediate horizon: we have always called for harmony *throughout Europe*. Our refusal to join alliances or coalitions was thus, at its core, a response to a broader European calling.

That is why we are delighted to see *the option of neutrality* included in the chapter on the principles that should govern relations between our states. Neutrality is thus recognised as a specific instrument of European security and cooperation.

Yet our desire for openness is far from being limited to the circle of states present here today. If we want Europe – which in the past has too often been a source of universal strife – to become a clear zone of peace and enterprise, it is also so that it can devote more attention, energy, and resources to the priorities of our time,

<sup>1</sup> Swiss Federal Archives CH-BAR#E2812#1985/204#228\* (4). *Translated from French. This speech was held by the Head of the Federal Political Department (FPD), President of the Swiss Confederation Pierre Graber, [dodis.ch/P4171](https://dodis.ch/P4171), on 30 July 1975. According to the Federal Council's decision No. 1433 of 20 August 1975, [dodis.ch/38883](https://dodis.ch/38883), it was published together with the text of the Helsinki Final Act in the Federal Gazette, 1975, II, in German, French and Italian, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](https://dodis.ch/58821). This document was also published in French in: Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS), vol. 26, doc. 158, [dodis.ch/38867](https://dodis.ch/38867).*

<sup>2</sup> *Speech by Federal Councillor Graber of 5 July 1973, [dodis.ch/38846](https://dodis.ch/38846), at the Ministerial Meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki (Phase I). Cf. also QdD 30, doc. 55, [dodis.ch/38816](https://dodis.ch/38816).*

which is to guide towards development and well-being the multitudes who are still deprived of the goods that almost all of us have in abundance.

Emphasis has been placed on the profoundly *original* nature, in more ways than one, of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Indeed, this is the first time that the leaders of all the member countries of the European family have come together, joined by those of the two great North American democracies, linked to it by a vibrant community of origin and destiny.<sup>3</sup>

Unlike certain diplomatic conferences of the past, the CSCE was prepared, convened, sat, deliberated, adopted its resolutions, and concluded its work today on the basis of *the sovereign equality of the participating states*. This principle found its eloquent expression in the practice of consensus. While it did not simplify the discussions in Geneva,<sup>4</sup> such a system had the merit of allowing delegations from all countries, large and small, to freely express their views and actively participate in the drafting of a common political document.<sup>5</sup> In our view, this is a perfectly legitimate prerogative, but one that must be balanced by responsible and measured behaviour.

For us Swiss, the essential virtue of the sovereign equality of states is that it in turn conditions the supreme principle of *national independence*.

What is independence for though? First, of course, to conduct our relations with other countries freely and in accordance with international rules. Yet just as importantly, it is to build and develop our own community based on *a certain idea we have of the human person*, their dignity, their needs, and their purpose – in a word, their *happiness*.

Another original feature of the CSCE is to establish more comprehensive and secure structures in inter-European relations, but also to facilitate, develop, and harmonise human relations in each of our countries and across their borders.

In our view, these are inseparable. For there can be no individual freedoms without national sovereignty, just as the independence of the state finds its primary justification in the full development of the *individual*. That is why we recognise the CSCE's achievement in raising *human rights* to the level of the ten principles that are to govern mutual relations between participating states. Because each of these rules is expressly recognised as having equal value, respect for fundamental freedoms can thus become a positive contribution by the Conference to the system of relations between states. As a result, respect for such a solemnly enshrined principle now has the same importance in the European consciousness as respect for the inviolability of borders.

It was precisely for such reasons that Switzerland considered, from the outset, that the chapter on human contacts and information would be an indispensable element of the CSCE.

At first glance, we must admit that the results appear modest. They certainly do not live up to the hopes that some had nurtured. The texts that have been

<sup>3</sup> For the bilateral talks of President Graber during the third phase of the CSCE in Helsinki, cf. DDS, vol. 26, doc. 160, [dodis.ch/38322](https://dodis.ch/38322).

<sup>4</sup> For the Geneva negotiations, cf. DDS, vol. 26, doc. 57, [dodis.ch/38848](https://dodis.ch/38848), QdD 30, doc. 69, [dodis.ch/38858](https://dodis.ch/38858), and the thematic compilation [dodis.ch/T1409](https://dodis.ch/T1409).

<sup>5</sup> For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](https://dodis.ch/58821).

drafted are too often vague and accompanied by reservations that further limit their scope.

And yet! The fact that such sensitive issues could be addressed and discussed frankly at the diplomatic level between countries with different political, economic, and social systems is in itself a positive development. And the fact that the same countries were able to agree on texts that at least have the merit of existing is a further source of hope. Here more than elsewhere, we must guard against the temptation to think in terms of all or nothing. That is why excessive ambition had no place in the political reality of Europe. Nevertheless, a lack of ambition would have been a betrayal of the very objectives we had set ourselves. Under these circumstances, we can say that the document before us represents a first *point of reference*. Only time will tell what it is worth.

In other words, tomorrow the provisions that we are about to solemnly adopt in this area, as in others, will have to be translated into action. Their implementation will reveal the degree of willingness on the part of the states represented here to give concrete substance to the framework that has just been outlined.<sup>6</sup>

The progress that will be made in the vast field of human relations, that is, those experienced at the individual level, aimed at breaking down barriers in Europe, will play a particularly revealing role in our assessment of the outcome of the Conference itself.<sup>7</sup>

We hope, for example, that certain problems which have proved particularly difficult – I am thinking especially of all the human tragedies resulting from the separation of families – will in future find solutions in the appropriate multilateral or bilateral frameworks which are in keeping with this spirit.

In another area – one to which we also attach great importance – that of *information*, we hope that its wider dissemination and freer access, as well as the work of journalists, will be facilitated and that this will gradually put an end to a situation that is still far from satisfactory everywhere.

It is the same concern to give concrete expression to the principles intended to govern relations between participating states that has prompted us to present a *detailed plan for the peaceful settlement of disputes*.

Unfortunately, the discussions in Geneva revealed that certain features of this project, particularly the binding nature of the decisions, or simply of the procedure, were not yet acceptable to everyone. This has in no way discouraged us in our efforts. We note for the time being that the Conference has, on the one hand, given the 35 participating countries the opportunity to discuss, for the first time and in depth, an idea that has always been one of the cornerstones of our foreign policy. On the other hand, the follow-up to the Conference and the specific mandate we have received on this subject will enable us to resume the study and development of such a system in two- or three-years' time.

6 Cf. DDS, vol. 26, doc. 177, [dodis.ch/38875](https://dodis.ch/38875).

7 For an assessment of the CSCE, cf. the report of the Swiss Delegation to the CSCE dated 7 July 1975, [dodis.ch/38868](https://dodis.ch/38868), and the memorandum from the FPD's Political Secretariat dated 8 July 1975, [dodis.ch/38869](https://dodis.ch/38869), which the Federal Council took note of in its decision No. 1230 of 9 July 1975, [dodis.ch/74267](https://dodis.ch/74267). Cf. also the report from the Head of the Swiss Delegation to the CSCE and Legal Advisor to FPD Rudolf Bindschedler, [dodis.ch/P1396](https://dodis.ch/P1396), dated 29 August 1975, [dodis.ch/38870](https://dodis.ch/38870).

This time, we will be able to envisage the realisation of our project with a better chance of success. Some have found it too ambitious, others not fully developed. Be that as it may, in our view it still has the merit of attempting to organise what we call peace, security, and détente; of giving these general concepts real, concrete content and, why not say it, a new dimension.

Finally, in the *economic sphere*, the CSCE, although essentially political in nature, has endeavoured to facilitate transactions, build confidence, and foster a better spirit of industrial, scientific, and technical cooperation between our states. For a country such as Switzerland, which is more dependent than any other on the growth of world trade, any measure designed to promote the free movement of goods is welcome. We hope that efforts in this area will continue, with a view to achieving a judicious balance between reciprocal rights and obligations.

Mr. President,<sup>8</sup> Distinguished High Representatives,

It would undoubtedly be unfair to measure the concrete results that have been achieved against the generous but fragile hopes that the announcement of the Conference had raised in some quarters. It is clear – and we have never doubted this – that establishing security and cooperation in Europe, a region which, more than any other in the world, has been ravaged by war and divided by mutual mistrust, is a *long-term undertaking*. It requires unwavering goodwill on the part of all participating states and will continue to demand the most considerable efforts.

I will therefore refrain from making any premature judgments on the texts that have been painstakingly drafted in Geneva. *Ultimately, these texts will be worth what their implementation is worth.*

It is therefore less today than in the months and years to come that we will be able to appreciate their true value.

For the time being, what is needed above all is a *new spirit* in international relations; it is that the solemnly proclaimed principles – above all those enshrining the full independence of states, non-interference in their internal affairs, the non-use of force or threat of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes and, of course, respect for human rights – that all these principles, I say, be translated tomorrow into action in the daily behaviour of the powers.

But let us make no mistake: if things were to continue as they too often have in the past, that is to say, if small countries remained exposed to pressure from larger ones, then the Conference would undoubtedly have failed in its efforts to establish security in Europe. What is certain is that such security is hardly compatible with the continued strengthening of military capabilities on our continent. The current state of play at conferences devoted to arms reduction or limitation in any case confirms that a national defence adapted to the challenges of modern warfare remains an absolute necessity for a country like ours.

For all these reasons, I would conclude by saying that the results we are about to endorse are both *little and much*. *Little*, if we consider them in isolation and as the end point of a long and difficult exercise. *Much*, if they could be the sign and promise of a truly new era in international relations.

8 The Holy See's Minister of Foreign Affairs Agostino Casaroli, [dodis.ch/P42817](http://dodis.ch/P42817).

For our part, we await such an outcome with *optimism* commensurate with the progress that has already been made. Yet also with *realism and caution*. We have always believed that it was not the climate of détente – beneficial though it may be in itself, as an antidote to the Cold War – that would magically bring about the security to which all the peoples we represent here aspire, but rather the opposite.

It is in this spirit that I express the hope that the long deliberations of the Conference, which are being solemnly concluded today, will have a lasting impact on the events of tomorrow.<sup>9</sup>

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9 For all Swiss documents in this volume, cf. [dodis.ch/C2935](https://dodis.ch/C2935).

[dodis.ch/75720](https://dodis.ch/75720)

Austria

*Speech by Federal Chancellor Kreisky at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE

*[Helsinki, 31 July 1975]*

As spokesperson for the Austrian Federal Government, I feel particularly obliged to thank President Kekkonen<sup>2</sup> and the Finnish Government for going to such great lengths to host this conference, which is unprecedented in the history of this continent. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union<sup>3</sup> advocated this idea with great urgency, and President Kekkonen took it up. And here in Helsinki, this idea has taken political shape for the first time through the will of 35 states.

I believe we should be clear that this conference is only possible because the two great powers – thanks to the willingness of the President of the United States, Gerald Ford,<sup>4</sup> despite all the dangers – have been able to continue the policy of détente in such a consistent manner.

The organisational achievements in preparing and holding the conference are admirable.

However, I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Switzerland for its proven contribution over many months to the organisation of the second phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We find it very encouraging that two of the smaller countries have been given the honour of organising two such important phases of this major conference.

The Final Act that we are signing here is a code of conduct between states in this era.<sup>5</sup> These documents appear to be unique in terms of their content, scope and nature. Certainly, they are rooted in old principles that are already contained in deeds, conventions and charters. However, they are also based on the experiences of nations in recent decades and the human and political needs of our time.

<sup>1</sup> Austrian State Archives/Archiv der Republik (AT-OeStA/AdR), BMAA, Zl. 808/123-II-7/75. Translated from German. This file contains a photocopy of the original manuscript of the speech delivered by Austrian Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, [dodis.ch/P2507](https://dodis.ch/P2507), which he had been working on until 31 July 1975. It was added to the files on 4 August 1975 by Foreign Ministry (BMAA) Legation Secretary Christian Zeileissen, [dodis.ch/P52037](https://dodis.ch/P52037). Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had been fine-tuning his speech manuscript until shortly before his appearance. This is evident not only from the handwritten corrections and additions in the first part of the speech, but also from the final passages of the speech, which were added in a different font. Ultimately, it was one of the most pronounced Western statements.

<sup>2</sup> Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, [dodis.ch/P15249](https://dodis.ch/P15249).

<sup>3</sup> Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

<sup>4</sup> Gerald Ford, [dodis.ch/P47012](https://dodis.ch/P47012).

<sup>5</sup> For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](https://dodis.ch/58821).



As extensive and magnificent as this work might be, it will depend<sup>6</sup> on how much reality we are able to give to it all.

This conference, however, is the result of a process of détente that has already taken place, which – we are so immodest as to claim – began with the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty.<sup>7</sup> For beyond its significance for the Austrian people, the Austrian State Treaty was a signal visible far and wide that it is once again possible to achieve substantial and lasting results at the negotiating table between the powers.

It has taken a long time from then to now, but we nevertheless find it remarkable that this continent has rarely known a quarter of a century without war in its history.<sup>8</sup>

And that is why we regard this conference as the conclusion of a first, but very decisive phase.<sup>9</sup> From this conference onwards, the policy of détente must begin; it must now show visible and substantial results. And here, a number of questions seem to us to be of particular importance.

Firstly, in the world in which we live, space and time seem to have been overcome to an unprecedented extent. This also applies to the lives of peoples and thus to world politics – there can therefore be no theatres of war far from Europe, no centres of tension in which Europe could remain uninvolved.

The policy of détente has thus become indivisible. And so I believe that we who are gathered here have a duty to do everything in our power to help calm a dangerous area of tension that is close to Europe.

In many respects, the Middle East has been the cradle of our culture. The mere fact that the great religions originated there and that much of our civilisation was adopted from there establishes a close relationship that is binding. And that is why<sup>10</sup> to the governments of the Arab states and Israel, a call on them to do everything in their power to resolve their conflicts peacefully, although we are well aware of the difficulty of the problems. There must be a way that respects the rights of both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples equally.

Closely related to this is a problem that is particularly relevant to Europe. A large group of European industrialised countries that feel they belong to the Western world are still 98% dependent on oil supplies, mainly from the Middle East, and since oil is a special kind of raw material, we must very quickly find a way to establish constructive cooperation between Europe and the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. This cooperation must involve more than just buying and selling. A special kind of cooperation needs to be established.

6 *Handwritten addition by Chancellor Kreisky: – and this has been repeatedly said yesterday and today –.*

7 *The Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria was signed in Vienna during a brief phase of East–West détente on 15 May 1955 after almost nine years of negotiations and, mostly Soviet, foot-dragging. It stipulated the withdrawal of Soviet and Western forces from Austria.*

8 *This formulation allowed to omit Soviet military intervention in Hungary 1956 and invasion in Czechoslovakia 1968.*

9 *Handwritten addition by Chancellor Kreisky: namely the introduction and preparation of the policy of détente in Europe.*

10 *Handwritten addition by Chancellor Kreisky: this conference shall be a reminder.*

Given that the energy problem is now a pressing issue and that Eastern Europe still produces more energy resources than Western Europe, at least for the time being, it seems reasonable to us that European cooperation should focus in particular on preparing the concept of a pan-European energy industry.

Another problem of current importance – one that I have spoken about many times – is the expansion of the European waterway system. Here, it will be important in the coming years to find solutions, particularly with regard to the European Canal, which is important for nine European countries.<sup>11</sup>

The European economy is characterised by integration efforts on a scale never seen before. These efforts reflect the current state of development of our productive forces and means of production. An important test of our efforts<sup>12</sup> will be how quickly we can achieve a genuine and constructive rapprochement between the two European integration systems.

I would therefore like to briefly outline an area of cooperation that is particularly important to me. The aid provided by industrialised countries to 130 countries in 1974 is estimated at approximately 38 billion dollars. As considerable as this sum is, it clearly does not seem to be sufficient to provide the development aid that is needed. The industrialised countries must be prepared to make a much greater effort here and must set themselves the goal of creating an infrastructure in the developing countries that will protect the people of these countries from falling into hunger and misery. I know that my country has not yet fulfilled these obligations to the extent that it should, but I have come to the conclusion that we could all fulfil these obligations more easily if they were part of a large-scale, concerted continental effort. Only in this way will we strengthen the developing countries economically and bring them up to a level that will allow them to enter into a genuine partnership with the industrialised world. Only in this way will we create a system of economic interdependence, which alone is the surest guarantee of peaceful development.

I am talking about a European plan for cooperation with other parts of the world.

And so I would like to turn finally to a political and psychological question of the utmost importance. The greatest difficulties in preparing for this conference lay in the deep mistrust that people feel towards power and its brutal manifestations. And that is why there have been such lengthy discussions about the humanitarian sphere.

The success of our efforts will depend above all on whether we succeed in eliminating this mistrust, if not completely, then at least to a minimum. Not that we want to harbour the illusion that there will be no disputes in the future about what we agree here. However, it seems crucial that we always find a way to resolve any disputes that may arise about this or that.

We do not have much time before the next conference in 1977: time passes quickly, and so we must set to work the day after this conference to do what we need to do if this conference is to have any meaning.

<sup>11</sup> *Handwritten addition by Chancellor Kreisky: in the West, in the middle and in the East of Europe.*

<sup>12</sup> *Handwritten addition by Chancellor Kreisky: for cooperation.*

The documents presented to us for signature repeatedly refer to our desire to cooperate despite the diversity of social systems that exist in Europe. What are these different systems we are talking about? Here, too, a word of clarification from my side is necessary. Hundreds of millions of people live in countries that are deeply committed to the idea of political democracy, and hundreds of millions more live in countries where the political ideas of communist parties have been realised, whereas the autonomous developments in some states are highly remarkable. It would make little sense to downplay or even ignore the fundamental differences between these various political systems and social orders. It is therefore very welcome that it is repeatedly clarified that coexistence – by which we mean the form of peaceful relations that is possible today – cannot be regarded as valid in the ideological sphere. I welcome this clarification, because the democratic states are also determined to promote the idea of democracy more and more, and we believe that democracy is in itself such a creative form of government that, within its framework and in strict accordance with its principles, major social reforms have taken place and will continue to take place in the future.

We are therefore prepared for this controversy and we welcome the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, not least because the principles that have been developed should allow this global debate to take place in a peaceful manner. In any case, this is how we understand the passage in the Declaration of Principles that refers to the right of each participating state to freely choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural system.

From the very beginning, Austria has been committed to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. For we know from our own experience how important it is to have a relaxed continent.

If it exists, then we lie at the heart of this continent as a flourishing community and a safe home for its people; if it does not exist, then we lie in the gloomy shadow of a military and political demarcation line, we lie in the shadow of a demarcation line that runs through the whole of Europe and becomes the dividing line between its military and political systems. You will therefore understand why Austria wants to contribute everything it can, why, despite being free of illusions, we are so positive about the idea of détente: an important first phase has been completed, and a new, even more fruitful one must begin after Helsinki.<sup>13</sup>

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13 For all the Austrian documents in this volume, cf. [dodis.ch/C2929](http://dodis.ch/C2929).

[dodis.ch/76762](https://dodis.ch/76762)

Portugal

*The Portuguese Ambassador in Washington, Themido, to Minister  
of Foreign Affairs Melo Antunes<sup>1</sup>*

[HELSINKI CONFERENCE AND AMERICAN PARTICIPATION]

Encrypted

Washington, 4 August 1975

The Helsinki Conference and American participation were viewed here without enthusiasm and in many cases with reservations and scepticism. Solzhenitsyn's statements<sup>2</sup> and the Portuguese case contributed to increasing criticism of the official American position. Ford<sup>3</sup> and Kissinger<sup>4</sup> have found it necessary to adopt a defensive stance. Virtually all articles and editorials published here on the subject allude critically to the alleged Soviet intervention in our affairs, emphasizing, based on election results<sup>5</sup> and popular demonstrations, that our people do not want to be communist. Just yesterday, James Reston<sup>6</sup> in the NYT said that Portugal and the Middle East constitute real tests to détente. Newspapers also reported that the British Prime Minister<sup>7</sup> had told Brezhnev<sup>8</sup> that the spirit of détente must first be confirmed in Portugal. News reports add that Wilson and other Western politicians told His Excellency the President of the

1 Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal (PL-DAR), PT/AHD/S16A1P1/PEA/1-1975/88082. Translated from Portuguese. This encrypted telegram No. 634 was signed by the Portuguese Ambassador in Washington João Manuel Hall Themido, [dodis.ch/P81221](https://dodis.ch/P81221), and concerns the reservations of the American press regarding the US and the Helsinki Conference, with the situation in Portugal to be a key test to the spirit of détente. The decade Themido spent as Ambassador in Washington encompassed the final years of the dictatorship and the early years of Portuguese democracy. Unless other ambassadors of the ancient regime, Themido was allowed to keep his position in Washington as a sign of stability given by the new Portuguese regime to the US. This telegram was sent from the Portuguese Embassy in Washington to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs Ernesto Augusto de Melo Antunes, [dodis.ch/P52050](https://dodis.ch/P52050), in Lisbon, where it was received on 4 August 1975 at 11:45 p.m. Melo Antunes ceased to be Minister of Foreign Affairs days later, with the fall of the 4<sup>th</sup> provisional government. He was one of the political strategists of the revolution and the main ideologue of the Armed Forces Movement.

2 In its first speech delivered to a Western audience since his exile, the Russian writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, [dodis.ch/P47624](https://dodis.ch/P47624), had recently scolded the US for its concessions to Soviet communism in the name of "détente".

3 United States President Gerald Ford, [dodis.ch/P47012](https://dodis.ch/P47012).

4 US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846).

5 The results of the first free elections held in Portugal after the fall of the dictatorship took place the 25<sup>th</sup> the April 1975. The Portuguese Communist Party, [dodis.ch/R29469](https://dodis.ch/R29469), only got 12,5% of the votes. The winning parties were the socialists (Socialist Party, [dodis.ch/R30414](https://dodis.ch/R30414), with 37,9%) and the popular democrats (Popular Democratic Party, [dodis.ch/R31096](https://dodis.ch/R31096), with 26,4%).

6 Vice-President of the New York Times James Reston, [dodis.ch/P15060](https://dodis.ch/P15060).

7 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, [dodis.ch/P13688](https://dodis.ch/P13688).

8 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

Republic<sup>9</sup> with “the most brutal frankness” their displeasure with “totalitarian tendencies in Lisbon.” Finally, I note that the NYT yesterday, in one of its editorials, again expressed scepticism about the Helsinki conference, adding that it seemed symptomatic that when the summit began, “a leftist military man in Lisbon” was announcing the need to use force to repress the majority of the Portuguese people who want democracy and not a communist dictatorship.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Marshall Francisco da Costa Gomes, [dodis.ch/P47036](https://dodis.ch/P47036), member of the National Salvation Junta which assumed power in Portugal after the Carnation Revolution on 25 April 1974. Following general António Spínola, [dodis.ch/P51721](https://dodis.ch/P51721), resignation in September 1974, he was named President of the Portuguese Republic until the first Presidential elections took place in 1976.

<sup>10</sup> For all Portuguese documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2897](https://dodis.ch/C2897).

[dodis.ch/76900](http://dodis.ch/76900)

Poland

*Circular from Deputy Foreign Minister Kułaga<sup>1</sup>*

[CSCE FINAL ACT]

Secret

Warsaw, 5 August 1975

1. The joint resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party and the Presidium of the Government of 4 August, confirming the compliance of the CSCE Final Act<sup>2</sup> with the vital interests of Poland, expressed the will of the Polish People's Republic to comply with the resolutions of the Conference and to act consistently – together with its allies and friendly countries – towards their full implementation.

2. The CSCE resolutions cover the entirety of inter-state relations in Europe in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and confirm the inviolability of the political and territorial realities of Europe.

The CSCE is of fundamental importance for the further strengthening of European security based on the recognition of these realities. Its resolutions have not been questioned by any country, and all have emphasised its historical significance.

The SC's achievement is causing the third phase of the CSCE to be dominated by the issue of security, which was a priority for us, rather than the issues of the "third basket".

Admittedly, the Final Act is not formally an international agreement, but its signing at the highest level gives it enormous weight. We believe that it is a political and moral commitment on the part of the Conference participants.

3. The speeches of the SC – with the exception of Romania – were united in character. They emphasised the importance of political and territorial realities in Europe as the basis for security, stressing the priority of the Declaration on Principles of Inter-State Relations. The role of economic cooperation in creating a material security structure was emphasised, and a willingness was declared to further expand cultural and other cooperation (from the "third basket") on the basis of respect for sovereignty and non-interference.

Poland strongly highlighted the significance of the principles of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. The adoption of these principles means renounc-

<sup>1</sup> Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (PL-AMSZ), ZD 59/78, w. 56, t. 388. Translated from Polish by Anna Sadowska. This cipher telegram No. 6579 is a circular signed by the Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugeniusz Kułaga, [dodis.ch/P50490](http://dodis.ch/P50490). It was sent to the Polish embassies in Europe as well as to the Polish representations in the USA, Canada, Mexico, Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Chile, Japan, Syria, Morocco and Tunisia.

<sup>2</sup> For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](http://dodis.ch/58821).

ing once and for all territorial claims, which have been a source of conflict in the past.

Ceauescu<sup>3</sup> presented the well-known programme of Romanian foreign policy with some demagogic accents.

4. A number of Western leaders pointed out that the CSCE Act is not a substitute for a peace treaty and that its provisions are not legally binding under international law.

5. The German problem became clearly apparent *only in* the speeches of both German states, the three Western powers and Poland.

Schmidt<sup>4</sup> stated that the FRG's goal remained to work towards such a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation would regain its unity through free self-determination. He presented an interpretation of the principle of the inviolability of borders as limited to the prohibition of violating them by force and supplemented by a formula for their peaceful modifications.

The USA, France and Great Britain limited themselves in the German question to reiterating their rights and responsibilities regarding "Berlin and Germany as a whole". They also stated that the CSCE resolutions must be applied to Berlin, which would be treated as one of the most important gauges of easing of tensions.

6. Much attention was devoted to the problems of curtailment of the arms race and the need for disarmament. The hope was expressed that the success of the CSCE would facilitate the Vienna negotiations.

In none of the Western statements was there presented an in-depth vision of the future security system of Europe.

Social Democratic leaders, especially Wilson,<sup>5</sup> Palme,<sup>6</sup> Kreisky,<sup>7</sup> Jorgensen<sup>8</sup> as well as Trudeau<sup>9</sup> and the Swiss President Graber,<sup>10</sup> stood out among those Western statesmen who emphasised the issue of individual rights as a fundamental element of easing tensions.

7. Ford<sup>11</sup> emphasised the US's determination to continue to participate fully in European affairs. He confirmed his commitments to his allies. He devoted a lot of attention to military issues and the "third basket".

8. Due to the uncontroversial nature of the proceedings, neutral and non-involved states, unlike in previous phases, did not have the opportunity to demonstrate a different face.

9. In conversations, present the view that the CSCE is a success of all forces advocating peace and easing of tensions. Emphasise the proactive role of the SC and their constructive approach in all phases of the Conference.

3 Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu, [dodis.ch/P15499](http://dodis.ch/P15499).

4 Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt, [dodis.ch/P15416](http://dodis.ch/P15416).

5 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, [dodis.ch/P13688](http://dodis.ch/P13688).

6 Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, [dodis.ch/P15501](http://dodis.ch/P15501).

7 Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, [dodis.ch/P2507](http://dodis.ch/P2507).

8 Danish Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen, [dodis.ch/P51204](http://dodis.ch/P51204).

9 Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, [dodis.ch/P43403](http://dodis.ch/P43403).

10 Swiss Head of the Federal Political Department and President of the Confederation Pierre Graber, [dodis.ch/P4171](http://dodis.ch/P4171).

11 United States President Gerald Ford, [dodis.ch/P47012](http://dodis.ch/P47012).



10. In light of the CSCE results and on the basis of its documents, we will prepare programmes of our actions, including bilateral ones towards individual states.

I therefore request that you carefully monitor the emerging trends in the interpretation and use of CSCE resolutions by the government and major opposition forces in the country of office.<sup>12</sup>

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**12** For all Polish documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2901](https://dodis.ch/C2901).

[dodis.ch/76763](https://dodis.ch/76763)

Portugal

*Conversations of President Costa Gomes at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki*<sup>1</sup>

BILATERAL MEETINGS OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE HEAD OF STATE  
ON 1-8-75 IN HELSINKI, WHERE HE TRAVELLED FOR THE CONFERENCE  
ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Secret

Lisbon, 6 August 1975

- 1) 10:45 a.m. – with President Kekkonen of Finland
- 2) 11:30 a.m. – with Mr. Arias Navarro, President of Spain
- 3) 12:30 p.m. – with Mr. Wilson, Prime Minister of Great Britain
- 4) 1:30 p.m. – with President Ceaucescu, of Romania
- 5) 2:30 p.m. – with President Husak, of Czechoslovakia
- 6) 3:15 p.m. – with President Zhivkov, of Bulgaria
- 7) 3:30 p.m. – with President Olaf Palme, Prime Minister of Sweeden
- 8) 4:15 p.m. – with President Tito, of Yugoslavia
- 9) 6:00 p.m. – with Mr. Schmidt, Chancellor of Federal Germany
- 10) 6:30 p.m.– with Mr. van der Uyl, Prime Minister of the Netherlands

1.) *With President Kekkonen of Finland*<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal (PL-DAR), PT/AHD/S16A1P1/PEA/1-1975/88082. Translated from Portuguese. These Meeting notes are a copy of a typewritten and signed original, with a handwritten note in red: "File," illegible initials. They were taken by the acting head of Protocol of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, First Secretary Rui Brito e Cunha, [dodis.ch/P81268](https://dodis.ch/P81268), regarding the bilateral meetings of the Portuguese President Francisco Costa Gomes, [dodis.ch/P47036](https://dodis.ch/P47036), on 1 August 1975 in Helsinki. The original copy of this document was signed by Brito e Cunha. He witnessed firsthand the all-day long meetings of the Portuguese President Costa Gomes, with the Presidents of Finland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the prime ministers of Spain, the UK, Sweden, Holland, and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. Francisco da Costa Gomes was President of the Portuguese Republic in a key period of the revolutionary process following the 25 April 1974 captains' military coup, which overthrew a 48-year long dictatorship in Portugal (including a military dictatorship (1926–1933) and the Salazar, [dodis.ch/P2115](https://dodis.ch/P2115) and Caetano's, [dodis.ch/P15496](https://dodis.ch/P15496), New State (1933–1974)). A month before the revolution, Costa Gomes was one of the two generals who refused to pledge his loyalty to the Caetano's government's African policies. The other was António de Spínola, [dodis.ch/P51721](https://dodis.ch/P51721), who became President of the Republic before being replaced by Costa Gomes. The latter remained in office until the first Presidential elections took place in 1976. The meetings in Helsinki reported in this document happened in an especially sensitive period of the PREC ("Processo Revolucionário em Curso" – Ongoing Revolutionary Process), which became known as the "Hot Summer 1975".

<sup>2</sup> Finnish President Urho Kekkonen [dodis.ch/P15249](https://dodis.ch/P15249).

President Kekkonen, in his capacity as host, welcomed all the Heads of State who travelled to Helsinki.

It was therefore more of a courtesy meeting.

President Kekkonen mentioned the interest and sympathy with which the Finnish people had followed our process and expressed his commitment to strengthening Portuguese Finnish relations, which had become possible after 25 April<sup>3</sup> with the beginning of the decolonisation process.

President Costa Gomes referred to the courage of the Finnish people during and after the Second World War and to the revolutionary goals of establishing socialism and national independence in Portugal, which, in his view, could be greatly inspired by the Finnish model.

2) *With Mr. Arias Navarro, President of Spain*<sup>4</sup>

It was one of the first meetings to be requested as soon as Lisbon learned of the Head of State's trip to Helsinki.

At the request of the Spanish side, the President and Prime Minister met alone.

3) *With Mr. Wilson, Prime Minister of Great Britain*<sup>5</sup>

The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Foreign Secretary, Mr James Callaghan.<sup>6</sup>

The Prime Minister began by saying that he wished to emphasise the clear stance he had always taken towards Marcelo Caetano's government.<sup>7</sup>

During the celebrations marking the anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, he was in opposition when he presented a motion of censure of the government in Parliament regarding Marcelo's visit to London,<sup>8</sup> which, as is public knowledge, caused him serious difficulties and unpleasantness.

25 April looked promising. The Revolution's key objectives, as announced at the time – democratisation and decolonisation – could not have been more welcome in Europe.

With the same clarity, he wanted to be very frank with the President of Portugal: in recent months, all the indicators pointed to a deterioration of the situation

3 25 April 1974 Portuguese revolution. Cf. the first note of this document.

4 Spanish Prime Minister and President of the Spanish Council of Ministers Carlos Navarro, [dodis.ch/P51203](https://dodis.ch/P51203).

5 Harold Wilson, [dodis.ch/P13688](https://dodis.ch/P13688).

6 Leonard James Callaghan, [dodis.ch/P15454](https://dodis.ch/P15454).

7 Marcelo Caetano, [dodis.ch/P15496](https://dodis.ch/P15496), succeeded António de Oliveira Salazar, [dodis.ch/P2115](https://dodis.ch/P2115), as Prime Minister of Portugal after Salazar was incapacitated in 1968. Caetano was removed from office by the 25 April 1974 military coup and escorted to exile, first in Madeira, then in Brazil.

8 In July 1973, the Portuguese Prime Minister visited London to mark the 600<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. More than ten thousand demonstrators marched through central London calling for an end to British government support for the Portuguese dictatorship and its empire and the "unholy alliance" of Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia in Southern Africa. The recently known massacre of the civilian population of the village of Wiriyamu in Mozambique by Portuguese soldiers caused additional public outrage. Mr. Wilson, who at the time was a member of the opposition, condemned in the House of Commons not only this last scandal but also "the whole lifestyle of Portuguese Fascism at home and repressive colonialism abroad", cf. the [House of Commons debate on Portugal](#) dated 17 July 1973. By then, expectations that Caetano would be able to reform Salazar's regime and end the colonial wars in Africa by negotiating with the liberation movements had already been dashed.

in our country. He had to confess that he was seriously concerned, as everything led him to believe that a dictatorial solution was inevitable in Portugal.

President Costa Gomes responded by recounting the events in Portugal after 11 March.<sup>9</sup> He referred to the pact signed with the parties, the elections and their outcome,<sup>10</sup> the crisis caused by the decision of the PS<sup>11</sup> and later the PPD<sup>12</sup> to abandon the coalition, and the decision of the Revolutionary Council, in an attempt to resolve the crisis, to concentrate power by handing it over to the triumvirate.<sup>13</sup>

If the intention had been to establish a dictatorship in Portugal, it would have been easier to do so on 25 April, when 90% of the population supported the Revolution. On the other hand, I can assure the Prime Minister, said Costa Gomes, that as long as I occupy the position I hold, there will be no dictatorship in Portugal. Neither military nor partisan.

The President also referred to the struggles between the leaders of the PS and the PCP,<sup>14</sup> which were completely alien to the masses and which, instead of clarifying matters, only served to confuse them.

The Prime Minister retorted that the Pact, to which we had referred repeatedly, did not impress Europe, and that democracy meant that it was the people who chose.

He asked the President to explain what he meant by “socialist democracy”, raised the question of whether democracy would be maintained in Portugal, and finally asked whether we still intended to continue drafting the Constitution and hold new elections.

President Costa Gomes outlined, in chronological order and specifying the deadlines, the planned process for the promulgation of the Constitution and the holding of local, parliamentary, and presidential elections.

He said that, since 25 April, a socialist solution based on a multi-party system had been chosen, in which everyone had a place.

It was then Mr Wilson’s turn to refer to Portugal’s economic situation and declare that Great Britain, as well as the other EEC countries, would be willing to help Portugal, but that this aid would be conditional on guarantees and proof that we would embark on a democratic solution of multi-party socialism with absolute respect for individual freedoms.

9 On 11 March 1975 the ex-President, general Spínola, [dodis.ch/P51721](https://dodis.ch/P51721), failed an anti-Communist putsch at Tancos air base, in central Portugal, and fled to Spain. The Armed Forces Movement’s radical elements took over. The Council of the Revolution was created, becoming the supreme authority in the state.

10 A pact between the Armed Forces Movement and the Parties was signed on 11 April 1975, guaranteeing the military oversight of the Portuguese political transition. The Constituent elections took place on 25 April 1975 and were won by the socialists.

11 (Portuguese) Socialist Party (PS), [dodis.ch/R30414](https://dodis.ch/R30414).

12 Popular Democratic Party (later renamed PSD, Socialist Democratic Party), [dodis.ch/R31096](https://dodis.ch/R31096).

13 Formed by the Portuguese Prime Minister general Vasco Gonçalves, [dodis.ch/P47035](https://dodis.ch/P47035), the commander of the Operational Command for the Continent, [dodis.ch/R30416](https://dodis.ch/R30416), and former chief strategist of the 25 April 1974 military coup major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, [dodis.ch/P52051](https://dodis.ch/P52051), and the Portuguese President general Francisco da Costa Gomes, [dodis.ch/P47036](https://dodis.ch/P47036).

14 Portuguese Communist Party, [dodis.ch/R29469](https://dodis.ch/R29469).

Regarding fundamental freedoms, the Prime Minister focused particularly on the “total absence” of press freedom in Portugal, citing the “República case”<sup>15</sup> as an example. He also asked whether the Portuguese press would be able to publish the conversation that was taking place, if it were aware of it.

He then referred to the attacks he himself had been subjected to in certain sectors of the British press, which often angered him, but which he considered to be true manifestations of freedom and democratic activity.

Costa Gomes responded by saying that he considered the Portuguese press to be, if not the freest, at least one of the freest in the world. It was false to think that the Portuguese media were in the hands of the Portuguese Communist Party. On the other hand, and this was proof of the freedom of the Portuguese press, it does create problems for the government. This was the case, for example, with news about the decolonisation of Angola.<sup>16</sup>

The President then explained in detail the “República case,” which he said had been on the verge of a solution two or three times, only to be systematically obstructed by “a last-minute spanner in the works.”

He stated that the “República case” was a labour issue and not a political one, mentioning that the PS itself had already acknowledged that the PCP had not interfered in the matter.

The President proceeded to explain that, as the Portuguese revolutionary process unfolded, the aim was to establish pluralist socialism by combining the revolutionary route with the electoral route. He then went on to explain the meaning of each of these lines.

It was getting late, and Mr. Wilson interrupted the President to ask him which line he would choose.

Standing up, he said he would send a letter to Lisbon regarding the problems British firms were encountering in Portugal.

This meeting was one of the longest that His Excellency the Head of State had in Helsinki, and took place in a tense atmosphere, which, incidentally, struck me as having been Prime Minister Wilson’s deliberate intention.

<sup>15</sup> The “República” case became an international “cause célèbre.” “República” was an old opposition newspaper to the Salazar and Caetano New State, which managed to survive despite the censorship blows. It was won mainly by socialists’ shareholders. On 19 May 1975, it was seized by radical workers’ commissions. The takeover was contested in demonstrations in Lisbon, with the socialists taking the lead of this battle for the freedom of the press, accusing the communists of being responsible for the seizure. The crisis went on for two months until, the 10 July 1975, the “República” resumes publication, but with a military director. As a protest, the socialists left the government, followed by the popular democrats. Together these two parties represented 62,3% of the electorate.

<sup>16</sup> On 15 January 1975, the Alvor Agreement between Portugal, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, [dodis.ch/R10994](https://dodis.ch/R10994), the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), [dodis.ch/R18384](https://dodis.ch/R18384), and the National Union for the Total Independence in Angola, [dodis.ch/R10995](https://dodis.ch/R10995), set the date for Angolan Independence on 11 November 1975.

4) *Lunch with President Ceaucescu*<sup>17</sup>

Ceaucescu invited Costa Gomes to lunch that very morning.

The lunch, which was also attended by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs,<sup>18</sup> took place in a friendly atmosphere and was an exchange of views following the conversations that had taken place during His Excellency the Head of State's visit to Bucharest.<sup>19</sup>

Ceaucescu showed particular interest in learning more about the acceleration of the Portuguese Revolution and relations with the Catholic Church.

President Costa Gomes, referring to the speech he had delivered a few days earlier at the General Assembly of the Armed Forces Movement, made some comments on the three points for reflection he had proposed at that time, regarding our political situation.

The President, aware of Ceaucescu's good relations with the Angolan Liberation Movements, concluded by asking him to intervene with them to help us resolve the crisis that is causing us such concern.

It was agreed that Ceaucescu would make an official visit to Lisbon in the third week of October.

5) *With President Husak of Czechoslovakia*<sup>20</sup>

The customary greetings were exchanged.

President Husák referred to the sympathy with which the Czech government had followed the Portuguese Revolution and declared that he was aware of the financial and economic difficulties we were facing.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Portugal and Czechoslovakia opened many possibilities for both countries, especially in the economic field.

Husak said he understood that these possibilities had to be studied pragmatically and that bilateral trade had to be increased. We do not wish to remain merely in the realm of intentions, he added.

On the other hand, if we saw interest in this, the Czech Foreign Minister could visit Portugal in September, and they would also be very pleased to welcome the Portuguese Foreign Minister.

President Costa Gomes replied that he would be very interested in the Czech Minister's visit to Lisbon and that the Portuguese Foreign Minister would return the visit as soon as possible.

We are committed to maintaining the best relations with all socialist countries.

Indeed, said President Costa Gomes, economic aid from socialist countries is welcome, all the more so as we are facing pressure in this area from Western countries and are facing serious difficulties, not only due to the economic situation but also because of decolonisation.

President Husak then asked if there was unity within the Armed Forces Movement.

<sup>17</sup> Romanian President and General Secretary of the Romanian Communist party, Nicolae Ceaușescu, [dodis.ch/P15499](http://dodis.ch/P15499).

<sup>18</sup> George Macovescu, [dodis.ch/P48063](http://dodis.ch/P48063).

<sup>19</sup> The official visit took place on 13–15 June 1975.

<sup>20</sup> Gustáv Husák, [dodis.ch/P48694](http://dodis.ch/P48694).

For us, he said, it is very important that Portugal evolves progressively.

President Costa Gomes then referred to the spirit that presided over the European Security Conference to say that the principles accepted by all participants must become a practical reality.

Each country has its own personality and the right to evolve in its own way. The socialist path we have chosen is still in a phase of adjustment.

It may well be different from some Eastern European countries, which is only natural when you consider that we are Latin people, with different customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies.

President Husak agreed and said that the Czechs respect the right of each nation to follow the path of its own choosing.

The Security Conference represents a milestone in European history, after which it will be more difficult for international reactionary forces to act.

He welcomed the presence of Costa Gomes in Helsinki, which he considered a good sign and asked the President to convey the greetings of the Czech people to the Portuguese people, the government, and the leaders.

Costa Gomes thanked him, expressed similar wishes, and said that despite the distance, Czechoslovakia was well known to the most educated Portuguese.

#### 6) *With President Zhivkov of Bulgaria*<sup>21</sup>

Words of circumstance.

President Zhivkov expressed Bulgaria's interest in and sympathy for the Portuguese process.

He said that the Bulgarian government had decided to help Portugal and that he had requested the meeting to convey this to the President himself.

In this regard, he was pleased to deliver an official proposal for "Initiatives for the development of relations between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Portugal." They would await our response to the proposal.

He then referred to the visit of the trade delegation to Sofia and the good understanding between the two delegations.

He concluded by inviting the President to pay an official visit to Sofia.

President Costa Gomes gave an overview of the situation in Portugal, thanked him for the invitation, which he accepted for a date to be agreed, and invited President Zhivkov to visit Lisbon.

He warmly welcomed the proposal for initiatives he had just received, which would be carefully examined in Lisbon.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Todor Hristov Zhivkov, [dodis.ch/P15343](https://dodis.ch/P15343).

<sup>22</sup> *Annotation in the original:* I submitted the above proposal to the Secretary-General of the M.N.E [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. The note refers to invitations that will be extended to His Excellency the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other members of the Government. It also proposed the signing of various agreements (consular, visa abolition, transport) and cooperation in various fields (economic, commercial, industrial, scientific, and technical, media, cultural and sporting).



7) *With Mr. Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden*<sup>23</sup>

Olov Palme began by expressing his pleasure at meeting President Costa Gomes again and thus having the opportunity to continue a conversation that had already begun.

The President was well aware of the stance he had always taken regarding the governments of Salazar and Caetano.<sup>24</sup>

Sweden and his party, as we well knew, had long helped to combat fascism and colonialism in Portugal.

He was a personal friend of Cabral<sup>25</sup> and knew Agostinho Neto<sup>26</sup> well.

Sweden continued to provide financial assistance to the MPLA at the same level as before 25 April. Financial assistance to Mozambique and Guinea had practically doubled.

The Portuguese Revolution could not have been welcomed in Sweden with greater enthusiasm.

The objectives set by the captains of 25 April, to implement socialism and decolonise, won over the Swedish people. However, he must admit that they were very concerned about the events of recent months in our country.

He referred to the difficulties that the Socialist Party, which he openly supported, was encountering with the República case, which was silencing its voice, with the information that [the newspaper] was in the hands of the PCP.

In fact, this concern is not mine [*sic*] alone; the whole of Europe is very apprehensive about the unfolding events in Portugal.

He was also certain that he was not telling the President anything new.

He assumed that this concern would be shared by the Portuguese government, as there would be those who took pleasure in what was happening in Portugal and in the difficulties that were mounting each passing day.

President Costa Gomes also confirmed how pleased he was to meet Olov Palme again.

He was well aware of the support that the Prime Minister had always given to the emancipation movements in our colonies and to the progressive forces in Portugal during the regime that was overthrown on 25 April.

He noted, however, that the world was misinformed about the reality of how the Portuguese process was unfolding.

The Revolution had opted for the socialist path and intended to establish a pluralist democracy in Portugal.

He explained the República case in detail and referred to the little support the Armed Forces Movement received from the main political parties: the PS and the PCP.

<sup>23</sup> Olof Palme, [dodis.ch/P15501](https://dodis.ch/P15501).

<sup>24</sup> António de Oliveira Salazar, [dodis.ch/P2115](https://dodis.ch/P2115), was Head of the government for 35 years. He was only replaced by Marcelo Caetano, [dodis.ch/P15496](https://dodis.ch/P15496), after being mentally incapacitated by a stroke in 1968.

<sup>25</sup> General Secretary of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, [dodis.ch/R26710](https://dodis.ch/R26710), Amílcar Cabral, [dodis.ch/P39411](https://dodis.ch/P39411), was an agriculture engineer and a pan-Africanist who founded and led the nationalist movement of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands and the ensuing war of independence in Guinea-Bissau.

<sup>26</sup> Agostinho Neto, [dodis.ch/P47034](https://dodis.ch/P47034), was General Secretary of the MPLA, [dodis.ch/R18384](https://dodis.ch/R18384).

In fact, he said, both of them were engaged in a partisan, pamphleteering struggle waged by their respective leaders, which was of no benefit whatsoever to the masses. Quite the contrary.

He then referred to freedom of the press in the same terms as he had done in his meeting with Prime Minister Wilson.

Mr Olov Palme then made some comments on cooperation between socialists and communists in Europe.

Unfortunately, he said, in general (there are prudent European communist parties), communist parties have had an attitude that he described as “stupid” for pursuing a Leninist line.

The big difference between European socialist and communist parties is that the former are mass parties, while the latter are merely elite parties.

He concluded by stating that there was no doubt whatsoever that responsibility in Portugal lay with the Armed Forces Movement.

It was the Armed Forces Movement that brought about the 25<sup>th</sup> of April.

But, in the spirit of the 25<sup>th</sup> of April, the Armed Forces Movement should share this responsibility with the most representative political parties.

And the Portuguese people proved to be far more mature than had been thought.

#### 8) *With President Tito of Yugoslavia*<sup>27</sup>

Words of circumstance.

Presidents Tito and Costa Gomes exchanged views on the Portuguese President's visit to Belgrade next October.

President Tito asked whether the Portuguese Armed Forces were united and whether Portugal was under foreign pressure.

Costa Gomes referred to his personal efforts to achieve this unity not only within the Armed Forces, but also among the most representative political parties.

He also spoke of the contacts between the people and the Armed Forces Movement.

Foreign pressure was felt most specifically in the economic field, and we expected a great deal of help from the socialist countries.

At this point in the conversation, reference was made to recent events in Portugal and to the accelerating pace of the Revolution, with President Tito stating that he was well aware of the situation and considered it more prudent to consolidate the gains already made first.

Tito referred to Mário Soares and the Socialist Congress that was taking place in Stockholm at that time.<sup>28</sup>

Costa Gomes spoke about the Third World Conferences in Peru and Colombo.

<sup>27</sup> Josip Broz Tito, [dodis.ch/P1002](http://dodis.ch/P1002).

<sup>28</sup> General Secretary of the PS Mário Soares, [dodis.ch/P46967](http://dodis.ch/P46967), was then in Stockholm, in a meeting of the Socialist International. In the occasion, was created the Committee of Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy and Socialism in Portugal. Soares was the first Minister of Foreign Affairs after the 25 April Revolution (in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> provisional governments) and minister without portfolio of the fourth provisional government, having resigned shortly after.

President Tito expressed interest in receiving clarification on the events in Cabinda.

Costa Gomes summarised the situation and requested Tito's intervention with the three Angolan emancipation movements<sup>29</sup> to peacefully overcome the crisis.

Tito promised this support and also agreed to study ways of helping Portugal in the economic and financial fields.

9) *With Mr. Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany*<sup>30</sup>

Words of circumstance from both sides.

The Chancellor referred to the interest with which the Federal Republic was following the Portuguese Revolution.

He had met Vasco Gonçalves<sup>31</sup> in Brussels and Melo Antunes and Rosa Coutinho<sup>32</sup> in Bonn.

Costa Gomes said he was aware of Europe's interest in our process and was also aware of Europe's concerns regarding the pace of the Revolution in the wake of the events of 11 March.

But political analysts and foreign press correspondents, for the most part, do not understand the real face of events as they unfold.

Sometimes the Portuguese Revolution loses its rhythm, takes leaps, seeming to have deviated from the normal evolutionary path.

Yet in a revolution, the Chancellor had to admit that not all events can be controlled.

After 11 March, there is only one objective: the establishment of a multi-party socialism in Portugal.

The confrontation between the two most representative parties, the Communist and the Socialist, has descended into a war of words and propaganda that does nothing to further the Revolution and indeed disturbs not only foreign public opinion but also, and above all, the Portuguese people.

In Costa Gomes' opinion, both parties have made mistakes that greatly hinder the action of the Armed Forces Movement, which is still the real driving force behind the Portuguese Revolution.

The crisis we are now experiencing, for example, is due to the PS's decision to abandon the coalition.

The PS had no valid reasons for taking this action.

The programmes of the Armed Forces Movement and the PS converge on the major principles.

<sup>29</sup> Regardless the Alvor Agreements, the situation in Angola deteriorated fast into a civil war. Yugoslavia had assisted the MPLA guerrillas throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s until the time of Angola's independence and the beginning of the Angolan civil war in 1975.

<sup>30</sup> Helmut Schmidt, [dodis.ch/P15416](https://dodis.ch/P15416).

<sup>31</sup> Portuguese Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves, [dodis.ch/P47035](https://dodis.ch/P47035), took part in the 25 April 1974 Revolution and was prime minister in the second, third, fourth and fifth provisional governments.

<sup>32</sup> In May 1975, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs of the fourth provisional government Ernesto de Melo Antunes, [dodis.ch/P52050](https://dodis.ch/P52050), visited Bonn. Major Melo Antunes was one of the political strategists of the April 25, 1974, revolution and the main ideologue of the Armed Forces Movement, having participated in several provisional governments. The Admiral António Rosa Coutinho, [dodis.ch/P51942](https://dodis.ch/P51942), member of the National Salvation Junta and of the Council of the Revolution was known as the "Red Admiral".

On the other hand, Western Europe does not understand why the government was not reshuffled to give more portfolios to the PS after the elections [of 25<sup>th</sup> April 1975].

But apart from the fact that the elections were aimed at forming a Constituent Assembly, the Armed Forces Movement had signed a pact with the political parties in which everything had been clearly established.

In fact, the PS made it clear, even recently, that the position of Prime Minister should be held by a military officer.

All documents issued by the Armed Forces Movement are absolutely consistent with the first programme of 25 April 1974.

I want to state unequivocally, said the President, that we intend to establish a multi-party socialist democracy in Portugal, guaranteeing respect for all individual freedoms.

We are being accused of not having freedom of the press and of it being dominated by the PCP.

In my opinion, the Portuguese press is, if not the freest, at least one of the freest in the world.

All the coalition parties agreed to prepare, together with the Armed Forces Movement, a document that would establish, once and for all, the best formula for the press to serve both the parties and the people.

Schmidt, taking the floor again, stated that the Armed Forces Movement did indeed deserve great recognition for having brought the dictatorship to an end.

Before, dialogue was impossible, but now, unfortunately, it remained very difficult.

We always referred to misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

Both the NATO and Common Market countries sought to provide economic and political support to a democratic Portugal.

But the fact is, said the Chancellor, we are concerned and apprehensive about the latest developments in your country.

We are not prepared to help and support the establishment of a South American-style military dictatorship.

Our assistance is therefore conditional on the guarantee that these are not your intentions.

Greece, for example, was counting on our economic support.

However, this assistance was suspended with the establishment of the dictatorship and only resumed later, after it had been overthrown.

Of the two parties that President Costa Gomes had mentioned, he said he knew one of them well. He had confidence in Mário Soares. But one must not forget that there were others.

A democracy could only function with elections and a parliament.

For a government to be democratic, it must have a party base.

He said he agreed with the Italian Communist Party, which recognises the need for a multi-party system in European democracies.

The Chancellor then referred to the República case and said that the pact signed with the parties was an argument that did not impress Europe.

However, what concerned the Chancellor most was the country's economic situation and the imbalance in our balance of payments.

For the time being, we were surviving on our reserves.

But what about afterwards?

We were counting on foreign aid.

But from whom?

I fear, he said, that you will find it difficult to obtain credit from the USSR.

Democracy cannot be built on paper; you must give bread to the people.

The information he received from German companies established in or with interests in Portugal pointed to a very large drop in productivity and a decision not to make new investments.

Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves referred in Brussels to an Investment Code that was being prepared. But the fact is that several months have passed and, so far, we have not heard of its enactment.

I was a soldier, Mr President, said the German Chancellor, but the economy cannot be run in the same way as a battalion. They are two different things.

Decisions with serious consequences for Portugal were being prepared in the EEC. It was the Netherlands and the FRG that managed to neutralise them.

We want to be hopeful, but we are seriously concerned.

I will not repeat outside anything I say in here, Schmidt declared.

Costa Gomes stated that he wanted to make it very clear to the Chancellor that there were no plans whatsoever for a military dictatorship in Portugal.

If we had wanted to establish one, we would have taken advantage of 25 April, when 90% of the population was in favour of the Revolution.

Furthermore, as long as I am in this position, I am totally opposed to the establishment of any kind of dictatorship, whether military or partisan.

The people are in charge, but the Chancellor had to agree that, after 48 years of dictatorship, Portugal was not ready to live in a Western European-style democracy.

We have only had 15 months of political learning.

Our main problem is economic.

The President had the opportunity to tell President Ford and Mr Kissinger last October<sup>33</sup> that the support they would have given us at that time would have been crucial.

But the fact is that, until now, we have not received any help, not even for decolonisation, which is a point that is uncontroversial for everyone.

As for the Investment Code, its non-promulgation is due to the current government crisis, but it is ready for publication.

The Chancellor concluded by saying just two more things:

– The FRG looks forward with great sympathy to the establishment of democracy in Portugal. Help us so that we can continue to help you, said Schmidt.

<sup>33</sup> Costa Gomes's first official visit abroad as President of Portugal was to the United States. On 17 October 1974 he gave a speech at the UN. Two days later, he met United States President Gerald Ford, [dodis.ch/P47012](https://dodis.ch/P47012), and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](https://dodis.ch/P31846), in the White House.

– I already had confidence in Your Excellency, said the German Chancellor. Today I had the opportunity to confirm it. As long as you are at the helm of Portugal's destiny, we have hope and wish you every success.

10) *With Mr. Van der Uyl, Prime Minister of the Netherlands*<sup>34</sup>

The Prime Minister was accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>35</sup>

Mr van der Uyl began by stating that the 25<sup>th</sup> of April appeared to the Dutch as the promise of a democratic Portugal.

However, recent events in Portugal had dampened the enthusiasm of that initial impact and the Dutch were now watching the Portuguese Revolution with apprehension.

Attacks on freedom were an everyday occurrence.

This was not to say that Portugal should follow the model of European democracies.

In the Netherlands, the first elections were held only 14 years after the war.

There are many recipes for transition, he said.

He then referred to the pact signed by the Armed Forces Movement with the parties, which he considered unacceptable; the República case, which meant silencing the voice of a party and a serious violation of press freedom; imposition of a single trade union federation, which he called a fascist measure; local government bodies that were not elected by secret ballot; the fact that the will of the people was not recognised after the elections.

Why were the elections held then?

What is the translation of the vote?

The Netherlands always fought against the Salazar and Caetano regime in defence of freedom.

For this very reason, it always advocated Portugal's expulsion from NATO.

He mentioned recent statements by General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, announcing, in flagrant contradiction to the democracy promised in Brussels by Vasco Gonçalves, that members of the opposition should be imprisoned.

In a democratic government, all parties have a place, and this is the best way to neutralise even the most reactionary ones.

In Portugal, there is talk of protecting the most disadvantaged.

The best way to achieve this protection is to give them the freedom to elect their representatives by secret ballot and without being subject to any kind of pressure.

The people, and only the people, must decide what they want.

We claim that we are not moving towards a dictatorship.

So why was it decided, on the 27<sup>th</sup>, to hand over power to three generals?

If the military are against dictatorship, they must have the courage to relinquish power.

The argument about confrontation and fruitless squabbles between the PS and the PCP does not hold water, because the secondary issues are overshadowed by the essential ones once the parties find themselves in government, bearing responsi-

<sup>34</sup> Joop den Uyl, [dodis.ch/P50261](https://dodis.ch/P50261).

<sup>35</sup> Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Max van der Stoep, [dodis.ch/P47040](https://dodis.ch/P47040).

bilities and having been democratically elected. He described himself as a great friend of Portugal and said he had come here several times on holiday.

He apologised for the frankness with which he expressed his concerns.

He said he understood the spirit and intentions that inspire Portuguese leaders and wanted to have hope in the future of the Revolution.

President Costa Gomes responded in the same vein as in previous meetings.

Regarding trade union, he explained that the inter-union association was an association of trade unions and not a single trade union. It included trade unions with governing bodies of different political tendencies.

Regarding the statements made by General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, Costa Gomes said that the COPCON commander was referring to reactionary elements and not to the opposition.<sup>36</sup>

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36 For all Portuguese documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2897](https://dodis.ch/C2897).



[dodis.ch/77014](https://dodis.ch/77014)

Federal Republic of Germany

*Circular from the Foreign Information Desk of the Federal Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

## CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE

[Bonn,] 6 August 1975

### 1. Introduction

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which was opened by the Foreign Ministers on 3 July 1973 following seven months of preparations, concluded on 1 August 1975 with the signing of the Final Act by the Heads of State and Government of the 35 European and North American participating States. Before signing, they issued statements that will be of some significance for the future.<sup>2</sup>

### 2. General assessment

Overall, the speeches by the Heads of Government were sober in tone. Irrespective of their ideological stance, the speakers made noticeable efforts to avoid any hint of euphoria. Almost all of them underlined the importance of the conference results for the future and the need for these results to be implemented in practice.

General Secretary Brezhnev's<sup>3</sup> emphasis that the CSCE results had been achieved through compromise is important, as it defines the language to be used by Eastern Europe. He said that the Soviet Union assessed the correlation and dynamics of various political forces in Europe soberly and that the "results of the Conference represent a delicately weighed balance of the interests of all participating States" and are "directed in their content towards the future"; what had been achieved was "the maximum of the possible", "there are neither victors nor vanquished, neither winners nor losers".

However, views on the standards by which the participating States' interest in détente is to be measured differed, revealing the old contrast between the doctrines of the East and West, namely enshrining of the territorial and political status quo in Europe versus gradual change in Europe via freedom of movement for people and ideas through the opening of the borders.

<sup>1</sup> Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (DE-PA/AA), B 28-ZA/111659. Translated from German. This Circular No. 112 was signed by the Head of the Foreign Information Desk of the Federal Foreign Office Joseph Engels, [dodis.ch/P81444](https://dodis.ch/P81444).

<sup>2</sup> For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](https://dodis.ch/58821).

<sup>3</sup> General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

### 3. *Line taken by the East*

However, it was also striking here that Brezhnev refrained from interpreting the conference results from the standpoint of the East, leaving this to his counterparts. The speeches by the Eastern heads of party or government largely followed a set structure.

They mentioned the thirtieth anniversary of the end of the war, the suffering during the Second World War, the liberation of Europe by the Soviet Union and the anti-Hitler coalition states (Honecker,<sup>4</sup> Gierek<sup>5</sup>), the CSCE as the realisation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, with an emphasis on the Principles Declaration (Gierek: “the great charter of peace in Europe”); Zhivkov:<sup>6</sup> “heart of the Final Act”), selectively mentioned the principles of the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity and non-interference (particularly by Honecker and Gierek) and described the CSCE as a first step towards a pan-European security system (Gierek, Zhivkov, Honecker).

Kádár<sup>7</sup> commented positively on the results of Basket III, while Brezhnev mentioned them in general terms, but did not give an opinion on them. The other Eastern European Heads of Government either did not mention the results at all or did so merely by referring to rights and laws, or to the laws, traditions and habits of the participating States (Zhivkov) – the very language that was not included in CSCE documents because of resistance from the West. Kádár stated that Hungary was willing to follow the recommendations on expanding information and human relations and solving humanitarian issues, as well as to expand existing relations.

How soberly the East assesses the outcome of the Conference is shown by the fact that it has abandoned its original main idea for the post-conference period – the creation of a permanent body – and, with the exception of Romania, which calls for the creation of a permanent body to be the main topic at the Senior Officials Meeting planned for 1977 in order to ensure the continuity of the multilateral détente process, no longer mentioned this idea.

### 4. *Line taken by the West*

For their part, the Western leaders, irrespective of whether their countries are NATO members or neutral, emphasised the Western concept of détente expressed in the CSCE documents, that is, the need for peaceful change in Europe, including the possibility of peaceful and consensual border changes; freedom of movement in the humanitarian field and in the exchange of ideas; and the realisation of human rights.

The fact that in addition to the Federal Chancellor,<sup>8</sup> and as prepared in the Group of Four, Prime Minister Wilson,<sup>9</sup> President Giscard d’Estaing<sup>10</sup> and Pres-

4 General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Erich Honecker, [dodis.ch/P46563](http://dodis.ch/P46563).

5 First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party Edward Gierek, [dodis.ch/P46565](http://dodis.ch/P46565).

6 General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Todor Zhivkov, [dodis.ch/P15343](http://dodis.ch/P15343).

7 General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party János Kádár, [dodis.ch/P11430](http://dodis.ch/P11430).

8 Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Helmut Schmidt, [dodis.ch/P15416](http://dodis.ch/P15416).

9 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, [dodis.ch/P13688](http://dodis.ch/P13688).

10 French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, [dodis.ch/P13791](http://dodis.ch/P13791).

ident Ford<sup>11</sup> explicitly emphasised Berlin's special role as a touchstone and test case for détente, as well as the applicability of the CSCE documents to Berlin, is particularly important for us. The fact that EC acting President, Italian Prime Minister Moro,<sup>12</sup> issued a declaration on behalf of the Community and signed the Final Act in both his roles is of importance for recognition of the EC.

Nuances could be heard in the speeches by Western leaders. President Ford passionately defended the ideals of the Western democracies. After initially sounding like an apology for his participation in the Helsinki Summit, his cleverly structured speech became a clear statement of support for the goals of the CSCE and for the United States' engagement in Europe. Giscard d'Estaing focused on Europe's role in global politics and conveyed the impression the superpowers were lateral powers who would be well advised to allow the interests of the "actual" Europeans in Europe to take precedence.

5. The speeches were held without any particular drama, and only interrupted by the largely unnoticed departure of the Turkish delegation during the speech by President Makarios<sup>13</sup> and by the vehemency of his speech. Turkey submitted a written caveat by which the CSCE Final Act will not have any impact on Turkey's relations with Cyprus, so long as a legitimate government has not been formed by both parts of the population; the Cypriot delegation rightfully rejected this protest as incompatible with the conference's rules of procedure. During the signing ceremony, Makarios and Demirel<sup>14</sup> sat together harmoniously at the same table.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *United States President Gerald Ford*, [dodis.ch/P47012](https://dodis.ch/P47012).

<sup>12</sup> *Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro*, [dodis.ch/P13878](https://dodis.ch/P13878).

<sup>13</sup> *Cypriot President Archbishop Myriarthes Makarios III*, [dodis.ch/P16540](https://dodis.ch/P16540).

<sup>14</sup> *Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel*, [dodis.ch/P44321](https://dodis.ch/P44321).

<sup>15</sup> *For all documents of the FRG in this volume, cf. the compilation* [dodis.ch/C2909](https://dodis.ch/C2909).

[dodis.ch/75726](https://dodis.ch/75726)

Austria

*The Austrian Ambassador in Moscow, Standenat, to the Federal Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

CSCE; SPEECH BY THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR IN HELSINKI; COMMENT  
BY AMBASSADOR BONDARENKO

Moscow, 7 August 1975

Following an intervention I was asked to make on air traffic rights (see FS 25151 of 5 August 1975),<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Bondarenko,<sup>3</sup> on 5 August this year, also brought up the final round of the CSCE in Helsinki. He said he had met briefly with Chancellor there. Bondarenko added, albeit jokingly, that our head of government had “declared war on communism” in his speech.<sup>4</sup> I replied that I had studied the Chancellor’s speech carefully, but could not interpret it authentically. Personally, however, I believed that other statesmen in Helsinki had taken an equally sharp, if not sharper, ideological stance against communism. Moreover, it was well known that the SPÖ had uncompromisingly distanced itself from communism and that there was no reason to deviate from this line before the National Council elections – quite the contrary! The events in Portugal<sup>5</sup> are even discouraging for democratic left-wing forces in other countries that do not fundamentally reject cooperation with the communists, which is likely to be the case in France, Italy and Spain, among others. Bondarenko, who now felt forced onto the defensive, explained that it would be wrong to blame the USSR for developments in Portugal. The Portuguese communists acted independently and confidently. Moreover, Soares’<sup>6</sup> supporters had also made mistakes and were openly supported by the West. I concluded by remarking that the alliance between a communist minority and some military leaders in the democratic West would understandably cause unrest, and

1 Austrian State Archives/Archiv der Republik (AT-OeStA/AdR), BMAA, Zl. 808/195-II-7/75. Ambassador Standenat to BMAA, Moscow, 7 August 1975, Zl. 599-Res/75. Translated from German. This report was signed by the Austrian Ambassador in Moscow, Heinrich Standenat, [dodis.ch/P81387](https://dodis.ch/P81387), and addressed to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BMAA) in Vienna. It was submitted in accordance with Zl. 588-Res/75 dated 2 August 1975, and filed at the BMAA on 22 August 1975 by Legation Secretary Christian Zeileissen, [dodis.ch/P52037](https://dodis.ch/P52037).

2 Not found.

3 Head of the Third European Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Alexander Bondarenko, [dodis.ch/P57463](https://dodis.ch/P57463).

4 For the speech of Austrian Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, [dodis.ch/P2507](https://dodis.ch/P2507), at the CSCE summit in Helsinki, cf. QdD 30, doc. 97, [dodis.ch/75720](https://dodis.ch/75720).

5 After Portugal’s Carnation Revolution of 1974, elections of April 1975 were won by the Socialist Party (PS), [dodis.ch/R30414](https://dodis.ch/R30414), followed by the more conservative Popular Democratic Party, [dodis.ch/R31096](https://dodis.ch/R31096), with the Portuguese Communist Party, [dodis.ch/R29469](https://dodis.ch/R29469), receiving 12.5 percent of the popular vote only, shattering expectations for a broad left-wing coalition.

6 Founder of the PS Mário Soares, [dodis.ch/P46967](https://dodis.ch/P46967).

quoted Talleyrand,<sup>7</sup> saying that bayonets could be used to do anything, but one could not sit on them. Bondarenko added: "At least not for long."

Fortunately, Ambassador Bondarenko, who occasionally cannot resist provoking others, is also tough when it comes to taking a punch. We therefore parted on friendly terms, and I wished him a restful holiday.

I would like to note in passing that Ambassador Bondarenko's remark probably referred to the passage in the Chancellor's speech in which he stated: "We are therefore prepared for this controversy ...", but omitted the end of the sentence, which states that this should take place in a peaceful manner.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> French statesman and diplomat Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, [dodis.ch/P5669](https://dodis.ch/P5669).

<sup>8</sup> For all the Austrian documents in this volume, cf. [dodis.ch/C2929](https://dodis.ch/C2929).

[dodis.ch/76777](https://dodis.ch/76777)

United Kingdom

*The British Ambassador in Helsinki, Elliott, to Foreign Secretary Callaghan*<sup>1</sup>

## THE CSCE SUMMIT: FINLAND'S PLACE IN THE SUN

Extract • Confidential

Helsinki, 12 August 1975

[...]²

The Third Stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe took place in Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August. Of the 35 European States only Albania and Andorra were not represented. The Conference was attended by the Prime Minister<sup>3</sup> and yourself, the Presidents of eight participating countries, the Prime Ministers or Heads of Government of 17 countries, and the Party Secretaries of six more, as well as the Secretary of the Council of Public Affairs of The Holy See,<sup>4</sup> the Deputy Prime Minister of Malta<sup>5</sup> and the Foreign Ministers of almost all 35, including San Marino. The only notable absentee, to no one's regret, was the bane of Stage I, Mr Dom Mintoff, Prime Minister of Malta.<sup>6</sup>

2. It is not for me to draw up the balance sheet of the three years of negotiations on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which started here in Helsinki on 22 November, 1972, and culminated in the only European Summit Conference of this century. Sir David Hildyard's despatch of 25 July<sup>7</sup> summarises with clarity and perception the long and arduous work of Stage II and its likely meaning for the future. In comparison the three days of Stage III may best be described as a happening, of impressive symbolic significance, illuminated by brilliant sunshine and the elegant architecture of Alvar Aalto's Finlandia Hall, and only partially obscured by the activities of some 3,000 supporting delegates, journalists and security police.

3. Since all the documents before the Conference had been agreed during Stage II, the sessions in the hall itself were inevitably in the nature of a set piece. The

1 The National Archives (GB) FCO/160/174/11. This despatch was signed by the British Ambassador in Helsinki Thomas Elliott, [dodis.ch/P81172](https://dodis.ch/P81172), and sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs James Callaghan, [dodis.ch/P15454](https://dodis.ch/P15454). Copies went to the British Ambassadors in Oslo, Copenhagen, Moscow, Bonn, Paris, Washington, Bucharest, Belgrade and to the British Representative in Geneva. The version here is taken from the Confidential Print series, No. 356/75.

2 The introductory summary of the document's content has been omitted. For the complete document, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/76777](https://dodis.ch/76777).

3 Harold Wilson, [dodis.ch/P13688](https://dodis.ch/P13688).

4 Agostino Casaroli, [dodis.ch/P42817](https://dodis.ch/P42817).

5 Anton Buttigieg, [dodis.ch/P53533](https://dodis.ch/P53533).

6 Dom Mintoff, [dodis.ch/P43091](https://dodis.ch/P43091).

7 Cf. QdD 30, doc. 95, [dodis.ch/76776](https://dodis.ch/76776).

opening address of President Kekkonen<sup>8</sup> was followed, as during Stage I in 1973, by speeches from the representatives of each of the 34 other countries, this time at the level of Heads of Government rather than Foreign Ministers. On both occasions the proceedings (appropriately enough in Finland) bore some resemblance to a marathon. But there was a difference this year. In 1973 the Foreign Ministers had been obliged to talk about the immediate and often pedestrian problems before the Conference. In 1975 the Heads of Government were free to talk about the future.

4. The tone was set by the Prime Minister<sup>9</sup> who (as the fortune of the ballot decreed) made the first speech and also took the chair at the last working session. His speech brought home the basic point that the success of the Conference would depend upon the extent to which its moral commitments were carried out in practice, in particular in relation to such sensitive issues as the status of Berlin, the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, and the possibility of future multilateral negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament. He emphasised too, in a passage which has already been widely quoted, the extent to which the Conference would be judged by the effect it had on the lives of ordinary people in Europe; “there is no reason why in 1975 Europeans should not be allowed to marry whom they want; hear and read what they want, travel abroad where and when they want, and meet whom they want”.

5. Inevitably succeeding speeches by other Western leaders were variations on the same basic themes. Herr Schmidt<sup>10</sup> spoke of the significance of *détente* to the Federal Republic and again underlined the significance of Berlin and the negotiations in Vienna. President Giscard d’Estaing,<sup>11</sup> in a speech of great elegance, also spoke of Berlin, though his approach to the question of disarmament was notably distinct from that of his two colleagues. President Ford<sup>12</sup> urged on the Conference, with notable firmness and force, the “decent respect for the opinions of mankind” prescribed in the Declaration of Independence, and reminded his audience succinctly that history would judge them “not by what we say today but what we do tomorrow; not by the promises we make but by the promises we keep”.

6. On the Eastern side there were (possibly orchestrated) indications of a rather wider range of views. Mr Honecker<sup>13</sup> of the German Democratic Republic and Dr Husak<sup>14</sup> of Czechoslovakia both took a hard line, emphasising the basic importance of the Declaration of Principles and in particular the inviolability of frontiers; while referring only perfunctorily (and in the context of official initiatives) to the need for the development of human contacts. Mr Brezhnev,<sup>15</sup> however, in marked contrast to them (as well as to Mr Gromyko<sup>16</sup> during Stage I two years ago) made a thoughtful and positive speech. He stressed the need for “a further

8 Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, [dodis.ch/P15249](https://dodis.ch/P15249).

9 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, [dodis.ch/P13688](https://dodis.ch/P13688).

10 Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt, [dodis.ch/P15416](https://dodis.ch/P15416).

11 French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, [dodis.ch/P13791](https://dodis.ch/P13791).

12 United States President Gerald Ford, [dodis.ch/P47012](https://dodis.ch/P47012).

13 First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic Erich Honecker, [dodis.ch/P46563](https://dodis.ch/P46563).

14 President of Czechoslovakia Gustáv Husák, [dodis.ch/P48694](https://dodis.ch/P48694).

15 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, [dodis.ch/P15543](https://dodis.ch/P15543).

16 Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](https://dodis.ch/P489).



development of military *détente*", and called for "further headway along the lines mapped out by the Conference", making none of the reservations that might have been expected about further work on confidence-building measures or in Basket III. He also attempted a redefinition of the idea of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. Controversy will continue about his precise meaning; but the Prime Minister at his Press conference the same day was able neatly to turn the Soviet leader's words to suggest that if he had made that pronouncement in 1967 the fate of Czechoslovakia might have been different.

7. Since the total time available for the meeting was limited, its prospects of success depended on there being no major dispute in the Conference Hall. In Mr Mintoff's absence the most likely cause of conflict was the Cyprus question. The Turkish delegation (clumsily) walked out during Archbishop Makarios'<sup>17</sup> speech, and subsequently circulated a formal reservation denying the applicability of the Final Act to Turkish relations with a Cyprus Government headed by the Archbishop. The move, which was not unexpected, at least diminished the likelihood of the Turks' refusing to sign the documents or of any requests for rights of reply, for which the agreed arrangements for Stage III had made no provision. It also unwarily provided the Cyprus Delegation with the opportunity to circulate, 10 minutes before the close of the final working session, a consummately timed and thus devastating reply to the Turkish note which gave Cyprus a victory on points and prevented any disruption of the arrangements for the signature of the Final Act immediately afterwards. The prospect of protracted argument on the issue was averted to the vast relief of most Delegations; and no one chose further to comment on the fact that reservations were being made to the Final Act even before its formal signature.<sup>18</sup>

8. The formal proceedings of the Conference thus concluded without a hitch in the time allotted for them. The speeches of Heads of Delegations will of course provide those who are fully versed in the intricacies of Stage II – as well as the historians of the future – with a great quarry of material for study and analysis. On the face of it, what went on in the corridors outside the hall may have been of as much immediate significance. The Conference provided unique opportunities for bilateral meetings. In addition to acting as host at a luncheon in the Embassy for his American, West German and French colleagues, the Prime Minister took part in a Community lunch given by the Italian Prime Minister,<sup>19</sup> had breakfast with President Ford, and other bilateral meetings with Secretary Brezhnev, President Kekkonen, Marshal Tito<sup>20</sup> of Yugoslavia, and Messrs Demirel<sup>21</sup> of Turkey, Karamanlis<sup>22</sup> of Greece, Gierek<sup>23</sup> of Poland, Husak of Czechoslovakia, Cosgrave<sup>24</sup> of Ireland and Costa Gomes<sup>25</sup> of Portugal. You yourself, Sir, in addition to ac-

17 Cypriot President Archbishop Myriarthos Makarios III, [dodis.ch/P16540](http://dodis.ch/P16540).

18 For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](http://dodis.ch/58821).

19 Aldo Moro, [dodis.ch/P13878](http://dodis.ch/P13878).

20 Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, [dodis.ch/P1002](http://dodis.ch/P1002).

21 Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, [dodis.ch/P44321](http://dodis.ch/P44321).

22 Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, [dodis.ch/P15271](http://dodis.ch/P15271).

23 First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Edward Gierek, [dodis.ch/P46565](http://dodis.ch/P46565).

24 Irish Prime Minister Liam Cosgrave, [dodis.ch/P15295](http://dodis.ch/P15295).

25 Portuguese President Francisco da Costa Gomes, [dodis.ch/P47036](http://dodis.ch/P47036).

companying the Prime Minister at his meetings, held bilateral talks with Foreign Ministers of Cyprus and Bulgaria.<sup>26</sup>

9. It was obvious to those who were present in Helsinki, as well as to the millions who watched the proceedings on television, that this was by any standard a remarkable gathering. Its organisation presented a formidable challenge for which the Finnish Government had long been preparing. Even their high level of organising skill was taxed by the fact that they received from Geneva less than three weeks' notice of the final date; while their difficulties were compounded by what they judged to be the need to take security measures on a scale unprecedented in Finland. The Government brought rather more than half of the whole police force of the country to Helsinki (at some risk to international understanding, since most of the rural police spoke only Finnish); and acquiesced in suggestions that helicopters and MiG aircraft should circle the city whenever President Ford and Mr Brezhnev were at large outside their respective Embassy premises. Yet (although there was one fatal accident involving a Finnish boatman who approached too near to a cocktail party attended by Heads of Delegations) there were no untoward incidents directly affecting delegates or the Press; and the lavish nature of the facilities provided for the latter did something to correct the cynicism with which many of them had at first approached the Conference.

10. All this could hardly have happened in any other Western European capital. Helsinki is still a small town by European standards, and its life was disrupted by the CSCE. All hotels were commandeered by the Government, all traffic diverted or brought to a standstill simply to allow delegates to move between hotels and the Conference Hall; and all this occurred without a murmur of protest from the population. On the contrary, they lined the streets for three days, applauding the Heads of Government (especially the Western ones) in their restrained Finnish manner; and showing every sign of realising that this was the most remarkable political event in their country during their 60 years of independence.

11. The fact is that the ordinary Finns have been and have felt more involved in the CSCE than the citizens of other participating states. For, as the Finnish public have come to understand, Finland stood to gain from the process of the Conference almost irrespective of its results. In promoting it the Finnish Government acted not (as some impercipient Western critics have suggested) as advocates of a stock Soviet cause; but out of pure self-interest. It is hardly true that, as has rather too often been said (by Mr Brezhnev among others), there have been no winners or losers in this Conference. The main Helsinki newspaper was nearer the mark when on 27 July it carried the headline "Finland the only winner of the CSCE".

12. The six-year process that ended here last week was thus a triumph for President Kekkonen. It was in May 1969, in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, (an event that had both alarmed and angered the Finns), that he had had the prescience to offer Helsinki as the site for the Conference. Even at that time he had realised how it could serve his twin aims of improving Finnish security and enhancing Finnish neutrality. A country like Finland in an exposed position on the Soviet borders has most to fear from tension between the great powers; and little to lose

26 Ioannis Christophides, [dodis.ch/P53305](http://dodis.ch/P53305), and Petar Mladenov, [dodis.ch/P46731](http://dodis.ch/P46731).

from the sort of understanding between Super-Powers that is criticised by many as Great-Power hegemony. Its interest is quite simply to reduce the risk of the sort of power game in which it itself can be used as a pawn by one side against the other. So Finland is bound to work for *détente* and to welcome any manifestations that will serve to persuade its Eastern neighbour that *détente* is becoming a reality.

13. President Kekkonen also had a more elaborate aim in mind; to try to use the development of *détente* to gain international recognition of the genuine "neutrality" of Finnish policy (a concept that the Soviet Union declines explicitly to acknowledge) and to increase Finland's freedom of manoeuvre in the international field. He was involved at the time in attempts (not all of which were successful) to gain for Finland membership of the Security Council, as well as the Secretary-Generalship of the UN, and to make Helsinki a centre for major international conferences, starting with SALT. But it was from the CSCE that in his calculation there was most to gain. Not only would the Conference itself deepen the process of *détente*; but the fact that it was held in Helsinki would serve as proof of the confidence of the participating countries in the reality of Finnish neutrality; while the presence of 35 Heads of Government on Finnish soil might serve to create a new interest in their part in the preservation of Finnish independence.

14. These arguments were always more enthusiastic than logical, and it seems doubtful if all the President's aims will be achieved. They always contained an element of contradiction. The Finnish Delegation played their hand with skill throughout the Conference; and succeeded often enough in acting as "honest broker" while contriving to conceal their anxiety lest Western insistence on getting "results" from the negotiations should jeopardise their outcome and perhaps also European hopes for *détente*. But Finnish enthusiasm for the idea of the Conference was sometimes misunderstood in the West as eagerness to play the Soviet game; and the misunderstanding did not help to promote belief in the genuineness of Finnish neutrality. Again, Finland's freedom of manoeuvre in international policy has not perceptibly increased during the three years of negotiation; Finnish Governments look over their shoulders to study Soviet reactions to their policies as anxiously today as they did during the opening year of the Conference when they were obliged by Soviet pressure to defer for many months the signature of their trade agreement with the EEC. And although Helsinki is now firmly on the map as an international meeting point, its geographical position is always likely to militate against its becoming a second Geneva or Vienna.

15. President Kekkonen, however, would be justified in claiming the success of the Conference as a success for Finland. The people of his country, who have long felt themselves an almost forgotten nation in an isolated corner of Europe, have for a short time had the sensation that they had been in the centre of the world. They have profited from the promotion of something which may become known as the "Helsinki spirit" – to be defined as the readiness to argue and negotiate over issues which in the past were considered too dangerous for discussion in international conferences in Europe. President Kekkonen has some cause for self-satisfaction when he recalls his words of 1967: "Today we can say we have been on the right road. We have taken upon ourselves the often thankless task... of a bridge-builder. Our example has been followed."

16. I have written at length about Finland's attitude to the Conference because I am bound to approach the remarkable events of the last week in Helsinki from that angle. But there is perhaps a general point to remember. Many of those in the West who have criticised the Conference have done so because of their calculations about its supposed effect on the relationship between the big Powers. What seems certain is only that that effect will be very difficult to estimate; and that no complete assessment can be reached before years have passed. There are points that the East can exploit in the Declaration of Principles; and points in Basket III which the West would be foolish to fail to exploit. But it must also be remembered that, not least because of the rule of consensus, the CSCE was a small nations' Conference. It obliged the big Powers to argue out and to justify their policies in front of the representatives of smaller Powers – in the case of the Soviet Union in front of the representatives of countries who have long unhappily considered themselves as its satellites. And it is precisely those nations who think themselves most threatened by the Soviet Union – besides Finland, Yugoslavia and Romania are the obvious examples – who have been most enthusiastic about the Conference, and most anxious that there should be some real follow-up to it in 1977. If the Conference has indeed contributed anything towards building up the self-respect and the security of the smaller European States, it will truly, to quote the words of the Prime Minister, Mr Wilson, when he closed the last working session, have been an historic event.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> For full details of British involvement in the CSCE, cf. Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO): Series III, vol. II: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975. For all British documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2898](http://dodis.ch/C2898).

[dodis.ch/75753](https://dodis.ch/75753)

Italy

*Circular from the Directorate-General for Political Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

CSCE – ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS

Confidential

Rome, 22 August 1975

*I. The Declaration of Principles*

The original intention of the USSR was that a declaration on the principles governing relations between European states should be the essential, if not exclusive, outcome of the CSCE.

The purpose of this declaration should have been, on the one hand, to recognise territorial annexations and definitively establish the borders resulting from the last conflict; secondly, to recognise the political status quo and, in particular, the existence of special relations within the socialist community and the legitimacy of certain forms of intervention (Brezhnev Doctrine); and, finally, to establish, on the basis of the recognition of the existence of a European regional law, partly different from general law, the foundations of a security system in Europe in which the USSR could have acquired a predominant role.

The Western powers, and in some respects the neutral countries and Romania, strongly opposed this idea, the potential consequences of which were clear from the outset. These negotiations were extremely difficult, due to the profound differences in values and objectives, which explains why the second phase took so long. Thanks to their cohesion, particularly among the Nine, the Western countries were able to achieve results that we have no hesitation in describing as consistent with our ideas and requirements.

a) On the one hand, the declaration of principles is, formally speaking, on a par with all the other parts of the Final Act: our aim was not to conclude the Conference with mere statements of principles, but also to give it more concrete content in the form of specific commitments in the various areas of international cooperation, particularly those most conducive to the protection of human rights and the freer movement of persons, ideas and information.<sup>2</sup>

b) Secondly, the declaration does not constitute a recognition or crystallisation of the existing territorial situation. It highlights the inviolability of borders as a

<sup>1</sup> Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Historical Diplomatic Archives (IT-ASDMAE), DGAP, Uff. XIII (ex III), CSCE, b. 149, fasc. CSCE. Parte generale, 1975. *Translated from Italian. This note was sent as "Telespresso" No. 053/396/C of the Office III of the Directorate-General for Political Affairs of the Italian Foreign Ministry was signed by the Italian Deputy Head of Delegation to the CSCE Umberto La Rocca, [dodis.ch/P81424](https://dodis.ch/P81424). It was addressed to Italian diplomatic missions abroad and to the main offices and ministerial services involved in the management of foreign affairs and defence. For the complete list of recipients, cf. the facsimile [dodis.ch/75753](https://dodis.ch/75753).*

<sup>2</sup> For the Final Act in all CSCE languages, cf. [dodis.ch/58821](https://dodis.ch/58821).

prohibition on the use of force to change existing borders; but peaceful changes remain lawful, which is particularly important for the prospects of the European unification process (as well as, of course, for German reunification).

Furthermore, the non-recognition of territorial occupations or acquisitions achieved by force is reaffirmed. Emphasis is placed on the prohibition of the use of force, not only in the declaration of principles, but also in a series of additional provisions, stipulated on the basis of a Romanian proposal, which seek to limit the possibilities of unlawful interventions.

c) The declaration of principles includes a series of provisions that can be invoked to challenge the "Brezhnev Doctrine" and prevent the political status quo from becoming entrenched: the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and self-determination are defined broadly and in a manner consistent with the concepts of freedom and pluralism in the democratic world; it is emphasised that the principles must be applied with equal rigour to all countries, regardless of their political, economic and social systems.

d) The principles are consistent with those already existing in general international law; they are consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and must be applied in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter itself. They do not therefore constitute a kind of special right for Europe.

e) In addition, after lengthy and difficult negotiations, Western countries obtained a definition of the principle of human rights and fundamental freedoms that exceeded expectations. This is the most developed principle in the entire declaration and contains, among other things, the important statement that respect for human rights is essential for peace, justice, friendly relations and cooperation, as well as the recognition, also as a value, of the commitment to implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a commitment that the Eastern countries had hitherto sought to downplay. The definition of self-determination is also entirely satisfactory: among other things, recognition has been obtained from the East that this principle is not only valid in an anti-colonialist context but also applicable to Europe. An argument of Swiss origin, approved by many Westerners, emphasises the need for progress in implementing the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and provides for future negotiations in this regard.

The general opinion of the Declaration of Principles, from the point of view of the free world, cannot fail to be positive, despite the inevitable flaws that are the result of seeking compromise solutions. While on the one hand it does not innovate, as was our intention, with respect to universally recognised international law, on the other hand it sufficiently reflects the dynamic conception of the West; it emphasises the dignity of the human person and recalls the role that the individual can play in international cooperation; it reflects, on the same level as the need for security, the needs for justice, cooperation and détente, understood not as a precondition but as the result of the implementation of all the CSCE's achievements.

## *II. The Confidence-Building Measures (CBM)*

The close relationship between the political and military aspects of security was a constant feature of Western positions at the Conference.

The importance and sensitivity of the issue, not least because of its implications for the present and future security of individual participating States, made it impossible for a long time to make any progress in the negotiations, which were only resolved in the final weeks of the Conference.

The Soviet Union's stubborn resistance to making specific commitments in the various areas covered by the so-called CBMs has significantly reduced the number and level of commitments. These consist of the exchange of observers at military exercises and voluntary notification of major exercises, meaning those that meet certain pre-established requirements. However, the voluntary nature of these commitments is offset by the link established between notification and the responsibility of states to strengthen trust and improve relations in Europe.

The measures adopted are therefore far from providing a basis for reducing tensions in Europe, due to the existence of large military forces, and cannot in any way create a sense of security.

Nevertheless, the difficult negotiations that took place in Geneva represent recognition of the failure of multilateral dialogue if it does not also include measures in the field of military security.

## *III. The Texts of the II Commission*

The results achieved in the economic field can be considered positive overall for Western countries, particularly for EU countries.

This assessment, shared by the Community partners and the Commission representative,<sup>3</sup> is based above all on the text obtained on economic and trade cooperation which, in our view, must be developed on the basis of reciprocity of advantages and obligations for the parties concerned. On the other hand, it has been possible to prevent the Eastern countries from obtaining a definition of most-favoured-nation treatment that would imply the affirmation of the principle that the application of such treatment would be a condition for the development of trade and that automatic benefits could therefore be attributed to the granting of such treatment. Consequently, the Eastern European countries will not be able to invoke the granting of most-favoured-nation status by market economy countries in all circumstances. The provisions concerning measures to improve economic information and business contacts, as well as those defining, as far as possible, the nature and forms of industrial, scientific and technical cooperation and cooperation in the environmental field, may be considered equally satisfactory.

These texts, together with those dealing with issues relating to transport, migrant workers and tourism, are to be considered a positive contribution to the development of cooperation in Europe.

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3 Not identified.



#### *IV. The Texts of the III Commission*

The area of CSCE work covered by the Third Committee was considered one of the most difficult; among other things, the West found itself in the position of “demandeur”.

Negotiations remained at a standstill for a long time, which meant that no significant texts could be recorded.

The situation was broken in the second half of May following the presentation by the Western countries of a document for comprehensive negotiation in the two most sensitive subcommissions, namely those dealing with human contacts and information.

The Soviet opening came after the meeting in Vienna between Gromyko<sup>4</sup> and Kissinger<sup>5</sup> on 19 May, when the US Secretary of State reiterated the fundamental importance that the United States attached to this area of the Conference. The approved texts refer to contacts between people, information, culture and education and are intended to promote improvements in the administrative practices of the participating States with regard to certain significant aspects, including the protection of certain fundamental human rights. These commitments should create greater opportunities for people to move across borders for the purposes of family reunification, marriage between foreigners or other personal or professional reasons.

In the field of information, decisions have also been taken to improve the working conditions of foreign journalists, while in the field of culture and education, greater cooperation between States is envisaged, to be achieved both through better use of existing organisations and institutions and through other possible forms of cooperation.

Westerners view the results achieved in terms of the expression of intentions positively and consider them a sign of the willingness and openness of the participating countries.

However, it will only be possible to make a concrete assessment of the Third Commission's texts during their implementation, the scope of which will depend on how they are applied. The governments of the participating countries will have to demonstrate their sense of responsibility and good faith in this regard.

#### *V. The Declaration on the Mediterranean*

The chapter on “questions relating to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean” originates from an Italian proposal of 16 July 1974 and a proposal by the delegations of Malta and Yugoslavia of 24 June 1974.

While it was the intention of Western countries, and Italy in particular, to recognise the existence of a correlation between security and economic cooperation in Europe and the Mediterranean area, in strict compliance with the Helsinki mandate, the position of Malta and some non-aligned countries was instead to extend, as far as possible, the specific competence of the Conference to the Mediterranean countries and, in this sense, to extend to them the documents relating to the CSCE follow-up.

<sup>4</sup> Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, [dodis.ch/P489](http://dodis.ch/P489).

<sup>5</sup> US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, [dodis.ch/P31846](http://dodis.ch/P31846).

The final document on the Mediterranean, while largely adhering to the main Western view of the problem, departs from it in the last two paragraphs of the operative part of the document. This is a result of Malta's well-known last-minute hardening of its position and its threat to link the acceptance of its demands to the setting of a date for the start of the Third Phase of the Conference.

Despite the formation of a common front by all participating countries against Malta's request, the last two paragraphs, although scaled down, nevertheless reflect, albeit only in part, an assessment of the problem that had been tried to avoid at all costs. The maintenance and expansion of contacts and dialogue with non-participating Mediterranean states, the intention to contribute to the reduction of armed forces in the region, to consolidate security, etc., are certainly issues that will have to be considered in 1977 by the representatives of the Foreign Ministers, given that they are included in the penultimate paragraph of the chapter on the Mediterranean.

Finally, it should be noted that the first paragraph includes a reference to the Declaration on Friendly Relations proposed by Malta, which was strongly opposed by the Soviets and supported from the outset of the negotiations by our delegation together with other Western countries, in particular the United Kingdom and France.

#### *VI. The Follow-up to the Conference*

With regard to the follow-up to the Conference, the Nine countries of the Community presented a common position from the outset, which was set out in the document deposited by the Netherlands in Geneva on 26 April 1974.<sup>6</sup>

The guidelines of that document reflected the view of the Nine that the assessment of the impact of the Conference's decisions on the process of improving security and developing cooperation in Europe could be based not so much on considerations of those decisions as on their actual implementation. Only after a certain period of time had elapsed would it therefore be possible to assess the results of the Conference, i.e. to verify how and to what extent the participating States had implemented those decisions, and to study the initiatives to be taken for follow-up.

The CSCE was conceived as a phase in the multilateral process, which it seemed logical to continue, while ruling out the creation of new institutional bodies that could interfere with the process of European integration and lead to the emergence of a pan-European collective security system.

For these reasons, the plan proposed by the neutral countries, which provided for the creation of permanent bodies responsible for monitoring the implementation of the CSCE results and organising meetings of experts and senior officials to further develop the multilateral dialogue initiated by the CSCE, was opposed from the outset.

The Eastern countries only took a position as the Conference drew to a close, giving their support, albeit without much conviction, to the establishment of a permanent body responsible for preparing a new Conference.

6 Cf. Swiss Federal Archives CH-BAR#J2.95#1975/44#68\* (06 067).

The document, which brought together the conflicting proposals of the various parties, recognises, on the one hand, that unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts must be made to achieve the objectives pursued by the Conference; on the other hand, that a first meeting between representatives appointed by the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries will only take place in 1977, after a preparatory meeting scheduled for 15 June 1977. At that first meeting, there will be an in-depth exchange of views on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act, the execution of the tasks defined by the Conference, the deepening, in the context of the issues dealt with by it, of mutual relations between the participating countries, the improvement of security and the development of cooperation in Europe, and the development of the process of détente in the future.

In essence, the approved document accepts the view of the Nine that, before deciding on new and more frequent meetings, it is necessary to first assess the extent to which the decisions taken by the Conference have been translated into reality. From this perspective, the continuation of multilateral dialogue after the Conference may have a real chance of success.<sup>7</sup>

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7 For all Italian documents in this volume, cf. the compilation [dodis.ch/C2915](http://dodis.ch/C2915).

This volume contains 104 documents, which also serve as a guide to further documents, topics, persons, corporations and geographical names thanks to the numerous cross-references and links in the notes and digital registers.

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
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