emerges defies reduction to a few simple formulae. Farmers grumbled about
the regimentation of agriculture and the shortage of labour; workers pro-
tested about bad conditions and low wages; and the bourgeoisie criticized
the regime for not restoring that class to its former greatness. Yet economic
grievances did not lead to overt opposition. The terror apparatus obviously
inhibited opposition, especially by industrial workers, most of whom were
totally alienated from the system by 1939. But there was much more to it
than crude repression. For peasantry and bourgeoisie alike the edge was
taken off economic grievances by (certainly for farmers) some compensatory
material gains, morale-boosting foreign political successes and the creation
of a powerful anti-Marxist state. The anecdote of a grumbling house-owner
who broke off to cheer a passing SS column bears eloquent testimony to
the complaining yet compliant attitude of many Germans. However, the
attack on organized religion aroused sharper opposition. The attempt
to dragoon the Protestant churches led to extraordinary outbursts in 1934 and
forced the authorities to adopt more cautious tactics in future. Similarly,
stubborn resistance by Catholic priests and people to such Nazi measures
as the crucifix and euthanasia 'actions' in 1941 was heeded by the Nazis. The
saddest pages are those on anti-semitism, where it is painfully obvious that,
despite many heroic acts by individual Christians, the ambivalence of
the Protestant and Catholic church authorities destroyed all hope of a principled
stand against the persecution of the Jews. Of course, Reichskristallnacht
shocked decent Germans, but without long-term effects. When mass
departations removed the 'problem' ordinary Germans ceased to think
about it, preferring not to give credence to dangerous talk circulating about
horrors in the east. Dr Kershaw is right to remind Christians that 'the road
to Auschwitz was built by hate but paved with indifference.' When due
allowance is made for regional peculiarities Dr Kershaw's general conclu-
sions will in all probability be found to apply to other parts of Germany.
That is one more reason why this splendid book represents a major con-
tribution to our understanding of the Third Reich.

University of Sheffield    The  Cyril Himmelfarb  Review    W. CARR
                        No  278, January 1986, pp. 384-393

Verlag, 1982. FS140), published as part of a series in preparation under the
auspices of various official Swiss bodies, gave me the pleasurable sensation of
staying in a really expensive Swiss hotel. The service is perfect and the
furniture and appointments of the rooms luxurious. The documents are set in
the original languages, and there is the same efficient multi-lingual apparatus
as in a Swiss timetable or official document. The index is magnificent, the
analytic table of contents a work of art. The user can find documents both by
country or subject and in the body of the work by date. The table of contents
offers a summary in three or four lines of the subject of each document.
Footnoting is precise, helpful and full. In short this is a product f which the
Swiss government and national research institutes who support it can be
justly proud. The period covered by the documents is uniformly gloomy.
After a period of relative exemption from the worst of the depression, by
1932 the Swiss economy had begun to catch up with the rest of the world.

Relations with surrounding states came to be dominated by renegotia-
tion of commercial treaties and by collapse of banking and foreign exchange facil-
ities. Bilateral trade came to replace multi-lateral, and domestic pressure to
protect suffering sectors of the Swiss economy mounted in frequency and
audibility. Since the Swiss federal executive, the Bundesrat (consile federal,
consglio federale) has a collective identity and is composed of seven members,
the editors have rightly understood 'diplomatic' to include minutes of federal
executive meetings and other executive documents. This gives the reader a
chance to see the whole process of taking decisions. The picture which
depicts is merged. Giuseppe Motta, the long-serving head of the political
department (the rough equivalent of the foreign office), has relations with
fascist Italy very much in his mind and there are extremely interesting
problems raised by irredentist activity supported by the fascist regime which
threatens the Italian part of Switzerland and by the presence of anti-fascists
and fascist spies and police within Swiss territory. On the whole, Motta seems
to be able to steer a judicious course in dealing with the Duce, helped, no
doubt, by his own sympathies as a clerico-moderate Ticinese politician for
the achievements of the fascist regime. The German case is much less
pleasing. There is a peculiarly repellant, lengthy interview given by Heinrich
Häberlin, chief of the department of justice and the police, to a group of Swiss
social democrats, dated 29 March 1933. The delegation of the SPS had come to
Häberlin to discuss the German refugee issue and the position of the Jews.
The frankness of Häberlin's comments reveals the light and the dark sides of
Swiss neutrality. On the one hand, Häberlin has some sympathy with the
poor devils but he wants to make sure that 'drainage', a peculiarly sinister
way to think of one's fellow human beings, will ensure that unless the Jews
and other victims of Nazi persecution have some assets they will be sluiced
out of Switzerland, the home of the ancient rights of asylum. It is not a pretty
picture nor is it improved by the homely bonhomie with which the fate of
these people is decided. The shadows of future calamities can be seen in the
documents of this volume, but the care and clarity with which the editors
allow them to appear uncensored and beautifully set out cannot be praised
too highly.

Trinity Hall, Cambridge    JONATHAN STEINBERG

The Rhineland crisis of March 1936 has attracted much attention. It soon
came to be thought of as a 'turning point', as the last moment when Britain
and France could have stopped Hitlerian expansion without a great war.
Later on, as more documentary evidence emerged, with governments' own
reasons for their actions or inaction, historians became less ready to regard
pre-war western governments as irrational bunglers, who failed to see the
obvious. Indeed governmental archives have caused some historians to
write as if governments were always right instead of always wrong. Eva H.
Haraszi in The Invaders. Hitler Occupies the Rhineland (Budapest: Akadémiai
Kiadó, 1983, $24) firmly restates the old view. Recent writers have explained
that Hitler did not intend immediately to withdraw from the entire Rhine-
land and promptly to collapse in case of any forcible opposition, and that
on the contrary he was determined to fight on the Rhine. Accordingly a
French riposte was not simple and Gamelin was justified in demanding full