

emerges defies reduction to a few simple formulae. Farmers grumbled about the regimentation of agriculture and the shortage of labour; workers protested about bad conditions and low wages; and the bourgeoisie criticized the regime for not restoring that class to its former greatness. Yet economic grievances did not lead to overt opposition. The terror apparatus obviously inhibited opposition, especially by industrial workers, most of whom were totally alienated from the system by 1939. But there was much more to it than crude repression. For peasantry and bourgeoisie alike the edge was taken off economic grievances by (certainly for farmers) some compensatory material gains, morale-boosting foreign political successes and the creation of a powerful anti-Marxist state. The anecdote of a grumbling house-owner who broke off to cheer a passing SS column bears eloquent testimony to the complaining yet compliant attitude of many Germans. However, the attack on organized religion aroused sharper opposition. The attempt to dragoon the Protestant churches led to extraordinary outbursts in 1934 and forced the authorities to adopt more cautious tactics in future. Similarly, stubborn resistance by Catholic priests and people to such Nazi measures as the crucifix and euthanasia 'actions' in 1941 was heeded by the Nazis. The saddest pages are those on anti-semitism, where it is painfully obvious that, despite many heroic acts by individual Christians, the ambivalence of the Protestant and Catholic church authorities destroyed all hope of a principled stand against the persecution of the Jews. Of course, *Reichskristallnacht* shocked decent Germans, but without long-term effects. When mass deportations removed the 'problem' ordinary Germans ceased to think about it, preferring not to give credence to dangerous talk circulating about horrors in the east. Dr Kershaw is right to remind Christians that 'the road to Auschwitz was built by hate but paved with indifference.' When due allowance is made for regional peculiarities Dr Kershaw's general conclusions will in all probability be found to apply to other parts of Germany. That is one more reason why this splendid book represents a major contribution to our understanding of the Third Reich.

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Documents Diplomatiques Suisses. Vol. 10: 1.1.1930-31.12.1933 (Bern: Benteli Verlag, 1982. FS140), published as part of a series in preparation under the auspices of various official Swiss bodies, gave me the pleasurable sensation of staying in a really expensive Swiss hotel. The service is perfect and the furniture and appointments of the rooms luxurious. The documents are set in the original languages, and there is the same efficient multi-lingual apparatus as in a Swiss timetable or official document. The index is magnificent, the analytic table of contents a work of art. The user can find documents both by country or subject and in the body of the work by date. The table of contents offers a summary in three or four lines of the subject of each document. Footnoting is precise, helpful and full. In short this is a product of which the Swiss government and national research institutes who support it can be justly proud. The period covered by the documents is uniformly gloomy. After a period of relative exemption from the worst of the depression, by 1932 the Swiss economy had begun to catch up with the rest of the world.

Relations with surrounding states came to be dominated by renegotiation of commercial treaties and by collapse of banking and foreign exchange facilities. Bilateral trade came to replace multi-lateral, and domestic pressure to protect suffering sectors of the Swiss economy mounted in frequency and audibility. Since the Swiss federal executive, the *Bundesrat* (*conseil fédéral*, *consiglio federale*) has a collective identity and is composed of seven members, the editors have rightly understood 'diplomatic' to include minutes of federal executive meetings and other executive documents. This gives the reader a chance to see the whole process of taking decisions. The picture which emerges is mixed. Giuseppe Motta, the long-serving head of the political department (the rough equivalent of the foreign office), has relations with fascist Italy very much in his mind and there are extremely interesting problems raised by irredentist activity supported by the fascist regime which threatens the Italian part of Switzerland and by the presence of anti-fascists and fascist spies and police within Swiss territory. On the whole, Motta seems to be able to steer a judicious course in dealing with the Duce, helped, no doubt, by his own sympathies as a clerico-moderate Ticinese politician for the achievements of the fascist regime. The German case is much less pleasing. There is a peculiarly repellent, lengthy interview given by Heinrich Häberlin, chief of the department of justice and the police, to a group of Swiss social democrats, dated 29 March 1933. The delegation of the SPS had come to Häberlin to discuss the German refugee issue and the position of the Jews. The frankness of Häberlin's comments reveals the light and the dark sides of Swiss neutrality. On the one hand, Häberlin has some sympathy with the poor devils but he wants to make sure that 'drainage', a peculiarly sinister way to think of one's fellow human beings, will ensure that unless the Jews and other victims of Nazi persecution have some assets they will be sluiced out of Switzerland, the home of the ancient rights of asylum. It is not a pretty picture nor is it improved by the homely bonhomie with which the fate of these people is decided. The shadows of future calamities can be seen in the documents of this volume, but the care and clarity with which the editors allow them to appear uncensored and beautifully set out cannot be praised too highly.

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The Rhineland crisis of March 1936 has attracted much attention. It soon came to be thought of as a 'turning point', as the last moment when Britain and France could have stopped Hitlerian expansion without a great war. Later on, as more documentary evidence emerged, with governments' own reasons for their actions or inaction, historians became less ready to regard pre-war western governments as irrational bunglers, who failed to see the obvious. Indeed governmental archives have caused some historians to write as if governments were always right instead of always wrong. Éva H. Haraszi in *The Invaders. Hitler Occupies the Rhineland* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1983. \$24) firmly restates the old view. Recent writers have explained that Hitler did not intend immediately to withdraw from the entire Rhineland and promptly to collapse in case of any forceful opposition, and that on the contrary he was determined to fight on the Rhine. Accordingly a French riposte was not simple and Gamelin was justified in demanding full