The documents presented in Volume 19 of the Swiss Diplomatic Documents cover the period from May 1952 to March 1955. They report on different aspects of the international situation and Swiss foreign policy in a time that was strongly shaped by the Cold War. Stalin's death in March 1953 marked the start of the first phase of détente, publicly confirmed in the conference organized in Geneva in early 1954 to end the Korean War and the conflict in Indochina.
The conference on these Asian conflicts boosted Geneva's role in international diplomacy. It enabled Swiss officials to establish privileged relations with statesmen from all over the world and made it possible for the leaders of the Soviet Union (Molotov) and the People's Republic of China (Zhou En Lai) to visit Berne for the first time. The preparations for this conference gave the Swiss government an opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to offer its "good services" in all questions that threatened peace.
In an international environment characterized by numerous conflicts - which were triggered both by the confrontation between East and West and by decolonialization movements - Switzerland remained true to its principle of neutrality and accepted the extension of its obligation in the International Commission of Neutral Countries to monitor the ceasefire in Korea. This commission was composed of representatives of neutral countries, though certain member countries from the Eastern Bloc in particular (Czechoslovakia and Poland) did not enjoy the same neutrality status as Switzerland. Swiss diplomacy was able to derive advantage from this effort. It requested explicit recognition of the distinct nature of its neutrality from both blocs: from the Soviet Union, which was long hostile to the country's "alleged neutrality", and from the United States, which expressed its scepticism or even hostility towards a policy of neutrality that it felt no longer had any meaning. In any case, Swiss participation in the Commission of Neutral Countries in Korea strengthened Max Petitpierre, the head of the Swiss diplomatic service, who at times was heavily criticized not only by the Federal Council but also by certain public circles, in his conviction that neutrality was better served "by participating in pacifist international actions, despite the associated risk and arbitrariness, rather than by standing aside." (Document no. 69).
As in the preceding volumes, several documents deal with the considerations and worries of the Swiss government about neutrality in practice - for instance, the attitude towards the United Nations, the demands of the superpowers or the effectiveness of a military agreement with a foreign government to prevent conflict on Switzerland's borders. The Federal Council took a cautious stance on NATO, but considered the question of measures to be adopted in the event of war. A directive addressed to the future commander-in-chief of the Swiss armed forces in 1953 described the measures planned in the event of mobilization. The Federal Council, facing a growing number of requests for permission to export military materiel, feared for the general credibility of Swiss neutrality and the political effects of exporting one-sidedly to countries in the West. Therefore, it decided to recommend that measures be adopted for quotas on arms deliveries that it felt were excessive. This affected orders from the United States in particular. The purchase of military equipment in the United States and Great Britain was the subject of interesting considerations. The American protests over deliveries of Swiss ammunition to the Arbenz government in Guatemala showed how closely the American authorities monitored trade with a region that they regarded as their own sphere of influence. Owing to the insignificance of the Swiss shipment, the incident was soon defused.
Since 1951, the Americans had imposed measures on their allies to control trade between the East and West, which the neutral states also had to observe. In 1954, the Federal Council adopted the view that, after the end to the conflicts in Korea and Indochina, Switzerland had the right to conduct trade with the communist states in keeping with its general policy of neutrality. These hopes were not borne out, however, as trade with the countries of Eastern Europe and China dwindled to insignificant quantities. Nonetheless, Switzerland regularly negotiated adjustments to its trade and currency agreements with all its trading partners.
At the same time, relations with the states of Western Europe grew increasingly close, both within the OEEC and the ECSC and through Switzerland's participation in various intergovernmental conferences on cooperation in technical fields such as health, agriculture, transport, etc. However, the Federal Council kept its distance from the other projects of European communities.
Although Switzerland was not a member of the United Nations, it had observer status in New York. In the period covered by this volume, the reports of August Lindt, an extremely attentive diplomat, provided excellent information and views on current affairs, opinions expressed by Dag Hammerskjöld, the Secretary-General, and confidential information on numerous foreign figures. Besides this, as hosts of international organizations based in Geneva, the federal authorities took part in the regular and special conferences held in the city. This enabled them to establish contacts with very different actors in international politics. Exchanges of information and opinions with Swedish politicians and diplomats were particularly frequent in this period.
Switzerland continued to pursue its humanitarian activities not only in Europe but also in countries all around the globe. In the period covered by this volume, Swiss diplomats had to contend with sharp attacks on the ICRC, which the communist states accused of adopting a pro-Western stance in the Korean conflict. A number of relevant documents shed light on the Swiss government's policy towards foreign nationals in Switzerland, the conditions for entry and residence, and the activities of prominent foreign persons on Swiss territory.
Cultural relations developed into a new aspect of foreign policy and gave rise to interesting proposals. However, the federal authorities did not have the resources to meet the many demands. With regard to expatriate communities, the Swiss authorities found themselves dealing with increasingly complex situations, in particular in countries such as China and Egypt, which were placing restrictions on resident foreigners as they went through a phase of economic and social transition. In North Africa, where the expatriate communities were still in their infancy, the Swiss authorities paid very close attention to the independence movements that were starting to take shape at this time. They were already starting to worry about the continued existence of the communities in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria - countries in which the authority of the French state was increasingly disputed. The question of the expatriates' security produced observations and very useful information about impressions within these communities.
Most of the selected documents deal with bilateral relations and, depending on the country, provide a variety of information and different nature and character. Economic questions predominate, even though in many cases politics and economic overlap. In contrast to earlier volumes, the economic dimension is particularly clear in relations with Latin America. Indeed, Switzerland hoped that it would find important markets for its products in these states by involving them in the processes of industrialization and modernization. Besides this, Switzerland tried to use its weighty economic presence around the world to give neutrality a universal character. The search for new markets in the immense region of Latin America became ever more pressing as trade relations with Eastern Europe, which had seemed so promising immediately after the war, had virtually come to a standstill. Whereas trade with Argentina was particularly significant, in Brazil, a country of seemingly unlimited opportunity, technical and financial impediments restricted the realization of ambitious projects.
Relations with neighbouring states are extensively documented, regardless of whether the focus is on political, economic or other issues. Swiss leaders and diplomats frequently exchanged opinions and points of view on the international situation or on European politics with their French, German, Italian and Austrian counterparts.
In this period Switzerland entered into negotiations with France on a new financial agreement, on the issuing of a bond (Pinay) and on the question of work permits. At the same time, there was one human and moral problem that remained persistently on the agenda: that of Swiss minors in the Foreign Legion. The Federal Political Department (now the Department of Foreign Affairs) repeatedly tried at different levels to free these minors from their commitment to the French army. This apparently secondary question refused to go away and weighed on Franco-Swiss relations throughout and beyond the period covered by this volume, especially as public opinion in Switzerland refused to remain silent on this matter.
In relation to Germany, the main focus was on the question of whether to recognize the German Democratic Republic. Berne decided in favour of maintaining expedient, i.e. economic, relations. On the other hand, there were a range of points to discuss with the Federal Republic of Germany, such as the fate of German spies arrested in Switzerland during the Nazi period, travel between the two countries and the refusal of entry to German citizens with a Nazi past. Other very complex questions concerned the release of German assets held in Switzerland, the debts of the former Reich, war reparations, and imports of German products whose export the Allied powers were interested in promoting. In this period, relations between Federal German and Swiss leaders were regular and frequent.
As it had already done with France, the Federal Council granted Italy the right to raise the status of its legation in Berne to an embassy (other states that converted their legations into embassies in this period included Canada, the United States, Belgium, Great Britain, India, Turkey and Pakistan). Through this gesture, the Swiss government signalled the importance of its southern neighbour for the Swiss economy. After the settlement of the debts of fascist Italy, which was facilitated by Switzerland's decision to relinquish its claims to considerable sums of money, the Italian government was granted a substantial loan. But one important contentious issue remained: the application by the Italian authorities of the exceptional wealth tax on Swiss assets. Negotiations on the work contracts of Italian immigrants in Switzerland supplemented earlier agreements.
Relations with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were far from equal. The problems with the Soviet Union were of a purely political nature. Berne observed that the Soviet government's perception of Swiss neutrality was changing. In this connection, Swiss diplomacy took great care that none of its actions or obligations gave Moscow the slightest cause to reassess its new appraisal of Switzerland's neutrality. Thus, the Soviet note of November 1954 appealing to the European states for an international conference on security in Europe prompted the Federal Council to propose a formulation that would leave open the prospect of collaboration in a new round of peace diplomacy and European cooperation.
As far as relations with the United States were concerned, the American position of hegemony in almost all international affairs also affected the way in which various international issues were addressed. Washington disapproved of the Swiss decision to continue pursuing its own approach in its relations with the two blocs. However, Berne succeeded in maintaining this approach thanks to the offer of its "good services", in particular in Korea, and by demonstrating the viability of Swiss democracy in the face of communism. Step by step Switzerland also defended its economic interests against American demands that the Swiss perceived as a hegemonial claim. In this way, Berne succeeded in watering down certain tariffs that would have badly hit the watch-making industry. Swiss diplomats also had to intervene to exempt Swiss citizens living in the United States from American military service. The Federal Council was also uneasy about technical cooperation, especially in the military field (Bührle) and the risk of a one-sided pro-Western commitment. Therefore, it was necessary to show great sensitivity in drawing up rules for the arms trade, because the authorities did not want to upset a partner that was indispensable for economic and industrial growth in Switzerland. Similarly tricky from the viewpoint of political neutrality was the question of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, which certain circles in Switzerland wanted to develop together with the Americans.
Some documents testify to the growing interest on the part of business to invest in promising countries. The case of South Africa was just as interesting as that of India, which was an important potential market for products such as watches, dyes and drugs. On the other hand, trade with Israel was hit by the growth of commerce between Germany and Israel, which had been facilitated by the signing of the compensation agreement for crimes committed by the Nazi regime.
A wide range of selected documents dealing with all the aforementioned and documented questions, as well as many other topics not covered by this volume, can be retrieved from the electronic database DoDiS (www.dodis.ch). It provides information not only on the various general and international dossiers, but also on people, organizations and institutions.
Finally, we would like to thank all our academic assistants and co-workers who have participated in the search for and selection of documents, entered them in the database and helped create the research infrastructure: Mauro Cerutti, Damien Carron, Eric Flury-Dasen, Dario Gerardi and Sacha Zala. After the departure of Michele Coduri, Roland Maurhofer and Therese Steffen Gerber, Kathrin Marthaler and Klaus Ammann joined the team. Daniel Bourgeois supported the various stages of this investigation with good advice. Monika Risse transcribed the documents and Boris Burri and Tina Maurer captured them for the electronic database. We should like to take the opportunity here to thank all of them. We are also grateful to the staff of the Federal Archives and the director, Christoph Graf, for their support. Further, we are also obliged to the Swiss Academy of the Humanities and Social Sciences, for including our project in their long-term programme and guaranteeing the finance for it. We thank the secretary-general, Markus Zürcher, and his staff for their efforts. We owe particular thanks to the Swiss National Science Foundation, which has arranged to finance this publication, and in particular Rudolf Bolzern for his support and wise suggestions. The cooperation between our research team and the History Service of the Centre for Analysis and Prospective Studies under the leadership of François Wisard, successor of Ambassador Georges Martin in the DDS Commission, was given additional significance by the engagement of Marc Perrenoud. This cooperation is based on an agreement with the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs that is renewed on a yearly basis. Our sincere thanks go to all those involved for their support and loyalty.
The synergies created by the cooperation between the Swiss Academy of the Humanities and Social Sciences, the universities and the federal authorities guarantee the survival of the DDS's research programme and render it possible not only to preserve, but also to continue to build on this specialized knowledge. In doing so, they contribute to a deeper knowledge of Switzerland's international relations, which are fundamental to this country's actions and to its very future.

Geneva, Januar 2003    Antoine Fleury